How Likely

[BL2KTN]

Perhaps that's possible, but I wonder if that is just a copy. Electricity and quantum states are physical things. If you take the real thing, dead people would have no brains. If they make a copy, the original person still dies.

Perhaps physics works differently than that, but that's how I understand it.



Embryos have no personal identity, so it's a completely different issue.

I just don't want false hope.

The only thing I would note here is that continuity of self may be an illusion.

 

[TillICollapse]

Perhaps that's possible, but I wonder if that is just a copy. Electricity and quantum states are physical things. If you take the real thing, dead people would have no brains. If they make a copy, the original person still dies.

Perhaps physics works differently than that, but that's how I understand it.



Embryos have no personal identity, so it's a completely different issue.

I just don't want false hope.

Thinking ou-tloud, I would say that continuity of self could be shown to be disrupted quite easily, even without the need to consider attempting to transfer consciousness or consider "copies" of oneself or copies of a brain.

Consider dementia, amnesia, Alzheimers, dissociative disorder, Sundowners Syndrome, simple brain trauma, hormones, puberty, general physiological change over time, etc. Disrupting one's identity in both the short term and long term seems relatively easy to accomplish. Even the search for identity, identity crises (mid-life, pubescent, etc), so on and so forth are often a hallmark of the human experience for that matter. Identity is always changing and evolving, sometimes making drastic changes depending on the context.

I'd have to think about it ... but I might explore the idea that the "illusion" of identity is linked to continuity of memory. Remove continuity of memory, and you disrupt identity. If you can maintain continuity of memory significantly enough, then perhaps you could maintain a portion of identity from a moment of personal history. In this context, the challenge of transferring over a "person" to some other status may have more to do with the ability to replicate continuity of memory and how those memories are accessed.

 

[terryjohn]

All things are possible if they possible through knowledge. If by power we could remain limited. I believe God would not let men ever reach a stage were they were ever gods in their own right.

 

[BL2KTN]

All things are possible if they possible through knowledge. If by power we could remain limited. I believe God would not let men ever reach a stage were they were ever gods in their own right.

The Tower of Babel couldn't have been tall as the Empire State Building

 

[Paradoxum]

The only thing I would note here is that continuity of self may be an illusion.

Fair enough.

Thinking ou-tloud, I would say that continuity of self could be shown to be disrupted quite easily, even without the need to consider attempting to transfer consciousness or consider "copies" of oneself or copies of a brain.

Consider dementia, amnesia, Alzheimers, dissociative disorder, Sundowners Syndrome, simple brain trauma, hormones, puberty, general physiological change over time, etc.

I'm not sure the self is completely disrupted by any of the things you've listed.

Disrupting one's identity in both the short term and long term seems relatively easy to accomplish. Even the search for identity, identity crises (mid-life, pubescent, etc), so on and so forth are often a hallmark of the human experience for that matter. Identity is always changing and evolving, sometimes making drastic changes depending on the context.

I'm not talking about the way one perceives oneself though. I'm talking about whether the former person is actually dead. I don't think children die when they go through puberty.

I'd have to think about it ... but I might explore the idea that the "illusion" of identity is linked to continuity of memory. Remove continuity of memory, and you disrupt identity. If you can maintain continuity of memory significantly enough, then perhaps you could maintain a portion of identity from a moment of personal history. In this context, the challenge of transferring over a "person" to some other status may have more to do with the ability to replicate continuity of memory and how those memories are accessed.

Whether the new person feels like the same person is irrelevant to what I'm talking about. I suspect a copy would feel like the same person woken up from sleep. But I'm asking if they are the same person, not if they feel like they are.

It doesn't seem like you're talking about the same thing as me. You seem to be talking about whether someone's personality changes alot, not whether they are the same person.

 

[TillICollapse]

Fair enough.



I'm not sure the self is completely disrupted by any of the things you've listed.



I'm not talking about the way one perceives oneself though. I'm talking about whether the former person is actually dead. I don't think children die when they go through puberty.



Whether the new person feels like the same person is irrelevant to what I'm talking about. I suspect a copy would feel like the same person woken up from sleep. But I'm asking if they are the same person, not if they feel like they are.

It doesn't seem like you're talking about the same thing as me. You seem to be talking about whether someone's personality changes alot, not whether they are the same person.

