Is God's Existence Possible?

[durangodawood]

If you haven't conceived of a God that is logically necessary then you only think you've conceived of God.

Sorry, I totally rewrote that post to read....

Basically youre saying: its possible that there's a necessary. I reject this because youre mixing logic terms that are defined in terms of each other. We end up with an endless recursion when we do this. (Read the definitions you provided earlier #83).

It makes as much sense as saying its possible that the impossible exists.

So where does that leave us?

 

[Moral Orel]

Concepts don't have to be real. We can conceptualize many things that are not real. And we do not have to know everything about God in order to conclude whether or not the concept of God is logically coherent.

Your concept is supposed to describe something in reality, though. And yes, you do need to know everything about God. Try this as an example.

Is it logically impossible for a being to exist that creates ex nihilo? No, there's one aspect of God.
Is it logically impossible for this being to love His creation? No, there's two aspects of God, and it doesn't contradict the first aspect, so we're still fine so far.
Now keep going until I know everything about God, and I'll let you know if I see a contradiction in there.

It's fine if you want to say that you don't know whether or not it's possible that God exists. But this seems to me to be too much of a retreat.

More people should be okay with saying, "I don't know". See, you don't just claim God exists, you claim that you know God exists, and I'm here to say, "No, you don't, and here's why". That isn't a retreat.

 

[Chriliman]

No one should believe in a multiverse or a singularity without sufficient evidence. Same goes for a god.

I think they look at the evidence and posit possible realities that can explain the evidence, which is normal.

 

[Moral Orel]

God's logical necessity is inherent to the concept of God. We cannot conceive of a God that would be logically contingent.

I don't follow. I can conceive of an infinite number of things that just exist eternally without causation, does that mean they all exist? I don't see how non-contingent == necessary. It looks like a false dichotomy to me.

 

[Silmarien]

You don’t seem to have grasped that “logically possible” relies on physical possibility. Square circles are logically impossible because the physical properties of a circle preclude a square from having them.

Would you argue that a square circle is impossible in the same way that water boiling at 0°C would be impossible? Even if you want to say that logical impossibility relies upon physical properties, it remains the case that there are certain types of facts that could vary from one possible world to another, and other ones, such as mathematical facts, that seemingly could not. Unless I have horribly misunderstood him, Tree of Life seems to be referring to the second class of facts with the term "logical possibility."

I'm not sure if he's explicitly stated it anywhere, but I see modal logic written all over this thread, so your resistance to some pretty standard logical distinctions is a little odd. Unless there's some serious confusion over terms?

Do you actually believe that logically possible things have no basis in physical reality?

I'm not sure how you could determine whether something like mathematical facts are less fundamental than physical reality and merely describe it, or are true in and of themselves and then reflected in physics. That sort of platonism isn't necessary to get modal logic off the ground, but in rejecting it out of hand, you're making a pretty big ontological claim here for someone who thinks no claims should be made without sufficient evidence.

 

[ToddNotTodd]

Would you argue that a square circle is impossible in the same way that water boiling at 0°C would be impossible?

Well, it's not impossible for water to boil at 0°C, so I'm not sure that's an example you want to use. But yes the set of "round things" does not include squares because of the physical properties of "roundness" and "squareness" can't overlap, in the same way that any set of X does not include Y if the the properties of X preclude Y. I'm asking how do you know that the set of "existent things" includes "a god" if you can't know if the physical properties of the set preclude the object in question.

Even if you want to say that logical impossibility relies upon physical properties, it remains the case that there are certain types of facts that could vary from one possible world to another, and other ones, such as mathematical facts, that seemingly could not. Unless I have horribly misunderstood him, Tree of Life seems to be referring to the second class of facts with the term "logical possibility."

Yes, I know he's talking about logical possibility.

I would argue that the set of physically possible things (existent things) is a subset of logically possible things, with no way for a physically impossible thing to make the leap to existent. And since the subject of the argument (a god) is presumably a non abstract existent entity, whether a god is logically possible can't answer the question of existence.

I'm not sure how you could determine whether something like mathematical facts are less fundamental than physical reality and merely describe it, or are true in and of themselves and then reflected in physics. That sort of platonism isn't necessary to get modal logic off the ground, but in rejecting it out of hand, you're making a pretty big ontological claim here for someone who thinks no claims should be made without sufficient evidence.

I'm at peace with saying that statements regarding existent things requiring sufficient evidence is, for me, different than other types of claims...

 

[Tree of Life]

I don't follow. I can conceive of an infinite number of things that just exist eternally without causation, does that mean they all exist? I don't see how non-contingent == necessary. It looks like a false dichotomy to me.

Something that exists eternally without causation would be a necessary thing. Necessary and contingent are mutually exclusive concepts. If something is not contingent, it is necessary.

 

[durangodawood]

Would you argue that a square circle is impossible in the same way that water boiling at 0°C would be impossible?...

"Square circle" cannot even be considered possible, nor impossible. Its not even a concept available for consideration.

 

[durangodawood]

God's logical necessity is inherent to the concept of God. We cannot conceive of a God that would be logically contingent.

This does not mean that God thereby exists....

Actually the problem is in the definition, which presumes the objects existence, rather than just letting the objects existence be available for consideration.

God "is a logically necessary being" means God exists. Just to agree to your definition means you find God does exist.

And I'm not sure God exists, so obviously I dont think God is logically necessary.

For me the question works better like this:
"Is our universe such that God is logically necessary to explain it?"
So far: no.
Or in your preferred terms: I dont know if God is "a logically necessary being".

