Godlessness and choice

[anonymous person]

The premises must be true if the argument is to be called sound. I prefer to believe sound arguments.

Given that, I judge arguments with premises that can only be shown to be "merely more plausibly true" as unsubstantiated instead of something to believe. Having a low standard in evaluating premises inevitably leads to believing a host of incorrect things.

And before you go off on a solipsistic tangent, yes, I realize there's no way to judge a premise with 100% accuracy. But that doesn't mean that your only alternative is to accept premises that are "merely more plausibly true"

What's the alternative then?

Seems to me that you yourself admit that certainty is an unreasonable requirement, for there is very little that we know with certainty.

 

[ToddNotTodd]

What's the alternative then?

Seems to me that you yourself admit that certainty is an unreasonable requirement, for there is very little that we know with certainty.

Being more certain than "merely more plausibly true", obviously.

 

[quatona]

I am having difficulties understanding the wording "plausibly true".
Something can be true, something can be plausible - but "plausibly true" appears to be wordsalad.
When a "more" is added, it gets even worse.

 

[anonymous person]

I am having difficulties understanding the wording "plausibly true".
Something can be true, something can be plausible - but "plausibly true" appears to be wordsalad.
When a "more" is added, it gets even worse.

English must not be your first language.

 

[anonymous person]

Being more certain than "merely more plausibly true", obviously.

Your use of the word "more" implies a comparative criterion, which is exactly what epistemologists use when assessing the epistemic status of premises.

Plausibility is used in the comparative criterion because it provides us with an alternative to having to achieve certainty, which is as we agree, simply an unreasonable and unrealistic expectation.

Obviously plausibility will be a heavily person-dependent notion. What I find plausible may not be plausible to you and vice versa. In the instance of disagreement we simply have to dig deeper and ask ourselves why we do or do not find a premise to be more plausible than its negation.

For example, the premise:

1. Something cannot come from nothing.

Now, this premise to me seems certain, not just more plausible than its negation. I am certain that something cannot come from nothing.

However, for whatever reason, you may not be certain, but as long as you can agree that it is at least more plausible than its negation, you should hold it to be true, at least tentatively.

 

[bhsmte]

Your use of the word "more" implies a comparative criterion, which is exactly what epistemologists use when assessing the epistemic status of premises.

Plausibility is used in the comparative criterion because it provides us with an alternative to having to achieve certainty, which is as we agree, simply an unreasonable and unrealistic expectation.

Obviously plausibility will be a heavily person-dependent notion. What I find plausible may not be plausible to you and vice versa. In the instance of disagreement we simply have to dig deeper and ask ourselves why we do or do not find a premise to be more plausible than its negation.

For example, the premise:

1. Something cannot come from nothing.

Now, this premise to me seems certain, not just more plausible than its negation. I am certain that something cannot come from nothing.

However, for whatever reason, you may not be certain, but as long as you can agree that it is at least more plausible than its negation, you should hold it to be true, at least tentatively.

Demonstrate that nothing, has ever existed.

 

[anonymous person]

Demonstrate that nothing, has ever existed.

When I am persuaded you are actually here to contribute in a substantive fashion, I will be more than happy to talk with you. Until then, you need not ask me to do anything.

 

[bhsmte]

When I am persuaded you are actually here to contribute in a substantive fashion, I will be more than happy to talk with you. Until then, you need not ask me to do anything.

LOL

 

[ToddNotTodd]

Your use of the word "more" implies a comparative criterion, which is exactly what epistemologists use when assessing the epistemic status of premises.

I see you know how to Google, or at least have William Lane Craig's website bookmarked...

Plausibility is used in the comparative criterion because it provides us with an alternative to having to achieve certainty, which is as we agree, simply an unreasonable and unrealistic expectation.

I love how apologists toy with solipsism when it suits them them, even though the consequence of it would mean their god, at least as they understand it, wouldn't exist.

For example, the premise:

1. Something cannot come from nothing.

Now, this premise to me seems certain, not just more plausible than its negation. I am certain that something cannot come from nothing.

However, for whatever reason, you may not be certain, but as long as you can agree that it is at least more plausible than its negation, you should hold it to be true, at least tentatively.

Demonstrate that "nothing" is even a coherent proposition in this context.

 

[ToddNotTodd]

LOL

Perhaps he should take a page from the WLC playbook and refuse to talk to anyone who doesn't have a doctorate.

 

[quatona]

English must not be your first language.

In other words: you can´t or won´t explain it.

 

[anonymous person]

I see you know how to Google, or at least have William Lane Craig's website bookmarked...

I am familiar with his work. I am also familiar with how to use Google.

Now Todd, these things have nothing to do with what criterion we should use when assessing the epistemic status of premises in deductive and inductive arguments. Please refrain, if you can, from using informal fallacies just as I will attempt to do the same.

