Homosexuals and Bisexuals

[FedererFan]

I appreciate the court cases. I really do. But unless you intend to have this discussion only with me and approximately once or twice a week, it would be helpful if you provided some statements. It's not just a minor thing for me to get to the law library.

I'm not sure, but I do not think court cases are copyright protected are they? You may well have a right to post the whole darned thing, is what I am getting at.

Don't take my word for it before you do it though.....

Court cases are available online.

From Varnum:

In contrast, the County points out, same-sex couples can procreate only through assisted reproductive techniques, and some same-sex couples may choose not to procreate. While heterosexual marriage does lead to procreation, the argument by the County fails to address the real issue in our required analysis of the objective: whether exclusion of gay and lesbian individuals from the institution of civil marriage will result in more procreation? If procreation is the true objective, then the proffered classification must work to achieve that objective.
Conceptually, the promotion of procreation as an objective of marriage is compatible with the inclusion of gays and lesbians within the definition of marriage. Gay and lesbian persons are capable of procreation. Thus, the sole conceivable avenue by which exclusion of gay and lesbian people from civil marriage could promote more procreation is if the unavailability of civil marriage for same-sex partners caused homosexual individuals to "become" heterosexual in order to procreate within the present traditional institution of civil marriage. The briefs, the record, our research, and common sense do not suggest such an outcome. Even if possibly true, the link between exclusion of gay and lesbian people from marriage and increased procreation is far too tenuous to withstand heightened scrutiny. Specifically, the statute is significantly under-inclusive with respect to the objective of increasing procreation because it does not include a variety of groups that do not procreate for reasons such as age, physical disability, or choice. In other words, the classification is not substantially related to the asserted legislative purpose.

Therefore, with respect to the subject and purposes of Iowa's marriage laws, we find that the plaintiffs are similarly situated compared to heterosexual persons. Plaintiffs are in committed and loving relationships, many raising families, just like heterosexual couples. Moreover, official recognition of their status provides an institutional basis for defining their fundamental relational rights and responsibilities, just as it does for heterosexual couples. Society benefits, for example, from providing same-sex couples a stable framework within which to raise their children and the power to make health care and end-of-life decisions for loved ones, just as it does when that framework is provided for opposite-sex couples.
In short, for purposes of Iowa's marriage laws, which are designed to bring a sense of order to the legal relationships of committed couples and their families in myriad ways, plaintiffs are similarly situated in every important respect, but for their sexual orientation. As indicated above, this distinction cannot defeat the application of equal protection analysis through the application of the similarly situated concept because, under this circular approach, all distinctions would evade equal protection review. Therefore, with respect to the government's purpose of "providing an institutional basis for defining the fundamental relational rights and responsibilities of persons," same-sex couples are similarly situated to opposite-sex couples.

From Kerrigan:

n his dissent, Justice Zarella alone asserts that same sex and opposite sex couples who wish to marry are not similarly situated because the former cannot engage in procreative sexual conduct. In view of the myriad and important similarities between same sex and opposite sex couples, including their shared interest in having and raising a family, we disagree that the inability of the former to conceive children together defeats the plaintiffs' equal protection challenge. Although it may be argued that the state's interest in regulating procreative conduct constitutes a rational basis for limiting marriage to opposite sex couples--an argument that, notably, the state itself expressly has disavowed--that rationale does not answer the entirely different question of whether same sex and opposite sex couples are similarly situated for present purposes. Because same sex and opposite sex couples have the same interest in having a family and the same right to do so, the mere fact that children of the former may be conceived in a different manner than children of the latter is insufficient, standing alone, to negate the fundamental and overriding similarities that they share, both with regard to matters relating to family and in all other respects. Thus, even though procreative conduct plays an important role in many marriages, we do not believe that such conduct so defines the institution of marriage that the inability to engage in that conduct is determinative of whether same sex and opposite sex couples are similarly situated for equal protection purposes, especially in view of the fact that some opposite sex couples also are unable to procreate, and others choose not to do so. Indeed, Justice Zarella has identified no case, and we are aware of none, that has rejected an equal protection claim on the ground that same sex couples are not similarly situated to opposite sex couples, either because the former cannot engage in procreative conduct or for any other reason. In fact, many courts have reached a contrary conclusion.

