If morality is subjective...

[elman]

Um, elman, I have to disagree with you on this point. Until quite recently, the Sawi universally prized "talented" murderers, and I doubt that their mental capabilities are the reason.

I don't know anything about the Sawi or what they prized but if they like murderers for being murderers they are mentally defective as a group. A mentally defective person can have other mental capability I think. I don't think being mentally defective means one has lost all mental capability.

 

[quatona]

Hi, Fledge!

This is an idea that I have not tried to defend, largely due to the fact that it is indefensible. If I have given you the idea that I personally see no reason to listen to what a subjectivist has to say about morality, then I apologize.

No need to apologize.
I usually prefer to avoid the „but you said“ game, but I am wondering. Maybe it´s again just a problem of language, but in the very post I had responded to, you said:
As has been stated on this thread numerous times, there is no particular reason for me to care what a subjectivist has to say about morality, other than in how it directly impacts me.
It´s possible that I am completely dense, but I fail to see the relevant difference between
“I personally see no reason to listen to what a subjectivist has to say about morality“ (which you say is not your position), and „There is no particular reason for me to care what a subjectivist has to say about morality.“ (which was your statement).
Whatever, I will regard the last statement as valid, and assume that you do care about what subjectivists have to say about morality.
Why do you do it? Do you have reasons for it? Doesn´t that answer your question?

I tried to make it clear in an earlier post that I do think it worth my time to at least listen to what you have to say, and then judge it on its own merits. It appears that I have failed to make that clear

Well, I at least hadn´t understood it, and I still have some problems reconciling your position and your question.
OP question: „Why should I care about...?“
Maybe I don´t get what you mean when saying „care about“ (maybe you mean „adopt their moral codes right away, without further consideration and without even asking“ or something ? ), but I am wondering whether you have ever seen a subjectivist asking more from you than to listen to his opinion (on morals or whatever) and to judge it on its own merits. For me that would fully qualify as „caring for his opinion“.
You care for them, you apparently have reasons for doing so – so why the heck do you ask? :wondering:

I asked the original question because I saw an apparent paradox. It seemed to me that subjectivists were almost deliberately marginalizing themselves by stating that their opinions have no more weight than personal preferences (favorite foods, for example).

Firstly (and just to keep things clear): I do not see anything close to a paradox in that. Maybe it would help me greatly to understand your point in general, if you would try to explain where you see the paradox here.
Secondly, although some subjectivists may hold this view, this certainly is not what subjectivism says. It doesn´t make any statements in regards to the weight that moral question have (compared to other questions), it even seems to put quite some weight on them, else it wouldn´t have them for a subject. What may have been misunderstood is the frequently (and I think accurate) illustration of the subjectivist viewpoint, that there doesn´t exist any more „Objective Morality“ than there exists an, e.g. „Objective Taste in Music“. This doesn´t seem to make any statement about the weight, relevance or importance of either.
Thirdly, I fail to see how the statement (assuming for the sake of the argument it has been made) „My opinions have no more weight than personal preferences“ means marginalizing oneself, particularly not if it´s not a personal statement, but a view on what opinions are in general. If no HigherMorality exists (as the subjectivists think), personal preferences and opinions are the best there is. It seems like you arrive at your conclusion "self-contradiction/paradox" by applying your personal axioms ("there exists something Higher") on the ideas of others, as if they would share them. Sure, if there were something Higher, Objective, personal opinions and preferences would be comparably marginal. But, you know, we don´t believe in these Higher, Objective things. You cannot conclude paradoxa or self-contradictions, if they are based on your own axioms. This doesn´t help showing how the ideas in question have inner self-contradictions (which actually would be necessary to constitute a paradox.)
Fourthly, and rather on a sidenote while talking about self-marginalization, I wonder what would make persons who prefer to think of themselves as „filthy rags“ more reliable sources than people who think that their „opinions have no more weight than personal preferences“.

In the past, when I've thought I've seen a paradox involved in a viewpoint I disagreed with, I've asked a question and found out that there is a reasonable way around that paradox.
So far, I haven't seen anyone try to explain this apparent paradox away, and that has puzzled me.

Whilst I am not at all surprised that noone explains this „apparent paradox“ away, in view of the facts that
1. the notion or statement in question is not held by those whom you ascribe it to,
2. as far as I can tell this notion or statement does not contain any paradox whatsoever.

Admittedly, if you think that whatever people have to say on morality carries no weight beyond personal preferences, then there is a large paradigm shift. All of a sudden, there is a group of people trying to claim special precedence for their moral opinions. However, I'm still wondering if there's any way for a subjectivist to explain this apparent paradox to this poor objectivist who still doesn't get it.

As soon as I manage to discern this paradox, I will try to adress it.

My exact wording was "If [the subjectivist is] right, then I have absolutely nothing to gain by following his code." This statement was made in an attempt to describe this apparent paradox, and was not intended as a commentary on objectivism in anyway. That is why I said "misinterpreting" instead of "misunderstanding", but as you suggest, I will use the less accusatory form in the future.

Thanks!
And I see how I saw something in your statement that was not really implied. Sorry!
Anyways, I still have problems to understand why you make your statements about a specific group, if in fact you don´t intend to imply that this is a particularity of this group (as opposed to other groups).

The thing about learning the rules of a game is that there are two ways to do so. One way is to watch it a lot, and learn the rules that way, and the other way is to sit down and read the rule book. Assuming the rules have already been made by the time I start to play (as opposed to a game I'm inventing), then the rules are what they are, and I either abide by them or suffer the consequences. Of course, with sports, the rules will shift over time, and what was once legal may become illegal, and what was once illegal may become legal, but I'm still forced to play by the rules.

