Is God's Existence Possible?

[Tree of Life]

Then precisely what kind of thing are we being asked to evaluate when we consider "a square circle"?

We agree its not a concept.
But what is it?

(I have my sense of what it is, but I want to hear your sense first).

It is a contradiction in terms, a logical impossibility. It purports to be a concept and sounds like a concept. But it is inconceivable because it is logically impossible.

The same is true for "contingent God". If you understand what "God" means and what "contingent" means then you will see that this is also a contradiction in terms, a logical impossibility. It sounds like a concept but is really inconceivable.

 

[durangodawood]

...The same is true for "contingent God". If you understand what "God" means and what "contingent" means then you will see that this is also a contradiction in terms, a logical impossibility. It sounds like a concept but is really inconceivable.

Yes, when you define God up front as a thing that must exist, then of course that contradicts a "contingent God".

But if youre trying to reason toward the necessity of God, you cant start with the necessity of God. Thats begging the question, or something.

 

[durangodawood]

Why can’t it be a concept that can’t physically exist? Maybe it can only exist as a concept...

I'm trying to conceptualize a square circle. Cant quite do it.

 

[Tree of Life]

Yes, when you define God up front as a thing that must exist, then of course that contradicts a "contingent God".

But if youre trying to reason toward the necessity of God, you cant start with the necessity of God. Thats begging the question, or something.

Well this is an ontological argument. The goal is not to demonstrate that God is a necessary being. We begin with that assumption. That's how we define God. It makes sense that if God existed he would be logically necessary, so I don't think that this definition of God is extravagant.

The goal of the argument, rather, is to demonstrate the logical absurdity of saying that God possibly exists. His existence is either actual or impossible.

 

[Tree of Life]

I'm trying to conceptualize a square circle. Cant quite do it.

You cannot. The more you conceptualize it as a circle, the more it loses its squareness. The more you conceptualize it as a square, it loses its circularness.

The more you conceptualize God as a contingent being, the more he loses his God-ness. The more you conceptualize God, the more he loses his contingency.

 

[durangodawood]

Well this is an ontological argument. The goal is not to demonstrate that God is a necessary being. We begin with that assumption. That's how we define God. It makes sense that if God existed he would be logically necessary, so I don't think that this definition of God is extravagant.

The goal of the argument, rather, is to demonstrate the logical absurdity of saying that God possibly exists. His existence is either actual or impossible.

If I go down that route, then I end up at "I dont know if God is possible".

 

[Tree of Life]

If I go down that route, then I end up at "I dont know if God is possible".

I think that's a fine place to end up.

 

[Silmarien]

Yes, when you define God up front as a thing that must exist, then of course that contradicts a "contingent God".

But if youre trying to reason toward the necessity of God, you cant start with the necessity of God. Thats begging the question, or something.

It isn't, though. This is why the modal ontological argument is useful--it helps us clarify what we mean when we say that God is necessary. We mean that God is the sort of thing that could not fail to exist in any possible world. If there is a grounds of being that makes existence possible, then this is the case for any instance of contingent existence. There are not certain instances of existence that do need a ground of being and others that do not.

This alone doesn't mean that God does exist. It just means that God is a necessary being. Either he exists necessarily, i.e., in every possible world, or he does not exist at all. He is not the sort of thing that could exist in some possible worlds but not in others.

I reject this particular argument because it doesn't successfully address the question of whether the existence of God is possible or not. It does, however, help us conceptualize what we mean by the idea of necessary being. Until someone truly understands this aspect of theism, they are not talking about the same thing when they use the term "God."

 

[durangodawood]

I think that's a fine place to end up.

To me it means the same thing as "God is possible" in common parlance, as opposed to modal-logic-speak.

But yes, in modal logic terms, I'm at "I dont know...."

 

[Tree of Life]

It isn't, though. This is why the modal ontological argument is useful--it helps us clarify what we mean when we say that God is necessary. We mean that God is the sort of thing that could not fail to exist in any possible world. If there is a grounds of being that makes existence possible, then this is the case for any instance of contingent existence. There are not certain instances of existence that do need a ground of being and others that do not.

This alone doesn't mean that God does exist. It just means that God is a necessary being. Either he exists necessarily, i.e., in every possible world, or he does not exist at all. He is not the sort of thing that could exist in some possible worlds but not in others.

I reject this particular argument because it doesn't successfully address the question of whether the existence of God is possible or not. It does, however, help us conceptualize what we mean by the idea of necessary being. Until someone truly understands this aspect of theism, they are not talking about the same thing when they use the term "God."

Indeed, this is a good analysis.

"God's existence is possible" is premise (1) of the argument. It is assumed. But I think this does have some rhetorical force because most unbelievers would concede that God's existence is possible without thinking of the logical implications of this concession.

 

[durangodawood]

...This alone doesn't mean that God does exist. It just means that God is a necessary being. Either he exists necessarily, i.e., in every possible world, or he does not exist at all. He is not the sort of thing that could exist in some possible worlds but not in others....

Why couldnt God be an ancient powerful and benevolent creator of our universe who was born and grew up and learned profound wisdom in some other uncreated/eternal universe?

