Interaction ("mind body") problem

[sandwiches]

I know that, but to conclude "therefore, because we don't know that they are, they are not" is an argument from ignorance.

It's not that we don't know. It's that WE KNOW they do not have the components observed in every other consciousness.

What's happening is akin to this:

You: There could be elephants hiding in Jupiter.

Us: Sure. But first off, we've never seen any there and second, there are reasons to think there aren't any there, as all elephants we've observed require oxygen, water, specific gravity, food, pressure, etc.

You: To conclude "therefore, because we don't know that there are elephants in Jupiter, there are none" is an argument from ignorance.

 

[KCfromNC]

Please provide any reason whatsoever to think that the law of non-contradiction can ever be broken.

I prefer to remain agnostic on the subject ... especially since in this thread we're apparently able to define anything into existence simply by writing it down in a moderately coherent statement.

 

[KCfromNC]

You have selected one definition dealing with human minds where we could make a connection to brains, and you want to generalize from there, right?

Yes, I tend to like to base my views of reality on what we observe there rather than wild flights of fancy.

But aren't you doing the same thing with chocolate - selecting one definition and generalizing from there?

 

[KCfromNC]

Chocolate comes from a fairly well definmed set of chemical compounds containing cacao etc. Without them the term "chocolate" becomes inappropriate. My chair is not made of chocolate but metal, and the two are logically incompatible (it would be nonsense to say that chocolate is metallic in that sense because of the set of compunds that are regarded as chocolate is not metallic and metal bars are not regarded as a foodstuff).

Only if you assume one definition of chocolate and generalize from there. As in, you're making exactly the same "mistake" you accuse everyone else of making towards the definition of consciousness. Just because your chair isn't the any kind of chocolate we've ever seen before doesn't mean it isn't so. Or so you'd have us believe when the subject is changed to consciousness.
Your entire argument is one huge exercise in shifting the burden of proof. You think that because we can never conclusively prove that consciousness doesn't exist somewhere other than in brains that presents a problem for naturalistic explanations of the brains we do see. But with no reason to believe that these non-brain based minds are anything more than a figment of your imagination, it's not a problem at all. No more than not conclusively proving that there isn't some kind of magical chocolate we've never observed (or is inherently unobservable) which includes chairs, quarks and houses.

 

[KCfromNC]

Why not, when chocolate has a well accepted chemical definition? On the other hand consciousness (or "counscious" if you like, pending further enquiry) does not have such a chemical definition.

One is a group of chemical compounds. The other is a process of the brain. Of course they don't have the same definition - they're different things. That doesn't mean you can just make up stuff and ignore the definitions they do have, as you're doing by saying that quarks might be conscious, if we invent a whole new category of stuff and label is consciousness just to prove that quarks might fit.

And?

I remember someone saying this "Or, if you can find a standard dictionary (i.e. ordinary language definition) which defines consciousness as "the brain" then go ahead " as if you thought it couldn't be done. I guess you just brought it up for no reason then, or maybe you're so worn out from moving those goal posts around that you forgot your reason for asking for it in the first place.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Yes, I tend to like to base my views of reality on what we observe there rather than wild flights of fancy.

But generalisation form one case is weak.

But aren't you doing the same thing with chocolate - selecting one definition and generalizing from there?

As I said chocolate has a chemical definition. Where is consciousness defined as the brain?

 

[GrowingSmaller]

It's not that we don't know. It's that WE KNOW they do not have the components observed in every other consciousness.

What's happening is akin to this:

You: There could be elephants hiding in Jupiter.

Us: Sure. But first off, we've never seen any there and second, there are reasons to think there aren't any there, as all elephants we've observed require oxygen, water, specific gravity, food, pressure, etc.

You: To conclude "therefore, because we don't know that there are elephants in Jupiter, there are none" is an argument from ignorance.

But I do not consider myself to be agnostic about elephants on Jupiter, so your analogy cannot be that good. For starters we know that elephants cannot survive under said conditions, but we do not know that of consciousness. Try and prove me wrong withou circular argument please.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

One is a group of chemical compounds. The other is a process of the brain. Of course they don't have the same definition - they're different things. That doesn't mean you can just make up stuff and ignore the definitions they do have, as you're doing by saying that quarks might be conscious, if we invent a whole new category of stuff and label is consciousness just to prove that quarks might fit.