Just so that this is not forgotten: I am not forced to play the game. I enter the game in full knowledge and acceptance of the rules. Not sure whether this is a significant difference, but I´d like to keep that in mind.
Again (although I think that fortunately has come across by now: Subjectivism is not about having no rules.

To connect the dots, I can either take my moral code solely from what I see around me, or I can find where it's all written down and read that (I know, there are multiple sources that claim to have the objective moral code). Now there are some dangers to learning my code solely from watching other people. I know that I've never seen someone learn all the rules of a game simply from watching. Usually, there is a misunderstanding or two, and sometimes some misconceptions that are exactly contrary to the truth. Ditto for morality. Even if we watch people who follow the rules perfectly, there's still plenty of room for us to misinterpret what we see. Of course, the weakness of reading the book and never taking a look at people actually playing the game is that we really need to see examples played out before we fully understand them.

I feel that your game comparison has its weaknesses, and on the other hand might be a good means of pointing out where the differences between subjectivists and objectivists really lie.
Objectivists are under the impression that there is something Higher (written in stone for all eternity), that they have an obligation towards. They do not play by the rules for the mere reason that they regard rules as necessary and beneficial for playing a game, but because they feel they owe playing by the rules to the higher authority (of whatever kind). Subjectivsts don´t believe such an Authority to exist, and most of them play the life-game with the same pardigms all games are played: They want it to be fun and make themselves and everybody else involved happier. Most of them acknowledge that this requires rules and the abiding of them. Since, in their view, there is no such absolute or objective rule catalogue the players (all humans)have an obligation towards, the rules are discussable – a matter of agreement. To stay in the picture: If all 22 participants of a soccer match agree that they want to change the rules completely, nobody and nothing gets hurt or violated. There are still rules to play by and the benefits that come from them.

Please note, that all these ways of dealing with subjectivity are not necessarily properties of moral subjectivism which in the broadest sense merely states that there aren´t any ObjectiveMoralRules. Everything beyond that are merely more or less common conclusions subjectivists draw in order to deal with this.

I understand how an objectivist does not expect to find the ObjectiveRules in the agreements of subjectivists. If your question in fact meant to ask „Why would I expect to find the ObjectiveMorality in admittedly subjective opinions?“ instead of „Why should I listen to subjectivists?“, the actual problem might have been more clear from the beginning.
My answer: Don´t expect them to be there. Those people do not even believe in such an OM to exist, consequently they don´t claim their rules to be congruent with this – in their view – non-existent OM, and they don´t want you to regard them as such.
Case closed.

The objectivists´ problem: They assume there to be an Absolute Rule Book, but, as you have pointed out, there are many different sources that claim to describe those rules, and there are no means to discern which is the correct one (or whether one of them is correct, at all).
If anywhere, I see a paradox in assuming there Objective Rules to exist (which apparently are not obvious and not discernable by human reason and cognition, else there wouldn´t be any doubt as to which they are), but on the other hand they think their human abilities are sufficient to tell which of the claimed RuleCatalogues is the RealOne. (Since we are not discussion objectivism, consider this only a side-note).

After reading your description, I think that you are right that I have been reading a bit more into subjectivism than is actually there. However, I think that the gravity analogy is rather better than the hot-plate one. If I'd fallen from 20,000 feet instead of just 20, I would have had an extended period of time in which my attempt to violate the law of gravity would have absolutely no consequences.

1. I don´t see how falling down 20.000 feet is an attempt to violate gravity. If someone springs of a 20.000 feet cliff in order to kill himself, all we can say is: He was aware of the consequences and acted accordingly. We do not arrive at a moral judgement through gravity.
2. Note how you speak of an „attempt of a violation“, and rightly so, because, as stated before, gravity can´t be violated. Whilst OM usually is exactly about violations of moral rules.
3. Again: Subjectivism doesn´t deny there to be consequences, it doesn´t deny there to be long-term consequences, and it doesn´t even deny there to be consequences we aren´t and can´t be aware of. Just demonstrate how something has this or that consequence, and they will be all ears.
4. A difference seems to be that objectivists (or at least theistic objectivists) do not simply assume there to be consequences, but assume that these consequences are inflicted intentionally (by who- or whatever) on us to keep us in check and to be able to reckon or judge us. I wouldn´t call that „consequences“ (things that happen because this is the way things must happen), but „sanctions/punishments/rewards“ (intentionally inflicted with the purpose of education or betterment or judgement or whatever).
Terminology and semantics aside, I definitely see a significant difference between those two sorts of „consequences“.
Thus, subjectivists and theistic objectivists don´t seem to disagree in the question whether there are consequences, but merely in their idea where those consequences originate from and whether they are inflicted upon us purposefully and intentionally.
I do not really know, though, where non-theistic objectivists fit in this picture.

The consequences would have been there all the same, but they would have been extensively delayed. In a similiar fashion, moral laws might well be equally descriptive as physical laws like gravity, only with a larger time-delay on the consequences.

Another problem with that (besides the ones mentioned above) is that our tried and tested means of discerning laws are their reliable, repeatable and experiencable consequences. In this case we are supposed to simply believe in particular consequences to exist.

Morality is an important issue. Obviously, people act on what they believe, and so morality effectively dictates the course of human history. Hence, it is important to discuss morality, as your moral code and mine are both going to have some kind of impact (however large or small) on everyone who lives after us.

I agree, and most every subjectivist will, too.

The other major reason why I think it is important to discuss morality is because I think that there is an objective moral code, and that people will ultimately be judged according to it. I view perfect adherence to this code as an unnatainable goal, but one that I need to strive for regardless of how badly I fall short (God's grace/mercy/forgiveness is the only thing that can make up for my deficiencies). Since this final judgment dictates the eternal fate of everyone, I obviously think that it is important to discuss the code that will be used in it...