 

[Tree of Life]

Why couldnt God be an ancient powerful and benevolent creator of our universe who was born and grew up and learned profound wisdom in some other uncreated/eternal universe?

You could imagine a being like this and call him "God", but this would not be what Christians mean by "God" and this would not be a maximally great being (that which no greater can be imagined).

Indeed, this conception of "God" would imply that there's something higher and greater than this "God" which then would, itself, be God. There is some more ultimate reality than the "God" that you're describing. So in that sense it only relocates the problem.

 

[Chriliman]

I'm trying to conceptualize a square circle. Cant quite do it.

Yea, maybe impossible to fully conceptualize.

 

[durangodawood]

This is like that old internet meme: necessary being is necessary.

 

[Silmarien]

Why couldnt God be an ancient powerful and benevolent creator of our universe who was born and grew up and learned profound wisdom in some other uncreated/eternal universe?

If this were the case, it would be that other uncreated/eternal universe which would be more worthy of the term "God," since it is our uncreated necessary being. What we would have in this scenario is a demiurge in a pantheistic reality, not a God in the theistic sense.

 

[durangodawood]

If this were the case, it would be that other uncreated/eternal universe which would be more worthy of the term "God," since it is our uncreated necessary being. What we would have in this scenario is a demiurge in a pantheistic reality, not a God in the theistic sense.

There's nothing illogical about a greater thing emerging from the actions of lesser things. I'm not saying this IS how it went, but its reasonable to consider life and human life as an emergent "greatest thing", at least in a naturalist view.

That would be the position of God in my thought experiment. And not just as a demiurge, but an involved and caring intervener.

 

[Tree of Life]

There's nothing illogical about a greater thing emerging from the actions of lesser things. I'm not saying this IS how it went, but its reasonable to consider life and human life as an emergent "greatest thing", at least in a naturalist view.

That would be the position of God in my thought experiment. And not just as a demiurge, but an involved and caring intervener.

But an absolute thing cannot emerge from relative things. When we're talking about God we're talking about an ultimate reality, an absolute reality. "The absolute" would be whatever is ultimately real not relative to anything else.

If the God in your thought experiment emerged from the non-personal, then reality is ultimately non-personal (all personality reduces to the impersonal) and a great many implications flow from this. Since this God is not absolute, I don't think he's worthy of the title "God" at all. He's actually just a bigger, more powerful version of us creatures. The transcendent creator concept is totally lost.

 

[Silmarien]

There's nothing illogical about a greater thing emerging from the actions of lesser things. I'm not saying this IS how it went, but its reasonable to consider life and human life as an emergent "greatest thing", at least in a naturalist view.

That would be the position of God in my thought experiment. And not just as a demiurge, but an involved and caring intervener.

There is no reason that a demiurge cannot be an involved and caring intervener, and technically no reason that God in the theistic sense needs to be those things (the deistic position would reject such notions). A demiurge is not a necessary being, it is not the most fundamental aspect of reality, and therefore does not qualify as theism.

I think one problem is that atheistic polemicists have been trying to collapse theism and polytheism into one thing called supernaturalism, and have effectively erased the traditional definition of theism from the public sphere. I'm not sure when this happened--probably in the last century--but it's certainly a factor.

 

[Moral Orel]

Take that up with logicians. They are not my definitions. They are the technical meaning of the terms. See this helpful article from the University of San Diego. Logical Possibility

Okay, then you're still wrong. See this from your source:

To say that a proposition is necessarily true is to say that its denial (or "negation") is not even logically possible. The following propositions are necessarily true in this sense:​

"God does not exist" is logically possible, since you have to assume He does and I showed a logically possible scenario in which God does not exist, therefore He is not necessary. Both of our "concepts" must be contingent, and not necessary.

 

[Dirk1540]

It isn't, though. This is why the modal ontological argument is useful--it helps us clarify what we mean when we say that God is necessary. We mean that God is the sort of thing that could not fail to exist in any possible world. If there is a grounds of being that makes existence possible, then this is the case for any instance of contingent existence. There are not certain instances of existence that do need a ground of being and others that do not.

This alone doesn't mean that God does exist. It just means that God is a necessary being. Either he exists necessarily, i.e., in every possible world, or he does not exist at all. He is not the sort of thing that could exist in some possible worlds but not in others.

I reject this particular argument because it doesn't successfully address the question of whether the existence of God is possible or not. It does, however, help us conceptualize what we mean by the idea of necessary being. Until someone truly understands this aspect of theism, they are not talking about the same thing when they use the term "God."

Hey Sil! But can’t necessary being create a world like a wound up clock and just let it go, almost like blowing bubbles, yet metaphorically sort of rest it’s foot & elbow on other created worlds, choose to poke & prode on some worlds but not others? Whatever that necessary existence might consist of?

I don’t know if people are moving back & forth with meanings in here when they keep saying God, or if I’m being philosophically lazy when I say God. Am I wrong to call necessary being itself God? Am I wrong to think that God exists merely because I know that something exists instead of nothing (Adding to that that I don’t believe in infinite regress)?