No I'm trying to address the "person" in regards to the continuity of "self" that was mentioned.

Have you ever met someone with dementia to the degree they no longer even know who they are, what their name is, etc ? I've dealt with patients who not only do not know whom they are ... but for all intent and purposes do not even behave like a toilet trained adult. They may go through a phase where they do not even know how to handle their own feces and waste or formulate proper sentences ... and then days later go back to "normal" and not even remember a single moment from their change.

So I'm not trying to address personality changes, rather the idea of what a person's "identity" as it regards self actually is or isn't. That is why I brought up disrupting memory ... it would seem to me, that certain disruptions in memory and how it is recalled may have a dramatic effect on the "person" as it regards the unique aspect of the person we would consider their "self" and not just their "collection of organic molecules" (quoting Sagan).

How this applies to the copy of the person being the same person or not ...

Suppose you are able to copy a human being exactly, down to the structure and organization of the brain ... a perfect facsimile. Let's say there is some method that is the equivalent of turning this "copy" on, kick starting their life, whatever. Depending on which moment of the person's life you "copy", that would arguably determine which "person" you are going to get when you turn them on, since a person goes through so many changes throughout their life anyways. Are you copying a moment from when they were 12 ? 15 ? 50 ? From last Monday ? From last Tuesday ? Compare a person who is 12, from that same aspect of them at 50. Are they the "same person" identity wise ? There are new memories, new events that had impacted and effected them, etc and so forth. They are arguably different people, not just in personality but physically as well. Same physical identifying markers that don't change ... but other aspects that do.

So now you flip the switch on for this copy. So long as the brain functions in exactly the same way, they will for all intent and purposes be the "same person" as the copy ... but only so far as that moment. Once you flip them on, they will begin to experience their own input, their own events, and this will change them. They will become "someone else" in the next few seconds they are alive. So making a copy becomes largely irrelevant. It's just a starting point ... once that point passes, that person is different. They are their own person. They are essentially a "twin", but with their own unique identity. So it's almost irrelevant to ask if they are the SAME person ... because once moments pass, they have changed.

What I'm saying, is that this same continuity can be disrupted in a person without the need to even use a facsimile copy to compare them too. That continuity a person faces in their life is filled with such changes, to where you are not the same person you were 5 minutes ago for that matter. You've had new experiences, new thoughts, new input. The changes are small ... and don't disrupt your perception too much, so it's taken for granted. Take something major: dementia, trauma, etc ... like I mentioned above, something that might cause loss of memory, impaired function of mentation, loss of ability ... and the change will not be small at all. It will be radical and quite noticeable. You will not seem like the same person. What I'm saying, is that it seems rather easy to show the idea of "identity being continuous" is rather easy to disrupt, and the way we access memory seems to play a large part. However quite literally, you are not the same person you were a few moments ago. A copy would only be the same person for an instant. A person who has died and come back to life via some method ... is not the same person either. Whether living, dead, copy, original ... seems rather irrelevant. A living "normal" person can be disrupted enough to show that identity as it concerns the "self" doesn't necessarily involve continuity. That continuity with it's small changes over time, gives a perception of something that may not actually be there at all, and can be easily shown not to be in certain contexts.

If you still think I'm not even addressing what you're saying, I'll shut up.

Oh and some children probably do think they are dying when they go through puberty, depending on their vanity

 

[BL2KTN]

I think part of the problem here is that we really have no idea how qualia and consciousness work. Our current guesses are akin to thinking Thor creates lightning. I suspect our future has revelations in this area that open it to meaningful inquiry.

 

[TillICollapse]

I think part of the problem here is that we really have no idea how qualia and consciousness work. Our current guesses are akin to thinking Thor creates lightning. I suspect our future has revelations in this area that open it to meaningful inquiry.

Yes perhaps. I think it's still so mystified at this point (consciousness), that we may even be misguided in the importance we give it as a brain function for that matter. There was an article a few years ago in Sci American on the "default mode network" ... basically the areas of the brain that were previously considered background noise without much going on, which some now consider could be responsible for the phenomena of consciousness itself and even trump our own self-awareness. The way the various areas of the brain work in concert would almost be like their own entity ... and the conscious part of ourselves are not calling the shots, but rather receiving orders from the DMN which is doing the bulk of the heavy lifting, anticipating, pattern finding, inspiring perhaps, etc. It's still being explored and debatable (the DMN for example, AFAIK), but the idea that consciousness isn't even the paramount aspect of our own neural function but rather the "noise" is the genius behind the operation is rather interesting.