These your axioms perfectly explain the impossibility to answer your question to your satisfaction.
Then again, I would have thunk that it was self-suggesting that no subjectivist ever entertained the idea that you might expect him to help him with discerning this OMC you believe in and he doesn´t.

Greetings
quatona

 

[quatona]

Your example is not an example of someone that believes it is alright to torture babies.

There are different opinions as to whether abortion is torturing babies, and therefore there is - practically - no agreement, although people are able to agree on the statement (but not its meaning).

The point is not that everyone agrees. The point is that everyone agrees without having to discuss it. They know it inately. They did not have to be edcated on it as children. The agreement is the evidence of the existence of objective morality. You correct in it need not be discussed because as human beings we know we should not torture babies without discussing it.

Well, great. Then anything that is discussed cannot be covered by OM. I´m afraid there aren´t many points in which OM is of help, and in those points where it could be of help, it is redundant, because people agree in them, anyways.

The do exist in that moral codes are simply codes. Human violate moral codes all the time.

And am I right in assuming that you are the expert who can tell whether people do those things because they believe them to be OK, or whether they are aware that they violate those rules?

People being willing to violate the moral codes of humans does not prove the code does not exist. I have always agreed that we can train ourselves and our children to be monsters. We can become monsters and convince ourselves it is a good thing. We can train our consciences. That does not make it a good thing and that does not mean there was no moral code before we trained ourselves out of it. Would there be any suicide bombers if there was no culture pressure in favor of it?

I would have problems with clearly discerning what can be traced back on culture pressure and what not. Things like suicide bombing have been around all the time. On the other hand I am pretty sure that a lot of things you regard implanted into us by OM, are merely "trained into us by culture pressure", either.
As soon as you can provide any valid means of determining the sources of certain human behavioural patterns (other than by circular reasoning), I will be all ears.

 

[quatona]

I don't know anything about the Sawi or what they prized but if they like murderers for being murderers they are mentally defective as a group.

Sure. Objective morals are those ideas that everyone naturally agrees upon, except if people disagree upon them, in which case those that disagree with me are wrong, mentally defective, or do not count for whatever else reason.

 

[Job_s_First_Son]

Fledge,
If you or your family or anyone you could possibly care about now or in the future are not subject to physical or emotional (be it fear or guilt) distress or harm due to a subjective moralist you should not care.
JFS

 

[elman]

Sure. Objective morals are those ideas that everyone naturally agrees upon, except if people disagree upon them, in which case those that disagree with me are wrong, mentally defective, or do not count for whatever else reason.

That is pretty close. Anyone that believes it is morally right to torture babies has mental problems and I suspect most phyciatrists would agree. I don't quite understand why you do not. Oh I know why, you don't want to agree some morality is objective and you also don't want anyone to feel any guilt for what they have done. Right?

 

[elman]

Originally Posted by: elman

Your example is not an example of someone that believes it is alright to torture babies.

There are different opinions as to whether abortion is torturing babies, and therefore there is - practically - no agreement, although people are able to agree on the statement (but not its meaning).

Please note that the difference in opinion is not wheather torturing babies is wrong. The difference in opinion is on what constitutes torturing babies and what does not. I have never claimed there was no subjective morality. Your argument here does not prove there is no objective morality.

Quote

The point is not that everyone agrees. The point is that everyone agrees without having to discuss it. They know it inately. They did not have to be educated on it as children. The agreement is the evidence of the existence of objective morality. You are correct in that it need not be discussed because as human beings we know we should not torture babies without discussing it.

Well, great. Then anything that is discussed cannot be covered by OM. I´m afraid there aren´t many points in which OM is of help, and in those points where it could be of help, it is redundant, because people agree in them, anyways.

No obviously there are mentally defective people who do not agree.

Quote

They do exist in that moral codes are simply codes. Humans violate moral codes all the time.

And am I right in assuming that you are the expert who can tell whether people do those things because they believe them to be OK, or whether they are aware that they violate those rules?

I never claimed to be an expert on mental defectiveness. I and most human beings are experts in knowing that tortuing babies is wrong.

Quote

People being willing to violate the moral codes of humans does not prove the code does not exist. I have always agreed that we can train ourselves and our children to be monsters. We can become monsters and convince ourselves it is a good thing. We can train our consciences. That does not make it a good thing and that does not mean there was no moral code before we trained ourselves out of it. Would there be any suicide bombers if there was no culture pressure in favor of it?

I would have problems with clearly discerning what can be traced back on culture pressure and what not. Things like suicide bombing have been around all the time. On the other hand I am pretty sure that a lot of things you regard implanted into us by OM, are merely "trained into us by culture pressure", either.
As soon as you can provide any valid means of determining the sources of certain human behavioural patterns (other than by circular reasoning), I will be all ears.

You don't feel qualified to look at the world around you and decide it is simply wrong to torture babies and no one needs to deveop a moral code for that to be wrong. You are also unable to decide that people who kill themselve with bombs in order to kill innocent people that happen to be in the vicinity are not acting out of natural instincts. OK but I do believe I am qualified to make those decisions.

 

[quatona]

Please note that the difference in opinion is not wheather torturing babies is wrong. The difference in opinion is on what constitutes torturing babies and what does not.

So there is merely an agreement that a certain word has a negative connotation, but no agreement upon the idea that they link to that word. This is not objective morality, but just the nature of universal signifiers. The word "beauty" also exists (with a positive connotation) and people disagree strongly on what beauty is. Does that show that an ObjectiveBeauty exist? Rather the opposite.

I have never claimed there was no subjective morality. Your argument here does not prove there is no objective morality.

I am not out to prove that there is no objective morality. I am merely waiting for a good argument that there is.

