Interaction ("mind body") problem

[sandwiches]

To be honest I dont know much about reduction. The only example I recall learning was the reduction of heat to mean molecular energy. But in that case the heat of the body is the MME, the heat does not "disappear" by being reduced. Rather we have a restatement of heat in more fundamental terms, not a displacement of the concept altogether.

Regardless. The example I showed you of emergent properties which don't exist in the components of the whole (aka. table salt.)

 

[sandwiches]

It is right that I do not know how they do. As for imagine, well I imagine that they could emerge by magic. Is there actually a better explanation that that?

I have no idea of the 'trillions of emergent properties' you are talking about, btw. IIRC the idea of emergence is contested in the philsophy of science. I will try and find a reference for that.

Plastics, fuels, cars, clocks, computers, fabrics, lenses, soft drinks, foods, etc, etc, etc all have emergent properties which arise from the specific arrangement of their components, which aren't present in said components. There's nothing more magical about those properties emerging than the property of a simpler lever (a board and an object used as a fulcrum) being able to increase my strength multiplicatively.

I am not sure that I do, but people have taught me that most of the universe is not conscious. So I suppose it is normal to believe it (consciousness) is fairly unique in some way.

Most of the universe doesn't seem to have hair either, yet you seem to single out consciousness. Again, why?

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Plastics, fuels, cars, clocks, computers, fabrics, lenses, soft drinks, foods, etc, etc, etc all have emergent properties which arise from the specific arrangement of their components, which aren't present in said components. There's nothing more magical about those properties emerging than the property of a simpler lever (a board and an object used as a fulcrum) being able to increase my strength multiplicatively.

I thought that for a property to be emergent it had to be irreducible to interaction of the parts given what we know about them. So we know that sodium and chlorine chemically bond, so salt ins understood reductively. But I may have some learning to do.

Most of the universe doesn't seem to have hair either, yet you seem to single out consciousness. Again, why?

Well we can see that the universe does not have hair, for sterters. But we cannot see whether other objects have mind. So we have to look at what we (apparently) know about mind, and that is that it is a physical thing. But we do not know what in general is necessary and sufficient for a mind to be present, so there is room for speculation.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Regardless. The example I showed you of emergent properties which don't exist in the components of the whole (aka. table salt.)

Well you could say that a ruler is amergent because non of the 1cm measures actually equals the 30cm of the ruler. But I am not sure if that (a ruler being 30cm) would cound as a example of emergence.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Your complaint is not unique, it stemms from, as I said earlier, not being satisfied with incomplete answers.

So what's the incomplete answer regarding mental causation? "It's physical, get over it"? I have no issues with that, but still think that there is a hefty problem remaining precisely because the explanation is not really much of an explanatin after all. It is really just a statement of the ontological category any expected explanation will be given in. Maybe brain science is meant to teach me about mental causation, but it seems a long way from the mark at present. I am not satisfied enough with what I believe is there to say that there is no "problem" remaining. Perhaps everyone is willing to accept there is a problem, but just not a problem like the mind-body problem because that sounds too embarrassing?

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Sure (although you´d just have to trace back the quotes in our conversation - just like I do now for you):
I quoted your initial claim from post #35 in my post #38 and criticized it as a reverse conclusion.
You attempted to modify your claim in post #41, but it was essentially the same problem (as I pointed out in post #44 ).
Then, instead of addressing the issue, you asked me a personal question.

Ok if consciousness is electrochemiostry then some (not all) electrochemistry is conscious. But we can argue from analogy and generalisation that other electrochemistry may be conscious. What I am saying is how do we know, what standards of justification are there to establish the opinion either way?

 

[GrowingSmaller]

I´m not an expert in this field - but since you just asked me for my beliefs:
I don´t believe that the distinction "conscious vs. non-conscious matter" is accurate or meaningful. Rather, I think that certain systems (composed of various forms of matter) can under certain conditions be(come) conscious. I believe that consciousness is an event rather than an object or a property.