Where is consciounsess defined as activity in the brain? That is why I asked for a dictionary definition, because I have never come across that definition myself. Like I said, an instance of consciousness may be observed to be activity in a brain, but that does not mean that the definition of consciousness is " electrochemical activity in a brain" or whatever. So like I said, chocolate has a chemical definition, but consciousness does not. So the contention I ought to - by analogy with my main argument - accept the possibility of chocolate houses, because houses "might be chocolate, who knows?" etc is not valid.

 

[sandwiches]

But I do not consider myself to be agnostic about elephants on Jupiter, so your analogy cannot be that good. For starters we know that elephants cannot survive under said conditions, but we do not know that of consciousness. Try and prove me wrong withou circular argument please.

We know that consciousness cannot exist without a brain. Try and prove me wrong without circular argument please.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

We know that consciousness cannot exist without a brain. Try and prove me wrong without circular argument please.

The burden of proof is on you to back up the claim. The default position for me is non-belief in it, until adequate justificztion is presented. That is not a "proof" you are wrong but a proof is not possible here. We have to use rules of thumb in cases like this one. So that's what I have done.

So, lets see you roll out the rationale.

 

[Eudaimonist]

As I see it, consciousness is an irreducible concept. What I mean is, it can't be defined in any way that doesn't involve synonyms. It can't be broken up into anything simpler.

Saying that consciousness is neural activity isn't defining consciousness. It's attempting an explanation of consciousness, which isn't at all the same thing.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Does that finalise anything?

 

[Tinker Grey]

As I see it, consciousness is an irreducible concept. What I mean is, it can't be defined in any way that doesn't involve synonyms. It can't be broken up into anything simpler.

Saying that consciousness is neural activity isn't defining consciousness. It's attempting an explanation of consciousness, which isn't at all the same thing.


eudaimonia,

Mark

I might agree here depending on what you mean. I'd say that like love consciousness is not a thing in itself. It's like saying some psychological condition isn't a medical diagnosis but a clinical one. We measure these things/conditions by their effects. We say perhaps a parrot is conscious because it recognizes itself in a mirror. We don't say it is conscious because we measure 3 drams of consciousness. We say someone is in love due to their actions not because we measure 3 cupids of love residing in some portion of the brain.

As such these "things" are our general consensus of what it means to be conscious or in love. But there is no thing to measure and therefore no thing to be reduced to.

Yes?

 

[KCfromNC]

But generalisation form one case is weak.

Who's doing that? There's lots of examples of consciousness to generalize from, not just one. Otherwise this discussion between two conscious individuals would be impossible.

As I said chocolate has a chemical definition. Where is consciousness defined as the brain?

Hopefully nowhere, since the brain isn't consciousness. As others have pointed out, you seem to have a problem confusing processes with physical objects.

 

[KCfromNC]

Where is consciounsess defined as activity in the brain?

I've posted links and definitions throughout the thread. You'll remember my most recent attempt, it was the one where you didn't understand why I posted it. Now you think it's important again. Round and round you go.

That is why I asked for a dictionary definition, because I have never come across that definition myself.

Hey look, an argument from ignorance.

Like I said, an instance of consciousness may be observed to be activity in a brain, but that does not mean that the definition of consciousness is " electrochemical activity in a brain" or whatever.

Meanwhile back in reality, all known instances of consciousness (billions and billions of them) occur in close relationship to brains. There are no other known instances. Since words are used to describe what we see, we say the definition of consciousness is a particular type of brain activity.

So like I said, chocolate has a chemical definition, but consciousness does not. So the contention I ought to - by analogy with my main argument - accept the possibility of chocolate houses, because houses "might be chocolate, who knows?" etc is not valid.

Using your argument, this is only because you're generalizing from one instance of chocolate.

 

[quatona]

So like I said, chocolate has a chemical definition, but consciousness does not.

