Free Will

[elman]

Can you? My problem with this is that while my experiences are likely very similar to yours, I can't say that they indicate free will.

The question, I suppose, is this: if you were a deterministic machine, how would you know? What makes you think a sufficiently advanced robot would feel any different than us? And if you yourself suddenly lost your free will, how would you know? And how would you feel?

I assert that you wouldn't know and you wouldn't feel any different, because free will has nothing to do with how we experience the world. We obviously cannot sense ourselves being "forced" by circumstance to make a particular decision, because the decision is a direct consequence of said circumstance. Tthe only way for us to act differently would be if we were in another circumstance, in which case we wouldn't know about the first one which again hides any feeling of limitation from us.

Your right. If we are being fooled we would not know we were being fooled. But why should I believe I am being fooled?

 

[DoubtingThomas29]

Ability to make decisions does not equate free will. Ability to not just contemplate, but to make ANY decision is free will. You may perceive options, but you will always pick the most optimal one from your point of view.

Hello Opethian,

I believe in free will and not the supernatural. I probably can't prove it is completely right or even hold up a good defense for it against you, but I have a hunch it is completely right. I just may not be able to prove it.

Here is an example of free will in Baghdad, those radical Jihadists can put a bunch of eplosives in a car and drive into a crowded market place and detonate the bomb, sometimes it is a suicide bomb, sometimes not. It happens every day now and it is quite sad. These people that do that are using their free will to do that. They have lost all normal thought control for their mind, and they are now dangerous. They have free will, and they used it the wholetime to go from being a normal everyday human being, to being a very lethal force of destruction.

We havefree will to push the boundaries of our mind, and what society has taught us as taboo, wrong and down right disgusting. Someone can choose to do that if they have the desire. They may not be put together right or were not trained properly in their moral up bringing. However some poor fool might just want to see what stupid thing they could get to run accross their mind, using their free will.

We are suppose to have boundaries and limitations that give us thought control. Everybody does need thought control for thier own protection. However someone could throw off their thought control mechanisms, with some work, and turn into a barbarian if they wanted to. Because of free will. Don't try it, just look at Iraq, it is happening as we speak.

I do believe though that under our thought control mechanisms, instituted by society and parental up bringing. We still have free will, and I believe that free will is a good defense for atheism and is a very clever idea. One of which I don't fully know about, but I will read itin full sometime.

Sincerely,

Thomas

 

[DoubtingThomas29]

Hello everyone,

I felt it only right to mention my understanding of the Free Will Defense of Atheism here is how I think it goes:

Suppose it is 8:00 am where you are at, and you are thinking about drinking some tea at 9:00 am. You are just thinking about it. You haven't done it yet. Now suppose God exists, and his name is Jesus Christ, Allah, Vishnu, or Yahway to the person of their respective faith, for my argument though I will only refer to him as God and it turns out he doesn't care to be called any partcular name really, and just likes to be called God.

Next suppose God starts to wonder if you are going to drink the tea at 9:00 am. You see the thing is God can't possibly know if you are going to drink the tea or not, because you have free will, you could pick whatever bevarge you want at 9:00 am. You could just try to drink something different, or not drink anything at all.

Possibly God could go into the future to 9:01 am and say hello to himself and ask did he drink the tea, and God would give the answer. Then God could go back to the present and try a little experiment. He could fly down to the house at 8:15 am let's say. On a golden chariot pulled by flying horses, go to your house knock on the door and say to you, the answer from God at 9:01 am was "you are going to drink the tea at 9:00 am and now I am wondering do you still want to drink it at nine, now that I have told you? Because I am wondering since I can't even build probabilities models on you drinking this tea at 9:00 am or not. I have no way of knowing since you have free will." What a conundrum for God because of our free will, the fact that you can chose to drink the tea or to not drink the tea at 9:00 am. This God can't figure it out even with time travel, and that is even with him not telling you "you will drink the tea." God has no way of knowing if you will do it or not till it is in the past, and stays in the past. You see so God cannot predict something like that because the choice is entirely up to you. There maybe things in your environment that influence your choice, but the choice is still yours, you could drink whatever you want, independent of what some deity supposedly knows from traveling to the future. Because you can always change your mind, and if there is a God he knows that, and can't predict if you are going to drink tea or not at 9:00 am.

