How is God distinguishable from an imaginary friend?

[ExodusMe]

If your contention is that the sensus divinitatis is derived from an existent god, then the number of people that believe in a god is immaterial. It's a non sequitur to go from "lots of people have a sense that a god must exist" to "the sense that a god exists is god given". And if the sensus divinitatis isn't derived from an existent god, but through evolution, the effect can be argued to be the same.

Again, I can say that we have a sense that no god exists and that as we evolve as a race, more and more people will be able to counteract the powerful primitive forces that cause us to reject that sense. And I can point to evidence this is happening. And it would be just as much of a non sequitur as your argument.

Personally, I'm interested in rational models that explain things. Using the sensus divinitatis as part of a model is not rational.

I don't think you understand how philosophy works. Just because you disagree with something does not invalidate the model. I'll just restate that the objection of the OP is a de jure objection to Christianity and handled by reformed epistemology as explained by Alvin Plantinga. On reformed epistemology the belief in God is occasioned by the sensus divinitatis. This answers the OP question.

I appreciate your attempt to reply, but it doesn't do anything to object to the model or (more specifically) the existence of the sensus divinitatis. It is still valid and just because you can come up with a competing model does not invalidate the model Alvin provided. You have only provided a competing model. Thank you

Also, a reason why your model is terrible is because the belief "God exists" can be a product of evolution AND can be true (i.e. so claiming that the belief "God exists" as a product of evolution does nothing to invalidate that belief).

Finally, I like the explanation the blind man gave in John 9:25 to how he distinguished God from an imaginary friend.

 

[com7fy8]

The question is how to distinguish between the imaginary friend and God.

Hi there, leftrightleftrightleft God bless you

What helps me is I be still and quiet and wait for whatever God pleases to do with me. And I expect correction since He is so better than I am, in love.

He is not only a comforter and companionship to make me feel good and get me through things. But I need His correction so I find out how to love in every situation.

If you feed on what is in the Bible, I think you can keep discovering standards which are more and better than an imaginary friend would hold you to Mostly, with Jesus, this would mean discovering how to love . . . how to be pleasing to our Father and how to love any and all people the way Jesus wants.

I do not think an imaginary friend would usually do this.

 

[ToddNotTodd]

I don't think you understand how philosophy works. Just because you disagree with something does not invalidate the model. I'll just restate that the objection of the OP is a de jure objection to Christianity and handled by reformed epistemology as explained by Alvin Plantinga. On reformed epistemology the belief in God is occasioned by the sensus divinitatis. This answers the OP question.

I appreciate your attempt to reply, but it doesn't do anything to object to the model or (more specifically) the sensus divinitatis. It is still valid and just because you can come up with a competing model does not invalidate the model Alvin provided. You have only provided a competing model. Thank you

I have a degree in Philosophy, so I'm pretty familiar with it...

Actually, I didn't just disagree with you. I've shown that it's fallacious to say that a sense of god is necessarily god-given. Just saying that the sensus divinitatis is valid doesn't explain away the fallacy.

You can either show how my non sequitur claim is wrong, or admit that the model includes a fallacy. And again, I prefer my models of reality to be as non-fallacious as they can be.

And I didn't "come up" with a competing model. I was showing you how your model was fallacious by pointing to an equally fallacious idea.

 

[ExodusMe]

1) The sensus divinitatis does not have to derive from God. It can be a product of evolution AND produce true beliefs about God.
2) there is no good reason to think Darwinism would produce any belief related to God. It is a godless process.

I am interested in rational models. Darwinsim is not rational.

 

[ToddNotTodd]

1) The sensus divinitatis does not have to derive from God. It can be a product of evolution AND produce true beliefs about God.

But still be irrational to point to in a model as to why the model is correct. There's no point in bringing it up at all if you can't show that it's derived from a god.

2) there is no good reason to think Darwinism would produce any belief related to God. It is a godless process.

There's been plenty of papers, articles, books, etc. on possible non-theistic reasons why humans have had a predilection for a belief in a god. While I don't believe any of them to be true, I don't see why one of them couldn't be true. So unless you have good reasons to show why all of them can't be true, this point doesn't apply.

3) Any attempt to provide a way for Darwinism to produce any belief related to God would be indistinguishable from Darwinism producing a belief in an imaginary friend which is a reductio ad absurdum

Demonstrate the reductio ad absurdum in your statement.

 

[ExodusMe]

There's been plenty of papers, articles, books, etc. on possible non-theistic reasons why humans have had a predilection for a belief in a god. While I don't believe any of them to be true, I don't see why one of them couldn't be true. So unless you have good reasons to show why all of them can't be true, this point doesn't apply.