 

[Shane Roach]

Court cases are available online.

From Varnum:

In contrast, the County points out, same-sex couples can procreate only through assisted reproductive techniques, and some same-sex couples may choose not to procreate. While heterosexual marriage does lead to procreation, the argument by the County fails to address the real issue in our required analysis of the objective: whether exclusion of gay and lesbian individuals from the institution of civil marriage will result in more procreation? If procreation is the true objective, then the proffered classification must work to achieve that objective.
Conceptually, the promotion of procreation as an objective of marriage is compatible with the inclusion of gays and lesbians within the definition of marriage. Gay and lesbian persons are capable of procreation. Thus, the sole conceivable avenue by which exclusion of gay and lesbian people from civil marriage could promote more procreation is if the unavailability of civil marriage for same-sex partners caused homosexual individuals to "become" heterosexual in order to procreate within the present traditional institution of civil marriage. The briefs, the record, our research, and common sense do not suggest such an outcome. Even if possibly true, the link between exclusion of gay and lesbian people from marriage and increased procreation is far too tenuous to withstand heightened scrutiny. Specifically, the statute is significantly under-inclusive with respect to the objective of increasing procreation because it does not include a variety of groups that do not procreate for reasons such as age, physical disability, or choice. In other words, the classification is not substantially related to the asserted legislative purpose.

Therefore, with respect to the subject and purposes of Iowa's marriage laws, we find that the plaintiffs are similarly situated compared to heterosexual persons. Plaintiffs are in committed and loving relationships, many raising families, just like heterosexual couples. Moreover, official recognition of their status provides an institutional basis for defining their fundamental relational rights and responsibilities, just as it does for heterosexual couples. Society benefits, for example, from providing same-sex couples a stable framework within which to raise their children and the power to make health care and end-of-life decisions for loved ones, just as it does when that framework is provided for opposite-sex couples.
In short, for purposes of Iowa's marriage laws, which are designed to bring a sense of order to the legal relationships of committed couples and their families in myriad ways, plaintiffs are similarly situated in every important respect, but for their sexual orientation. As indicated above, this distinction cannot defeat the application of equal protection analysis through the application of the similarly situated concept because, under this circular approach, all distinctions would evade equal protection review. Therefore, with respect to the government's purpose of "providing an institutional basis for defining the fundamental relational rights and responsibilities of persons," same-sex couples are similarly situated to opposite-sex couples.

From Kerrigan:

n his dissent, Justice Zarella alone asserts that same sex and opposite sex couples who wish to marry are not similarly situated because the former cannot engage in procreative sexual conduct. In view of the myriad and important similarities between same sex and opposite sex couples, including their shared interest in having and raising a family, we disagree that the inability of the former to conceive children together defeats the plaintiffs' equal protection challenge. Although it may be argued that the state's interest in regulating procreative conduct constitutes a rational basis for limiting marriage to opposite sex couples--an argument that, notably, the state itself expressly has disavowed--that rationale does not answer the entirely different question of whether same sex and opposite sex couples are similarly situated for present purposes. Because same sex and opposite sex couples have the same interest in having a family and the same right to do so, the mere fact that children of the former may be conceived in a different manner than children of the latter is insufficient, standing alone, to negate the fundamental and overriding similarities that they share, both with regard to matters relating to family and in all other respects. Thus, even though procreative conduct plays an important role in many marriages, we do not believe that such conduct so defines the institution of marriage that the inability to engage in that conduct is determinative of whether same sex and opposite sex couples are similarly situated for equal protection purposes, especially in view of the fact that some opposite sex couples also are unable to procreate, and others choose not to do so. Indeed, Justice Zarella has identified no case, and we are aware of none, that has rejected an equal protection claim on the ground that same sex couples are not similarly situated to opposite sex couples, either because the former cannot engage in procreative conduct or for any other reason. In fact, many courts have reached a contrary conclusion.

These decisions seem to ignore that a lot of people besides gays are stuck being single at inconvenient stages in their lives. It also ignored the subject I have raised that the government has an interest in regulating relationships that are fundamentally different in different ways.

If the court is basically using gay marriage to extend benefits to gays that it is not willing to extend to single people, yet does not explain why single people do not deserve the same benefits, it is essentially discriminating against people for being responsible citizens who are still in the process of looking for a mate. If all of the benefits of marriage rightly belong to everyone, then that is an argument for wider socialist programs, not the redefinition of marriage.