 

[Paradoxum]

No I'm trying to address the "person" in regards to the continuity of "self" that was mentioned.

Have you ever met someone with dementia to the degree they no longer even know who they are, what their name is, etc ? I've dealt with patients who not only do not know whom they are ... but for all intent and purposes do not even behave like a toilet trained adult. They may go through a phase where they do not even know how to handle their own feces and waste or formulate proper sentences ... and then days later go back to "normal" and not even remember a single moment from their change.

Yeah, they change alot. But change doesn't necessarily mean the old person died.

You keep talking about great change, but not explaining why you think that is comparable to death of the old person.

So I'm not trying to address personality changes, rather the idea of what a person's "identity" as it regards self actually is or isn't. That is why I brought up disrupting memory ... it would seem to me, that certain disruptions in memory and how it is recalled may have a dramatic effect on the "person" as it regards the unique aspect of the person we would consider their "self" and not just their "collection of organic molecules" (quoting Sagan).

I agree there can be great change of personality in life, but I'm not sure that means the old person is dead. And I'm still not sure if you're talking about that, or the psychological identity of a personality.

Suppose you are able to copy a human being exactly, down to the structure and organization of the brain ... a perfect facsimile. Let's say there is some method that is the equivalent of turning this "copy" on, kick starting their life, whatever. Depending on which moment of the person's life you "copy", that would arguably determine which "person" you are going to get when you turn them on, since a person goes through so many changes throughout their life anyways. Are you copying a moment from when they were 12 ? 15 ? 50 ? From last Monday ? From last Tuesday ? Compare a person who is 12, from that same aspect of them at 50. Are they the "same person" identity wise ? There are new memories, new events that had impacted and effected them, etc and so forth. They are arguably different people, not just in personality but physically as well. Same physical identifying markers that don't change ... but other aspects that do.

You seem to assume that significant change is personality means a different person. I'd say it's reasonable to say that the different personalities are connected by slow change over time. It's not that the old person dies and a new old appears, the old personalities changes into the new old.

eg: Imagine a sphere turning into a cube. The shape (personality) may change, but the substance is the same.

Perhaps I'm wrong, but I think the different personalities being connected makes them the same thing which has changed.

So now you flip the switch on for this copy. So long as the brain functions in exactly the same way, they will for all intent and purposes be the "same person" as the copy ... but only so far as that moment. Once you flip them on, they will begin to experience their own input, their own events, and this will change them. They will become "someone else" in the next few seconds they are alive. So making a copy becomes largely irrelevant. It's just a starting point ... once that point passes, that person is different. They are their own person. They are essentially a "twin", but with their own unique identity. So it's almost irrelevant to ask if they are the SAME person ... because once moments pass, they have changed.

I wouldn't say they are the same person, even in the first moment.

Consider making a copy, but the original doesn't die. Obviously the copy is a different person from the original. They are separate entities. Death of the original doesn't change the fact that a new entity is brought into existence.

What I'm saying, is that this same continuity can be disrupted in a person without the need to even use a facsimile copy to compare them too. That continuity a person faces in their life is filled with such changes, to where you are not the same person you were 5 minutes ago for that matter. You've had new experiences, new thoughts, new input. The changes are small ... and don't disrupt your perception too much, so it's taken for granted.

I'm not the same person from 5 minutes ago, in the sense of not being an exactly copy of myself 5 minutes ago. But I wouldn't say that makes me a different person in the sense I mean.

If people are dying each second, is murder immoral? It really makes no difference because according to you, people don't exist for more than a second anyway.

Take something major: dementia, trauma, etc ... like I mentioned above, something that might cause loss of memory, impaired function of mentation, loss of ability ... and the change will not be small at all. It will be radical and quite noticeable. You will not seem like the same person. What I'm saying, is that it seems rather easy to show the idea of "identity being continuous" is rather easy to disrupt, and the way we access memory seems to play a large part. However quite literally, you are not the same person you were a few moments ago. A copy would only be the same person for an instant. A person who has died and come back to life via some method ... is not the same person either. Whether living, dead, copy, original ... seems rather irrelevant. A living "normal" person can be disrupted enough to show that identity as it concerns the "self" doesn't necessarily involve continuity. That continuity with it's small changes over time, gives a perception of something that may not actually be there at all, and can be easily shown not to be in certain contexts.