Think about it, and feel free to believe it, because I don't think a person can prove one thing one wayor the other. I just think it is totally right.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas

 

[elman]

Hello everyone,

I felt it only right to mention my understanding of the Free Will Defense of Atheism here is how I think it goes:

Suppose it is 8:00 am where you are at, and you are thinking about drinking some tea at 9:00 am. You are just thinking about it. You haven't done it yet. Now suppose God exists, and his name is Jesus Christ, Allah, Vishnu, or Yahway to the person of their respective faith, for my argument though I will only refer to him as God and it turns out he doesn't care to be called any partcular name really, and just likes to be called God.

Next suppose God starts to wonder if you are going to drink the tea at 9:00 am. You see the thing is God can't possibly know if you are going to drink the tea or not, because you have free will, you could pick whatever bevarge you want at 9:00 am. You could just try to drink something different, or not drink anything at all.

Possibly God could go into the future to 9:01 am and say hello to himself and ask did he drink the tea, and God would give the answer. Then God could go back to the present and try a little experiment. He could fly down to the house at 8:15 am let's say. On a golden chariot pulled by flying horses, go to your house knock on the door and say to you, the answer from God at 9:01 am was "you are going to drink the tea at 9:00 am and now I am wondering do you still want to drink it at nine, now that I have told you? Because I am wondering since I can't even build probabilities models on you drinking this tea at 9:00 am or not. I have no way of knowing since you have free will." What a conundrum for God because of our free will, the fact that you can chose to drink the tea or to not drink the tea at 9:00 am. This God can't figure it out even with time travel, and that is even with him not telling you "you will drink the tea." God has no way of knowing if you will do it or not till it is in the past, and stays in the past. You see so God cannot predict something like that because the choice is entirely up to you. There maybe things in your environment that influence your choice, but the choice is still yours, you could drink whatever you want, independent of what some deity supposedly knows from traveling to the future. Because you can always change your mind, and if there is a God he knows that, and can't predict if you are going to drink tea or not at 9:00 am.

Think about it, and feel free to believe it, because I don't think a person can prove one thing one wayor the other. I just think it is totally right.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas

God knowing what you are going to do before you do it does not elimanate free will. Whatever you chose will be your choice, but God will know what you are going to chose. If you are going to change your mind at the last minute that is what He will know and if you are not that is what He will know. Knowing does not ellimante your ability to chose.

 

[Hnefi]

Your right. If we are being fooled we would not know we were being fooled. But why should I believe I am being fooled?

Very good question. And indeed, by default you shouldn't. After all, if it talks like a duck, walks like a duck and looks like a duck - it's a duck, right?

Unfortunately, not all things are that simple. In the case of free will, you have to look at what you actually mean with free will. It turns out, as I have pointed out before, that the concept itself is logically incoherent - it's a paradox, which means it can't exist regardless of what the world actually looks like as long as the world follows the laws of logic (which it does, AFAIK).

Look at it this way: We have at least two positively identified logical "archetypes" for any given system: deterministic and random. If something is deterministic, each action in that system is wholly dependent on a previous action - a cause. In a random system, no action is dependent on any previous action. These are the basic definitions of (strict) determinism and randomness.

From these two definitions, we can deduce a third kind of system, where some effects are caused and some aren't. This is a common principle in decision making systems. Typical for this kind of system is that on a large scale, the system is deterministic, but the small details are random. This, of course, is not free will either.

So, what IS free will if none of the above? It is easy to claim it is just that - none of the above. But that is not a meaningful definition, since everything "is not" an infinite number of things. Before you decide whether free will exists or not, you must formulate a positive definition of free will that fits none of the three system archetypes above. I assert that this is impossible because free will is logically incoherent. Hence, it does not exist, and therefore, our experience of it is an illusion assuming that it being so does not introduce new contradictions. And to my knowledge, it doesn't.

Note that it is, in principle, easy to refute my position. Just come up with a positive definition of free will that fits none of the systems above and you've done it. This might be harder than it first seems, however.

 

[quatona]

Very good question. And indeed, by default you shouldn't. After all, if it talks like a duck, walks like a duck and looks like a duck - it's a duck, right?

Unfortunately, not all things are that simple. In the case of free will, you have to look at what you actually mean with free will. It turns out, as I have pointed out before, that the concept itself is logically incoherent - it's a paradox, which means it can't exist regardless of what the world actually looks like as long as the world follows the laws of logic (which it does, AFAIK).

Look at it this way: We have at least two positively identified logical "archetypes" for any given system: deterministic and random. If something is deterministic, each action in that system is wholly dependent on a previous action - a cause. In a random system, no action is dependent on any previous action. These are the basic definitions of (strict) determinism and randomness.

From these two definitions, we can deduce a third kind of system, where some effects are caused and some aren't. This is a common principle in decision making systems. Typical for this kind of system is that on a large scale, the system is deterministic, but the small details are random. This, of course, is not free will either.