Not to mention this is saying marriage is to encourage procreation rather than to regulate issues surrounding it, which I believe is flatly false. Marriage, if anything, stifles procreation in terms of raw numbers.

 

[FedererFan]

CONTINUED

From In re Marriage Cases

"The Proposition 22 Legal Defense Fund and the Campaign agree that the constitutional right to marry is integrally related to the right of two persons to join together to establish an officially recognized family, but they contend that the only family that possibly can be encompassed by the constitutional right to marry is a family headed by a man and a woman. Pointing out that past cases often have linked marriage and procreation, these parties argue that because only a man and a woman can produce children biologically with one another, the constitutional right to marry necessarily is limited to opposite-sex couples.

**431 This contention is fundamentally flawed for a number of reasons. To begin with, although the legal institution of civil marriage may well have originated in large part to promote a stable relationship for the procreation and raising of children, the constitutional right to marry never has been viewed as the sole preserve of individuals who are physically capable of having children. Men and women who desire to raise children with a loved one in a recognized family but who are physically unable to conceive a child with their loved one never have been excluded from the right to marry. Although the Proposition 22 Legal Defense Fund and the Campaign assert that the circumstance that marriage has not been limited to those who can bear children can be explained and justified by reference to the state's reluctance to intrude upon the privacy of individuals by inquiring into their fertility, if that were an accurate and adequate explanation for the absence of such a limitation it would follow that in instances in which the state is able to make *826 a determination of an individual's fertility without such an inquiry, it would be constitutionally permissible for the state to preclude an individual who is incapable of bearing children from entering into marriage. There is, however, no authority whatsoever to support the proposition that an individual who is physically incapable of bearing children does not possess a fundamental constitutional right to marry. Such a proposition clearly is untenable. A person who is physically incapable of bearing children still has the potential to become a parent and raise a child through adoption or through means of assisted reproduction, and the constitutional right to marry ensures the individual the opportunity to raise children in an officially recognized family with the person with whom the individual has chosen to share his or her life. Thus, although an important purpose underlying marriage may be to channel procreation into a stable family relationship, that purpose cannot be viewed as limiting the constitutional right to marry to couples who are capable of ***739 biologically producing a child together.FN48 [“the first purpose of matrimony, by the laws of nature and society, is procreation”]; see generally Blankenhorn, The Future of Marriage (2007) pp. 23-125), and although the right to marry and to procreate often are treated as closely related aspects of the privacy and liberty interests protected by the state and federal Constitutions.

​

Furthermore, although promoting and facilitating a stable environment for the procreation and raising of children is unquestionably one of the vitally important purposes underlying the institution of marriage and the constitutional right to marry, past cases make clear that this right is not confined to, or restrictively defined by, that purpose alone. (See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, supra, 13 Cal. 87, 103[“[t]he second purpose of matrimony is the promotion of the happiness of the parties by the society of each other”].) As noted above, our past ***740 cases have recognized that the right to marry is the right to enter into a relationship that is “the center of the personal affections that ennoble and enrich human life” ( De Burgh v. De Burgh, supra, 39 Cal.2d 858, 863-864, 250 P.2d 598) - a relationship that is “at once the most socially productive and individually fulfilling relationship that one can enjoy in the course of a lifetime.” ( Marvin v. Marvin, supra, 18 Cal.3d 660, 684, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106; see also Elden v. Sheldon, supra, 46 Cal.3d 267, 274, 250 Cal.Rptr. 254, 758 P.2d 582.) The personal enrichment afforded by the right to marry may be obtained by a couple whether or not they choose to have children, and the right to marry never has been limited to those who plan or desire to have children. Indeed, in Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678 - one of the seminal federal cases striking down a state law as violative of the federal constitutional right of privacy - the high court upheld a married couple's right to use contraception to prevent procreation, demonstrating quite clearly that the promotion of procreation is not the sole or defining purpose of marriage. Similarly, in Turner v. Safley, supra, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, the court held that the constitutional right to marry extends to an individual confined in state prison - even a prisoner who has no right to conjugal visits with his would-be spouse - emphasizing that “[m]any important attributes of marriage remain ... after taking into account the limitations imposed by prison life ... [including the] expressions of emotional support and public commitment [that] are an important and significant aspect of the marital relationship.” (482 U.S. at pp. 95-96, 107 S.Ct. 2254.) Although Griswold and Turner *828 relate to the right to marry under the federal Constitution, they accurately reflect the scope of the state constitutional right to marry as well. Accordingly, this right cannot properly be defined by or limited to the state's interest in fostering a favorable environment for the procreation and raising of children."

