How is God distinguishable from an imaginary friend?

[ToBeLoved]

Under the assumption that the external world exists (which is the assumption which we all share and should have been implicit in the conversation), how do you show that God is part of that external world rather than a mental construct?

I don't want to play a brain-in-a-jar philosophical game.

Are apples imaginary? No one would think twice about it. No, they aren't. They would show me photographs. They would show me an apple in the grocery store. Its such a foolish question that no one even asks whether apples are imaginary. It's well-understood since childhood that they aren't. No one would need to launch into some philosophical brain-in-a-jar thought experiment. They would just show me.

Is God imaginary? Suddenly, I've got to jump through 100 philosophical hoops and play some philosophical games to sort out the answer. And throughout all this, the fact that it is so difficult (or impossible) to answer this question makes me more and more suspicious that God is, in fact, a mental construct and nothing more.

Give me something that suggests otherwise.

So then you give credence to some kind of big bang theory? Which doesn't even explain everything?

Creation and life is part of God's revelation to the world.

 

[leftrightleftrightleft]

Mind & robot discussion is completely relevant as you are repeatedly showing us that you do not subject your own beliefs to the same criteria you are subjecting theism.

No it is irrelevant because it is a hypothetical that no one is seriously claiming.

Both of us (and many other people) make a ton of assumptions in life regarding things: I am not a brain in vat, other people are not philosophical zombies, etc.

How do you know your belief in God is not an elaborate mind-control trick performed by highly-advanced aliens?

(Do you see how these questions are ridiculous? Lots of claims can't be "known".)

We work with what we have to work. There are a million "unknowable" situations in a True™ sense.

What I'm getting from you is that the existence of God belongs in a similar category of "unknowables". Is that your position?

The logic of the absence of evidence goes like this. We can deny the existence of something only if we should expect to possess evidence sufficient to know that something exists but in fact lack it.

You make the mistake in assuming that I deny the existence of God. I do not.

Show me God and I will understand a) what you mean by God and b) that God exists.

To use WLC's example from your link:

We’re standing atop the Grand Canyon and someone asks, “Is there a fly way down there?” After a quick glance I say, “No, I see none. There is no fly down there.

The problem with God here is twofold:

1) The person is not asking me, "Is there a fly down there?" People are saying, "There is a fly down there". People claim that God does positively exist.

2) I am not saying "there is no fly down there". I am saying, "I don't know if there is a fly down there, please show me this fly which you claim exists". If someone claims a fly exists at the bottom of the Grand Canyon at a specific location then it is theoretically possible for that claim to validated by going to that specific location and either a) finding a fly or b) not finding a fly.

From my perspective, you are the one claiming to know about some fly (God) somewhere but cannot produce evidence for such a fly (God). You also cannot seem to provide a theoretically possible, consistent method for validating the claim by locating the fly (God). From my perspective, it appears that this fly (God) you are speaking of is completely imaginary and does not actually exist.

(a) the epistemic situation in which we find ourselves with respect to belief in God’s existence is either if God existed, then we would expect there to be evidence for it and if there were evidence of God, then we would expect to have knowledge of the evidence and (b) demonstrate that we lack sufficient evidence for knowing that God exists. You must also show that all the arguments for God are unsound and then argue that if God existed then we would expect to be in a position to know whether God exists.

This is not relevant to the conversation because I am not claiming to know that God does not exist.

Once again to reiterate:

I am the guy at the top of the Grand Canyon with you. You say, "There is a fly!" and I say "Where?" That is all I am asking. I am not saying, "there is no fly". Please stop assuming that.

 

[ExodusMe]

No it is irrelevant because it is a hypothetical that no one is seriously claiming.

Both of us (and many other people) make a ton of assumptions in life regarding things: I am not a brain in vat, other people are not philosophical zombies, etc.

How do you know your belief in God is not an elaborate mind-control trick performed by highly-advanced aliens?

(Do you see how these questions are ridiculous? Lots of claims can't be "known".)

We work with what we have to work. There are a million "unknowable" situations in a True™ sense.

What I'm getting from you is that the existence of God belongs in a similar category of "unknowables". Is that your position?

My question regarding minds & robots is relevant to you because you do not have an epistemic theory to discriminate between beliefs in a rational & consistent way. These questions are not a problem for me because I have an epistemic theory. I have already elaborated on reformed epistemology, but I can give more detail if you want to understand how I am able to hold theism as a properly basic belief. They do pose a problem for you though because you are not consistently discriminating between theism & your belief in other minds.

You make the mistake in assuming that I deny the existence of God. I do not.

Show me God and I will understand a) what you mean by God and b) that God exists.

To use WLC's example from your link:

We’re standing atop the Grand Canyon and someone asks, “Is there a fly way down there?” After a quick glance I say, “No, I see none. There is no fly down there.

The problem with God here is twofold:

1) The person is not asking me, "Is there a fly down there?" People are saying, "There is a fly down there". People claim that God does positively exist.

2) I am not saying "there is no fly down there". I am saying, "I don't know if there is a fly down there, please show me this fly which you claim exists". If someone claims a fly exists at the bottom of the Grand Canyon at a specific location then it is theoretically possible for that claim to validated by going to that specific location and either a) finding a fly or b) not finding a fly.

From my perspective, you are the one claiming to know about some fly (God) somewhere but cannot produce evidence for such a fly (God). You also cannot seem to provide a theoretically possible, consistent method for validating the claim by locating the fly (God). From my perspective, it appears that this fly (God) you are speaking of is completely imaginary and does not actually exist.

This is not relevant to the conversation because I am not claiming to know that God does not exist.

Once again to reiterate:

I am the guy at the top of the Grand Canyon with you. You say, "There is a fly!" and I say "Where?" That is all I am asking. I am not saying, "there is no fly". Please stop assuming that.

The analogy of the fly in the Grand Canyon is meant to show what type of evidence is necessary to make a claim that the fly does/does not exist.

Belief in God is completely different from a fly in the Grand Canyon, because God is an immaterial being that exists external to our universe. What we should be asking is what type of evidence is necessary to make a claim that God does/does not exist?

You began the thread by asserting that believing in God is akin to believing in an imaginary friend. I gave you a model that shows that belief in God warranted for Christian's if Christianity is true. Reformed epistemology also satisfies the evidence criterion as the model shows that God is witnessing to us that He exists.

You reject this because you believe it needs to be empirically verified. Then, I respond by showing you, based on the mind & robot analogy, that you hold beliefs that are not empirically verified and so we are in a constant circle of cat & mouse.

Let's start here:

What type of evidence & how much would be sufficient for you to believe in God?

 

[leftrightleftrightleft]

My question regarding minds & robots is relevant to you because you do not have an epistemic theory to discriminate between beliefs in a rational & consistent way. These questions are not a problem for me because I have an epistemic theory. I have already elaborated on reformed epistemology, but I can give more detail if you want to understand how I am able to hold theism as a properly basic belief. They do pose a problem for you though because you are not consistently discriminating between theism & your belief in other minds.

And as I said earlier, your epistemology results in an "Everything Exists" scenario because any god (or anything at all!) can be argued to be "properly basic" so long as the person "feels" it exists. Your method gives no way of discriminating between real, existing things and imaginary, non-existing things.

