I am a fallible p-zombie?

[GrowingSmaller]

From the internal perspective, we are meant to know we are conscious. Close the eyes, and open them. Notice the difference, and viola, we have a direct understanding of consciousness. It's 'apodeictic' or some other clever word.

Now lets imagine that something diffferent happens to me when I open my eyes, to that which happens to you. Normally, the doubt is on the other - is the other conscious? I am for sure, but maybe not you. But what of me? My open eyes could lead to state of affairs a, b, c etc. Not necessarily c. For instance it - my designation "I am in fact consicous" - may be the automated labelling of an unconscious response to a process such as "sensory information feed established via retina"...

So when I claim to be conscious, I may in fact be a p-zombie without knowing it...

Like the inverted spectrum argument, my "blue" may be your "green". My denotation of "consciousness" may not be the same as yours...

Maybe this relates to the priivate language argument, the beetle in the box scenario of Wittgenstein. Any takers?

 

[Davian]

Philosophy Humans - Existential Comics

 

[TillICollapse]

You’ve got a little boy. He shows you his butterfly collection plus the killing jar. What do you do?

 

[Davian]

From the internal perspective, we are meant to know we are conscious. Close the eyes, and open them. Notice the difference, and viola, we have a direct understanding of consciousness. It's 'apodeictic' or some other clever word.

"It's very hard to change people's minds about something like consciousness, and I finally figured out the reason for that. The reason for that is that everybody's an expert on consciousness. We heard the other day that everybody's got a strong opinion about video games. They all have an idea for a video game, even if they're not experts. But they don't consider themselves experts on video games; they've just got strong opinions. I'm sure that people here who work on, say, climate change and global warming, or on the future of the Internet, encounter people who have very strong opinions about what's going to happen next. But they probably don't think of these opinions as expertise. They're just strongly held opinions. But with regard to consciousness, people seem to think, each of us seems to think, "I am an expert. Simply by being conscious, I know all about this." And so, you tell them your theory and they say, "No, no, that's not the way consciousness is! No, you've got it all wrong." And they say this with an amazing confidence."

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fjbWr3ODbAo

Now lets imagine that something diffferent happens to me when I open my eyes, to that which happens to you. Normally, the doubt is on the other - is the other conscious? I am for sure, but maybe not you. But what of me? My open eyes could lead to state of affairs a, b, c etc. Not necessarily c. For instance it - my designation "I am in fact consicous" - may be the automated labelling of an unconscious response to a process such as "sensory information feed established via retina"...

So when I claim to be conscious, I may in fact be a p-zombie without knowing it...

Like the inverted spectrum argument, my "blue" may be your "green". My denotation of "consciousness" may not be the same as yours...

Maybe this relates to the priivate language argument, the beetle in the box scenario of Wittgenstein. Any takers?

I subscribe to Thomas Metzinger's the self-model theory of subjectivity.

"SMT is not only a conceptual framework in analytical philosophy of mind, but at the same time an interdisciplinary research program spanning many disciplines from neuroscience, cognitive science, neuropsychology and psychiatry to artificial intelligence and evolutionary robotics."

Self models - Scholarpedia

I would hypothesize that, if the internal experience - the phenomenal self - was not consistent in giving itself the impression that it was (however self-defined) "conscious", the results might be uncomfortable, to the point of nihilism. If self-awareness is a survival trait, then those individuals better able to maintain this internal illusion would have the advantage, and would be our ancestors.

Being No One with Thomas Metzinger - YouTube

 

[Paradoxum]

If you experience consciousness, then you (the experiencing being) aren't a zombie.

The body talking might be a zombie, but that was an issue even without this current consideration.

I suppose you could say you are a person in a zombies' body?

Have I missed something?

 

[GrowingSmaller]

If you experience consciousness, then you (the experiencing being) aren't a zombie.

True, but how am I supposed to know I am conscious? There is only my fallible opinion to verify it.

The body talking might be a zombie, but that was an issue even without this current consideration.

But what I believe to be mind, may not be mind. It is not a necessary truth that when I believe I am conscious, I am conscious, or is it?