I don't have to show that they can't be true anymore than you have to show that the sensus divinitatis can't be true.

You are walking yourself in circles with you logic and it is not entertaining having to repeat myself. The OP's question is worthless unless it is objecting to something factual regarding theism/Christianity. Unless he is sincerely trying to differentiate between his imaginary friend and a god he is praying to, which I doubt. He is trying to make a de jure objection to belief in God. Reformed epistemology answers this.

I don't want to discuss the reductio ad absurdum point because I think my previous statements handle this and it would just distract.

 

[food4thought]

My God gives me guidance on how to live my life that includes information that my mind does not know... an imaginary friend is limited to the mind of it's originator.

 

[ToddNotTodd]

I don't have to show that they can't be true anymore than you have to show that the sensus divinitatis can't be true.

If I were to actually say that the sensus divinitatis can't be true I would absolutely have to show that. I'm not though.

I'm saying that there isn't any evidence that shows that it is true that there's a sense that we have of an existent god. Plantiga doesn't show any. His attempt at justification involves shifting the burden of proof.

And what's presented without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.

As for "reformed epistemology" as a whole, it's a mess of baseless assertions and wordplay.

I don't want to discuss the reductio ad absurdum point because I think my previous statements handle this and it would just distract.

It would explain why you wrote it. So either explain why the fallacy applies or retract point 3.

 

[ExodusMe]

If I were to actually say that the sensus divinitatis can't be true I would absolutely have to show that. I'm not though.

I'm saying that there isn't any evidence that shows that it is true that there's a sense that we have of an existent god. Plantiga doesn't show any. His attempt at justification involves shifting the burden of proof.

And what's presented without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.

As for "reformed epistemology" as a whole, it's a mess of baseless assertions and wordplay.



It would explain why you wrote it. So either explain why the fallacy applies or retract point 3.

Do you not realize that you are talking yourself in circles? To use the same reply as you gave me to show how circular this conversation is and how it is not going anywhere...

"There's been plenty of papers, articles, books, etc. on possible theistic reasons why humans have had a predilection for a belief in a god. While I don't believe any of them to be true, I don't see why one of them couldn't be true. So unless you have good reasons to show why all of them can't be true, this point doesn't apply."

I just switched one word as support that sensus divinitatis is possible.

I was editing my post when you quoted it and had it removed before your replied.

 

[leftrightleftrightleft]

One difference between imaginary friends and God is that imaginary friends don't correct your beliefs that are wrong, if anything they tell you your beliefs are true no matter what.

In my experience, I've been wrong a lot, but never would have realized my error if God wasn't there to help me see the truth through His word and creation.

Can you describe precisely how God helped you to see the truth? Did he communicate with you in some fashion? Did you sense him in someway? Was there any indication that your interaction with him was not just a mental event occurring in your own head?

How was your interaction different than someone just reasoning with themselves in their own mind? (For example, I can have a conversation with myself in my own head quite easily. If I call that "voice" in my head "God", is that somehow distinguishable from your experience?)

Thanks

 

[ToddNotTodd]

"There's been plenty of papers, articles, books, etc. on possible theistic reasons why humans have had a predilection for a belief in a god. While I don't believe any of them to be true, I don't see why one of them couldn't be true. So unless you have good reasons to show why all of them can't be true, this point doesn't apply."

I just switched one word as support that sensus divinitatis is possible.

No, you absolutely didn't.

What you've written only supports the idea that people have a predilection for a belief in god. This is not synonymous with the sensus divinitatis, because the sensus divinitatis is defined as the sense of an existent god.

And like I keep saying, which you're mistaking for going in circles, is that it's a non sequitur to jump from "people have a predilection for a belief in a god" to "the sense I have is due to the fact that a god actually exists".

 

[leftrightleftrightleft]

Does the imaginary friend have scars on his hands? My God does. This is a historical fact. Some may find it ridiculous to believe he rose from the dead, but consider all those testified of the event with their own blood. That's the method I go by.

Step back for a moment and view this from an outsider perspective.

Even if Jesus rose from the dead, I do not see how that proves the existence of this "God" concept. Do you see why I can say that?

Jesus may have rose from the dead due to some advanced alien technology. To me, as an outsider, the alien theory seems just as likely as this "God" concept. In fact, in some ways, it seems more likely because aliens are well-defined physical entities with a location in time and space whereas God is an ill-defined concept which, thus far, seems indistinguishable from a mental construct.

So, for this conversation, Jesus plays no role. I want to see how God can exist (and is existing) right here and right now. I do not want historical references.

So, how can you and I distinguish God from something that exists purely as a mental construct in our minds?