Yet, "consciousness" has a definition, too. It is derived from observed phenomena and manifestations. Definitions make sure we know what we are talking about.

If you wish to (un-)define a term into obscurity that is up to you. Personally, I am happy for any term that is used in an intelligible definition.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Who's doing that? There's lots of examples of consciousness to generalize from, not just one. Otherwise this discussion between two conscious individuals would be impossible.

I thought you were generalising from human consciousness. "If it deosn't pass a human neurological examination, then it's not conscious" seemed to be your argument.

Hopefully nowhere, since the brain isn't consciousness. As others have pointed out, you seem to have a problem confusing processes with physical objects.

So whats the analogy with the chocolate arguement. As I said chocolate has defines chemical properties. It seems to me that consciousness does not. Or if you want: "conscious is not defienned chemically" which seems like an ungrammatical statement to me. Please provide a reputable source that defines conscious activity (or however you want to express it) as brain activity.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

I've posted links and definitions throughout the thread.

Repeat please. I am looking for a standard English language source, not some dreamed up implication somewhere in a personal Wikipedia encounter or whatever. Reputable dictionary please (which is where we find the definitions of words, you know).

You'll remember my most recent attempt, it was the one where you didn't understand why I posted it. Now you think it's important again. Round and round you go.

You poster a scientific definition of human consciousness (or the word conscious as applied to humans) and it did not define "consciousness" (or, if you would like "conscious") as the brain, did it? Even if it did, it would not be a universal definition, just one from human psychology as it was a definition from human psychology. Whats the objection to this?

Hey look, an argument from ignorance.

If youre making a claim then the burden of proof is on you to come up with the defintion. I am saying I don't know of a definition, and you have to provide one. I am not saying there isn't one, but as far as I am familiar with standard reference tools there is not.

Meanwhile back in reality, all known instances of consciousness (billions and billions of them) occur in close relationship to brains. There are no other known instances.

I agree. Except when it comes to simpler lifeforms such as worms and the likes which might have some form of awareness but afaik some of them do not have brains. Whether we can "know" them to be conscious or not is a very incomplete and sketchy science though.

Since words are used to describe what we see, we say the definition of consciousness is a particular type of brain activity.

Who is this "we". You and your friends? Certainly afaik not the staff working on the Oxford English Dictionary. You should know that the meaning of English terms are found in such dictionaries, and you can't just invent them as you go along - even if it would help your argument to do so. So who is this "we"?

Using your argument, this is only because you're generalizing from one instance of chocolate.

No, because chocolate has a chemical definition. So it is not hasty generalisation to imply that all chocolate ought to have a certain chemical form, but rather it is a valid inference.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Yet, "consciousness" has a definition, too. It is derived from observed phenomena and manifestations. Definitions make sure we know what we are talking about.

If you wish to (un-)define a term into obscurity that is up to you. Personally, I am happy for any term that is used in an intelligible definition.

You still seem to think that there is an analytic (definitional) link between any consciousness whatsoever and the brain. Please provide a standard dictioary reference for this claim, if that is the one you are making and I am not 'straw manning' your perspective. If I am denying standard English - the burden of proof is on you to show it assuming you ase applying the principle of charity - it really ought to be as easy as linking to the OED to prove me wrong.

So... Def: "consciousness is the brain" or "conscious is the brain" if that seems more gramatical to you (although it does not seem grammatical to me). Please.

 

[quatona]

You still seem to think that there is an analytic (definitional) link between any consciousness whatsoever and the brain.

No, we have observed entities with a brain having certain characteristics, and we coined the term "conscious" from there.

So... Def: "consciousness is the brain" or "conscious is the brain" if that seems more gramatical to you (although it does not seem grammatical to me). Please.

Since this is not the claim I see no duty to substantiate it. Repeating the same strawman over and over won´t help you.

Point being: I doubt you have any idea whatsoever what it might mean for an inanimate object to be conscious. That means that your postulate that chairs or whatever else inanimate objects might be conscious is just a play with words for obscurity´s sake.

Maybe the mirror is conscious and intentionally imitates my movements. Can´t be excluded. I must be careful to claim agnosticism in this question.