No obviously there are mentally defective people who do not agree.

The strategy of calling all people who disagree "mentally defective" has a fine old tradition and is a safe method to prove oneself right no matter what.

I never claimed to be an expert on mental defectiveness.

Then how do you know they are mentally defective?
That´s a nice textbook example of circular reasoning you´ve got there:
Q: How do you know that there is an OMC?
A: People agree on morality.
Q: Actually people do not agree.
A: Those who disagree are mentally defective.
Q: How do you know they are mentally defective?
A: They don´t agree with the OMC.

I and most human beings are experts in knowing that tortuing babies is wrong.

So what´s left of your OMC is an argument from popularity, or alternatively a consensus on the negative connotation of a practically meaningless universal signifier.

You don't feel qualified to look at the world around you and decide it is simply wrong to torture babies and no one needs to deveop a moral code for that to be wrong.

Except that I haven´t said that, in fact I think it needs to be developed, and therefore is not an OMC.

You are also unable to decide that people who kill themselve with bombs in order to kill innocent people that happen to be in the vicinity are not acting out of natural instincts.

Sure I am able to decide that, but that would exactyl make it my subjective opinion.

OK but I do believe I am qualified to make those decisions.

Since it´s your decision, it is a product of your subjective opinions, and is in no way an argument for the existence of a OMC.

Fine then. Others believe they are qualified to come to different judgements than you do, and there goes your OMC.

 

[elman]

=quatona]

So there is merely an agreement that a certain word has a negative connotation, but no agreement upon the idea that they link to that word. This is not objective morality, but just the nature of universal signifiers. The word "beauty" also exists (with a positive connotation) and people disagree strongly on what beauty is. Does that show that an ObjectiveBeauty exist? Rather the opposite.

Beauty may be in the eye of the beholder but tortuing babies is not. You have not made a valid argument here. The people who would debate over the question of wheather abortion is torturing babies or not would not debate over the actual torturing of a baby already born.

I am not out to prove that there is no objective morality. I am merely waiting for a good argument that there is.

I have given it to you.

The strategy of calling all people who disagree "mentally defective" has a fine old tradition and is a safe method to prove oneself right no matter what.

It can be misused. In the case of torturing babies it is not being misused.

Then how do you know they are mentally defective?
That´s a nice textbook example of circular reasoning you´ve got there:
Q: How do you know that there is an OMC?
A: People agree on morality.
Q: Actually people do not agree.
A: Those who disagree are mentally defective.
Q: How do you know they are mentally defective?
A: They don´t agree with the OMC.

Do you know of a Psychiatrist that would say torturing babies is normal human behavior? Is there an agreement to some extent among most Pshychiatrist and psychologists on what is abnormal human behavior? No circular reasoning there.

So what´s left of your OMC is an argument from popularity, or alternatively a consensus on the negative connotation of a practically meaningless universal signifier.

No it is not decided by a vote of the majority that torturing babies is wrong. The vote is never taken because it would be silly to take it. It would be silly to take such a vote because everyone except perhaps you understand it is a given.

Except that I haven´t said that, in fact I think it needs to be developed, and therefore is not an OMC.

Why do you think it needs to be developed that torturing babies is wrong? What would it mean to develope what we all know already?

Sure I am able to decide that, but that would exactyl make it my subjective opinion.

It would unless it was also every other normal persons view.

Since it´s your decision, it is a product of your subjective opinions, and is in no way an argument for the existence of a OMC.

I don't know that I ever had to make a decision on that. It must therefore be an OMC.

Fine then. Others believe they are qualified to come to different judgements than you do, and there goes your OMC.

Who are these others again who believe it is good to torture babies? Have you met them?

 

[Fledge]

Hi, Fledge!

No need to apologize.
I usually prefer to avoid the „but you said“ game, but I am wondering. Maybe it´s again just a problem of language, but in the very post I had responded to, you said:
As has been stated on this thread numerous times, there is no particular reason for me to care what a subjectivist has to say about morality, other than in how it directly impacts me.
It´s possible that I am completely dense, but I fail to see the relevant difference between
“I personally see no reason to listen to what a subjectivist has to say about morality“ (which you say is not your position), and „There is no particular reason for me to care what a subjectivist has to say about morality.“ (which was your statement).
Whatever, I will regard the last statement as valid, and assume that you do care about what subjectivists have to say about morality.
Why do you do it? Do you have reasons for it? Doesn´t that answer your question?

The line that you (accurately) quoted about how "there is no particular reason for me to care what a subjectivist has to say bout morality" was not a statement of my views. I thought I was accurately summarizing (sp?) the posts of some of the subjectivists who have responded on this thread. For my own statement about my own views, please see the final paragraph of this post from earlier in the thread.

Well, I at least hadn´t understood it, and I still have some problems reconciling your position and your question.
OP question: „Why should I care about...?“
Maybe I don´t get what you mean when saying „care about“ (maybe you mean „adopt their moral codes right away, without further consideration and without even asking“ or something ? ), but I am wondering whether you have ever seen a subjectivist asking more from you than to listen to his opinion (on morals or whatever) and to judge it on its own merits. For me that would fully qualify as „caring for his opinion“.
You care for them, you apparently have reasons for doing so – so why the heck do you ask? :wondering:

Yes, I have my reasons for caring what a subjectivist has to say about morality. I asked this question, not because I didn't care, but because I didn't see why a subjectivist would expect me to care (perhaps naively, I expected them to at least want me to listen). So far, I've been told that they don't expect me to care, and even that they don't want me to care.