Ok but I am not sure what that means. What is an event without objective existence (if that is what consciousness may be)?

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Show me a single conscious electrochemical process, not one that is part of the process of consciousness (NOT THE SAME THING.)

Well afaict people are arguing that the brain is electrochemical, and that the brain is consciousness. I was just extrapolating from there. If they are not your beliefs then maybe I was imagining a straw man.

If you have a problem with this request, then I would suggest defining "consciousness."

Will a dictionary definition not do?

 

[KCfromNC]

But if it is "only chemistry", it seems a little arbitrary to assume that the vast majority of chemical reactions are non-conscious

It's not an assumption, it's an observation. Or more specifically, lots of observations.

Even if we didn't have these observations, though, your argument is equally valid at proving that fire can't be reduced to a chemical reaction. After all, if it's only "only chemistry", it seems a little arbitrary to assume that the vast majority of chemical reactions are not fire. Therefore fire must have a supernatural component, since naturalist ideas of fire have an inherent problem.

It also proves that television signals can't be reduced to EM waves. After all, if it's only "only electricity", it seems a little arbitrary to assume that the vast majority of electrical systems are not television signals. Therefore TV must have a supernatural component that science is missing, correct?

Understand why these arguments make no sense and you'll see why yours doesn't either.

 

[KCfromNC]

Ok if consciousness is electrochemiostry then some (not all) electrochemistry is conscious. But we can argue from analogy and generalisation that other electrochemistry may be conscious. What I am saying is how do we know, what standards of justification are there to establish the opinion either way?

Do you not have a set of standards you use to determine if, say, the chair you're sitting on is actually a conscious being? Come on, we weren't born yesterday.

 

[KCfromNC]

Ok but I am not sure what that means. What is an event without objective existence (if that is what consciousness may be)?

Who said anything about the event not having objective existence?

 

[GrowingSmaller]

I inferred that because he said (IIRC) that consciousness is not an object.

 

[KCfromNC]

So what's the incomplete answer regarding mental causation?

Can you be more specific on what you're looking for? All I've seen is vague hand-waving that science can't explain why mental events cause behavior, but that seems to be begging the question that consciousness is somehow part of the cause. How do you know those events cause behavior rather than our conscious thoughts about certain events being another effect from an unconscious decision? Can you give a specific cause-event sequence you'd like to see explained? I can point to lots of research showing that our consciousness is only informed of decisions after they're made - can you show research which proves that consciousness actually causes behavior like you think it does?

 

[KCfromNC]

I inferred that because he said (IIRC) that consciousness is not an object.

Objective and object aren't the same word, despite sharing many letters.

 

[sandwiches]

I thought that for a property to be emergent it had to be irreducible to interaction of the parts given what we know about them. So we know that sodium and chlorine chemically bond, so salt ins understood reductively. But I may have some learning to do.

Emergent properties don't have to be properties that we can't deduce from mere interactions of components. They're merely those properties that aren't present in the components. That emergent properties can be hard to predict is true but non-predictability of said properties isn't a requirement.

Well we can see that the universe does not have hair, for sterters. But we cannot see whether other objects have mind. So we have to look at what we (apparently) know about mind, and that is that it is a physical thing. But we do not know what in general is necessary and sufficient for a mind to be present, so there is room for speculation.

But I am asking why you think consciousness is unique in its dualism and that there is some disconnect between the process of consciousness and the machines which create them (brains?)

Well you could say that a ruler is amergent because non of the 1cm measures actually equals the 30cm of the ruler. But I am not sure if that (a ruler being 30cm) would cound as a example of emergence.

Except the fact that both 1cm and 30cm are merely variation of the length property. Moreover, this property of greater length is easily predicted.

 

[sandwiches]

Well afaict people are arguing that the brain is electrochemical, and that the brain is consciousness. I was just extrapolating from there. If they are not your beliefs then maybe I was imagining a straw man.

The brain IS NOT consciousness. The brain produces consciousness through electrochemical, which themselves ARE NOT consciousness.