Really, you should read the entire cases because they pretty much logically dispel all the arguments against gay marriage. The only remaining argument is religious.

As to your second point, I have addressed it I think here.

http://www.christianforums.com/t7358406-37/#post51432604

To sum up, we need the right to retain useful distinctions in order to regulate matters unique to the institution of marriage, not just generalized rules for anyone who happens to end up caring for a child after the fact.

It is fascinating to me to watch people seemingly purposefully denying any distinction between gays and heterosexuals where procreation, family, and marriage are concerned. Some people even seem to get so into it that they imagine no one can actually see any real difference, and from there spring to hating anyone who suggests there is one on the grounds that they must be the worst sorts of bigots.

Then, when I break it down, other people will come in and say, "well of course, no one is arguing that."

Of course people are arguing to destroy the distinction between heterosexuals as the model for the family unit. Of course they are... What other purpose is there for trying to thrust people into the laws concerning marriage other than to destroy the institution as it stands now?

People argue on the one hand, "marriage has changed and is currently outmoded," and on the other hand, "no one wants to destroy marriage." Well, if you think it is outmoded and your "fix" is to simply turn it into a rubber stamp from the state for anyone cohabiting to get on demand, then it seems to me you are destroying the unique institution of marriage.

I'm not saying that gays are not different in many respects from heterosexuals, however, the law should not treat them differently due to those differences.

 

[Veyrlian]

I had a gay uncle who died of AIDS and more than one gay friend. Your side comments here about the nature of people who disagree with you are inappropriate and inaccurate.

Well it must be hard for you then. I sympathize. Or do you think I am wrong? Do you think it is easy to mistreat people who you empathize with? Why did you respond to this line which wasn't even addressed to you but ignored the others?

 

[FedererFan]

These decisions seem to ignore that a lot of people besides gays are stuck being single at inconvenient stages in their lives. It also ignored the subject I have raised that the government has an interest in regulating relationships that are fundamentally different in different ways.

If the court is basically using gay marriage to extend benefits to gays that it is not willing to extend to single people, yet does not explain why single people do not deserve the same benefits, it is essentially discriminating against people for being responsible citizens who are still in the process of looking for a mate. If all of the benefits of marriage rightly belong to everyone, then that is an argument for wider socialist programs, not the redefinition of marriage.

You should read the cases again. First, the relationships are not fundamentally different. The courts make this clear that they're entitled to equal protection.

Second, the court clearly explains why RELATIONSHIPS should have those benefits. What kind of benefits could you give to a single person that they are currently denied? I don't understand how this would even work.

 

[Shane Roach]

Well it must be hard for you then. I sympathize. Or do you think I am wrong? Do you think it is easy to mistreat people who you empathize with? Why did you respond to this line which wasn't even addressed to you but ignored the others?

It is exceedingly common in these forums for people to just toss these accusations around. I doubt they are legitimate to anyone posting. I doubt they are legitimate to the vast majority of people who believe gay marriage is a bad idea.

 

[FedererFan]

From In re Marriage Cases

"The Proposition 22 Legal Defense Fund and the Campaign agree that the constitutional right to marry is integrally related to the right of two persons to join together to establish an officially recognized family, but they contend that the only family that possibly can be encompassed by the constitutional right to marry is a family headed by a man and a woman. Pointing out that past cases often have linked marriage and procreation, these parties argue that because only a man and a woman can produce children biologically with one another, the constitutional right to marry necessarily is limited to opposite-sex couples.