I suppose you could say you are a person in a zombies' body?

Have I missed something?

Ok you "know" you are conscious. How do you know? You assume that some state of affairs is what we are all referring to, but since you have no access to my "state of afairs", any knowledge of similarity is indirect, inductive, and therefore fallible. Therefore, theres a possible world where you are using the term mistakenly. Can you tell which one (possible world, right or wrong) you are in?

You assume that everyione else may be a zombie (I suppose) but not you yourself. What about deconstructing that. Everyone else may be conscious, and you the zombie...

What do you have to rely on except - or at least crucially - the usage of the term "conscious"? And that can apparently be misapplied, as the ordinary p-zombie scenario illustrates...

 

[GrowingSmaller]

"It's very hard to change people's minds about something like consciousness, and I finally figured out the reason for that. The reason for that is that everybody's an expert on consciousness. We heard the other day that everybody's got a strong opinion about video games. They all have an idea for a video game, even if they're not experts. But they don't consider themselves experts on video games; they've just got strong opinions. I'm sure that people here who work on, say, climate change and global warming, or on the future of the Internet, encounter people who have very strong opinions about what's going to happen next. But they probably don't think of these opinions as expertise. They're just strongly held opinions. But with regard to consciousness, people seem to think, each of us seems to think, "I am an expert. Simply by being conscious, I know all about this." And so, you tell them your theory and they say, "No, no, that's not the way consciousness is! No, you've got it all wrong." And they say this with an amazing confidence."

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fjbWr3ODbAo

I subscribe to Thomas Metzinger's the self-model theory of subjectivity.

"SMT is not only a conceptual framework in analytical philosophy of mind, but at the same time an interdisciplinary research program spanning many disciplines from neuroscience, cognitive science, neuropsychology and psychiatry to artificial intelligence and evolutionary robotics."

Self models - Scholarpedia

I would hypothesize that, if the internal experience - the phenomenal self - was not consistent in giving itself the impression that it was (however self-defined) "conscious", the results might be uncomfortable, to the point of nihilism. If self-awareness is a survival trait, then those individuals better able to maintain this internal illusion would have the advantage, and would be our ancestors.

Being No One with Thomas Metzinger - YouTube

Thanks for the response, I feel you care...

I think that self awareness is a survival trait, and I believe I am not a zombie. I think that I can prove that consciousness has instrumental power, because it has effects in the world, like our resultant knowledge "We are conscious". Its very odd that people may defend epiphenomenalism, given they know (or seemingly know) they are consicous. If they know the sun exists, its due to the effects of the sun.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

You’ve got a little boy. He shows you his butterfly collection plus the killing jar. What do you do?

Cripes... lucky I am not a parent I guess. I could discuss meta ethics with him though.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Philosophy Humans - Existential Comics

Spy level philosopy...

 

[KCfromNC]

True, but how am I supposed to know I am conscious? There is only my fallible opinion to verify it.

How do you believe you know anything at all, considering you have to use your fallible opinion to verify that you believe it?

But what I believe to be mind, may not be mind. It is not a necessary truth that when I believe I am conscious, I am conscious, or is it?

If you experience things, you experience them. If you don't, you don't. Seems like an area where philosophy is making stuff difficult with no benefit.

Ok you "know" you are conscious. How do you know?

I experience things. It is a solid tentative conclusion.

Therefore, theres a possible world where you are using the term mistakenly.

Is there? Please describe that world.

You assume that everyione else may be a zombie (I suppose) but not you yourself. What about deconstructing that. Everyone else may be conscious, and you the zombie...

Since zombies are logically inconsistent unless you assume the conclusion they are used to prove, we have no reason to worry about them.

 

[Gottservant]

I think the fact is that you got your inspiration from someone and they in turn got their inspiration from someone, so ultimately everyone gets their inspiration from someone - so in that sense the data of the information is absolutely referenced in a coherently patterned way, that is shared from individual to individual by design.

In other words, everyone questions whether reality is real, in exactly the same way (fundamentally), therefore reality is as real as everybody.