Firstly (and just to keep things clear): I do not see anything close to a paradox in that. Maybe it would help me greatly to understand your point in general, if you would try to explain where you see the paradox here.
Secondly, although some subjectivists may hold this view, this certainly is not what subjectivism says. It doesn´t make any statements in regards to the weight that moral question have (compared to other questions), it even seems to put quite some weight on them, else it wouldn´t have them for a subject. What may have been misunderstood is the frequently (and I think accurate) illustration of the subjectivist viewpoint, that there doesn´t exist any more „Objective Morality“ than there exists an, e.g. „Objective Taste in Music“. This doesn´t seem to make any statement about the weight, relevance or importance of either.
Thirdly, I fail to see how the statement (assuming for the sake of the argument it has been made) „My opinions have no more weight than personal preferences“ means marginalizing oneself, particularly not if it´s not a personal statement, but a view on what opinions are in general. If no HigherMorality exists (as the subjectivists think), personal preferences and opinions are the best there is. It seems like you arrive at your conclusion "self-contradiction/paradox" by applying your personal axioms ("there exists something Higher") on the ideas of others, as if they would share them. Sure, if there were something Higher, Objective, personal opinions and preferences would be comparably marginal. But, you know, we don´t believe in these Higher, Objective things. You cannot conclude paradoxa or self-contradictions, if they are based on your own axioms. This doesn´t help showing how the ideas in question have inner self-contradictions (which actually would be necessary to constitute a paradox.)
Fourthly, and rather on a sidenote while talking about self-marginalization, I wonder what would make persons who prefer to think of themselves as „filthy rags“ more reliable sources than people who think that their „opinions have no more weight than personal preferences“.

Perhaps "paradox" isn't the best word, because you're right about a paradox being internally illogical. However, I think that the term "inexplicable" (at least, to me) fits fairly well. However, I'm not sure that the word "weight" was a bad one (although I certainly wasn't trying to imply that subjectivists thought morality was unimportant). Perhaps I should have said "no more weight than other personal preferences"?

Back to "inexplicable". Perhaps more than in any other Western country, people in the US believe that their moral views should control (to at least some extent) the way they vote as well as the way they act. As a result, moral issues are often in the forefront of public discussion here in the States, and I find it extremely odd that such a large segement of the population would say that I can ignore what they have to say about morality. Or at least, it seems like this is what they are saying, and if so, then I find it inexplicable. Perhaps you will argue that subjectivism is just intellecual realism, and if you want to do so, please go ahead. Since I don't have the time to discuss that particular topic, I probably would simply not respond in detail to that section of your post. Still, if that is your view, I would be interested in hearing it articulated.

(To clarify an apparent misconception, it is not we who are "filthy rags". It is our "righteousness", or our good deeds that are "filthy rags". If we were sinless, this would not be the case, but humans cannot help but mess up, and so our attempts at acheiving God's righteousness through our actions always fall woefully short.)

Thanks!
And I see how I saw something in your statement that was not really implied. Sorry!
Anyways, I still have problems to understand why you make your statements about a specific group, if in fact you don´t intend to imply that this is a particularity of this group (as opposed to other groups).

Let me try it this way. The statement about having nothing to gain from following the MC of a subjectivist sprung from this basic line of reasoning.
1. If subjectivists are right, then the only consequences from my actions will be in this life.
2. Therefore, I should form my MC so as to provide the maximum amount of personal advantages for myself. (What such a MC would look like will of course be debated pretty much everywhere. Regardless, I'd want to figure it out on my own, and there is little point in adopting this other person's MC.)

This is why I said "nothing to gain". It was intended as an observation, not a commentary.

Just so that this is not forgotten: I am not forced to play the game. I enter the game in full knowledge and acceptance of the rules. Not sure whether this is a significant difference, but I´d like to keep that in mind.
Again (although I think that fortunately has come across by now: Subjectivism is not about having no rules.

I feel that your game comparison has its weaknesses, and on the other hand might be a good means of pointing out where the differences between subjectivists and objectivists really lie.
Objectivists are under the impression that there is something Higher (written in stone for all eternity), that they have an obligation towards. They do not play by the rules for the mere reason that they regard rules as necessary and beneficial for playing a game, but because they feel they owe playing by the rules to the higher authority (of whatever kind). Subjectivsts don´t believe such an Authority to exist, and most of them play the life-game with the same pardigms all games are played: They want it to be fun and make themselves and everybody else involved happier. Most of them acknowledge that this requires rules and the abiding of them. Since, in their view, there is no such absolute or objective rule catalogue the players (all humans)have an obligation towards, the rules are discussable – a matter of agreement. To stay in the picture: If all 22 participants of a soccer match agree that they want to change the rules completely, nobody and nothing gets hurt or violated. There are still rules to play by and the benefits that come from them.

We've agreed that there are some cause/effect laws that govern our actions, right? These laws affect us whether or not we consent to them upon our arrival; they simply exist. So in that sense , the game analogy does break down, but I'm somewhat hesitant to throw it out just yet. (For the record, I wouldn't go so far as to say that objectivists don't think it is beneficial to follow the OMC.)

Let's take a closer look at the soccer match. Let's say that we're discussing an important match between two excellent teams. Before playing, both teams and all the game officials get together and agree on a different set of rules to play by. They go out, and the changes make the game vastly more enjoyable for the players on the field and the people in the stands. Unfortunately, the league refuses to recognize the results of the match because the rules were no followed. Of course, if you don't accept a higher power of any sort, then this is beside the point. However, I think that it makes the valid point that just because everyone agrees and has fun doesn't mean that nothing else matters.

The objectivists´ problem: They assume there to be an Absolute Rule Book, but, as you have pointed out, there are many different sources that claim to describe those rules, and there are no means to discern which is the correct one (or whether one of them is correct, at all).
If anywhere, I see a paradox in assuming there Objective Rules to exist (which apparently are not obvious and not discernable by human reason and cognition, else there wouldn´t be any doubt as to which they are), but on the other hand they think their human abilities are sufficient to tell which of the claimed RuleCatalogues is the RealOne. (Since we are not discussion objectivism, consider this only a side-note).