This contention is fundamentally flawed for a number of reasons. To begin with, although the legal institution of civil marriage may well have originated in large part to promote a stable relationship for the procreation and raising of children (see, e.g., Baker v. Baker, supra, 13 Cal. 87, 103 Valerie N., supra, 40 Cal.3d 143, 161, 219 Cal.Rptr. 387, 707 P.2d 760; Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655), the constitutional right to marry never has been viewed as the sole preserve of individuals who are physically capable of having children. Men and women who desire to raise children with a loved one in a recognized family but who are physically unable to conceive a child with their loved one never have been excluded from the right to marry. Although the Proposition 22 Legal Defense Fund and the Campaign assert that the circumstance that marriage has not been limited to those who can bear children can be explained and justified by reference to the state's reluctance to intrude upon the privacy of individuals by inquiring into their fertility, if that were an accurate and adequate explanation for the absence of such a limitation it would follow that in instances in which the state is able to make a determination of an individual's fertility without such an inquiry, it would be constitutionally permissible for the state to preclude an individual who is incapable of bearing children from entering into marriage. There is, however, no authority whatsoever to support the proposition that an individual who is physically incapable of bearing children does not possess a fundamental constitutional right to marry. Such a proposition clearly is untenable. A person who is physically incapable of bearing children still has the potential to become a parent and raise a child through adoption or through means of assisted reproduction, and the constitutional right to marry ensures the individual the opportunity to raise children in an officially recognized family with the person with whom the individual has chosen to share his or her life. Thus, although an important purpose underlying marriage may be to channel procreation into a stable family relationship, that purpose cannot be viewed as limiting the constitutional right to marry to couples who are capable of biologically producing a child together. [“the first purpose of matrimony, by the laws of nature and society, is procreation”]; see generally Blankenhorn, The Future of Marriage (2007) pp. 23-125), and although the right to marry and to procreate often are treated as closely related aspects of the privacy and liberty interests protected by the state and federal Constitutions"

There's a lot more to it, but I don't have room!

As to your second point, I have addressed it I think here.

http://www.christianforums.com/t7358406-37/#post51432604

To sum up, we need the right to retain useful distinctions in order to regulate matters unique to the institution of marriage, not just generalized rules for anyone who happens to end up caring for a child after the fact.

It is fascinating to me to watch people seemingly purposefully denying any distinction between gays and heterosexuals where procreation, family, and marriage are concerned. Some people even seem to get so into it that they imagine no one can actually see any real difference, and from there spring to hating anyone who suggests there is one on the grounds that they must be the worst sorts of bigots.

Then, when I break it down, other people will come in and say, "well of course, no one is arguing that."

Of course people are arguing to destroy the distinction between heterosexuals as the model for the family unit. Of course they are... What other purpose is there for trying to thrust people into the laws concerning marriage other than to destroy the institution as it stands now?

People argue on the one hand, "marriage has changed and is currently outmoded," and on the other hand, "no one wants to destroy marriage." Well, if you think it is outmoded and your "fix" is to simply turn it into a rubber stamp from the state for anyone cohabiting to get on demand, then it seems to me you are destroying the unique institution of marriage.

I'm not denying that there are differences between homosexuals and heterosexuals. However, the law shouldn't treat them differently because of these incidental differences.

 

[Shane Roach]

You should read the cases again. First, the relationships are not fundamentally different. The courts make this clear that they're entitled to equal protection.

Second, the court clearly explains why RELATIONSHIPS should have those benefits. What kind of benefits could you give to a single person that they are currently denied? I don't understand how this would even work.

Something you need to understand about court cases is that they do not "make clear" anything. They are called opinions for a reason, and can be altered at will by the same court or other courts should other issues arrise.

Secondly, I think it is clear since I have been arguing the case from a separate angle as apparently was argued before this court that this decision is not addressing my concerns.

Finally, I am not sure why you ignored it, but as I point out, there are many, many relationships out there that are helpful to people financially and socially that are not called marriage. I think trying to expand marriage to include people that it does not currently include is, to an extent, and end around to grant benefits to people they were not intended to be given by society -- a classic socialist tactic. The more money the government gives away under your style of government, the more votes you can buy.

 

[beechy]

It's informative to replace "marriage" with "procreation" in these and see where it makes sense and where it does not.

All of these things are true about marriage, but they are true for an underlying reason -- procreation is an important matter, happens between people, thus gives rise to a lot of distinct legal issues that have had to be dealt with over the years. Socialists simply do not want us to be able to self govern in this matter any more, so they are defining away the useful aspects of the institution.