Your mistake is to assume that you can change the assumptions of a small unit in the collective - the individual - and not affect the coherence of the unit, even though the unit is dependent on the whole for its interpretation, not the other way around.

If you could prove that everyone simultaneously disagrees what blue is and coordinates a response that reflects that, without losing the coherence that makes them "everyone" then you would have a problem

 

[TillICollapse]

Cripes... lucky I am not a parent I guess. I could discuss meta ethics with him though.

I didn't think my reference was that obscure lol

I was referencing the Voight-Kampff machine from the book "Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep ?" and the movie Blade Runner. :/ It's a nod to the Turing Test, sort of. Odd questions are asked which attempt to elicit specific responses to see who is human or not, who is conscious, etc.

In a roundabout way (which obviously got missed), I was trying to say that if you can pass something like a Turing Test or Voight-Kampff machine, then whether you're a P-Zombie or not is irrelevant. So long as you can fake it so well that you are indistinguishable from a conscious, self aware being ... that's good enough. Whether you actually are or aren't.

 

[Paradoxum]

True, but how am I supposed to know I am conscious? There is only my fallible opinion to verify it.

Well if you experience something, you are conscious. If you're conscious you know it and you can't be wrong. And if you're a zombie and got it wrong, why does it matter?

But what I believe to be mind, may not be mind. It is not a necessary truth that when I believe I am conscious, I am conscious, or is it?

Well I know what I mean by mind... whether that's someone else's definition doesn't matter.

Ok you "know" you are conscious. How do you know? You assume that some state of affairs is what we are all referring to, but since you have no access to my "state of afairs", any knowledge of similarity is indirect, inductive, and therefore fallible. Therefore, theres a possible world where you are using the term mistakenly. Can you tell which one (possible world, right or wrong) you are in?

If you mean something different, that doesn't mean that what I mean is wrong.

I know that I'm conscious because I feel things, and I can't be wrong about that while I'm feeling something.

You assume that everyione else may be a zombie (I suppose) but not you yourself. What about deconstructing that. Everyone else may be conscious, and you the zombie...

My body might be a zombie (if I have a body), but I know my mind is conscious because I feel things.

What do you have to rely on except - or at least crucially - the usage of the term "conscious"? And that can apparently be misapplied, as the ordinary p-zombie scenario illustrates...

I don't know what you mean.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Well I know what I mean by mind... whether that's someone else's definition doesn't matter.

The problem is then communication. If you tell me youre conscious, can I know what you mean? I think there may be A, B or C etc which you may intend.

Only Occams Razor cuts the mustard. What you mean is what I mean, thas the most ontologically efficient decision to make.

Other than that theres no "definite proof"...

 

[Davian]

Thanks for the response, I feel you care...

I think that self awareness is a survival trait, and I believe I am not a zombie. I think that I can prove that consciousness has instrumental power, because it has effects in the world, like our resultant knowledge "We are conscious".

Prove away, then.

Its very odd that people may defend epiphenomenalism, given they know (or seemingly know) they are consicous. If they know the sun exists, its due to the effects of the sun.

Feel free to provide your own definition of "consciousness", and how it comports with the same evidence.

 

[variant]

The problem is then communication. If you tell me youre conscious, can I know what you mean? I think there may be A, B or C etc which you may intend.

Only Occams Razor cuts the mustard. What you mean is what I mean, thas the most ontologically efficient decision to make.

Other than that theres no "definite proof"...

Communication itself would be impossible if we could not tell that other peoples experiences had a similar quality to our own.

 

[Paradoxum]

The problem is then communication. If you tell me youre conscious, can I know what you mean? I think there may be A, B or C etc which you may intend.

Perhaps you can't know what I mean. I suspect it might be extremely hard, or impossible to explain to a blind person what colour is like.

Only Occams Razor cuts the mustard. What you mean is what I mean, thas the most ontologically efficient decision to make.

That sounds a bit like mere assumption.

Other than that theres no "definite proof"...

