Neither, because God's nature is not independent of Himself.
Meaning he didn't choose it. Meaning there is a standard to which he is being measured, one that, if not met, would disqualify him from godhood.
You've chosen the horn of independent standard. 'Goodness' necessitates no ontological basis in Yahweh.
I have a word for good already. It's called 'good'. You can avoid the horns of the dilemma this way - by strictly identifying 'good' and 'god' with each other, interchangeably - but you've rendered the entire concept of 'god' superfluous in doing so.
You are assuming some form of Platonism. You need to stop reading plato and check into the 21st century.
I am not a Platonist in any form (pardon the pun).
The Euthyphro dilemma is a counter to the intent of theistic moral arguments, which seek to prove an ontological dependence between morality and the 'god' concept. No one need ascribe to any particular moral philosophy to make use of it. It is a rejection of theistic moral ontology, not a defense of Platonism.
Objective moral values are moral values that are true whether you agree with them or not. For instance, murder (please don't make me explain the difference between self-defense and murder), lying, stealing, etc...
I would not call those 'values'. I would call them standards. Sounds like in this case, we're just describing the same thing using different words. I find the distinction useful.
But to the point, I agree. All of those things are objectively quantifiable in the amount of harm they cause. I would add, though, that at now point in that process is the invocation of Yahweh necessary, nor even remotely helpful.
Peter Pan is not Good. The Loch Ness Monster is not Good. This is the same error you made with your first question.
The point was that the invocation of imaginary non-entities - including, but not limited to, Yahweh - does not illuminate my moral philosophy.
Good and God are not separable.
Again, if they are strictly identical to one another, then Yahweh is superfluous.
You are taking 'good' and making it some sort of thing that exists 'out there'.
No, that would be you.
My concept of moral good is an emergent property rooted entirely in the interactions of sentient beings capable of experiencing harm and wellbeing.
Yours is rooted in a nebulous, 'supernatural' non-concept that is both ontologically and epistemologically vacuous.
Now you are just playing semantics. You are taking good and speaking about it in non-moral terms.
No I'm not.
Morality, in my philosophy, is relevant
only in regard to wellbeing or harm deriving from quantifiable experiences. So, drinking motor oil is in fact a moral concern. Were there no minds in existence to glean these experiences, 'morality' would have no meaning at all.
Wrong, the existence of a system of morals that God has allowed humanity to come to know is not hard to hypothesize.
That's hardly a profound statement. It's not hard to hypothesize
anything.
The hard part is actually providing a useful epistemological model by which information from and about this 'god' may be consistently and reliably gleaned.
Without that, his existence is irrelevant. He could just as well exist, or not, and we'd be left to our own moral devices in either case.
Which is all to say nothing of the fact that there is no reason to automatically suspect a 'god' would have our best interests in mind in the first place, which is a whole different mountain to climb.
I'm sure glad these aren't my problems.
Further, if we got back to the original point I made about your confusion with the euthyphro dilemma, God = Good.
And I'll get back to your options in pleading this case:
Either 'good' and 'god' are strictly identical, and 'god' is superfluous.
Or you take the horn of independent standard. Any being not acting in accordance with 'goodness' could not possibly be 'god', which necessarily implies an independent standard to which he is being measured.
Shazbot. Nanu-Nanu.