So, what IS free will if none of the above? It is easy to claim it is just that - none of the above. But that is not a meaningful definition, since everything "is not" an infinite number of things. Before you decide whether free will exists or not, you must formulate a positive definition of free will that fits none of the three system archetypes above. I assert that this is impossible because free will is logically incoherent. Hence, it does not exist, and therefore, our experience of it is an illusion assuming that it being so does not introduce new contradictions. And to my knowledge, it doesn't.

Note that it is, in principle, easy to refute my position. Just come up with a positive definition of free will that fits none of the systems above and you've done it. This might be harder than it first seems, however.

I guess the main problem is that we experience ourselves as decision makers. We experience ourselves as conceiving options, we experience ourselves as considering those options ("What is the best thing to do? What are the pro´s and con´s? etc.") and ending up making a decision.
That´s what elman seems to base the idea of having "freewill" upon.
(For some people even the mere facts that people are different and that the same person does different things in similar situations at different points in time are sufficient evidence for "freewill", btw.)

None of these notions make an argument for there being an "I" that generates decisions autonomously and in a self-determined way, of course.
All those processes can themselves be determined. The "decision" process can be determined, differences can be determined, so can changes.

As for the question "Why assume that my experience of 'freewill' is an illusion?":
In order to make "having 'freewill and experiencing it' meaningful and distinguishable from "having no 'freewill but experiencing it nonetheless" we would first have to get an idea what "experiencing oneself as not having 'freewill'" feels like, get an idea what it feels like to want to do (think, feel) something but not have the "freewill" to do it. How would a being without 'freewill' experience himself as not having "freewill"? It seems that self-awareness necessarily comes with the idea of making choices, of being a determining agent.
IOW: I am inclined to think that being self-aware determines us to experience ourselves as being undetermined.

For argument´s sake let´s assume a hypothetical god who does not allow us "freewill". How would our experience be different? What would be such experiences that tell us that we don´t have freewill? (Like: Some of our thoughts rise, but are immediately overwritten by an inner image of god holding up a "censored" sign? Or would it be more like being allowed all thoughts, but as soon as trying to act aganst god´s will god will paralyse us or send an electric shock through our bodies? ).
So here is my request for elman: Tell me how you imagine the alternative to "experiencing having 'freewill'. What would the experience of not having "freewill" be like?
Unless we find an answer to this question, "experiencing free will" is not a valid argument for there being "freewill".

 

[elman]

Very good question. And indeed, by default you shouldn't. After all, if it talks like a duck, walks like a duck and looks like a duck - it's a duck, right?

Unfortunately, not all things are that simple. In the case of free will, you have to look at what you actually mean with free will. It turns out, as I have pointed out before, that the concept itself is logically incoherent - it's a paradox, which means it can't exist regardless of what the world actually looks like as long as the world follows the laws of logic (which it does, AFAIK).

Look at it this way: We have at least two positively identified logical "archetypes" for any given system: deterministic and random. If something is deterministic, each action in that system is wholly dependent on a previous action - a cause. In a random system, no action is dependent on any previous action. These are the basic definitions of (strict) determinism and randomness.

From these two definitions, we can deduce a third kind of system, where some effects are caused and some aren't. This is a common principle in decision making systems. Typical for this kind of system is that on a large scale, the system is deterministic, but the small details are random. This, of course, is not free will either.

So, what IS free will if none of the above? It is easy to claim it is just that - none of the above. But that is not a meaningful definition, since everything "is not" an infinite number of things. Before you decide whether free will exists or not, you must formulate a positive definition of free will that fits none of the three system archetypes above. I assert that this is impossible because free will is logically incoherent. Hence, it does not exist, and therefore, our experience of it is an illusion assuming that it being so does not introduce new contradictions. And to my knowledge, it doesn't.

Note that it is, in principle, easy to refute my position. Just come up with a positive definition of free will that fits none of the systems above and you've done it. This might be harder than it first seems, however.

This reminds me of the greek philosopher who argued you could not cross the room to the other side because you first have to go half the distance and you cannot go half the distance until you go one fourth of the distance, etc. Logical but I can cross the room while we are talking about how I cannot, and I can do it with the free will I don't logically have.

 

[elman]

I guess the main problem is that we experience ourselves as decision makers. We experience ourselves as conceiving options, we experience ourselves as considering those options ("What is the best thing to do? What are the pro´s and con´s? etc.") and ending up making a decision.
That´s what elman seems to base the idea of having "freewill" upon.
(For some people even the mere facts that people are different and that the same person does different things in similar situations at different points in time are sufficient evidence for "freewill", btw.)