Think of consciousness as a computer program (let's say Microsoft Excel) and the brain as a computer which has that program. When we break down the program to electrical signals, the calculating and spreadsheet aspects are lost. The computer isn't Excel any more than the electrical signals are. The computer uses electrical signals to produce a process which is itself the Excel program.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Can you be more specific on what you're looking for? All I've seen is vague hand-waving that science can't explain why mental events cause behavior, but that seems to be begging the question that consciousness is somehow part of the cause. How do you know those events cause behavior rather than our conscious thoughts about certain events being another effect from an unconscious decision? Can you give a specific cause-event sequence you'd like to see explained? I can point to lots of research showing that our consciousness is only informed of decisions after they're made - can you show research which proves that consciousness actually causes behavior like you think it does?

The argument I use is this. If pleasure and pain had no causal power they may as well be randomly distributed in experience. For example [bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse] could be painful, and broken legs pleasurable. The genetics for this would make as much sense as any other if pleasure and pain had no influence on behaviour. But we see that pleasure and pain tend to be experienced in an orderly fasnion, such that things deleterious to survival such as drowning, broken legs, hunger, open wounds etc all tend to be "hardwired" to be painful or unpleasant. Therefore this non-random distribution of pain indicates to me that it has been selectively associated with certain states like lack of food, and that in turn indicates it has a causal role of pain states (otherwise, as I said, why would certain geneticically influence pain patterns or trends emerge if pain did not influence behaviour and therefore did not contribute to fitness differentials?).

The alternative to me seems to be that is it a complete accident or fluke that broken legs etc are painful and [bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse] etc are pleasurable, that being because if they had no causal power they would not have been naturally selected except by accident, in which case the patterns or trends would not be expected to be there (except by accident or fluke).

Simply put there seems to be a reason that what we enjoy is associated with what is good for survival (and vice versa), and the reason is that is that enjoyment influences behaviour which in turn effects fitness. Such that when enjoyment is genetically influenced certain patterns - such as enjoying [bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse] - will be selected in the gene pool because they enhance survival chances by causing appropriate behaviour.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

The brain IS NOT consciousness. The brain produces consciousness through electrochemical, which themselves ARE NOT consciousness.

Think of consciousness as a computer program (let's say Microsoft Excel) and the brain as a computer which has that program. When we break down the program to electrical signals, the calculating and spreadsheet aspects are lost. The computer isn't Excel any more than the electrical signals are. The computer uses electrical signals to produce a process which is itself the Excel program.

Sorry you have lost me. I would have thought that the program runs on the conmputer, and it is part of the working computer (screen etc) that windows appears. The programme is not over and above, it is simply an expression of the working machine.

 

[Gracchus]

Sorry you have lost me. I would have thought that the program runs on the conmputer, and it is part of the working computer (screen etc) that windows appears. The programme is not over and above, it is simply an expression of the working machine.

No. A computer may run Windows, or Linux, or even run standalone programs with no operating system. The last is not much done these days, except in very special circumstances, but the program is not part of the computer.

 

[variant]

So what's the incomplete answer regarding mental causation? "It's physical, get over it"? I have no issues with that, but still think that there is a hefty problem remaining precisely because the explanation is not really much of an explanatin after all. It is really just a statement of the ontological category any expected explanation will be given in. Maybe brain science is meant to teach me about mental causation, but it seems a long way from the mark at present. I am not satisfied enough with what I believe is there to say that there is no "problem" remaining. Perhaps everyone is willing to accept there is a problem, but just not a problem like the mind-body problem because that sounds too embarrassing?

I'm not sure why is should care wether or not you are satisfied.

I’m not satified with our current understanding on the subject but I spend my time investigating these kinds of things. What’s your excuse?

The complete answer is a good enough understanding of the system of consciousness that all your questions would be answered.

You still haven't articulate what the "problem" is such that I don't think there is one. Consciousness is differn't phsyscally than rocks, quite a bit so, but that dosen't ammount to a problem so much that it shows us a distinction we can learn from.

And yes, we are learning. So, what is the problem?