Well minds function seems to be connect to brain function. Humans seem to have similar brains, so it's not crazy to think we have similar mental lives. Though we can't be sure.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Prove away, then.

I assume a causal theory of knowledge* We know iof something because of its effects, like we know of the sun because its rays affect our eyes. There is a causal chain from "sun" to "awareness of the sun".

Now, if there were no causal power for consicousness, how could we know we are conscious?

Feel free to provide your own definition of "consciousness", and how it comports with the same evidence.

Awareness. We know we are aware, and this is an effect of awareness!

Otherwise our self awarenss is not caused, which sounds odd. Just like if I were to say "I hear what youre saying" but I were deaf, and hence not paert of a full causal chain.


*
Causal Theory of Knowledge { Philosophy Index }

 

[Davian]

I assume a causal theory of knowledge* We know iof something because of its effects, like we know of the sun because its rays affect our eyes. There is a causal chain from "sun" to "awareness of the sun".

Now, if there were no causal power for consicousness, how could we know we are conscious?

You said, "I think that I can prove that consciousness has instrumental power, because it has effects in the world, like our resultant knowledge "We are conscious"."

Unless, as described by neuroscience, the phenomenal self is only a construct of the brain, and what we experience is actually an illusion. Introspection would be of no help to you on this point, and proves nothing.

Awareness. We know we are aware, and this is an effect of awareness!

Otherwise our self awarenss is not caused, which sounds odd. Just like if I were to say "I hear what youre saying" but I were deaf, and hence not paert of a full causal chain.


*
Causal Theory of Knowledge { Philosophy Index }

I don't know what the significance is of "awareness". My cat is self-aware, and knows that he sees himself, and not another cat, in the mirror.

Can you define "consciousness" in some testable, falsifiable manner? Do you think of it as a thing, or a process?

 

[Mediate]

True, but how am I supposed to know I am conscious? There is only my fallible opinion to verify it.

I think the only way to really validate consciousness experience as being "real" is with knowledge we do not already have. That we learn shows us there are things of which we cannot conceive of unless confronted with them, otherwise they would be preconceived and we would have no need of learning.

But what I believe to be mind, may not be mind. It is not a necessary truth that when I believe I am conscious, I am conscious, or is it?

It is a total truth whether it is objectively true on some "otherness" level or not. You are conscious for all you "know", thus, you are conscious. Unless you "know" you do not have consciousness. But how could you know anything without a knowing mind with which to know it?

Ok you "know" you are conscious. How do you know? You assume that some state of affairs is what we are all referring to, but since you have no access to my "state of afairs", any knowledge of similarity is indirect, inductive, and therefore fallible. Therefore, theres a possible world where you are using the term mistakenly. Can you tell which one (possible world, right or wrong) you are in?

Any knowledge of anything is subjective due to the nature of human conscious experience. We've known this for milennia. There's nothing that's truly "objective", not in the broadest and widest sense of the word, because before it becomes a "thing" in mind it must be perceived through a colour of perception.

You assume that everyione else may be a zombie (I suppose) but not you yourself. What about deconstructing that. Everyone else may be conscious, and you the zombie...

Perhaps, but in practical terms it means nothing -- that is, it doesn't have place or relevance. To me I am conscious. You may very well be a figment of my imagination, but then that means I have constructed an entire array of sights, sounds, smells, tastes, experiences, people, books, movies, concepts, scientific discoveries, foods, plants, animals, all in my own mind. If I have, I would be very surprised at that. I doubt that my mind has the ability to do that. Then again, perhaps it does. Perhaps that's what life is. Some representation of my very essence of being. Perhaps this entire universe is just my projection. But practically, again, it means nothing. I perceive a consciousness, thus anything beyond it is not practical, applicable, knowable, or thus relevant.

What do you have to rely on except - or at least crucially - the usage of the term "conscious"? And that can apparently be misapplied, as the ordinary p-zombie scenario illustrates...

Abstraction only makes sense when it has contextual relevance. Asking "what's beyond what can be known" is sort of like asking "what exists that doesn't exist?"