I love how apologists toy with solipsism when it suits them them, even though the consequence of it would mean their god, at least as they understand it, wouldn't exist.

That's great, but let's not forget, you agree with me that certainty is simply an unreasonable and unrealistic requirement as an epistemic status of a premise in an argument. So let's build on this commonly shared belief.

Demonstrate that "nothing" is even a coherent proposition in this context.

"Nothing" is not a proposition Todd. You should know this. It is a word which is used as a universal negation. It simply means "no thing".

 

[anonymous person]

In other words: you can´t or won´t explain it.

Reference works that are pertinent to these issues. An introductory text to philosophy is a good start. Or simply google the words you're having difficulty understanding.

 

[quatona]

Reference works that are pertinent to these issues. An introductory text to philosophy is a good start. Or simply google the words you're having difficulty understanding.

I do understand the words - I do not see how the adverb "plausibly" qualifies the word "true" in a meaningful way.
There isn´t much to be found in classical philosophy nor on the internet for this expression. Actually, it seems more like it´s something that good ol´Willy invented to muddy the waters.

 

[anonymous person]

I do understand the words - I do not see how the adverb "plausibly" qualifies the word "true" in a meaningful way.
There isn´t much to be found in classical philosophy nor on the internet for this expression. Actually, it seems more like it´s something that good ol´Willy invented to muddy the waters.

Ok.

"More likely to be true" is another way of expressing the same thing. If a premise is more likely to be true than its negation, then I accept that as a good reason to hold the premise to be true, at least tentatively.

Do you?

 

[quatona]

Ok.

"More likely to be true" is another way of expressing the same thing.

Ah, I see. (It´s funny how "more plausibly true" sounds so much more philosophically deep than "more likely to be true.).

If a premise is more likely to be true than its negation, then I accept that as a good reason to hold the premise to be true, at least tentatively.

Do you?

What objective method do you use and propose for measuring and comparing the likelihood of the truth of premises?

 

[ToddNotTodd]

I am familiar with his work. I am also familiar with how to use Google.

Now Todd, these things have nothing to do with what criterion we should use when assessing the epistemic status of premises in deductive and inductive arguments. Please refrain, if you can, from using informal fallacies just as I will attempt to do the same.

Since fallacies only apply to arguments, and my criticizing your debating methods isn't tied to an argument, I committed no fallacy.

That's great, but let's not forget, you agree with me that certainty is simply an unreasonable and unrealistic requirement as an epistemic status of a premise in an argument. So let's build on this commonly shared belief.

Yes, 100% certainty is an impossibility for almost every proposition.

"Nothing" is not a proposition Todd. You should know this. It is a word which is used as a universal negation. It simply means "no thing".

Of course it's a proposition. When saying "Something cannot come from nothing" you're implying that nothing is a possible state of affairs, lest the sentence be incoherent.

Show how this "nothing" is a possible state of affairs.

 

[possibletarian]

I think 'likely to be true, given the evidence' is a base standard.

One thing being more plausible than another does not make it likely to be true without following evidence.

I think asking what nothing means in this context, and then asking if that definition has some supporting evidence is a valid question.

I think it's honest to simply say that we do not know what there was before the big bang.

 

[anonymous person]

Since fallacies only apply to arguments,

Wrong.

A red herring is something that misleads or distracts from a relevant or important issue. It may be either a logical fallacy or a literary device. A red herring might be intentionally used or it could be inadvertently used during argumentation.

Instead of addressing what I wrote about the suitability of a comparative criterion for assesing the epistemic status of a premise in an argument, you started talking about me knowing how to use Google and about having Dr. Craig's website bookmarked. I could have gotten my information from Dr. Seuss' Cat in the Hat. It is simply irrelevant.

Now if you took issue with my debating methods, as you call it (I had no idea this was even a debate so this is news to me) then you should have said so clearly and I would have responded by asking you what exactly the problem was.

As it stands the fact that we are even discussing this is simply reinforcing my point that we are off topic.

We are discussing what criterion to use when assessing the epistemic status of a premise. And no, this is not a debate.

Of course it's a proposition. When saying "Something cannot come from nothing" you're implying that nothing is a possible state of affairs, lest the sentence be incoherent.

Show how this "nothing" is a possible state of affairs.

Well, since an essential property of a proposition is its ability to be either true or false, you're wrong again.

The word "nothing" is incapable of being true or false and thus fails to bear the chief characteristic which distinguishes propositions from non propositions.

 

[anonymous person]

Ah, I see. (It´s funny how "more plausibly true" sounds so much more philosophically deep than "more likely to be true.).

What objective method do you use and propose for measuring and comparing the likelihood of the truth of premises?

I just look at the evidence that the person gives for thinking the premise is true. I then ask if there is any evidence for the premise's negation. Explanatory scope and power, degree of adhocness, accordance with accepted beliefs, fit to the data, and other things I use to adjudicate between the premise and its negation.