Interaction ("mind body") problem

[GrowingSmaller]

I'm not sure what can and can not be conscious, at least in the sense you're asking it. I've been spending most of this thread talking about what is, not what might possibly hypothetically could be, if you use your imagination a bit.

So we agree then?

 

[GrowingSmaller]

OK, please list your premises and the syllogism leading to the conclusion that quarks and office furniture might be conscious.

Matter (the brain) is conscious.
If some matter is conscious, all matter may be conscious.
Therefore, all matter may be conscious.

I think this is an inductive generalisation.

So says the guy who is so worked up that there's no definition showing that brains produce consciousness.

I am not saying the mind cannot be defined as the brain for medical doctors. I am only saying that does not actually prove all awareness is of the brain.

It looks like you're admitting your whole tangent about a lack of a dictionary definition for various ideas of consciouness is really meaningless, since it's not the job of dictionaries to define consciousness. Why have you been wasting our time asking for one?

I think it was in response to the chocolate quarks idea presented as an analogy of my reasoning. My argument was "all chocolate has a chemiical definition, but all sentience does not have a chemical definition. so it would be illogical to say quarks may be chocolate because it does not meet the necessary chemical conditions for chocolate, but the same cannot be said for awareness."

 

[quatona]

I would not say they are too scientific. Whatever definition of oconsciousnes we use it would have to guarantee the presence of subjective like (awareness, experience etc).

Just to be clear: Does that imply that consciousness (in your definition) cannot be objectively be determined?
In which case agnosticism would be forced by your definition.

Now you might define consciousness as brain activity, and therefore conclude that all non brains are non conscious.

Yes, that would be a definition that provides testable criteria for "consciousness" (which would exclude apples from being called "conscious").
Another definition that would also provide such testable criteria would be:
"Responsiveness to the environment" ( a definition that would include apples into those entities that can be called "conscious", and that also would allow for an answer to the question "Are quarks conscious" if only we will know enough about them.)

But to me that's word games.

No, what I am trying to do is put an end to your word games.
Au contraire - the word (in both definitions I have provided) is sufficiently defined for the purpose at hand - whilst your definition is deliberately denying to provide any such criteria.

You have given a theoretical definition of consciousness (awareness etc) in material terms, but there is apparently no way to test the theory and xperimentally validate it's claims.

Which "theory" would that be? It´s merely the definition of a word.
I have given a definition of the way I use a word, and I have given criteria to check whether an entity matches that definition. There´s no further theory involved.

but there is apparently no way to test the theory and xperimentally validate it's claims.

Irony alert.
That´s actually the problem with your definition of "conscious".
I have been asking you all the time to come up with criteria that allow for testing "consciousness" (in your definition).

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Just to be clear: Does that imply that consciousness (in your definition) cannot be objectively be determined?
In which case agnosticism would be forced by your definition.

Possibly true, I am not sure.

Yes, that would be a definition that provides testable criteria for "consciousness" (which would exclude apples from being called "conscious").

Ok fine, but then you might just be inventing a new meaning for the term "conscious" which bares no essential relationship to the ordinary subjectively understood usage.

I reckon that for instance if the word "consicous" is to be categorically defined as such and such brain activity it would have to be shown that "consciousness if and only if such and such brain activity" is true. IOW I think that the statements "there is consciousness" and "there is such and such brain activity" would have to be materially equivalent. We could then say "A: if consciousnss then such and such brain activity AND B: if such and such brain activity then consciousness" (which conjunctive proposition is just another way of stating material equivalence). However although I might accept B I cannot accept A.

Merely defining consciousness as necessarily involving brain activity doesn't help, just as defining a tree as necessarily having leaves doesn't help (because as we all know there may be a tree without leaves). You might have defied evergreen trees, thats all.

Another definition that would also provide such testable criteria would be:
"Responsiveness to the environment" ( a definition that would include apples into those entities that can be called "conscious", and that also would allow for an answer to the question "Are quarks conscious" if only we will know enough about them.)

Ok like I said you can stipulate a new meaning for the term, but don't try and conflate it with the original meaning unless you can show them to be identical or interchangable without a change in denotation.