 

[Moral Orel]

Something that exists eternally without causation would be a necessary thing. Necessary and contingent are mutually exclusive concepts. If something is not contingent, it is necessary.

Okay, then I'm conceiving of an eternal, uncaused, infinite expanse of space in which an infinite number of universes pop into existence. Is this logically possible? Remember that you've eliminated from the argument anything to do with empirical science, so don't try arguing that it doesn't work with the laws of physics as we know them or anything to that effect. If my conceived multiverse is logically possible, then it exists without a god to create it.

 

[Steve Petersen]

Okay, then I'm conceiving of an eternal, uncaused, infinite expanse of space in which an infinite number of universes pop into existence. Is this logically possible? Remember that you've eliminated from the argument anything to do with empirical science, so don't try arguing that it doesn't work with the laws of physics as we know them or anything to that effect. If my conceived multiverse is logically possible, then it exists without a god to create it.

Using ToL's reasoning, if it is possible, then it exists. What rot!

 

[durangodawood]

Using ToL's reasoning, if it is possible, then it exists. What rot!

Thats because the "it" gets defined up front as "logically necessary".

Its just a card trick.

 

[Tree of Life]

Okay, then I'm conceiving of an eternal, uncaused, infinite expanse of space in which an infinite number of universes pop into existence. Is this logically possible? Remember that you've eliminated from the argument anything to do with empirical science, so don't try arguing that it doesn't work with the laws of physics as we know them or anything to that effect. If my conceived multiverse is logically possible, then it exists without a god to create it.

Yes this would be the route you need to take. I would say that a necessary universe is logically impossible because I assume God's existence.

 

[Tree of Life]

"Square circle" cannot even be considered possible, nor impossible. Its not even a concept available for consideration.

It's fine to say that it's impossible. It means that it cannot possibly be conceived. This is not logically different than saying that it's not a concept.

 

[Tree of Life]

Using ToL's reasoning, if it is possible, then it exists. What rot!

It's just modal logic. If a necessary thing is possible then it exists. The purpose of the argument is to show that it doesn't make sense to be on the fence about God's existence.

 

[Moral Orel]

Yes this would be the route you need to take. I would say that a necessary universe is logically impossible because I assume God's existence.

But then I'll just assume my multiverse conception exists, and then God is logically impossible. The contradiction doesn't lie between God and my multiverse, the contradiction lies between "possible" and "necessary" as you've defined them. Your terms are bad.

 

[Silmarien]

Well, it's not impossible for water to boil at 0°C, so I'm not sure that's an example you want to use. But yes the set of "round things" does not include squares because of the physical properties of "roundness" and "squareness" can't overlap, in the same way that any set of X does not include Y if the the properties of X preclude Y. I'm asking how do you know that the set of "existent things" includes "a god" if you can't know if the physical properties of the set preclude the object in question.

I think water not boiling at 0°C is a good example precisely for the reason that you think it isn't, though--under normal physical conditions, this is something that doesn't happen, but there are possible circumstances under which it might happen. This still marks it as something that can be true in some possible worlds but not in others. In contrast, are there things that cannot be true in any possible world, or must be true in every? I think that is the distinction Tree of Life is trying to get at, and it's not clear to me that the key to understanding why certain mathematical truths cannot fail to be true is their physical properties.

I just don't think you need to attack the distinctions he's making to challenge the argument. It seems to me that your counter-argument actually is that God might fail to exist in every possible world, and therefore be logically impossible, which is certainly a coherent objection within the framework Tree of Life is using.

Yes, I know he's talking about logical possibility.

I would argue that the set of physically possible things (existent things) is a subset of logically possible things, with no way for a physically impossible thing to make the leap to existent. And since the subject of the argument (a god) is presumably a non abstract existent entity, whether a god is logically possible can't answer the question of existence.

Well, that gets into a whole separate debate. I would deny that God is a non-abstract existent entity altogether, but this is Tree of Life's thread and I'd rather not complicate it with different strands of theistic thought.

I'm at peace with saying that statements regarding existent things requiring sufficient evidence is, for me, different than other types of claims...

Interesting. So if God were defined as something other than an existent entity, you would abandon the evidentialism?

"Square circle" cannot even be considered possible, nor impossible. Its not even a concept available for consideration.

Well, that is the whole point. The fact that it's not a concept available for consideration is what makes it logically impossible. A concept available for consideration is the type of thing which we could conceivably say is true in one possible world but not in another.

 

[durangodawood]

...Well, that is the whole point. The fact that it's not a concept available for consideration is what makes it logically impossible. A concept available for consideration is the type of thing which we could conceivably say is true in one possible world but not in another.

Then precisely what kind of thing are we being asked to evaluate when we consider "a square circle"?

We agree its not a concept.
But what is it?

(I have my sense of what it is, but I want to hear your sense first).

 

[Chriliman]

Then precisely what kind of thing are we being asked to evaluate when we consider "a square circle"?

We agree its not a concept.
But what is it?

(I have my sense of what it is, but I want to hear your sense first).

Why can’t it be a concept that can’t physically exist? Maybe it can only exist as a concept...

 

[Tree of Life]

But then I'll just assume my multiverse conception exists, and then God is logically impossible. The contradiction doesn't lie between God and my multiverse, the contradiction lies between "possible" and "necessary" as you've defined them. Your terms are bad.

Take that up with logicians. They are not my definitions. They are the technical meaning of the terms. See this helpful article from the University of San Diego. Logical Possibility