I am concerned most about method. Like I said before, there is a method for testing to distinguish between a human and a robot. There is a class of objects for which we apply the label "robot" and a class of objects for which we apply the label "human". If a particular "robot" has all the categorical features of the thing which we call "human", then the "robot" has been mis-labeled and is actually a "human" by definition. For example, if a robot is made of metal, it is not human because our category for "human" does not include things made of metal. If a robot was not created via the biological division of cells, then it is not human because our category for "human" requires that it be created via the biological division of cells. Etc. And I am not concerned so much with the specific tests so much as the fact that there are tests which can be hypothetically performed.

Now for God. Is there a method for testing to distinguish whether God is a mental construct or an entity with an existence external to the mind of the believer? This is emphatically not a brain-in-a-vat thought experiment. It should be approached the same way we approach any person making any claim about the existence of any entity. If someone asks, "Is there a car on the road?" it generally is not necessary to launch into a philosophical brain-in-a-vat, what-is-real, the-matrix, epistemology-of-solipsism discussion.

The analogy of the fly in the Grand Canyon is meant to show what type of evidence is necessary to make a claim that the fly does/does not exist.

And I will repeat that I am not making the claim that the fly (God) does not exist. You are making the claim that the fly (God) does exist.

Belief in God is completely different from a fly in the Grand Canyon, because God is an immaterial being that exists external to our universe.

A couple issues here:

1) What does it mean for something to be "external" to the universe? To me "universe" implies "everything that exists". How can something be "outside" the universe?

2) What does it mean for something to be "immaterial"? How do we differentiate an immaterial mental construct which doesn't exist from an immaterial entity which does exist? Can you provide an example?

What we should be asking is what type of evidence is necessary to make a claim that God does/does not exist?

I don't know. You are the one claiming that God exists, so what evidence do you have?

You began the thread by asserting that believing in God is akin to believing in an imaginary friend.

No I didn't.

I began this thread asking: "Can someone give me a consistent methodology for determining the difference between God and an imaginary friend?" Perhaps the wording was slightly ambiguous but basically what I was asking is: If there is a Person A who has a belief in a god-like imaginary friend and Person B who believes in God, what method can *I* apply to distinguish Person A's belief as false and Person B's belief as true?

Throughout this whole thread I have been trying to focus on method. For example, with the human-robot problem that you brought up, I have shown that I could apply a method for distinguishing the two which at least attempts to find the differences between the two.

Is there any similar method which could be applied to distinguish God's existence (as understood by Person B) from imaginary friend's existence (as understood by Person A)?

I gave you a model that shows that belief in God warranted for Christian's if Christianity is true.

What model was that? The "properly basic" model? So, a Hindu who believes in Vishnu feels that belief in Vishnu is properly basic, does that mean Vishnu also exists?

Your properly basic model results in an "Everything Exists" scenario.

What type of evidence & how much would be sufficient for you to believe in God?

What type of evidence was sufficient for you?

 

[ExodusMe]

And as I said earlier, your epistemology results in an "Everything Exists" scenario because any god (or anything at all!) can be argued to be "properly basic" so long as the person "feels" it exists. Your method gives no way of discriminating between real, existing things and imaginary, non-existing things.

We need to distinguish between the objections you are making. The defense made by reformed epistemology is for the objection "I may not know whether Christianity is true, but I do know that Christianity is not rational to believe". This is an entirely different objection from an objection to the truth of Christianity. Therefore, I am not saying "everything exists". I am only saying that it is rational to believe Christianity if it is true. This means that I am okay with a person who claims that they come to know that Vishnu exists in a properly basic way. An extremely important part of this model is that a person is able to arrive at the belief "Vishnu exists" in a properly basic way if there are no defeaters for their belief. There are good reasons to believe Vishnu does not exists. Let me quote some text from Warranted Christian Belief by Alvin Plantinga

Begins Pg. 363
...Martin’s claim, so construed, would be that (1) if the claim
made by the Reformed epistemologist—namely, that belief in God is properly basic with respect to warrant—has warrant, then for any proposition p (no matter how bizarre) accepted by some community, if the epistemologists of that community were to claim that p is properly basic with respect to warrant, their claim would itself have warrant; (2) the consequent of (1) is false; the conclusion of the argument would be that the Reformed epistemologist’s claim does not enjoy warrant. A problem with evaluating this version of the argument is that the Reformed epistemologist (this Reformed epistemologist, anyway) doesn’t claim as part of his philosophical position that belief in God and the deliverances of IIHS do have warrant. That is because (above, p. 186ff.) in all likelihood they have warrant only if they are true, and I am not arguing that these beliefs are in fact true. No doubt the Reformed epistemologist does believe that they are true, and is prepared to claim that they are, even if he doesn’t propose to argue for that claim. So for the nonce, suppose we think of the Reformed epistemologists as actually claiming that belief in God and the deliverances of the IIHS enjoy warrant in the basic way; suppose further that they claim this ‘legitimately’—that
is, under the current interpretation, suppose this claim itself has warrant for them. Would it follow that for any proposition p, if there were a community who endorsed p, these people (or the epistemologists of their community) would be warranted in believing that p is properly basic with respect to warrant for those in this community? It would not follow. Suppose the extended A/C model is true (not just possible); then (a) the central claims of the Christian faith are, in fact, true, (b) there really are such cognitive processes as the sensus divinitatis and IIHS, and (c) their deliverances do meet the conditions for warrant. Suppose a Reformed epistemologist believes the great things of the gospel on the basis of the sensus divinitatis and IIHS; suppose he notes, further, that his belief and that of many others is accepted in the basic way (where, of course, accepting p on the basis of testimony is one way to believe p in the basic way). Suppose he further comes to see or believe that God intends his children to know about him and to know the great things of the gospel, but also that it isn’t possible for enough of us to know enough about him by way of inference from other beliefs; he therefore concludes (correctly) that God has instituted cognitive processes by virtue of which we human beings can form these true beliefs in the basic way.
He concludes still further that the cognitive processes or mechanisms by way of which we
form these beliefs are functioning properly when it delivers them, and are also functioning
in an epistemically congenial environment according to a design plan successfully aimed
at truth: that is, he concludes that Christian belief, taken in this basic way, has warrant. He
thus concludes that these beliefs are properly basic with respect to warrant, drawing this
conclusion from beliefs that themselves have warrant; but forming a belief in that way itself
It doesn’t follow, of course, that the voodoo epistemologist is also warranted in claiming
that voodoo belief is properly basic with respect to warrant. For suppose voodoo belief is
in fact false, and suppose further that it arose originally in some kind of mistake or confusion,
or out of a fearful reaction to natural phenomena of one sort or another, or in the mind of
some group hoping to gain or perpetuate personal political power. If so, then those original
voodoo beliefs did not possess warrant. Suppose still further that these voodoo beliefs were
passed on to subsequent generations by way of testimony and teaching. Now if a testifier
testifies to some belief p that has no warrant for her, then p will also have no warrant for
anyone believing it on just the basis of her testimony. If p has no warrant for the testifier,
then it has none for the testifiee either—even if the latter’s faculties are working perfectly
properly. I am taught a lot of garbage by my parents (out of profound ignorance, they
teach me that the stars are really pinholes in a giant canvass stretched over the earth each
night in order to give humankind a good night’s sleep, or that Frisians are politically inferior
and should not be allowed to vote); then, even if my own cognitive faculties are functioning
properly in the conditions propitious for warrant, my beliefs acquired by way of this testimony
lack warrant.
So consider the voodoo epistemologist, and suppose he accepts those voodoo views on
the basis of testimony and (analogous to the Reformed epistemologist) reasons from their
truth together with other premises to their being properly basic with respect to warrant.
Then his conclusion that voodoo beliefs are warrant-basic will not itself be warranted, because
it is accepted on the basis of an argument at least one premise of which has no warrant for him. That is because inference exhibits the same sort of warrant-dependent structure as
testimony. I believe p and q; these together yield (deductively, or in some other way) r; r
will have warrant for me if p and q do (and perhaps we must add if p and q, the conjunction
of p and q does); but if either p or q lacks warrant for me, the same will go for r. (Clearly I
can’t come to know some proposition by inferring it from propositions some of which I
don’t know.) The voodoo philosophers are mistaken in holding their voodoo views;
furthermore, their claim that voodoo views are properly basic with respect to warrant is
both false and not itself warranted.
It could certainly happen, therefore, that the views of the Reformed epistemologist are
legitimate in the sense of being warranted, and those of the voodoo epistemologist, who
arrives at his views in structurally the same way as the Reformed epistemologist, are not.
That could be if, for example, the central claims of the Christian faith are true and voodoo
belief is false. It is therefore not the case that if the claim that belief in God and in the great
things of the gospel is properly basic with respect to warrant is itself warranted, then by the
same token the claim that voodoo belief is properly basic with respect to warrant is itself
warranted. Martin’s argument, construed as we are currently construing it, therefore fails;
its first premise is false.