I suppose I knew at least one court disagreed with me because I read portions of the Iowa decision, but there is nothing of particular note here. It is basically socialist, anti-Christian talking points being parroted by socialist, anti-Christian judges.

You asked for a case and I gave you one. I think the court got it right when it characterized marriage as being about commitment, mutuality, responsibility and familty. I disagree with your position that the sine qua non of marriage in modern society is procreation. I also disagree that gay marriage has anything to do with socialism, which is a political theory advocating government ownership and administration of goods and services.

 

[FedererFan]

Something you need to understand about court cases is that they do not "make clear" anything. They are called opinions for a reason, and can be altered at will by the same court or other courts should other issues arrise.

Thanks for explaining to me how the common law works.

Secondly, I think it is clear since I have been arguing the case from a separate angle as apparently was argued before this court that this decision is not addressing my concerns.

Finally, I am not sure why you ignored it, but as I point out, there are many, many relationships out there that are helpful to people financially and socially that are not called marriage. I think trying to expand marriage to include people that it does not currently include is, to an extent, and end around to grant benefits to people they were not intended to be given by society -- a classic socialist tactic. The more money the government gives away under your style of government, the more votes you can buy.

The fact that there are helpful relationships outside of marriage doesn't take away that it violates the fundamental right to marry to deny homosexuals the same rights as heterosexuals. I don't think you understand equal protection very well.

 

[Shane Roach]

I'm not denying that there are differences between homosexuals and heterosexuals. However, the law shouldn't treat them differently because of these incidental differences.

They are fundamentally different in their relation to marriage.

This case you present is full of liberal talking points concerning this "confusion". Again, all of the issues raised by this opinion are addressed by the simple expedient of explaining that it is not about encouraging procreation, but regulating it. All of the benefits and duties involving marriage have as their underlying motivation the regulation of heterosexual relationships for the purpose of being able to deal with the issues inherent between men and women where children are concerned.

It's so bizarre to see people attack marriage by stating it was a horrible institution for women because if they did not have kids they might be divorced in one breath, and in the next state it had nothing to do with child bearing.

 

[Shane Roach]

Thanks for explaining to me how the common law works.



The fact that there are helpful relationships outside of marriage doesn't take away that it violates the fundamental right to marry to deny homosexuals the same rights as heterosexuals. I don't think you understand equal protection very well.

I understand just fine. You are taking this court case and arguing your beliefs behind an illusory wall of authority buttressed by this decision, which you seem to feel I ought to respect. I don't.

 

[FedererFan]

They are fundamentally different in their relation to marriage.

This case you present is full of liberal talking points concerning this "confusion". Again, all of the issues raised by this opinion are addressed by the simple expedient of explaining that it is not about encouraging procreation, but regulating it. All of the benefits and duties involving marriage have as their underlying motivation the regulation of heterosexual relationships for the purpose of being able to deal with the issues inherent between men and women where children are concerned.

It's so bizarre to see people attack marriage by stating it was a horrible institution for women because if they did not have kids they might be divorced in one breath, and in the next state it had nothing to do with child bearing.

They're only fundamentally different because the law treats them differently, which it should not.

As for all my "liberal" talking points, my arguments are shared by a unanimous Iowa Supreme Court, the mostly Republican appointed California Supreme Court, and the admittedly semi-liberal Connecticut Supreme Court. The law is the law and when it clearly requires something, political leanings don't matter.

I've never criticized marriage as anti-woman so I don't feel the need to respond.

 

[beechy]

They are fundamentally different in their relation to marriage.

Only if we buy your idea that the fundamental purpose of marriage is to "regulate procreation". But since people who procreate are not required to get married, and married people are not required to procreate, that doesn't really hold water.

This case you present is full of liberal talking points concerning this "confusion". Again, all of the issues raised by this opinion are addressed by the simple expedient of explaining that it is not about encouraging procreation, but regulating it.

Again, doesn't seem like a very effective regulation, since people who procreate are not required to get married, and married people are not required to procreate.

All of the benefits and duties involving marriage have as their underlying motivation the regulation of heterosexual relationships for the purpose of being able to deal with the issues inherent between men and women where children are concerned.

And how are those issues different when the child is conceived through procreation between the married couple, as opposed to when the child is adopted by the married couple? And how are those issues relevant when the married couple decides not to have kids?