(Since this is just a side-note, I will make my brief answer a side-note. Many, maybe even all objectivists don't think that their unaided human abilities are sufficient for the task.)

1. I don´t see how falling down 20.000 feet is an attempt to violate gravity. If someone springs of a 20.000 feet cliff in order to kill himself, all we can say is: He was aware of the consequences and acted accordingly. We do not arrive at a moral judgement through gravity.
2. Note how you speak of an „attempt of a violation“, and rightly so, because, as stated before, gravity can´t be violated. Whilst OM usually is exactly about violations of moral rules.
3. Again: Subjectivism doesn´t deny there to be consequences, it doesn´t deny there to be long-term consequences, and it doesn´t even deny there to be consequences we aren´t and can´t be aware of. Just demonstrate how something has this or that consequence, and they will be all ears.
4. A difference seems to be that objectivists (or at least theistic objectivists) do not simply assume there to be consequences, but assume that these consequences are inflicted intentionally (by who- or whatever) on us to keep us in check and to be able to reckon or judge us. I wouldn´t call that „consequences“ (things that happen because this is the way things must happen), but „sanctions/punishments/rewards“ (intentionally inflicted with the purpose of education or betterment or judgement or whatever).
Terminology and semantics aside, I definitely see a significant difference between those two sorts of „consequences“.
Thus, subjectivists and theistic objectivists don´t seem to disagree in the question whether there are consequences, but merely in their idea where those consequences originate from and whether they are inflicted upon us purposefully and intentionally.
I do not really know, though, where non-theistic objectivists fit in this picture.

If I were to jump off said 20,000 foot cliff, I would be effectively challenging the law of gravity (unless I'm simply suicidal). The consequences of my issuing this foolish challenge will more than likely be fatal, but there is an extended period of time in which these consequences are not very apparent. Likewise, violations of moral laws do not often have immediately apparent consequences. This does not change the fact that the consequences will be very grave, or that they will someday come. There is simply a much more obvious connection between the consequences of jumping off a cliff than there is between the consequences of doing something like, say, lying.

Now, I'm not trying to suggest that subjectivists don't believe that actions have consequences (although I appreciate your clarifications on the subject). However, demonstrating consequences that take place after death is rather harder than demonstrating consequences that take place before death. As a result, demonstrating the worst consequences of violating the OMC is impossible.

I for one would not refer to the fruit of following/disobeying the OMC using any of the three words you used (sanctions, punishments, and rewards). I would instead say that God has an unchangeable nature, and this unchangeability is what dictates both the OMC and the consequences of violating it. He didn't just sit down one day and say "I want people to do this and not do that, so here's what I'm going to do for people who do this, and here's what I'm going to do to people who do that."

These your axioms perfectly explain the impossibility to answer your question to your satisfaction.
Then again, I would have thunk that it was self-suggesting that no subjectivist ever entertained the idea that you might expect him to help him with discerning this OMC you believe in and he doesn´t.

Greetings
quatona

If you are referring to the OP, then I think that I can have the question answered to my satisfaction. I think that it is important to discuss what I believe to be the OMC, but that doesn't mean that all my moral discussions will center around it, or that I cannot discuss your MC in a rational fashion.

Fledge

 

[quatona]

=quatona]
Beauty may be in the eye of the beholder but tortuing babies is not. You have not made a valid argument here. The people who would debate over the question of wheather abortion is torturing babies or not would not debate over the actual torturing of a baby already born.

The argument is valid: People disagree on what "torturing babies" signifies, therefore it is in the eye of the beholder.
Your argument seems to be that there are particular cases in which the vast majority agrees in that it is torturing of a baby, and this is certainly an accurate observation.
What we have, then, is a majority opinion and feeling, but not yet an OMC. A vast majority agrees in that a rose is beautiful, but not everyone. We won´t conclude an ObjectiveBeautyCode to exist. We won´t call those persons defective. The reason being that the majority does not perceive this minority view as a danger or threat, and therefore has no problems tolerating it. The more important the points are considered in which minorities vary from the majority, the more strongly the majority will feel threatened by this minority view and actions, to the extreme of considering them insane. This happens everywhere and is independent of the nature of the axioms of this majority (which often are a product of socialization and conditioning).
This seems to be a useful and maybe necessary reaction of a group in order to function, but it does in no way point to the axioms of this group being OMC.

On another note: I´m glad you have found one example for something that is indeed widely agreed upon, and I understand that you therefore use it all the time. So let´s assume, that there were indeed cases of torturing a baby in regards to which 100% of the humans agree that it is wrong. Some may call that a result of reason, some may call the result of the genetic code, some may call that the result of an OMC.
I suspect that you will find many more examples for real actions (as opposed to mere universal signifiers), that are so agreed upon to be wrong.
If indeed this "OMC" is universally agreed upon and has by and large the same results as applying reason has, why would it be even an issue?
As a matter of fact, this OMC is usually used for an argument in those very cases where people do disagree (and where you will have a hard time to simply do your opponents off as an extreme minority of nutcases).

It can be misused. In the case of torturing babies it is not being misused.

According to your decree, I guess.

Do you know of a Psychiatrist that would say torturing babies is normal human behavior? Is there an agreement to some extent among most Pshychiatrist and psychologists on what is abnormal human behavior? No circular reasoning there.

Agreements of psychiatrists, psychologists and most everyone on certain behaviours are undisputed. What is disputed is the source of this agreement. And that´s where your circular reasoning kicks in.
I don´t know that psychiatrists and psychologists argumentate by some obscure OMC, they argumentate by reason and observation and the societal needs.