I hope that clarifies, but the gist is that we are only claiming that Christian belief is warranted only if it is true. This is an important distinction because if non-Christian's want to object to Christianity they can no longer do it on the basis of rationality (i.e. I do not know whether Christianity is true, but I do know that Christianity is not rational to believe) - they must do it on the basis of truth (i.e. Christianity is not true because Jesus did not exists, etc...).

I am concerned most about method. Like I said before, there is a method for testing to distinguish between a human and a robot. There is a class of objects for which we apply the label "robot" and a class of objects for which we apply the label "human". If a particular "robot" has all the categorical features of the thing which we call "human", then the "robot" has been mis-labeled and is actually a "human" by definition. For example, if a robot is made of metal, it is not human because our category for "human" does not include things made of metal. If a robot was not created via the biological division of cells, then it is not human because our category for "human" requires that it be created via the biological division of cells. Etc. And I am not concerned so much with the specific tests so much as the fact that there are tests which can be hypothetically performed.

I have shown why your method fails. A person is not identified by its physical parts. If you were able to hook a brain up to a computer and that computer could communicate with you, would it be a robot or is there a mind? Your test would fail this scenario.

Now for God. Is there a method for testing to distinguish whether God is a mental construct or an entity with an existence external to the mind of the believer? This is emphatically not a brain-in-a-vat thought experiment. It should be approached the same way we approach any person making any claim about the existence of any entity. If someone asks, "Is there a car on the road?" it generally is not necessary to launch into a philosophical brain-in-a-vat, what-is-real, the-matrix, epistemology-of-solipsism discussion.

And I will repeat that I am not making the claim that the fly (God) does not exist. You are making the claim that the fly (God) does exist.

A couple issues here:

1) What does it mean for something to be "external" to the universe? To me "universe" implies "everything that exists". How can something be "outside" the universe?

2) What does it mean for something to be "immaterial"? How do we differentiate an immaterial mental construct which doesn't exist from an immaterial entity which does exist? Can you provide an example?

I believe your issues are only semantic as you just defined something as your conclusion and then concluded I am wrong. Nice trick...? Anyways let me provide you with a few answers here

1) I don't think anyone defines the universe as "everything that exists". This is pretty much the fly in the Grand Canyon. You don't know what is external to our universe. How are you making a claim there is nothing beyond the universe? Further, there are good reasons to believe there is 'something' beyond our universe whether you are a theist or an atheist. Our universe came from somewhere - to propose it just popped into existence is literally worse than magic (to quote WLC).

2) It means it isn't material. Not sure what your problem is here. Numbers are immaterial. Thoughts are immaterial. Do your thoughts exist? Do numbers exist? Abstract objects are immaterial. Minds are immaterial.

Think about how you identify yourself. When you are happy do you think "Wow, my brain is super happy right now". No, you think "I am happy" (i.e. your mind - not your body). Also, if all you are is a physical glob of cells, then you have no personal identification over time, but you do identify as a person over time. Whatever your name is - you don't change your name every time a new cell joins/dies in your body do you?

You haven't really provided any good reason for epiphenomenalism to be true. All you do is resort to an absence of evidence =evidence of absence which is fallacious in this case.

I don't know. You are the one claiming that God exists, so what evidence do you have?

You just followed up your OP by shifting the burden of proof. You started this thread. You made the claim. You have the burden.

No I didn't.

I began this thread asking: "Can someone give me a consistent methodology for determining the difference between God and an imaginary friend?" Perhaps the wording was slightly ambiguous but basically what I was asking is: If there is a Person A who has a belief in a god-like imaginary friend and Person B who believes in God, what method can *I* apply to distinguish Person A's belief as false and Person B's belief as true?

Throughout this whole thread I have been trying to focus on method. For example, with the human-robot problem that you brought up, I have shown that I could apply a method for distinguishing the two which at least attempts to find the differences between the two.

Is there any similar method which could be applied to distinguish God's existence (as understood by Person B) from imaginary friend's existence (as understood by Person A)?

The way to distinguish the difference between the imaginary friend and God is the bible. It tells you who God is. For istance, let's say some wacko guy at church comes up to me and says "God told me to go jump off a bridge" - I would immediately presume this guy either 1) has an imaginary friend who he calls God 2) has a psychological disorder 3) is speaking to a demon

What model was that? The "properly basic" model? So, a Hindu who believes in Vishnu feels that belief in Vishnu is properly basic, does that mean Vishnu also exists?

Your properly basic model results in an "Everything Exists" scenario.

Answered above

What type of evidence was sufficient for you?

God revealed himself to me in the person of Jesus Christ. He can heal you.

 

[-V-]

To check if a car is or is not coming down the road is a falsifiable test. You're the one that keeps throwing the word "science" around.

No, YOU brought up science when you demanded that the method be falsifiable. What do you think “falsifiable” means? Did you miss the definitions I linked? Are you just ignoring them? Are you just making up your own personal definition?

While a falsifiable test (a science experiment) *CAN* be done to determine if a car is coming down the street, what you described was NOT a falsifiable test. In the casual act of crossing the street, people are not performing “falsifiable tests”.

I absolutely do not trust your perceptions and only your perceptions.

If you and I were standing on a street corner and I was about to cross the street and you said, "Watch out, there's a car coming!" and I look and see no evidence of any car at all on the road, you can be quite certain that I would be highly skeptical of your perceptions. I would ask, "Where? I don't see it." If you responded with some vague philosophical argument about immaterial cars you can be quite certain I would proceed to cross the road.

I need more than just someone's idea or feeling or emotion when it comes to determining if something exists external to their mind**.

