Here is why I find it incoherent.
(1) A material human body cannot interact with an immaterial soul, by definition (more on this later).
(2) An immaterial God would be too intangible to even push a pencil. I provided plausible exegetical evidence to the effect that God does indeed move matter by His own direct agency.
(3) DDS holds that God is spatially indivisible into parts (no size and shape) - and yet claims He is omnipresent throughout the universe! I am literally at a loss for words to describe how thoroughly incoherent such a claim seems to me.
(4) This omnipresence isn't volumetric, or graduated, or staggered in any way. Rather, the fullness of His presence is essentially said to be duplicated as to coexist simultaneously at every point in space. (If I were to claim that I'm simultaneously in the USA and Russia, you'd say I'd lost a marble).
(5) The volumetric nature of God's presence is strongly implied in the divine pillars of Smoke, Cloud, Fire, Light - but is also exegetically demonstrable (an argument not yet shown).
(6) As noted earlier, such omnipresence contradicts outpourings. If God is already plenally present everywhere, there can be no meaningful outpouring of His Presence from one locale to another.
(7) DDS claims that God is indivisible into parts - and yet consitutes a Trinity! Even Millard J. Erickson - whose famous systematic theology textbook is featured in probably every evangelical seminary in the world - admitted that the orthodox Trinity is "logically absurd from the human standpoint" (his words).
(8) DDS claims that God is immutable, and yet became man. The hypostatic union claims to reconcile this, but that doctrine isn't humanly comprehensible. As Charles Lee Feinberg stated, "No sane study of Christology even pretends to fathom it" (Charles Lee Feinberg, "The Hypostatic Union: Part 2," Bibliotheca Sacra, (1935), p. 412). Did I mention that my cosmogyny makes the Incarnation a cinch to explain? A debater once told me I was crazy to suggest that. But he became very quiet after I explained my view. He remained on the thread for several days, but never challenged me again on that point.
(9) DDS claims that God is atemporal, and yet intervenes in temporal human affairs.
(10) Immaterialism seems to postulate the oxymoronic concept of a substance without substance.
(11) In fact, DDS seems to divest God of any notion of substance - it seems to reduce Him to a concept. And then we're supposed to believe that He exists? That dilemma is introduced in the first two paragraphs of this article:
Divine Simplicity (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)