No it is not decided by a vote of the majority that torturing babies is wrong. The vote is never taken because it would be silly to take it. It would be silly to take such a vote because everyone except perhaps you understand it is a given.

That would make it a majority vote (which indeed is considered an important thing in our societies, but doesn´t make it an OMC. Yes, you are right: I don´t understand it as a given by an obscure source of OMC - I understand it to be a paradigm that can easily be argumentated for, and is therefore most likely to convince everyone.
I personally prefer a good argument for a certain behaviour over the mere claim of some beyond/supernatural/spiritual/divine/whatnot sources any day. If it can be explained, why not simply explain it?
I understand that there is a need to transcend your god concept into a beyond realm, because it doesn´t make much sense in this realm. Whilst certain axioms do make perfect sense in this realm, and they needn´t be obscured.

Why do you think it needs to be developed that torturing babies is wrong? What would it mean to develope what we all know already?

Well, actually it was you who claimed it needs to be developed.

It would unless it was also every other normal persons view.[/quote[
You seem to confuse subjective vs. objective and wrong vs right here. And again, you simply take those who disagree out of the equation by calling them not normal, which in fact is an accurate term because they are different from the majority. I suspect, though, that by saying "not normal" you actually want to label them irrelevant.

I don't know that I ever had to make a decision on that. It must therefore be an OMC.

Then why did you yourself say you dediced so? I merely referred to your own statement.

Who are these others again who believe it is good to torture babies? Have you met them?

Well, if your OMC is merely making a statement about torturing babies, then fine. I was working from the assumption that you were attempting to establish the idea of an OMC that covers more areas. If not, I´m sorry that I have misunderstood you. Whilst if my idea was accurate, there are certainly people who disagree with you on the idea of what is right and what is wrong.

 

[quatona]

Hi Fledge,


I still don´t seem to understand your actual problem (maybe it has been solved by now, but I wasn´t able to tell that from your response).

Instead of responding to each of your paragraphs, I will firstly try to paraphrase what I understand your problem to be, and then I will explain why I think it is unreasonable to expect a subjectivst to solve it for you.

If I understand you correctly, your question is: Why would I take a subjectivist´s idea of morality into account when searching for the OMC I think God has given to us?

Answer: This would be the most unreasonable thing to do, because usually subjectivists have different ideas about the sources, the nature and the purposes of morality than you. And, even more to the point, what makes them subjectivists is their notion that you don´t get anything but subjective opinions if asking humans (or investigating sources provided and produced by humans). Thus the very definition of their worldview prevents them from expecting you to find your God-given OMC in their opinions. They consider this so painfully obvious, that they probably didn´t even understand why you would expect them to have your axioms confirmed by them, who, by definition do not share your axioms.
I, the atheist, could as well ask a theist, why I should care about hell. The very fact that I don´t believe in Biblegod should make it obvious that people need not and cannot help me with the issue of hell, because it isn´t even an issue for me.

Now for a couple of statements I would like to give you my opinion about:d care about hell. Ity them, who, by definition do not share your axioms.

Yes, I have my reasons for caring what a subjectivist has to say about morality. I asked this question, not because I didn't care, but because I didn't see why a subjectivist would expect me to care (perhaps naively, I expected them to at least want me to listen). So far, I've been told that they don't expect me to care, and even that they don't want me to care.

Well, they would like you to listen to their opinions merely for what they themselves think they are: their subjective opinions. They certainly don´t expect you to consider them the source of your assumed God-given OMC, simply because they don´t even believe it exists and therefore are far from considering themselves a valid source for this non-existing OMC. That would be absurd, wouldn´t it?

Back to "inexplicable". Perhaps more than in any other Western country, people in the US believe that their moral views should control (to at least some extent) the way they vote as well as the way they act. As a result, moral issues are often in the forefront of public discussion here in the States, and I find it extremely odd that such a large segement of the population would say that I can ignore what they have to say about morality. Or at least, it seems like this is what they are saying, and if so, then I find it inexplicable.

Yes, if they did, I would also see the problem you see. But they don´t say that, and I am increasingly wondering where you have taken that idea from.
If you are searching for your GgOMC, they will tell you they have nothing to contribute (and along with that they hold the opinion that literally nobody has to contribute anything, because what you get from humans are merely subjective opinions). Your axioms have transcended morality into a supposedly existing Higher Objective Realm of your choice, so what could they possibly say?
Let me repeat my statement from a previous post: If you impose your own axioms on opinions of persons who don´t share these axioms, that´s the safest way of arriving at inexplicabilities (pointing to contradictions between your axioms and theirs).
If you – hypothetically - are not interested in music at all, but I am a music fan, I would find it inexplicable that you don´t go to a concert of the London Philharmony in your town. If learning that you are not interested in music anyways this inexplicability is solved. Falsely I have assumed you to share my axioms. If you ask a question to subjectivists, I am under the impression that you don´t have to learn about the antagonistic axioms anymore, because the term itself already pretty precisely describes the axiom that is incompatible with yours.

Perhaps you will argue that subjectivism is just intellecual realism, and if you want to do so, please go ahead. Since I don't have the time to discuss that particular topic, I probably would simply not respond in detail to that section of your post. Still, if that is your view, I would be interested in hearing it articulated.

No, I won´t argue that. I do think that subjectivism is a very reasonable view, though (else I wouldn´t hold it, after all ). But I wouldn´t equivocate two completely independent philosophical ideas.

(To clarify an apparent misconception, it is not we who are "filthy rags". It is our "righteousness", or our good deeds that are "filthy rags". If we were sinless, this would not be the case, but humans cannot help but mess up, and so our attempts at acheiving God's righteousness through our actions always fall woefully short.)