First, I already gave you the methodologies used showing it's not "just someone's idea or emotion". You disagreeing with their conclusions doesn't change that.

Second, who said anything about “ONLY my” perceptions? The vast majority of the world perceives that there is a higher power. If you can’t see the car, just how many millions of people need to tell you there’s a car coming before their perception seems to be reasonable?

You need to decide what question you want answered. Either - what methodology might someone use to determine God isn’t imaginary? (That question has been answered, you just don’t agree with their conclusion, so you dismiss it. That doesn’t change the fact that a methodology is used.) Or, is the question - what methodology will prove to YOU that God isn’t imaginary? How do we know that question is even answerable? What guarantee do we have that you’re reasonable? If you can’t prove you’re reasonable, why should we even try to answer if it seems you’ll reject everything no matter what?

Here’s an idea - suppose you’re alone with someone blind from birth. Come up with a falsifiable test to be performed by the blind person so they can determine that rainbows exist.

 

[leftrightleftrightleft]

We need to distinguish between the objections you are making. The defense made by reformed epistemology is for the objection "I may not know whether Christianity is true, but I do know that Christianity is not rational to believe". This is an entirely different objection from an objection to the truth of Christianity. Therefore, I am not saying "everything exists". I am only saying that it is rational to believe Christianity if it is true. This means that I am okay with a person who claims that they come to know that Vishnu exists in a properly basic way. An extremely important part of this model is that a person is able to arrive at the belief "Vishnu exists" in a properly basic way if there are no defeaters for their belief. There are good reasons to believe Vishnu does not exists. Let me quote some text from Warranted Christian Belief by Alvin Plantinga

I hope that clarifies, but the gist is that we are only claiming that Christian belief is warranted only if it is true. This is an important distinction because if non-Christian's want to object to Christianity they can no longer do it on the basis of rationality (i.e. I do not know whether Christianity is true, but I do know that Christianity is not rational to believe) - they must do it on the basis of truth (i.e. Christianity is not true because Jesus did not exists, etc...).

A couple comments here:

1) None of this (or the Platinga quote) mentions God specifically.

2) There are so many if's in that Platinga quote that I don't even know where to begin. Basically, "If X, then P, Q, R, S". Sure, "If I was a frog, I would not own a house and type on a computer". Who cares about conditionals if the protasis clause is a) false or b) undetermined.

3) Christian belief is warranted only if it is true? So is it true or not? That's the whole point.

I have shown why your method fails. A person is not identified by its physical parts. If you were able to hook a brain up to a computer and that computer could communicate with you, would it be a robot or is there a mind? Your test would fail this scenario.

It would not be a human, that's for sure!

It would be a brain hooked up to a computer.

I believe your issues are only semantic as you just defined something as your conclusion and then concluded I am wrong. Nice trick...? Anyways let me provide you with a few answers here

1) I don't think anyone defines the universe as "everything that exists". This is pretty much the fly in the Grand Canyon. You don't know what is external to our universe. How are you making a claim there is nothing beyond the universe? Further, there are good reasons to believe there is 'something' beyond our universe whether you are a theist or an atheist. Our universe came from somewhere - to propose it just popped into existence is literally worse than magic (to quote WLC).

The first definition in Merriam-Webster:
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/universe
"Universe: the whole body of things and phenomena observed or postulated." (emphasis mine)

That is a very broad definition. It includes everything. Every phenomena observed. Every phenomena postulated. By this definition it is nonsensical to say something is "outside" the universe because it is a contradiction of definition.

Perhaps what you mean is that God exists in some other higher dimension or reality or something of that sort? That I could understand because other dimensions are possible, if poorly understood.

2) It means it isn't material. Not sure what your problem is here. Numbers are immaterial. Thoughts are immaterial. Do your thoughts exist? Do numbers exist? Abstract objects are immaterial. Minds are immaterial.

These things do "exist" in some sense but in the same way that unicorns, Harry Potter and Santa Claus exist. Numbers just happen to be more useful than unicorns so we use the abstract concept of numbers more often than the abstract concept of unicorns.

Be careful how you define existence otherwise you'll end up in an Everything Exists scenario.

How is God distinguishable from some other abstract concepts such as "8", "unicorn", "libertarianism", "Frodo", or "Tao"?

Think about how you identify yourself. When you are happy do you think "Wow, my brain is super happy right now". No, you think "I am happy" (i.e. your mind - not your body). Also, if all you are is a physical glob of cells, then you have no personal identification over time, but you do identify as a person over time. Whatever your name is - you don't change your name every time a new cell joins/dies in your body do you?

I would suggest reading The Self Illusion by Bruce Hood. Its a very interesting read and touches on this.

The idea of personal identification over time depends strongly on a set of preserved memories. Have you ever had the experience of looking at an old photograph and thinking, "Was that really me?" You might have no memory of the photograph or events surrounding the photograph, but you know that the person in the photograph has all the physical attributes of yourself (as you remember or as you've been told).

There is actually no true sense of Self beyond the present moment. This can also be observed in people with severe memory disorders. They completely lose their temporal sense of Self because they have no set of preserved memories. They exist only in the present moment.

The present sense of Self is related to the hard problem of consciousness which is fascinating but I believe a subject for another thread.

You just followed up your OP by shifting the burden of proof. You started this thread. You made the claim. You have the burden.

I started this thread by asking a question.

Are questions now claims which require proof? How bizarre...

The way to distinguish the difference between the imaginary friend and God is the bible.

An answer to the thread OP!

After all that big epistemological discussion, that's the answer? The Bible?

I said a long time ago in this thread that I don't want the Bible to be an answer because God is claimed to exist right here and right now.

To say that the Bible is somehow required to distinguish God from an imaginary concept is like someone asking how you distinguish the sun from the moon and you reference him to a 1960s astronomy textbook. You shouldn't need to reference old sources (even if they are authoritative!) in order to show that something exists right here and right now.

And if there are no distinguishing features from a mental construct then it is a mental construct, by definition.

It tells you who God is. For istance, let's say some wacko guy at church comes up to me and says "God told me to go jump off a bridge" - I would immediately presume this guy either 1) has an imaginary friend who he calls God 2) has a psychological disorder 3) is speaking to a demon

The Biblical God set a precedent where killing your firstborn son (Gen 22:2) and murdering everyone in a whole city (1 Sam 15:2-3) were both acceptable commands from God. So jumping off a bridge doesn't seem so crazy.

God revealed himself to me in the person of Jesus Christ. He can heal you.

This discussion has come down to the age-old Christian responses of "the Bible" and "accept Jesus into your heart". I think we have finished the conversation.

Thanks for the discussion! It was a good one

 

[ExodusMe]

A couple comments here:

1) None of this (or the Platinga quote) mentions God specifically.

2) There are so many if's in that Platinga quote that I don't even know where to begin. Basically, "If X, then P, Q, R, S". Sure, "If I was a frog, I would not own a house and type on a computer". Who cares about conditionals if the protasis clause is a) false or b) undetermined.

3) Christian belief is warranted only if it is true? So is it true or not? That's the whole point.



It would not be a human, that's for sure!

It would be a brain hooked up to a computer.



The first definition in Merriam-Webster:
"Universe: the whole body of things and phenomena observed or postulated." (emphasis mine)

That is a very broad definition. It includes everything. Every phenomena observed. Every phenomena postulated. By this definition it is nonsensical to say something is "outside" the universe because it is a contradiction of definition.