None of these notions make an argument for there being an "I" that generates decisions autonomously and in a self-determined way, of course.
All those processes can themselves be determined. The "decision" process can be determined, differences can be determined, so can changes.

As for the question "Why assume that my experience of 'freewill' is an illusion?":
In order to make "having 'freewill and experiencing it' meaningful and distinguishable from "having no 'freewill but experiencing it nonetheless" we would first have to get an idea what "experiencing oneself as not having 'freewill'" feels like, get an idea what it feels like to want to do (think, feel) something but not have the "freewill" to do it. How would a being without 'freewill' experience himself as not having "freewill"? It seems that self-awareness necessarily comes with the idea of making choices, of being a determining agent.
IOW: I am inclined to think that being self-aware determines us to experience ourselves as being undetermined.

For argument´s sake let´s assume a hypothetical god who does not allow us "freewill". How would our experience be different? What would be such experiences that tell us that we don´t have freewill? (Like: Some of our thoughts rise, but are immediately overwritten by an inner image of god holding up a "censored" sign? Or would it be more like being allowed all thoughts, but as soon as trying to act aganst god´s will god will paralyse us or send an electric shock through our bodies? ).
So here is my request for elman: Tell me how you imagine the alternative to "experiencing having 'freewill'. What would the experience of not having "freewill" be like?
Unless we find an answer to this question, "experiencing free will" is not a valid argument for there being "freewill".

The alternative to experiencing freewill I suppose would be to either be a robot with no decisions to make or a robot that is fooled into thinking they are making decision when they are not. My question is toward why should I think the latter is correct? I can see that I make decisions. In flipping pennies I can call heads every other time or I can chose to call only heads and never tails. It is not logical or reasonable that something outside of my control is making these decisions for me and allowing me to think they are my decisions.

 

[elman]

From these two definitions, we can deduce a third kind of system, where some effects are caused and some aren't. This is a common principle in decision making systems. Typical for this kind of system is that on a large scale, the system is deterministic, but the small details are random. This, of course, is not free will either.

I vote for this one except there are a lot of other people with free will around me and sometimes the effect is partially caused by their decisions. No one and certainly I am not arguing that we have free will independent of all outside influences. We have the ability to chose to love each other or mistreat each other, but we are never totally free from influences and our decsions can be our decisions even when we are not the only factor in the decisions being made as they are made.

 

[quatona]

The alternative to experiencing freewill I suppose would be to either be a robot with no decisions to make or a robot that is fooled into thinking they are making decision when they are not. My question is toward why should I think the latter is correct? I can see that I make decisions. In flipping pennies I can call heads every other time or I can chose to call only heads and never tails. It is not logical or reasonable that something outside of my control is making these decisions for me and allowing me to think they are my decisions.

elman, once you have understood that which I have emphasized what, dozens? of times: that I do not say "something else makes the decision for you" (but that there is no decision) and that I do not say "we are fooled" (because there is noone to fool us) - once you have understood that, I am willing to continue this discussion.
I am frustrated with repeating this over and over again, just to find you simply repeating these strawmen in response.

 

[quatona]

This reminds me of the greek philosopher who argued you could not cross the room to the other side because you first have to go half the distance and you cannot go half the distance until you go one fourth of the distance, etc. Logical

No, it isn´t logical, just like the idea of "freewill" isn´t logical - and it can be shown.

but I can cross the room while we are talking about how I cannot, and I can do it with the free will I don't logically have.

You can cross the room without "freewill", because the argument against being able to cross the room and the idea of "freewill" are illogical.

 

[Hnefi]

This reminds me of the greek philosopher who argued you could not cross the room to the other side because you first have to go half the distance and you cannot go half the distance until you go one fourth of the distance, etc. Logical but I can cross the room while we are talking about how I cannot, and I can do it with the free will I don't logically have.

Except, of course, that the "uncrossable room" is a demonstrably illogical stance. The greek philosopher in question simply made a mistake which resulted in faulty logic. It is, of course, perfectly possible that I have made a similar mistake, but you'd have to show that to be the case in order to properly use the analogy you attempted above.

I vote for this one except there are a lot of other people with free will around me and sometimes the effect is partially caused by their decisions. No one and certainly I am not arguing that we have free will independent of all outside influences. We have the ability to chose to love each other or mistreat each other, but we are never totally free from influences and our decsions can be our decisions even when we are not the only factor in the decisions being made as they are made.