It's so bizarre to see people attack marriage by stating it was a horrible institution for women because if they did not have kids they might be divorced in one breath, and in the next state it had nothing to do with child bearing.

Are you suggesting that modern marriage laws should mirror historic marriage laws?

 

[David Brider]

First, the study itself calls into question whether or not there is anything outside the control of a person concerning homosexuality. Secondly, I already described how saying "homosexuality" concerns a behavior is a simple matter of language.

Whether it's "a simple matter of language" or not is irrelevant.

The fact is homosexuality is not a behaviour. It's a sexual orientation. Same as heterosexuality, bisexuality, and asexuality. And there is no one behaviour that is common to all homosexuals that is not also shared by all people of other sexual orientations as well.

So, y'know, just stop saying it's a behaviour. Then we can all move on.

David.

 

[Shane Roach]

They're only fundamentally different because the law treats them differently, which it should not.

As for all my "liberal" talking points, my arguments are shared by a unanimous Iowa Supreme Court, the mostly Republican appointed California Supreme Court, and the admittedly semi-liberal Connecticut Supreme Court. The law is the law and when it clearly requires something, political leanings don't matter.

I've never criticized marriage as anti-woman so I don't feel the need to respond.

No, they are not fundamentally different because the law treats them so. They are fundamentally different because it is impossible to regulate matters concerning procreation if you are not allowed to regulate the very set of people for whom it is possible to procreate.

And, it's not as if we've never seen a Republican appointed judge make liberal decisions, so that point is irrelevant to the case. It is a demonstrably liberal decision based on liberal talking points.

 

[Shane Roach]

Only if we buy your idea that the fundamental purpose of marriage is to "regulate procreation". But since people who procreate are not required to get married, and married people are not required to procreate, that doesn't really hold water.

Again, doesn't seem like a very effective regulation, since people who procreate are not required to get married, and married people are not required to procreate.

And how are those issues different when the child is conceived through procreation between the married couple, as opposed to when the child is adopted by the married couple? And how are those issues relevant when the married couple decides not to have kids?

Are you suggesting that modern marriage laws should mirror historic marriage laws?

That's largely the result of no fault divorce -- another socialist attempt at social engineering gone utterly wrong.

Regulations about extra marital procreation have had to adapt because of the last wave of liberal social engineering. The result has been massive divorce, massive single motherhood, massive poverty in inner cities where this policy decision hit the hardest, and massive pain and anguish for all the people who have had to live through this devastation.

Anyone who actually cares about marriage understands that it is currently broken. Arguing that since it is already broken, we might as well poke another hole in it is not particularly convincing to me.

 

[FedererFan]

No, they are not fundamentally different because the law treats them so. They are fundamentally different because it is impossible to regulate matters concerning procreation if you are not allowed to regulate the very set of people for whom it is possible to procreate.

And, it's not as if we've never seen a Republican appointed judge make liberal decisions, so that point is irrelevant to the case. It is a demonstrably liberal decision based on liberal talking points.

But those differences are incidental to the purposes of marriage!

But what would cause the entire Iowa Supreme Court to? Clearly it's because the law requires it! The justices were simply following the law, not making political or ethical judgments.

 

[beechy]

That's largely the result of no fault divorce -- another socialist attempt at social engineering gone utterly wrong.

Regulations about extra marital procreation have had to adapt because of the last wave of liberal social engineering. The result has been massive divorce, massive single motherhood, massive poverty in inner cities where this policy decision hit the hardest, and massive pain and anguish for all the people who have had to live through this devastation.

Anyone who actually cares about marriage understands that it is currently broken. Arguing that since it is already broken, we might as well poke another hole in it is not particularly convincing to me.

No fault divorce is the reason that people who procreate outside of marriage are not forced to get married, and why people who are married aren't required to procreate?

 

[Shane Roach]

Whether it's "a simple matter of language" or not is irrelevant.

The fact is homosexuality is not a behaviour. It's a sexual orientation. Same as heterosexuality, bisexuality, and asexuality. And there is no one behaviour that is common to all homosexuals that is not also shared by all people of other sexual orientations as well.

So, y'know, just stop saying it's a behaviour. Then we can all move on.

David.

Answered repeatedly.

http://www.christianforums.com/t7358406-45/#post51475849

It's a behavior.