I don't think this has all that much to do with what I'm talking about. Do you have no friends because you can't know someone for more than one second?

I don't think change means the person isn't the same person.

If you still think I'm not even addressing what you're saying, I'll shut up.

I think you need to argue why what you're saying is the same as what I am. You seem to be assuming I'll just agree if your point out change, and that I'm not exactly the same as a second ago.

I'm not perfectly the same as a second ago, but I'd say I'm the same person. If someone is the same is more broad and fuzzy.

 

[TillICollapse]

Yeah, they change alot. But change doesn't necessarily mean the old person died.

You keep talking about great change, but not explaining why you think that is comparable to death of the old person.



I agree there can be great change of personality in life, but I'm not sure that means the old person is dead. And I'm still not sure if you're talking about that, or the psychological identity of a personality.



You seem to assume that significant change is personality means a different person. I'd say it's reasonable to say that the different personalities are connected by slow change over time. It's not that the old person dies and a new old appears, the old personalities changes into the new old.

eg: Imagine a sphere turning into a cube. The shape (personality) may change, but the substance is the same.

Perhaps I'm wrong, but I think the different personalities being connected makes them the same thing which has changed.



I wouldn't say they are the same person, even in the first moment.

Consider making a copy, but the original doesn't die. Obviously the copy is a different person from the original. They are separate entities. Death of the original doesn't change the fact that a new entity is brought into existence.



I'm not the same person from 5 minutes ago, in the sense of not being an exactly copy of myself 5 minutes ago. But I wouldn't say that makes me a different person in the sense I mean.

If people are dying each second, is murder immoral? It really makes no difference because according to you, people don't exist for more than a second anyway.



I don't think this has all that much to do with what I'm talking about. Do you have no friends because you can't know someone for more than one second?

I don't think change means the person isn't the same person.



I think you need to argue why what you're saying is the same as what I am. You seem to be assuming I'll just agree if your point out change, and that I'm not exactly the same as a second ago.

I'm not perfectly the same as a second ago, but I'd say I'm the same person. If someone is the same is more broad and fuzzy.

I thought the topic you were addressing was:

* copies of persons (dead or alive for that matter)
* copies of brain states
* identity
* continuity of self/identity/"person"

You had already stated that a copy of a dead person would still be just a copy, as would a copy of a brain state (at least that's what I understood you to say). So I wasn't addressing whether or not changes/copies/etc made a person "dead". I was addressing more specifically the continuity of person in regards to the self/identity.

This is why I thought my comments were actually still on topic with your own If I'm wrong, I'm wrong, it's cool

What I was trying to show, is how relatively easy it may be to show discontinuity of self in a living person without the need to copy brains/compare them to a dead person/copy a physical body/etc.

Thus .. no I don't think it means the old person is dead, or the previous states of the person are "dead". That wouldn't be useful terminology anyways I don't think. So I wasn't saying that change=death, that's why I'm not comparing it to death of the old person, because I don't think that. I *am* talking about the psychological identity of a person to a large degree, but revealing how it can be disrupted by biological changes (not necessarily equating to death, hopefully that's obvious at this point).

Yes, I *may* argue that significant change makes a different person. Not just in personality, since a person changes physically over time as well. Even aspects of our DNA change over time.

Whether murder is immoral because of how we view the personality or not, or because people are dying rapidly … I didn't say anything to or along those lines whatsoever I suppose we could discuss the identity/personality/nature of straw men, but I'd rather not I'd be more than happy to talk about creamy skin and ankles though

I may still argue that significant change means the person is no longer the same person. Consider mid-life crises, significant trauma, disease which effects mentation, so on and so forth. But I do suppose it depends on what both of us mean by "person" in such contexts.

I'm not sure we are saying the same thing … perhaps in parts, but I'm guessing we are missing each other semantically. At this point, I am derailing so we can drop it. So no worries

ETA: Just saw this article here, made me think of this thread lol.