Thanks for clarifying. Still I think that this marginalizes the value of human actions by comparing them to God´s righteousness. Maybe this marginalization is appropriate (according to your axioms), maybe not (according to mine), but it´s certainly not much less of a marginalization (according to mine, the person whom you have asked to explain his views).

Let me try it this way. The statement about having nothing to gain from following the MC of a subjectivist sprung from this basic line of reasoning.
1. If subjectivists are right, then the only consequences from my actions will be in this life.

Sorry, but this is not what subjectivism says. I don´t know that subjectivism makes statements about consequences in an afterlife, or the existence or non-existence of an afterlife, anyways.
If anything, this is what materialism says, or at least implies.
Thus, if this is the point of your concern, you´d better initiate a discussion between persons who believe in an afterlife that provides consequences for this life and persons who don´t believe this. This is not an inherent problem of objectivism vs. subjectivism.

2. Therefore, I should form my MC so as to provide the maximum amount of personal advantages for myself.

Hang on. This is merely your personal conclusion that you would draw from the lack of an afterlife and the consequences it provides. It does not automatically follow from this idea.
Anyways, we are far from subjectivism here, anyways.

Let's take a closer look at the soccer match. Let's say that we're discussing an important match between two excellent teams. Before playing, both teams and all the game officials get together and agree on a different set of rules to play by. They go out, and the changes make the game vastly more enjoyable for the players on the field and the people in the stands. Unfortunately, the league refuses to recognize the results of the match because the rules were no followed. Of course, if you don't accept a higher power of any sort, then this is beside the point.

Exactly. And that´s why it´s futile to ask those pragmatic players why you should expect their rules to be the Rules published by this League you believe exists.

However, I think that it makes the valid point that just because everyone agrees and has fun doesn't mean that nothing else matters.

„Nothing else“ being too broad a term here, methinks. What you are talking about are specifically the Rules of this League you believe exists, and they don´t believe to exist. Thus, they quite obviously don´t matter to them. If you want to join their game, you either accept the rules they play by or you convince them that your rules warrant more fun. Whilst if you are searching for the RulesOfTheLeague, you better look elsewhere. Self-suggesting, actually.

If I were to jump off said 20,000 foot cliff, I would be effectively challenging the law of gravity (unless I'm simply suicidal).

And that´s exactly why people don´t do it, and why there needn´t be a moral law against it.
Next time you hear of someone jumping off a cliff for the purpose of challenging the law of gravity, let me know.
The law of gravity is so freaking obvious, that noone would ever challenge it. You maybe ignorant or unaware of a law, but you will never challenge it once you know this law. Because this is what „law“ in this context means: it´s futile to challenge it. On another note that´s the very reason why we conceptualize our reliable observation into „laws“: they sum up and abstract our experiences.

The consequences of my issuing this foolish challenge will more than likely be fatal, but there is an extended period of time in which these consequences are not very apparent.

Sure they are apparent. You perceive yourself as falling, going to hit the ground with incredibly high speed, and from everything you know and from abstracting previous experiences you know in what that will result. You are aware of the gravity all the time.
Whilst in regards to your OMC you would believe me in laws that I have never experienced, cannot experience, laws which have „consequences“ that aren´t immediate, but delayed into an afterlife. While laws like gravity are closely linked to our experiences (derived and abstracted by them, confirmed reliably and without exception by them, the consequences we will experience being predictable to a t, your OMC is exactly defined to be not a matter of experience. Else we could derive and discuss it, just like we do with laws like gravity.
Don´t take it personally (but rather as a momentary frustration on my part): For the life of me I don´t understand why theists so often point out how different the things they believe in are from that which we observe here, and in the next moment they would me believe that they are by and large the same. Rant over.

Likewise, violations of moral laws do not often have immediately apparent consequences.

I have said it several times, yet I feel it needs to be repeated: Laws like gravity cannot be violated. That´s the very difference, and that already shows how we are talking about two completely different concepts, unfortunately both carrying the same label „law“. Prescriptive and descriptive laws.
One difference being, that prescriptive laws can be violated, descriptive laws can not. On the one hand you would like to establish that moral laws aren´t different from natural laws, on the other hand you keep telling me how they can be violated.

This does not change the fact that the consequences will be very grave, or that they will someday come. There is simply a much more obvious connection between the consequences of jumping off a cliff than there is between the consequences of doing something like, say, lying.

Well, I have to wait for that point in time then. One essential foundation of our ability to learn is to face consequences. The more immediate the consequences, the better the learning effect. That´s exactly why people don´t jump off cliffs, except for suicidal purposes. If the assumed Author of OMC shifts the consequences for my actions extremely far into the future, even into another form of existence, then I can´t help assuming that He is not interested in me learning about them.
But we are way off-topic again. Nothing to do with subjectivism whatsoever.

Now, I'm not trying to suggest that subjectivists don't believe that actions have consequences (although I appreciate your clarifications on the subject). However, demonstrating consequences that take place after death is rather harder than demonstrating consequences that take place before death. As a result, demonstrating the worst consequences of violating the OMC is impossible.

I would assume their Author has made that so for a reason.

I for one would not refer to the fruit of following/disobeying the OMC using any of the three words you used (sanctions, punishments, and rewards). I would instead say that God has an unchangeable nature, and this unchangeability is what dictates both the OMC and the consequences of violating it. He didn't just sit down one day and say "I want people to do this and not do that, so here's what I'm going to do for people who do this, and here's what I'm going to do to people who do that."

I´d suggest that we discuss God´s unchangability and other limitations which He is restricted by, and the way He brought the OMC about another time. It´s really too far off. Ok?

If you think I have left important points unadressed, please let me know.

Greetings
quatona