No, what I am trying to do is put an end to your word games.

"Word games" is some kind of disorder in philosophy theat only other people suffer from, sorry.

Au contraire - the word (in both definitions I have provided) is sufficiently defined for the purpose at hand - whilst your definition is deliberately denying to provide any such criteria.

See above.

Which "theory" would that be? It´s merely the definition of a word.
I have given a definition of the way I use a word, and I have given criteria to check whether an entity matches that definition. There´s no further theory involved.

If you are going to say "I have not invented a new term, but elucidated on the original meaning of "consciousness" by means of science" you have to show that tese "definitions" you give actually have an essential relationship to subjectively apprehended awareness.

What I mean is that your definition of consicousness may involve physical states that are not conscious in the ordinary sense of the word, or there may be consicous states that are not covered by your "definition".

I can (I suppose) "define" consciousness as the wave function of an electron if I like, or any object with a mass above 15 grams, and that would give me a "testable definition". Great! If I have my physics right I can test for mass with weighing scales, sure. Does that mean I have understood what consciousness (in the ordinary sense) is by defining it as mass over 15 grams? No.

Irony alert.
That´s actually the problem with your definition of "conscious".
I have been asking you all the time to come up with criteria that allow for testing "consciousness" (in your definition).

Well if there is no testing for the original term, how does "redefining the term materially" actually do anything constructive, except perhaps to inadvertantly change the subject without realising and give everyone illusory relief? See above for details.

 

[KCfromNC]

Well are you going to doubt thare is awareness, because as far as I know our primary access to it is though first person mental life, if not instrospection itself.

Hardly. Remember the various neurological tests for consciousness I posted a while back? There would be no need for them if we could diagnose and fix mental problem simply by thinking about them.

 

[KCfromNC]

So we agree then?

If you mean that you accept that your flights of fancy about office furniture having souls have no bearing on our current scientific understanding of consciousness then yes, we agree.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Hardly. Remember the various neurological tests for consciousness I posted a while back? There would be no need for them if we could diagnose and fix mental problem simply by thinking about them.

Which camefiorst, the subjective experience or the neurological test? The test is there to indicate the subjective experience, not vice versa.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

If you mean that you accept that your flights of fancy about office furniture having souls have no bearing on our current scientific understanding of consciousness then yes, we agree.

I think we agree then. Only that's to say that our current scientific understanding is pretty limited in capacity and scope.

(Btw as far as I can recall I have been generally talking about "awareness" and "consciousnes" not "souls" especially over the last 30 pages or so. Maybe you introduced the term "soul" for partisan purposes, in an tactical attempt to discredit me with a straw man? I accept IIRC I did talk about the soul initially but for me the debate has moved on. For the record what I talk an0it "awareness" I am not implying there is a soul there.)

 

[KCfromNC]

Matter (the brain) is conscious.
If some matter is conscious, all matter may be conscious.
Therefore, all matter may be conscious.

I think this is an inductive generalisation.

Shouldn't step 2 be "If the brain is conscious, all brains may be conscious", and step 3 be "therefore all brains may be conscious"? Or is it OK to generalize from one particular form of matter to all forms of matter, in your opinion - as I can do below using an "inductive generalization" from chocolate to all matter as well.

I am not saying the mind cannot be defined as the brain for medical doctors. I am only saying that does not actually prove all awareness is of the brain.

It's impossible to prove a negative. Do we have any reason to think that consciousness exists other than in brains?

I think it was in response to the chocolate quarks idea presented as an analogy of my reasoning. My argument was "all chocolate has a chemiical definition, but all sentience does not have a chemical definition. so it would be illogical to say quarks may be chocolate because it does not meet the necessary chemical conditions for chocolate, but the same cannot be said for awareness."

Depends on whether you can jump from particular configurations of matter to matter in general via "inductive generalization" :

Matter (chocolate) is chocolatey.
If some matter is chocolatey, all matter may be chocolatey.
Therefore, all matter may be chocolatey.

If you can't make the jump from chocolate to all matter, you also can't make the jump from brains to all matter in your syllogism either. Brains are a particular well-defined configuration of matter, just like chocolate. Either the rules of "logic" apply in both cases or in neither.

