I need a proof for free will.

[Eudaimonist]

http://www.comereason.org/phil_qstn/phi038.asp

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[RatzingerRocks]

I am only questioning free will with an omniscient being. If it's easy for you to demonstrate, please do.

I'd like to take more time to answer your questions, but I have to get to work in 25 minutes .

Anyway, I hope you plan on going into philosophy when you leave high school. I think you have demonstrated a good mind for this.

I shoulden't have said it's easy for any universal objections, i ment for the most common objection, namely that if God is omniscient then he knows our future, then we can't change what we will do because it's predestined by God. Is that what your refering to?

 

[elman]

All I want is a proof for free will. Please provide me a logical proof of free will and the existence of an omniscient being (where omniscient means "having all knowledge"). I don't need you to make the proof, just provide it.

There is not proof for God. That is a matter of faith. If you want prove to yourself you have free will, decide not to shave tomorrow. If you are able to not shave, you have free will.

 

[levi501]

...and then try to fly... if you can't then you don't have freewill.

 

[JonF]

All I want is a proof for free will.

Don’t we all.

Please provide me a logical proof of free will and the existence of an omniscient being (where omniscient means "having all knowledge"). .

First of all whether or not we have free will is highly debatable even if God isn’t thrown into the picture. How you state this question is: you want proof that free will exist and God exist. I doubt that many people on these forums believe that you can prove God exist; so you probably won’t get the desired proof as you have it stated.

What I think you meant is that you want someone to show that an omniscient God is consistent with freewill.

In other words you want us to show consistency for the claim: An omniscient God is consistent with freewill.

The problem is you can’t give a first-order representation of the claim in question, (since it is usually considered the set of all possible actions are a continuum, no schemata will work). So far as I know all methods of modeling only deal with first-order theories. The usual method to prove something is consistent is to construct a model and use Gödel's completeness theorem. Since this can’t be done with your claim, it’s undecidable.

 

[Danhalen]

http://www.comereason.org/phil_qstn/phi038.asp

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/


eudaimonia,

Mark

Ohhh! The first link is a weak and easily defeated argument. The argument is not that that an omniscient being forces an action to take place. It is that there is no other possible scenario in which I act in a different way than what is foreknown. Therefore there is no choice. I've posted the proof time and again on these fora, no need to do so again.

The second link is one I'll have to take some time reading. It looks good. I have their site bookmarked already, but I have never thought to look up this specific dilemma. Thanks for that!

 

[Danhalen]

I shoulden't have said it's easy for any universal objections, i ment for the most common objection, namely that if God is omniscient then he knows our future, then we can't change what we will do because it's predestined by God. Is that what your refering to?

No. I mean there is no other possible world in which I do something other than what I do. It is not an act of the omniscient being which forces free will to be invalid. It is the nil chance of any other action taking place.

 

[Danhalen]

There is not proof for God. That is a matter of faith. If you want prove to yourself you have free will, decide not to shave tomorrow. If you are able to not shave, you have free will.

I'm not asking for a proof of God. I am asking for a proof of free will being compatible with an omniscient being. This being does not necessarily have to be God (or any deity, just omniscient).

 

[Danhalen]

Don’t we all.

First of all whether or not we have free will is highly debatable even if God isn’t thrown into the picture. How you state this question is: you want proof that free will exist and God exist. I doubt that many people on these forums believe that you can prove God exist; so you probably won’t get the desired proof as you have it stated.

What I think you meant is that you want someone to show that an omniscient God is consistent with freewill.

In other words you want us to show consistency for the claim: An omniscient God is consistent with freewill.

The problem is you can’t give a first-order representation of the claim in question, (since it is usually considered the set of all possible actions are a continuum, no schemata will work). So far as I know all methods of modeling only deal with first-order theories. The usual method to prove something is consistent is to construct a model and use Gödel's completeness theorem. Since this can’t be done with your claim, it’s undecidable.

Thanks for the response. I've not gone far enough in my philosopical studies to cover Godel yet. So I cannot say I actually understand what you are saying at this point. I'm sure when I get to logic, I'll get it a bit more. At least you have given me something to look forward to. It sucks to be a freshman, all the logic classes get full before I get to sign up for them.

 

[RatzingerRocks]

No. I mean there is no other possible world in which I do something other than what I do. It is not an act of the omniscient being which forces free will to be invalid. It is the nil chance of any other action taking place.

I kind of understand your objection, kind of don't. Could you elaborate a bit?

 

[Danhalen]

I kind of understand your objection, kind of don't. Could you elaborate a bit?

It's easier with the syllogism. Here it is (I just hope no one gets sick of seeing it):

premises, to lay everything out:
1. God is omniscient, that is, he knows every fact.
2. God is perfect, that is, the greatest of all possible entities.
3. God is necessary, that is, God exists in every possible world.
4. for libertarian free will to exist, there must be multiple possible worlds for any given event.