Perhaps what you mean is that God exists in some other higher dimension or reality or something of that sort? That I could understand because other dimensions are possible, if poorly understood.



These things do "exist" in some sense but in the same way that unicorns, Harry Potter and Santa Claus exist. Numbers just happen to be more useful than unicorns so we use the abstract concept of numbers more often than the abstract concept of unicorns.

Be careful how you define existence otherwise you'll end up in an Everything Exists scenario.

How is God distinguishable from some other abstract concepts such as "8", "unicorn", "libertarianism", "Frodo", or "Tao"?



I would suggest reading The Self Illusion by Bruce Hood. Its a very interesting read and touches on this.

The idea of personal identification over time depends strongly on a set of preserved memories. Have you ever had the experience of looking at an old photograph and thinking, "Was that really me?" You might have no memory of the photograph or events surrounding the photograph, but you know that the person in the photograph has all the physical attributes of yourself (as you remember or as you've been told).

There is actually no true sense of Self beyond the present moment. This can also be observed in people with severe memory disorders. They completely lose their temporal sense of Self because they have no set of preserved memories. They exist only in the present moment.

The present sense of Self is related to the hard problem of consciousness which is fascinating but I believe a subject for another thread.




I started this thread by asking a question.

Are questions now claims which require proof? How bizarre...



An answer to the thread OP!

After all that big epistemological discussion, that's the answer? The Bible?

I said a long time ago in this thread that I don't want the Bible to be an answer because God is claimed to exist right here and right now.

To say that the Bible is somehow required to distinguish God from an imaginary concept is like someone asking how you distinguish the sun from the moon and you reference him to a 1960s astronomy textbook. You shouldn't need to reference old sources (even if they are authoritative!) in order to show that something exists right here and right now.

And if there are no distinguishing features from a mental construct then it is a mental construct, by definition.



The Biblical God set a precedent where killing your firstborn son (Gen 22:2) and murdering everyone in a whole city (1 Sam 15:2-3) were both acceptable commands from God. So jumping off a bridge doesn't seem so crazy.



This discussion has come down to the age-old Christian responses of "the Bible" and "accept Jesus into your heart". I think we have finished the conversation.

Thanks for the discussion! It was a good one

Absolutely, I hope it helped you.

I think we can wrap this up with the following bullets
1) Your objection to theism on the basis of evidentialism is flawed because a) theism is held in a properly basic way where we can come to know God exists through properly functioning cognitive processes and b) because you hold many other beliefs in the same manner that are not verified in the way you are subjecting theism that make your epistemology inconsistent.
2) God has revealed himself to us through His Word and we can come to know Him through prayer and the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit who gives us warrant for our beliefs about God.
3) This is more of an elaboration on #1 - you haven't really shown us why we can't hold beliefs that are not empirically verified. You just keep resorting to evidence of absence = absence of evidence. This is fallacious and you never fulfilled your burden of proof. From this it seems that you have no good reasons to hold this belief.

I appreciate the discussion and would suggest looking deeply into your belief concerning verificationism.

 

[leftrightleftrightleft]

Absolutely, I hope it helped you.

I think we can wrap this up with the following bullets
1) Your objection to theism on the basis of evidentialism is flawed because a) theism is held in a properly basic way where we can come to know God exists through properly functioning cognitive processes and b) because you hold many other beliefs in the same manner that are not verified in the way you are subjecting theism that make your epistemology inconsistent.
2) God has revealed himself to us through His Word and we can come to know Him through prayer and the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit who gives us warrant for our beliefs about God.
3) This is more of an elaboration on #1 - you haven't really shown us why we can't hold beliefs that are not empirically verified. You just keep resorting to evidence of absence = absence of evidence. This is fallacious and you never fulfilled your burden of proof. From this it seems that you have no good reasons to hold this belief.

I appreciate the discussion and would suggest looking deeply into your belief concerning verificationism.

I don't want to continue the discussion but I am just going to provide a quick summary of the points from my perspective as well just to offer a balanced summary from each of us if anyone reads this.

1) I find the that Reformed epistemology and properly basic beliefs leads to an Everything Exists scenario in which God is given the same level of "existence" as other abstractions or mental concepts which people "feel" exist (e.g. Vishnu, unicorns, etc.).

2) No method has been supplied to determine how we can distinguish from Person A who claims to believe in a non-existing, mental construct and Person B who claims to believe in a God who exists in some fashion external to their minds. If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, then it is probably a duck. In other words, if there is no distinguishing feature between an Object A in some Category X and some other Object B, then Object B belongs in Category X by the definition of Object A.

Cheers, thanks for the discussion

 

[leftrightleftrightleft]

While a falsifiable test (a science experiment) *CAN* be done to determine if a car is coming down the street, what you described was NOT a falsifiable test. In the casual act of crossing the street, people are not performing “falsifiable tests”.

If a person says, "Watch out there is a car coming down the road and its going to hit you!" and you look and see no car, you are performing a falsifiable test by crossing the road. If you get hit by the car, then I guess the car did exist after all...You have falsified the notion that "The car does not exist" by being hit and injured by the car.

First, I already gave you the methodologies used showing it's not "just someone's idea or emotion". You disagreeing with their conclusions doesn't change that.

Are you referring to Post #9?

I responded to it in Post #14. In that post, I explained how the answers offered were not actually methodologies for determining if an actual personal God exists here and now but rather offered philosophical arguments for the existence of some abstract entity (could be Vishnu for all I know) that may have existed at some point in the past who instantiated the universe. It was a definitional problem.

This thread has not really been about deism. I believe a deist God who set up the universe in some fashion could exist in the same way that an alien race could have created our observable universe in some fashion. That is a very different claim than the idea of a personal God who exists here and now. Arguments for deism belong in a different thread.

Second, who said anything about “ONLY my” perceptions? The vast majority of the world perceives that there is a higher power. If you can’t see the car, just how many millions of people need to tell you there’s a car coming before their perception seems to be reasonable?

Argumentum ad populum.

You need to decide what question you want answered. Either - what methodology might someone use to determine God isn’t imaginary? (That question has been answered, you just don’t agree with their conclusion, so you dismiss it. That doesn’t change the fact that a methodology is used.)

Can you point to the post where a methodology was supplied for distinguishing between a Person A who claims he has a god-like friend which in reality only exists in his mind and a Person B who claims that God exists external to his mind?

All I saw was a logical philosophical argument for the existence of some entity who must have instantiated the universe. I did not see an argument for the personal Christian God who exists today, who takes requests today, who comforts and loves today, who is active in our world today.

Here’s an idea - suppose you’re alone with someone blind from birth. Come up with a falsifiable test to be performed by the blind person so they can determine that rainbows exist.

Here's what I would do. I would first explain to the blind person the abstract concept of light. I would explain the way light works as best I could using something he could understand (like sound waves). I would give examples of sound waves refracting in water and explain that light can do the same thing and separate out to form its different constituent parts in the same way the sound waves can be decomposed into different frequencies. I would clearly define this decomposition of visible light as a "rainbow". I would explain how you can make a rainbow with a prism and give the equations for how light will refract inside the prism. That's all the theory.