 

[KCfromNC]

Which camefiorst, the subjective experience or the neurological test?

Which came first? Introspection proving that different masses fall at different speeds or experiments which show that gravity accelerates all masses equally? As we develop better methods some of the ways we thought were good for learning about subjects turn out to bad.

So the real question isn't which came first, but which is the best way of investigating the problem. Given the lack of results from the "lets sit around and think about it harder" club, I think the answer is obvious. But the next time you or a loved one has a stroke, feel free to treat it via introspection.

 

[KCfromNC]

I think we agree then. Only that's to say that our current scientific understanding is pretty limited in capacity and scope.

Yes, I think we discussed the shocking fact that people aren't omniscient many pages ago. Scientists are people. That doesn't mean we get to pretend that philosophical approaches trump science just because you can imagine a possible world where office furniture is conscious.

[(Btw as far as I can recall I have been generally talking about "awareness" and "consciousnes" not "souls" especially over the last 30 pages or so.

If you're claiming that there's an inherent problem with non-supernatural explanations of consciousness, souls are what you're left with.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Shouldn't step 2 be "If the brain is conscious, all brains may be conscious", and step 3 be "therefore all brains may be conscious"? Or is it OK to generalize from one particular form of matter to all forms of matter, in your opinion - as I can do below using an "inductive generalization" from chocolate to all matter as well.

Yes there is a problem with inductive generalisation, I know.

It's impossible to prove a negative. Do we have any reason to think that consciousness exists other than in brains?

What do you mean "impossible to prove a negative"? If I say "there have been no human expiditions to Mars, as far as records show" that is that not a proof? I don't get it....especially in relation to this thread.

Depends on whether you can jump from particular configurations of matter to matter in general via "inductive generalization" :

Matter (chocolate) is chocolatey.
If some matter is chocolatey, all matter may be chocolatey.
Therefore, all matter may be chocolatey.

Yes thats a generalisaiton, but known to have a falseconclusion.

If you can't make the jump from chocolate to all matter, you also can't make the jump from brains to all matter in your syllogism either. Brains are a particular well-defined configuration of matter, just like chocolate. Either the rules of "logic" apply in both cases or in neither.

We know the "all matter is chocolate" conclusion to be false, because like I said we can test it. I am not sure (as I have repeatedly pointed out) that asking "is ist a brain?" is a universal test for consciousness in matter, so the conclusion that all matter is conscious may not be easily falsifiable in the same way that "all matter is chocolate" is.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Which came first? Introspection proving that different masses fall at different speeds or experiments which show that gravity accelerates all masses equally?

Lets stay on topic please.

As we develop better methods some of the ways we thought were good for learning about subjects turn out to bad.

Wait on. Are you saying that if I want to know whether I am conscious or not I actually have to take a brain scan because introspection is not reliable?

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Yes, I think we discussed the shocking fact that people aren't omniscient many pages ago. Scientists are people. That doesn't mean we get to pretend that philosophical approaches trump science just because you can imagine a possible world where office furniture is conscious.

Look, if science doesn't actually happen to have the answer dont claim it does. You can't have your cake and eat it you know.

If you're claiming that there's an inherent problem with non-supernatural explanations of consciousness, souls are what you're left with.

That's your conclusion, I'd like to see your reasoning. Anyway I am not claiming an "inherent problem" in determining whether quarks are conscious (although there may well be), I am just saying "I don't know whether quarks are consicous" because I don't believe that science has the answer, that's all.

 

[sandwiches]

Look, if science doesn't actually happen to have the answer dont claim it does. You can't have your cake and eat it you know.

Strawman. Nobody claims it does.

This is getting pretty silly. You seem to keep evading the point, which is: We have no reason to think quarks or chairs are conscious AND we actually have reasons to believe they are, in fact, NOT conscious. So, the most reasonable conclusion, is that quarks and chairs are in fact NOT conscious. Why is this so hard to understand?