For simplicity there are two possible choices to constitute free will. Choice 1 will be "A" in which I pray. Choice 2 will be "B" in which I do not pray. for free will to exist we have must have:
<>A
<>B

The 2 possible worlds created by these choices are:
X: the world in which it is true that I choose to pray.
Y: the world in which it is true that I choose not to pray.

God as defined in our premises knows that in X, A is true. God knows that in Y, B is true. We will define these as:
G: God knowing i will pray.
g: God knowing that i will not pray.

Assuming A is true:
if A then X then G. Therefore God is not g. We know that God exists necessarily, that God is the greatest of all possible entities, and that God is G. The problem is; if Y then g. Therefore not G.

Since God exists in all possible worlds, and God is G, and G does not exist in Y, then God does not exist in Y, then Y is not a possible world. If Y is not a possible world, then there is no possible world in which I do not pray. God's omniscience and necessity show that I could not possibly choose to not pray. Thus, there is no free will, since there is only one possible world.

 

[Eudaimonist]

Ohhh! The first link is a weak and easily defeated argument. The argument is not that that an omniscient being forces an action to take place. It is that there is no other possible scenario in which I act in a different way than what is foreknown. Therefore there is no choice. I've posted the proof time and again on these fora, no need to do so again.

I used to take your position on this issue, but I'm not so certain any more. Let me flesh out reasons for my uncertainty.

A choice involves taking one course of action out of more than one possible course of action. Possible courses of action are those are are consistent with one's nature and the nature of the universe. IOW, nothing physically forbids such actions from happening, aside from our inability to split ourselves up and do more than one thing at one time. The fact that one can, and must, take only one course of action does not limit choice; it is the very nature of choice.

Foreknowledge of actions is only of what will occur, not of what was possible to occur. The crux of the issue is: if one can have foreknowledge of what will occur, does that mean the other actions are not, in fact, possible?

And here is the problem -- knowing that a particular course of action will occur tells you nothing about whether free will is permitted or not -- it is beside the point. In both a deterministic and a free will universe, only one course of action will occur. In the deterministic universe, only one specific course of action (e.g. sleep instead of watch TV) can occur and will occur (one goes to sleep). In the free will universe, several courses of action can occur (sleep or watch TV), but only one will occur (e.g. one chooses to sleep). And so all we deal with in foreknowledge is that which is common to both models, and does not exclude either.

You speak of "scenarios" in which you expect to find someone acting in a different way than what is foreknown. But the point here is that only one scenario will actually happen (if other scenarios could happen, this would invalidate the whole issue and give rise to a new one, e.g. can God have foreknowledge of people's choices if time is repeatedly rewound, and the like), and the scenario will by necessity involve only one course of action. Your foreknowledge of what someone will do does not limit what could have been done. No course of action has been fixed in the past. What one has foreknowledge of is the choice -- that one course of action -- that will be made. No other courses of action are actually rendered impossible.

So the argument from the link that God isn't forcing anyone to do what they will do is a stronger point than it may appear -- unless, of course, my rational insight is failing me here.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Danhalen]

Foreknowledge of actions is only of what will occur, not of what was possible to occur. The crux of the issue is: if one can have foreknowledge of what will occur, does that mean the other actions are not, in fact, possible?

And here is the problem -- knowing that a particular course of action will occur tells you nothing about whether free will is permitted or not -- it is beside the point. In both a deterministic and a free will universe, only one course of action will occur. In the deterministic universe, only one specific course of action (e.g. sleep instead of watch TV) can occur and will occur (one goes to sleep). In the free will universe, several courses of action can occur (sleep or watch TV), but only one will occur (e.g. one chooses to sleep). And so all we deal with in foreknowledge is that which is common to both models, and does not exclude either.

You speak of "scenarios" in which you expect to find someone acting in a different way than what is foreknown. But the point here is that only one scenario will actually happen (if other scenarios could happen, this would invalidate the whole issue and give rise to a new one, e.g. can God have foreknowledge of people's choices if time is repeatedly rewound, and the like), and the scenario will by necessity involve only one course of action. Your foreknowledge of what someone will do does not limit what could have been done. No course of action has been fixed in the past. What one has foreknowledge of is the choice -- that one course of action -- that will be made. No other courses of action are actually rendered impossible.

So the argument from the link that God isn't forcing anyone to do what they will do is a stronger point than it may appear -- unless, of course, my rational insight is failing me here.

The argument is not that God forces anything to happen. The argument is that omniscience necessitates there being only one possible choice. If--what seems to be--choice A is known to be the one I will take, it is not possible I will choose any other course of action. How do I know this? Because If an omniscient being exists in all possible worlds--out of necessity--and I will not make any other choice--known from omniscience--it is not choice B I will make. Therefore it is not possible for the world which would be B exists, and it follows that any world which is possible contains the necessary being. Thus it is not possible for any other choice to actually be available. A is the only possible choice since omniscience and necessity of existence dictate.