To prove to him that this thing called a "rainbow" has some sort of external existence here's what I would do:

I would tell him over the phone to go find 5 identical, square cardboard (or plastic) boxes. I would instruct him to make a hole on the front face. I would then tell him to make a second hole on the left face which corresponds to the angles of refraction of light through a prism relative to the first hole. I would then tell him to buy a glass prism and tell him to afix it to the inside bottom of any box he chooses at an orientation so that it aligns with the hole on the front face and so that the angles align with the hole on the left face (as per the theory). Now I would tell him that, because rainbows exist, I can tell him which box the prism is in every time. Take any of the five boxes, mix them up in any order and place each box against a smooth wall in a dark room so that the hole on the left side of the box faces the wall. Now, take a lamp and shine the light into the hole on the front face of the box. Any time a rainbow is projected onto the wall, I will tell him, "That box has the prism". I will get it right every time. I could not have tampered with the apparatus because the blind man constructed the entire apparatus.

This experiment does not prove that rainbows exist, but it proves that something exists which aligns very well with the theory of rainbows. It allows me to make a correct prediction every time.

I could tell him to do this with any other person that can see. All he has to say is, "Tell me which box has a rainbow projected onto the wall." Any person who can see will get it right every time. No one that he talks to will disagree about the definition of rainbows.

That is a methodology.

 

[-V-]

If a person says, "Watch out there is a car coming down the road and its going to hit you!" and you look and see no car, you are performing a falsifiable test by crossing the road. If you get hit by the car, then I guess the car did exist after all...You have falsified the notion that "The car does not exist" by being hit and injured by the car.

It's NOT a falsifiable test, because what if you DON'T get hit? Does it mean the car doesn't exist, or does it simply mean it missed you?

Are you referring to Post #9?

I responded to it in Post #14. In that post, I explained how the answers offered were not actually methodologies for determining if an actual personal God exists here and now but rather offered philosophical arguments for the existence of some abstract entity (could be Vishnu for all I know) that may have existed at some point in the past who instantiated the universe. It was a definitional problem.

This thread has not really been about deism. I believe a deist God who set up the universe in some fashion could exist in the same way that an alien race could have created our observable universe in some fashion. That is a very different claim than the idea of a personal God who exists here and now. Arguments for deism belong in a different thread.

You're responding as if the methodologies specified were intended to prove the Christian God, or any other *specific* God. They aren't. They are intended to show *a* God, not specifically identify Him, though.

Can you point to the post where a methodology was supplied for distinguishing between a Person A who claims he has a god-like friend which in reality only exists in his mind and a Person B who claims that God exists external to his mind?

Yes, I gave you that the first time - the difference between simply conjuring up an imaginary friend and using reasoning to see the likelihood of God existing.

All I saw was a logical philosophical argument for the existence of some entity who must have instantiated the universe. I did not see an argument for the personal Christian God who exists today, who takes requests today, who comforts and loves today, who is active in our world today.

Like I said, it wasn't about identifying a specific God, merely that *A* God exists.

Here's what I would do.... That is a methodology.

That's a fail methodology. At best, all you're doing is showing the prism does *something* to give it away. No proof of any rainbow at all.

 

[leftrightleftrightleft]

It's NOT a falsifiable test, because what if you DON'T get hit? Does it mean the car doesn't exist, or does it simply mean it missed you?

If I don't get hit, then it could mean that the car missed me but it still falsifies the statement that the person made, "Watch out, there's a car and it's going to hit you."

So yes, it is not a falsifiable test for the car's existence or non-existence. Sorry about the mix-up. Remind me again how this was related to the thread?

You're responding as if the methodologies specified were intended to prove the Christian God, or any other *specific* God. They aren't. They are intended to show *a* God, not specifically identify Him, though.

The whole point of this thread (if you didn't gather from the OP) is that a personal God exists.

Like I said, the argument for a deistic god is about as compelling as the idea of an advanced alien race who instantiated the universe.

But a personal God who exists here and now is something different entirely. It's the difference between claiming that large dinosaurs once roamed the Earth millions of years ago versus claiming that a large dinosaur is living in your backyard right now. Very, very, very different claims.

The deistic arguments do nothing to prove that a God exists now. All they do is suggest that some god-like entity may have existed in the past in order to instantiate the universe.

Yes, I gave you that the first time - the difference between simply conjuring up an imaginary friend and using reasoning to see the likelihood of God existing.

Oy. You don't understand.

How can **I** distinguish (as a third person) between Person A and Person B?

How can **you** distinguish (as a third person) between Person A and Person B?

Yes, for the person doing the imagining (i.e. Person A) he knows he is just imagining (or perhaps he doesn't since he might be delusional). But for a third party, how can we distinguish?

For example, with any physical object, it's easy: we look for physical evidence of the object. For example, if Person A and Person B both claim to own a dog at their house and yet Person A's house has no evidence of a dog (e.g. no physical dog, no barking, no dog food, no dog hair, no dog house, no dog leash, etc.) then it seems highly unlikely that they actually own a dog whereas Person B can be verified to have a dog by encountering some or all of those physical evidences. That is the method. Is there such a method to distinguish between God and an imaginary friend?

That's a fail methodology. At best, all you're doing is showing the prism does *something* to give it away. No proof of any rainbow at all.

The blind man shows some stranger the set up and asks, "Which box projects a rainbow on the wall?" The stranger will pick the box with the prism every time.

It is not showing that the prism does "something" to give it away. It is showing that the prism is specifically creating something which everyone who can see immediately recognizes as a "rainbow".

That is proof that rainbows exist. Or, more specifically, it is proof that the word "rainbow" points to some entity which everyone (who can see) instantly recognizes as such. I have also provided the blind man with some theory as to why the prism creates the rainbow (but the theory itself is irrelevant to the proof). Thinking back now, I could have just skipped the theory part and told the blind man: "This prism creates rainbows, put it in the box this way and then ask strangers which box creates a rainbow on the wall". The strangers will get it right every time. The strangers can identify the rainbow very easily and it matches up exactly with the box which contains the prism, every time.

 

[-V-]

If I don't get hit, then it could mean that the car missed me but it still falsifies the statement that the person made, "Watch out, there's a car and it's going to hit you."

Funny how you had to CHANGE the test from simply a car being on the road to "it's going to hit you."

So yes, it is not a falsifiable test for the car's existence or non-existence. Sorry about the mix-up. Remind me again how this was related to the thread?

Really? You mean to tell me you see NO relationship between an example of testing whether or not a car is imaginary and whether or not God is imaginary? You honestly see no connection?

The whole point of this thread (if you didn't gather from the OP) is that a personal God exists.

The OP says NOTHING of a "personal" God, it just says God.

Like I said, the argument for a deistic god is about as compelling as the idea of an advanced alien race who instantiated the universe.

But where did the aliens come from? Unless you're giving the aliens the qualities of God, then there's still a God, you simply changed its name from "God" to "alien".

The deistic arguments do nothing to prove that a God exists now. All they do is suggest that some god-like entity may have existed in the past in order to instantiate the universe.

So it's no longer alive? Not much of a God if it died. What characteristics are we allowed to presume this god-like entity has and which are we not allowed to presume it has - include the criteria you are using to determine that.

How can **I** distinguish (as a third person) between Person A and Person B?

How can **you** distinguish (as a third person) between Person A and Person B?

