Your questions only apply if free will exists. Since you start with the assumption that free will doesn't exist, your questions are moot: they don't apply.
Sorry, WC, but this is just another term (like moot/nought) that I don´t understand in this context if not specified. They don´t apply to what, they don´t apply why?
You misunderstand. The very notion of 'good' and 'bad' break down without free will: a 'good' thing is something that should be done in preference to a 'bad' one. 'Should' and 'ought'. How can such notions make sense if there is only one thing that can possibly come to pass?
Since I don´t know what it is that will come to pass I think wishes, desires, ideas what should be and shouldn´t, hopes do make sense - unless you expect them to alter that which is predetermined.
If a researcher puts up a chemical experiment that´s never been done before, he also has his ideas what "should" happen (not only in the sense of "what would I expect to happen, to tell from previous experiments - hypothesis -, but also what he would prefer to happen), even though hardly anyone will ascribe "freewill" to chemical elements., and even though he´s not deluded into thinking that his anticipations and hopes will change anything about the fact that that which will happen
must happen.
Consider the two possibilities:
- We do not have free will. In this case, there is nothing more to say: we do what we are destined to do, and that's that.
- We have free will. In this case, we can make one of two assumptions:
- We assume free will doesn't exist.
- We assume free will does exist.
If not having "freewill" we also can make the assumptions that "freewill" exist or that it doesn´t exist (we can even change our position on that question) - only that this is predestined.Thus I don´t understand what the "that´s that" in #1 means. That which you postulate as the difference, isn´t different, after all.
Thus, it is logical to assume we have free will: if the assumption is false, then we never had any choice to begin with.
So what? If the assumption is false, we have no choice either way, to be precise.
But if it's true, we do have a choice about what to assume, so why would we assume otherwise?
I don´t understand the question. Why? E.g. because we would be mistaken about the existence/non-existence of freewill. Or because freewill strikes us as an illogical concept, a logical impossibility.
Your argument escapes me completely, to be honest.
"Fruitless", "pointless".
In regards to which fruit or point? (I suspect that this is the keyquestion, the answer to which would tell me what you expect from morality that I apparently don´t expect from it).
Another question, if I may:
If everything is predestined would you think it would make sense/be reasonable/logical to learn mathematics? To tell from what you have said so far I´d expect you to say no: Whether I´ll learn mathematics or not is predestined, so how is logical/reasonable to do it?
If everything is predestined would you think that a discussion is pointless (whether I - or the person opposite will change my/her mind is predestined after all). So why even try it?
Personally, I fail to see how you get to question arbitrary elements in the predestined cause-effect chain(s), and don´t question others. Premeditations aren´t any different than actions in this respect.
So what is your understanding of 'morality'?
Basically, the differenciation between human behaviours that I find desirable and human behaviours that I find undesirable.
I just don't see how the questions in the OP make sense without free will being part of the picture. In an ethical dilemma, we decide what is the most moral action, and we take it.
I don´t think we
decide it. We premeditate, and the result is another one of those causes and effects that are part of that which must happen (just like the course of the premeditation is).
We choose which action is fairest.
What at which point in time we think is fairest is predestined.
I fail to see how preferring something is moot, nought, point- and fruitless/doesn´t apply just because the preference is predestined.
Hardly anyone will claim that how tall everyone is is subject to their freewill. Yet, I can weigh up the advantages/disadvantages of being tall against those of being short quite fine, and come to the result Being tall (or small, or average) is preferrable/is best., and noone would call these considerations moot, nought or pointless/doesn´t apply unless they assume (for whatever reason) that I expect these considerations to affect my height.
If free will does not exist, it makes no sense to ask what we should or should not do, what is or is not fair: there is only what will come to pass.
I still don´t understand this argument. I think I can have an idea of what´s fair even though there is only what will come to pass. Like, I could say It would be fair if wealth and resources would be equally distributed among all persons living on earth. I fail to see how having an idea of fairness is negatively affected by the fact that whether things are or are not fair (according to my idea) is predestined.
There is no decision to be made (only the illusion of one), no options to weigh.
Since I don´t expect to make any decisions, in the first place, and I am just premeditating on the preferrability of hypothetical options not knowing what it is that will come to pass I don´t see a problem.
The result of the lottery is certainly not a matter of my freewill (even if assuming for a moment there were such), yet I can find it desirable/preferrable to be the winner next week.
Barring sociopaths, of course

.
I am afraid I have no clue what you are trying to communicate with this remark. If it´s material to the question, would you care to explain?