Thanks

 

[leftrightleftrightleft]

Well the big difference is that there is scientific evidence that the Christian God created the universe, imaginary friends don't create anything.

An imaginary friend didn't create the universe.

I addressed why these responses do not answer the thread question in previous posts. See Post #37 and Post #14.

The key here is that I am interested primarily in the fact that God is purported to exist and interact with humans here and now. Today. For this thread, I am not concerned with past stories or origin arguments.

I am interested in how God can be distinguished from a mental construct when people interact with God today.

Thanks

 

[leftrightleftrightleft]

Hi there, leftrightleftrightleft God bless you

What helps me is I be still and quiet and wait for whatever God pleases to do with me. And I expect correction since He is so better than I am, in love.

He is not only a comforter and companionship to make me feel good and get me through things. But I need His correction so I find out how to love in every situation.

If you feed on what is in the Bible, I think you can keep discovering standards which are more and better than an imaginary friend would hold you to Mostly, with Jesus, this would mean discovering how to love . . . how to be pleasing to our Father and how to love any and all people the way Jesus wants.

I do not think an imaginary friend would usually do this.

Can you describe precisely how God comforts you and provides companionship? How do you interact with God?

If I were to observe you while you interacted with God, would there be any precise feature that could distinguish your interaction from the interaction of a person with an imaginary mental construct in their head?

 

[Radrook]

I addressed why these responses do not answer the thread question in previous posts. See Post #37 and Post #14.

The key here is that I am interested primarily in the fact that God is purported to exist and interact with humans here and now. Today. For this thread, I am not concerned with past stories or origin arguments.

I am interested in how God can be distinguished from a mental construct when people interact with God today.



Thanks

The simple answer is that someone making such claims of seeing or hearing God can be hallucinating due to chemical imbalances of his brain.

 

[variant]

That itself seems to be an argument with implicit premises. What are they?

Well, if the universe were a created system in which we, intelligent beings live.

Would you say it is designed to teach you rationality or gullibility?

 

[variant]

How do you account for rationality?

Why would "we" have to account for rationality?

It seems obvious to me that rationality is what you should expect when intelligent creatures are added to a system where rationality works towards their goals.

 

[ExodusMe]

No, you absolutely didn't.

What you've written only supports the idea that people have a predilection for a belief in god. This is not synonymous with the sensus divinitatis, because the sensus divinitatis is defined as the sense of an existent god.

And like I keep saying, which you're mistaking for going in circles, is that it's a non sequitur to jump from "people have a predilection for a belief in a god" to "the sense I have is due to the fact that a god actually exists".

The OP has a de jure objection to the rationality of belief in God. Reformed epistemology is a model that shows that it is rational to believe God exists.

Your objection to the sensus divinitatis is that the only reason to believe the sensus divinitatis exists is because 'people have a predilection for a belief in God'. That is not the argument for the sensus divinitatis provided in WCB.

WCB classifies the sensus divinitatis in the same way we classify memory beliefs. The circumstances we experience as humans occasion beliefs about God in us. We see a beautiful vista and it occasions the belief "God made this" - you are in extreme doubt about your future and the sensus divinitatis occasions the belief "God can hear my prayers".

This means that theistic belief in respect to the model (coined Aquinis/Calvin (AC) model in WCB) is properly basic- (i.e. you don't need justification for theistic belief).

You don't accept memory beliefs, or your belief that your friends have minds and are not robots, or your belief in the external world - we don't need to provide justification for our beliefs about God either.

Further, our beliefs about God are properly basic in the following ways
1) belief can be properly basic for a person in the sense that it is indeed basic for him (he doesn’t accept it on the evidential basis of other propositions)
2) he is justified in holding it in the basic way: he is within his epistemic rights, is not irresponsible, is violating no epistemic or other duties in holding that belief in that way.

Taken from WCB pg 194

This should pretty much answer the OP and obliterate this thread GGKTHXBAI

 

[jimmyjimmy]

Can someone give me a consistent methodology for determining the difference between God and an imaginary friend?

Someone says that they have an imaginary friend who they talk to and who sometimes does things for them and who makes them feel happy and fulfilled and comforts them.

How is this different than God?

This is primarily an epistemological question. In order for me to believe in God, I need to be able to distinguish this "God" character from an "imaginary friend" character.

How is God distinguishable from an imaginary friend?

My imaginary friend only appears after too much tequila.

 

[leftrightleftrightleft]

The simple answer is that someone making such claims of seeing or hearing God can be hallucinating due to chemical imbalances of his brain.

Just to clarify: are you a theist or a deist? Do you believe that God interacts with us in some way? If so, how?