Yes, for the person doing the imagining (i.e. Person A) he knows he is just imagining (or perhaps he doesn't since he might be delusional). But for a third party, how can we distinguish?

That *IS* the methodology I gave the first time. Let's say the GotQuestions people came up with that methodology and determined there's a God. Then I, the third person, also use that methodology and came to the same conclusion.

The blind man shows some stranger the set up and asks, "Which box projects a rainbow on the wall?" The stranger will pick the box with the prism every time.

It is not showing that the prism does "something" to give it away. It is showing that the prism is specifically creating something which everyone who can see immediately recognizes as a "rainbow".

First, you're changing the test (funny how you have to keep doing that). I specifically said you were ALONE with the blind person.

Second, all you're STILL doing is showing that the prism is having SOME effect. Oh, everyone "says" it's a rainbow? Sounds like now you're using an argumentum ad populum.

And don't look now, but you're giving us a scientific experiment to perform to prove rainbows. So, will you admit that you are relying on science to determine truth, or can you provide a "methodology" that does not involve a scientific experiment?

 

[Hawkins]

Can someone give me a consistent methodology for determining the difference between God and an imaginary friend?

Someone says that they have an imaginary friend who they talk to and who sometimes does things for them and who makes them feel happy and fulfilled and comforts them.

How is this different than God?

This is primarily an epistemological question. In order for me to believe in God, I need to be able to distinguish this "God" character from an "imaginary friend" character.

It is and 'before' and 'after' comparison. It is a peer comparison.

First, one of the reasons why God prefers an intangible relationship is because it constructs your faith instead of destructs your faith.

A lot of people perceive His presence with a comparison before and after they are second born. Moreover, such a kind of perception has some common characteristics shareable among Christians, and it's often teaching related and is thus consistent with what the Bible says. God won't ask you to murder someone you don't like, as it's not a perception shareable among second born Christians.

That said. You are confused about the difference our relationship with God and how God made Himself known to humans. He made Himself known to humans by using eyewitnesses (i.e., His appointed prophets) and for them to write things down about Him then for other humans to believe with faith. Maintaining an intangible relationship with second born Christians is not the way or only way God makes Himself known to humans as you sound it to be!

 

[leftrightleftrightleft]

Funny how you had to CHANGE the test from simply a car being on the road to "it's going to hit you."

People make mistakes. [/shrug]

Really? You mean to tell me you see NO relationship between an example of testing whether or not a car is imaginary and whether or not God is imaginary? You honestly see no connection?

Well, if we are just testing whether a car is imaginary or not we could use all sorts of tests. We could measure it's mass, we could see it's impact on the physical world (as in, if it runs over an object, that object is impacted), etc.

The OP says NOTHING of a "personal" God, it just says God.

I think it was heavily implied by the use of words in which only a personal God could accomplish: comforting someone, able to be talked to, doing things for them, etc.

Come on, man. Even if it was *slightly* ambiguous in the OP, I have re-clarified it multiple times to multiple people in this thread.

I've edited the OP with a disclaimer at the bottom to clarify in the OP since it seems to be causing much confusion.

But where did the aliens come from? Unless you're giving the aliens the qualities of God, then there's still a God, you simply changed its name from "God" to "alien".

Do you talk to this God today? How so? How do I distinguish you talking to your God from the crazy man talking to his imaginary friend?

I do not know how I am supposed to distinguish the two.

That *IS* the methodology I gave the first time. Let's say the GotQuestions people came up with that methodology and determined there's a God. Then I, the third person, also use that methodology and came to the same conclusion.

I just don't think you are understanding what I am asking.

I'll use the dinosaur example again.

Person: "I have a dinosaur in my backyard"

Me: "Show me that this dinosaur is real and you are not just imagining/delusional"

Person: "I went to paleontology.org and they provided a methodology for discovering dinosaur bones in the ground."

Me: "...."

Do you understand the problem with your answer to my question?

First, you're changing the test (funny how you have to keep doing that). I specifically said you were ALONE with the blind person.

I specifically said in my first post that I would be able to identify the box with the prism every time. The blind man constructs the entire apparatus himself so I cannot have tampered with it.

I don't know why being alone is relevant anyway. Whether its me or some stranger doing the test doesn't matter. Although probably more convincing if a stranger does it since then there is no way at all that I could have tampered or influenced the test.

Second, all you're STILL doing is showing that the prism is having SOME effect.

Yes, I am showing the prism has some effect and I have defined that effect with a name: rainbow. Remember, when I told him all the theory... The theory defines what a rainbow is.

The effect is consistent. Every time the prism produces the same effect. So clearly something exists which I am able to consistently identify every single time.

To make it even more convincing, I could tell him to rotate the prism slightly so that only a portion of the rainbow is shown. I could look at the partial rainbow projected on the wall and tell him what angle he rotated the prism in the box. It`s a reliable prediction and I will get it right every time. It`s fulfilling every aspect of what a rainbow should be as I`ve described it to him.

Oh, everyone "says" it's a rainbow? Sounds like now you're using an argumentum ad populum.

Any time anyone uses a definition of a word, they are implicitly using an argumentum ad populum. Definitions are when the argumentum ad populum fallacy kind of "breaks" because language relies on a shared understanding of word definitions.

So yea, if everyone sees something and gives it the same name, then that's pretty convincing evidence that that thing exists. (P.S. that's actually part of the problem with god-concepts: no one seems to be able to agree on exactly what God is, what God tells them, what God's effects are, what books God was involved in writing, what morality God condones, etc. There is no consistency in definition or effect.)

If I had told the blind man that unicorns exist and defined unicorns as "any display of the colors of the spectrum produced by dispersion of light" and if I told him that unicorns are produced when light passes through a prism and gave him the theory and angles and etc., then I would be able to prove that "unicorns" exist as defined. Would I have proved that a horse with a single horn on its head exists? No of course not because I defined the word differently.

And don't look now, but you're giving us a scientific experiment to perform to prove rainbows. So, will you admit that you are relying on science to determine truth, or can you provide a "methodology" that does not involve a scientific experiment?

You asked for a methodology to show a blind man that rainbows existed and I provided such a methodology.

You never placed any conditions on what type of methodology I could use.

Do you happen to have a non-scientific methodology for showing a blind man that rainbows exist? Because if you do, I would love to hear it!

 

[-V-]

Well, if we are just testing whether a car is imaginary or not we could use all sorts of tests. We could measure it's mass, we could see it's impact on the physical world (as in, if it runs over an object, that object is impacted), etc.

And we're back to falsifiable scientific testing, which is NOT what happens when the average person decides to cross the street. They simply presume their perceptions are accurate.

I have re-clarified it multiple times ...

You mean you've moved the goalposts.

Do you talk to this God today? How so? How do I distinguish you talking to your God from the crazy man talking to his imaginary friend?

I do not know how I am supposed to distinguish the two.

Asked & answered numerous times. AGAIN, what question do you want answered?
1. How can someone in general distinguish between an imaginary friend and God?
2. What methodology will prove to leftrightleftrightleftright that God isn't imaginary?

You seem to flip between the two as if they're interchangeable. They're not.

I just don't think you are understanding what I am asking.

I'll use the dinosaur example again.