And stop using the word agnostic in this sense, since NO ONE HERE has claimed absolute knowledge of quarks, chairs, or consciousness. We're all agnostics on the subject but I think most of us are saying that "as far as we can tell, quarks have no indication of being conscious and many indications that quarks and chairs are in fact NOT conscious."

 

[quatona]

Possibly true, I am not sure.

Ok fine, but then you might just be inventing a new meaning for the term "conscious" which bares no essential relationship to the ordinary subjectively understood usage.

If you insist on appealing to the "ordinary subjective understood usage" of the term "consciousness" you have lost your case before you have even started. Ask a random sample of persons whether "chairs are conscious" matches their subjectively understood usage of the term "conscious", and the result will be desastrous.

I reckon that for instance if the word "consicous" is to be categorically defined as such and such brain activity it would have to be shown that "consciousness if and only if such and such brain activity" is true.

No, it wouldn´t have to be shown. It would simply follow from the definition.

IOW I think that the statements "there is consciousness" and "there is such and such brain activity" would have to be materially equivalent. We could then say "A: if consciousnss then such and such brain activity AND B: if such and such brain activity then consciousness" (which conjunctive proposition is just another way of stating material equivalence). However although I might accept B I cannot accept A.

I would assume B and don´t see how A follows logically (unless you employ a fallacious reverse conclusion).

Merely defining consciousness as necessarily involving brain activity doesn't help, just as defining a tree as necessarily having leaves doesn't help (because as we all know there may be a tree without leaves).

If I define "tree" as something that necessarily has leaves then something without leaves is not a "tree". That would be a practically useful (albeit unusual) definition.
"We all know there may be trees without leaves" merely appeals to an equally rigorous (albeit more common) definition.
Since this distinction is more common and does not define "trees" into obscurity (it gives clear criteria how to distinguish trees from not-trees in the given definition) I have no problem using the term in this definition.

Ok like I said you can stipulate a new meaning for the term, but don't try and conflate it with the original meaning unless you can show them to be identical or interchangable without a change in denotation.

That´s exactly why I neither see much use in establishing this definition that includes apples into the group of conscious entities: This definition would be contrary to the intuitive meaning that everyone "knows" (as you call an agreement on semantics): Apples aren´t conscious.
However, the idea that consciousness depends on there being a brain can matches exactly any traditional and/or commonly accepted connotation, denotation and implication of the term "conscious". This definition does not stipulate a new meaning, it simply summarizes the intuitive and broadly subjectively understood meaning of the term.


Unadvertantly, though, you have shot your own foot here:
Your idea that quarks, chairs, apples may be conscious, albeit in a completely different understanding of consciousness than we have now, rests squarely on the very approach you are criticizing here so vehemently.

If you are going to say "I have not invented a new term, but elucidated on the original meaning of "consciousness" by means of science" you have to show that tese "definitions" you give actually have an essential relationship to subjectively apprehended awareness.

As I have said above, your appeal to subjectivity and intuitivity is damaging your own cause rather than mine. Ask some randomly picked persons whether they consider apples to be conscious, capable of love and emotions, and you will get 99% "No, that´s absurd" (or something to that effect) for a response.

What I mean is that your definition of consicousness may involve physical states that are not conscious in the ordinary sense of the word, or there may be consicous states that are not covered by your "definition".

Well, since I have given a clear definition for "conscious states", there can´t be any "conscious states" that are not covered by this definition. That´s how language works.

I can (I suppose) "define" consciousness as the wave function of an electron if I like, or any object with a mass above 15 grams, and that would give me a "testable definition". Great! If I have my physics right I can test for mass with weighing scales, sure. Does that mean I have understood what consciousness (in the ordinary sense) is by defining it as mass over 15 grams? No.

At any rate, you have at least given a definition that allows for a meaningful discussion based on your definition. That´s far more than you have done so far. The claim that there may be consciousness of a kind that is completely different from what our current "understanding of consciousness" neither allows for such a meaningful discussion, nor does it accept the "consciousness (in the ordinary sense) - au contraire, it postulates "consciousness" to go beyond that which it is understood as in the ordinary sense.

Well if there is no testing for the original term, how does "redefining the term materially" actually do anything constructive, except perhaps to inadvertantly change the subject without realising and give everyone illusory relief?