 

[Eudaimonist]

If an omniscient being exists in all possible worlds

Exists in all possible worlds?

Sorry, I don't think that all possible worlds exist or should be thought of as existing.

But I think that part of the problem with thought experiments of this sort is the failure to understand just what omniscience is and how it is even possible for an omniscient being to know in advance what some free willed agent will choose to do.

and I will not make any other choice--known from omniscience--it is not choice B I will make. Therefore it is not possible for the world which would be B exists

No, the possibility may still exist. It is only the actualization of that possibility that won't.

I suspect that it is your style of philosophy (this "many-worlds" approach) that accounts for the differences in how we think about this issue. It is foreign to my way of thinking.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[JonF]

It's easier with the syllogism. Here it is (I just hope no one gets sick of seeing it):

I. premises, to lay everything out:
1. God is omniscient, that is, he knows every fact.
2. God is perfect, that is, the greatest of all possible entities.
3. God is necessary, that is, God exists in every possible world.
4. for libertarian free will to exist, there must be multiple possible worlds for any given event.

For simplicity there are two possible choices to constitute free will. Choice 1 will be "A" in which I pray. Choice 2 will be "B" in which I do not pray. for free will to exist we have must have:
<>A
<>B

II. The 2 possible worlds created by these choices are:
X: the world in which it is true that I choose to pray.
Y: the world in which it is true that I choose not to pray.

III. God as defined in our premises knows that in X, A is true. God knows that in Y, B is true. We will define these as:
G: God knowing i will pray.
g: God knowing that i will not pray.

IV. Assuming A is true:
if A then X then G. Therefore God is not g. We know that God exists necessarily, that God is the greatest of all possible entities, and that God is G. The problem is; if Y then g. Therefore not G.

Since God exists in all possible worlds, and God is G, and G does not exist in Y, then God does not exist in Y, then Y is not a possible world. If Y is not a possible world, then there is no possible world in which I do not pray. God's omniscience and necessity show that I could not possibly choose to not pray. Thus, there is no free will, since there is only one possible world.

Your argument does something rather sneaky here. You list two possible worlds, then affirm one of them as actual, then object that something can’t exist in the other world. The problem is once you affirm one of the worlds as actual; the other is no longer a possible world. Thus nothing exist in it.

Example:
The proposition “I am alive, or I am dead” is necessarily true in any possible world in which I exist.
Now clearly there are two sets of possible worlds to consider:
<>A [The set of worlds in which I am alive.]
<>B [The set of worlds in which I am dead.]

Let us assume some world in <>A is actual. Clearly this means I am alive. This means I am not dead. So <>B can’t be a possible world. Similarly it can be argued <>A can’t be a possible world. But either a world in <>A or <>B must be actual if I exist. So, I must not exist!

There do seem to be contradictions between any form of determinism and free will. This has confounded philosopher for a very long time. But Hume pointed out there are even bigger problem with the complete absence of determinism and free will. If actions aren’t determined something previous, how can anything you “will” effect anything at all? For example: if I decide to respond to this post, didn’t that decision determine that I responded to this post?

It might be helpful at this point in time to give us a rigorous definition of what you mean by freewill.

 

[h2whoa]

I don't believe that you can provide proof of freewill. That's not to say it does, or doesn't, exist. However, I think it's much too conceptual to have a nice little scientific equation.

I would go so far as to say that the existance of freewill is as untestable, unprovable, and (most importantly) irrelevant in science as the existance of God.

 

[elman]

...and then try to fly... if you can't then you don't have freewill.

Having free will does not mean I am the omnipotent God. Being limited n some way in ones ability is not about free will. Free will is having some contol over ones actions, such as being kind to someone or unkind whichever you want to chose to do. It not about being able to fly to the moon on gossemer wings.

 

[Eudaimonist]

Having free will does not mean I am the omnipotent God. Being limited n some way in ones ability is not about free will. Free will is having some contol over ones actions, such as being kind to someone or unkind whichever you want to chose to do. It not about being able to fly to the moon on gossemer wings.

Agreed.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[elman]

I'm not asking for a proof of God. I am asking for a proof of free will being compatible with an omniscient being. This being does not necessarily have to be God (or any deity, just omniscient).

In order to prove free will is compatible with an omniscient being, Iwould have to prove the existence of an omniscient being. I cannot which does not mean of course the being does no exist, just that we cannot prove its existenc. Free will on the other hand is observable if we are talking about the ability to be either kind or unkind to someone as being evidence of the free will we have.

 

[jacksam]

All I want is a proof for free will. Please provide me a logical proof of free will and the existence of an omniscient being (where omniscient means "having all knowledge"). I don't need you to make the proof, just provide it.

Hi,
I too am struggling with this question- Is there a free will really? Each action of man has a series of thoughts behind it and man is not responsible for those thoughts. So, is man really free? If you find an answer please help me too.
jaccksam