Person: "I have a dinosaur in my backyard"

Me: "Show me that this dinosaur is real and you are not just imagining/delusional"

Person: "I went to paleontology.org and they provided a methodology for discovering dinosaur bones in the ground."

Me: "...."

Do you understand the problem with your answer to my question?

Yeah, I understand you're using a false analogy.

I specifically said in my first post that I would be able to identify the box with the prism every time. The blind man constructs the entire apparatus himself so I cannot have tampered with it.

So?? You're still showing NOTHING other than the prism has SOME kind effect. You have not proven the exact nature of that effect.

I don't know why being alone is relevant anyway. Whether its me or some stranger doing the test doesn't matter. Although probably more convincing if a stranger does it since then there is no way at all that I could have tampered or influenced the test.

And now you're changing it once again. Before it was for multiple strangers, now you have just "a" stranger doing it. You keep altering the methodology, and you wonder why we can't nail down an answer.

Yes, I am showing the prism has some effect and I have defined that effect with a name: rainbow. Remember, when I told him all the theory... The theory defines what a rainbow is.

Wrong. You have NOT proven the prism produces a rainbow. How does the blind man know that the prism isn't simply redirecting the light WITHOUT reformatting it into a rainbow?

The effect is consistent. Every time the prism produces the same effect. So clearly something exists which I am able to consistently identify every single time.

Yes, "SOMETHING" which you have yet to prove is actually a rainbow rather than simply redirected white light.

You never placed any conditions on what type of methodology I could use.
Do you happen to have a non-scientific methodology for showing a blind man that rainbows exist? Because if you do, I would love to hear it!

But you said it did NOT have to be a scientific experiment, and then all you give are scientific examples. So my question still stands. And if you're just going to keep dodging it, I think it's a valid presumption that you do in fact believe science is the only source of truth here.

 

[leftrightleftrightleft]

And we're back to falsifiable scientific testing, which is NOT what happens when the average person decides to cross the street. They simply presume their perceptions are accurate.

Yes. It is not a good example. Let's move on.

You mean you've moved the goalposts.

My conversation with @ExodusMe was a really great forum conversation and I really appreciated it. He never falsely accused me of doing something I did not do.

Let me reiterate: I did not move any goal posts with regards to the OP. My intention in starting this thread was to specifically discuss a personal God. If that was not clear to you, I apologize. I have repeatedly clarified the miscommunication in a polite manner. Please do not accuse me of moving the goalposts.

Asked & answered numerous times. AGAIN, what question do you want answered?
1. How can someone in general distinguish between an imaginary friend and God?
2. What methodology will prove to leftrightleftrightleftright that God isn't imaginary?

I would like the first question answered.

Person A claims: "Bob exists. I communicate with him. He comforts me. He often responds to my requests. I interact with him every day whenever I want to."
Person B claims: "God exists. He talks to me. I communicate with him. He comforts me. He often responds to my requests. I interact with him every day whenever I want to."

Now a third person (Person C) is trying to evaluate their claims. What are the distinguishing features (if any) between the delusional Person A who believes in something which does not exist (an imaginary mental construct called Bob) and Person B who believes in something which does exist (i.e. God).

Yeah, I understand you're using a false analogy.

The relevant part of the analogy is that one is a claim of a present state of existence whereas another is a claim of a past state of existence.

So?? You're still showing NOTHING other than the prism has SOME kind effect. You have not proven the exact nature of that effect.

Rainbow definition: the dispersion of visible light as a function of frequency.

Background info: Prism will disperse visible light as a function of frequency depending on the angle of incidence of the light and the internal angles of the prism.

I have shown this to be true by the fact that I can identify the angle which the prism has been rotated in the sealed box by observing the dispersion of light on the wall.

More complications could be added to the scenario (e.g. using optical sensors or something) which would further refine the thing which I am observing to be identifiable as a rainbow, as defined.

And now you're changing it once again. Before it was for multiple strangers, now you have just "a" stranger doing it. You keep altering the methodology, and you wonder why we can't nail down an answer.

It's irrelevant. I'm not changing it. I'm just pointing out that it is irrelevant. One stranger. Me. You. A hundred strangers. It doesn't matter. Your original request for for just me, so it can be just me then. It doesn't matter.

Wrong. You have NOT proven the prism produces a rainbow. How does the blind man know that the prism isn't simply redirecting the light WITHOUT reformatting it into a rainbow?

My addition of the prediction of the rotation of the prism addresses this.

Yes, "SOMETHING" which you have yet to prove is actually a rainbow rather than simply redirected white light.

Thank you for the correction. Yes, the initial experiment was flawed as you pointed out. As stated earlier, the addition of the second test (predicting the angle of rotation of the prism) solves this problem.

The entire blind man argument is tangential to the main conversation. Perhaps it belongs in another thread and you are welcome to start such a thread.

But you said it did NOT have to be a scientific experiment, and then all you give are scientific examples. So my question still stands. And if you're just going to keep dodging it, I think it's a valid presumption that you do in fact believe science is the only source of truth here.

I asked in the OP for a method to distinguish between an imaginary friend and God. I clarified the original OP because the original OP was being misunderstood to specifically focus on a personal God. So far, no method (scientific or otherwise) has been supplied to me. The best discussion I had was with @ExodusMe who argued that God was properly basic which was not a method or observation of any kind but was rather an a priori assertion.

I think at this point, we are talking past one another and not furthering the discussion.

Thanks for the discussion!

 

[-V-]

I would like the first question answered.

Person A claims: "Bob exists. I communicate with him. He comforts me. He often responds to my requests. I interact with him every day whenever I want to."
Person B claims: "God exists. He talks to me. I communicate with him. He comforts me. He often responds to my requests. I interact with him every day whenever I want to."

Now a third person (Person C) is trying to evaluate their claims. What are the distinguishing features (if any) between the delusional Person A who believes in something which does not exist (an imaginary mental construct called Bob) and Person B who believes in something which does exist (i.e. God).

And that HAS BEEN ANSWERED. The "distinguishing feature" is the method by which people conjure up imaginary friends in contrast to the method I gave links to long ago where logic/reason is used to deduce God's existence. Once again, you disagreeing with their conclusions does not mean there was no valid method used.

The relevant part of the analogy is that one is a claim of a present state of existence whereas another is a claim of a past state of existence.

And, once again, you're picking and choosing what qualities of God we're expected to accept. Why should we think God can create a universe, making Him exist independent of the physical universe, yet is subject to then dying, a condition of the physical universe. I asked before how you're determining what qualities we're allowed to presume God has, and you ignored it.

And your prism experiment STILL only shows *something* happening to the light without any proof that it's actually a rainbow. How does the blind man know that it's not simply affecting the brightness of the light? Different angles affect the brightness differently, giving you the ability to determine the angle by seeing the light. Why should he assume you're telling the truth that it is, instead, making a rainbow?

Further, someone else tells him that rainbows form in the sky and leprechauns hide gold at the end of them. You guys can't even give a consistent definition of "rainbow", and you apparently want the blind man to believe there's a giant glass prism magically floating in the sky making rainbows there. Clearly, rainbows are imaginary.

I asked in the OP for a method ....

And you still insist the method be falsifiable, which demands scientific experimentation. Yet you still apparently insist on ignoring it whenever that definition is brought up, and you still apparently are intent on dodging the question as to you requiring science to be the only source of truth here.