It helps meaningful conversation, whereas your approach establishes obscurantism as a virtue.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Sorry for the long post but I have to explin my view of knowledge.

Strawman. Nobody claims it does.

This is getting pretty silly. You seem to keep evading the point, which is: We have no reason to think quarks or chairs are conscious AND we actually have reasons to believe they are, in fact, NOT conscious. So, the most reasonable conclusion, is that quarks and chairs are in fact NOT conscious. Why is this so hard to understand?

What I am saying is you can argue a case, yeah. But possibly like the case for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, maybe? What I am saying is not that knowledge is impossible, but I am not sure that "arguments indicating a lack of consciousness in quarks" are actually robust enough to give us knowledge, even if they give us TJB.

In my epistemological model knowledge is true justified belief (TJB), but a qualified form of it. Knowledge comes on a sliding sacle. There can be very skillfully or robustly justified beliefs at the top end, which are the paradigms for knowledge. Then there are weaker forms of TJB sliding down a scale. At the top of the "justification scale" - paradigmatic knowledge - is true belief with a justification score of 10 (lets call it apodictic knowledge or something similar, perhaps for example knowing "if A then A") and from there the "justification scale" slides down to 0 where there is no skill, just luck in the TJB (for instance, something like guessing a randon 6 digit number).

The justification scale goes from 10 ("pure skill") to 0 ("pure luck").

Now, knowledge may start at true belief with a J score of 10 unarguably, and true beliefs with a justification score of 5 or 6 may be fairly uncontroversially labelled "knowledge", but 4 and 3 are in the "twilight zone", and 2 and 1 are just too lucky to be regarded as knowledge. For example if daddy telly hes 3 year oly son species have evolved, does he "know" this? Just listening to dad is taking risks, because his dad could well have been a creationist talking about Adam and Eve. The child's TJB is definitely on the lower end of the scale. Do you see?

My point is I am not that confident arguments "proving", "showing" or "indicating" quarks are not conscious are not in the "twilight zone" or below, at the low end of the scale, even if beliefs justified by them are actually true. Hence my agnosticism.

And stop using the word agnostic in this sense, since NO ONE HERE has claimed absolute knowledge of quarks, chairs, or consciousness. We're all agnostics on the subject but I think most of us are saying that "as far as we can tell, quarks have no indication of being conscious and many indications that quarks and chairs are in fact NOT conscious."

See above.

 

[KCfromNC]

What do you mean "impossible to prove a negative"? If I say "there have been no human expiditions to Mars, as far as records show" that is that not a proof? I don't get it....especially in relation to this thread.

I guess I can prove it then : "there is no non-brain based consciousness, as far as records show". But I'm guessing you won't accept that as proof even though it works fine for everything else.

so the conclusion that all matter is conscious may not be easily falsifiable in the same way that "all matter is chocolate" is.

So basically the whole nonsense about your syllogisms was just a red herring since you're not willing to accept their conclusions even if they're valid for a variety of convenient excuses. Figures.

 

[KCfromNC]

Lets stay on topic please.

I'm directly addressing a question of yours - showing that "how did we originally think about a subject" has little bearing on the success of any particular approach.

Wait on. Are you saying that if I want to know whether I am conscious or not I actually have to take a brain scan because introspection is not reliable?

No, I'm not. I'm saying that introspection hasn't done a good job telling us how the brain works. There's no reason to pretend that philosophical approaches are any better than rigorous scientific investigation, despite the assumption of the contrary throughout your arguments.

 

[KCfromNC]

Look, if science doesn't actually happen to have the answer dont claim it does.

An answer for what, specifically? Your objection has been answered multiple times. Specifically - there's absolutely no scientific reason to believe my chair is conscious and lots of reasons to believe it is not. You can ignore that data all you like, but it's not the fault of science for discounting an idea that no one can give any reason to consider in the first place.

That's your conclusion, I'd like to see your reasoning.

It comes from the definitions of supernatural being "outside of nature". As in, if there's an inherent problem in all naturalistic ideas of consciousness, the answer must lie in the supernatural - souls, magic and so on.