Well, ok, but in that case, your definition of free will also fits what is exhibited by machines, animals and arguably even inanimate objects such as dice. That means that free will, although logically sound, is a hollow, meaningless concept.

 

[DoubtingThomas29]

Hello Everyone,

I am a firm believer we have freewill and there is nothing supernatural to the world. Is someone suggesting we have the same amount of free will as a rock or a river? I don't think those things have any will whatsoever. So my question is about the rock and the river, here something else I thought I would add.

To me free will is simply the freedom to make choices. There maybe a finite selection of choices to make, but it is totally up to you to chose either way. There are some choices to make that could be called no brainer, but you still have the freedome to choose what you want. Just for the heck of it you could choose to not go with the no brainer choice and do something different. You have free will. That is why I am saying if there is a God and he is looking at someone thinking about drinking some tea, and suppose he can't travel into the future to take a look, because after all the future is not written yet like the past is, the two are totally different. This Deity who is looking at you does not know if you are going to drink the tea or not. He has no way of knowing. If there is no way to know, then God does not know. And what ever complicated hypothesis this God could think of about you drinking the tea or not, our free will, to drink the tea or not drink the tea, keeps him guessing.

This argument works best when you consider the person who is just thinking about drinking the tea, and has not made up their mind as to do it or not.

Sincerely,

Thomas

 

[Hnefi]

Thomas, could you please explain how a person that possesses your version of free will is any different from a person that is mostly deterministic, but with a degree of randomness added to each decision? From what you've explained so far, there isn't any, which makes that particular concept of "free will" redundant.

 

[DoubtingThomas29]

Thomas, could you please explain how a person that possesses your version of free will is any different from a person that is mostly deterministic, but with a degree of randomness added to each decision? From what you've explained so far, there isn't any, which makes that particular concept of "free will" redundant.

I am no philosopher, but I still like to do philosophy, and some day I will take more philosophy classes. Now, I am wondering how does this make someone to be deterministic? Because I think that the person has free will and has an ability to make a choice, and can even chose to go against their best interest, just for the hell of it really.

However I am glad that someone is finally talking to me on this massive thread, and maybe I'll learn something we shall see.

Sincerely,

Doubting Thomas29

 

[Hnefi]

I am no philosopher, but I still like to do philosophy, and some day I will take more philosophy classes. Now, I am wondering how does this make someone to be deterministic? Because I think that the person has free will and has an ability to make a choice, and can even chose to go against their best interest, just for the hell of it really.

However I am glad that someone is finally talking to me on this massive thread, and maybe I'll learn something we shall see.

Sincerely,

Doubting Thomas29

Sorry for my prolonged absence. Midterm exams are to blame.

Well, look at it this way: we both probably agree that computers, as they are today, do not have free will according to any reasonable definition of the term. Even if we use the most sophisticated algorithms we have available today, we cannot imbue free will into the computer. Perhaps this will change in the future, but that is irrelevant to this discussion.

Despite this, it is rather trivial to program computers to make choices that are not determined by the programmer (such as the one you gave as example above). This is done all the time, in many different types of programs, games being the most obvious example. Now, we know that the computer does not have free will, yet their choices within the game are often very similar to or even indistinguishable from those of a human. The only way we can tell the difference is to step outside the game, and that is for reasons not really relevant to the discussion.

So, how does the choices the computer make, which are usually a mix of determinism and randomness, differ from those of a human, assuming an environment where both are on relatively equal footing? My answer would be that there isn't one, at least not in the context of free will, because we also make our choices based on a mix of determinism and randomness. But free will proponents claim that there is a difference, and a mechanism that is neither deterministic nor random. Define how.

Again, just to be clear: I know there are vast differences between computer and men regarding their actual functionality. This discussion only touches on free will.

 

[elman]

Except, of course, that the "uncrossable room" is a demonstrably illogical stance. The greek philosopher in question simply made a mistake which resulted in faulty logic. It is, of course, perfectly possible that I have made a similar mistake, but you'd have to show that to be the case in order to properly use the analogy you attempted above.


Well, ok, but in that case, your definition of free will also fits what is exhibited by machines, animals and arguably even inanimate objects such as dice. That means that free will, although logically sound, is a hollow, meaningless concept.
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Explain how dice can love you or better yet chose to love you.

 

[elman]

So, how does the choices the computer make, which are usually a mix of determinism and randomness, differ from those of a human, assuming an environment where both are on relatively equal footing? My answer would be that there isn't one, at least not in the context of free will, because we also make our choices based on a mix of determinism and randomness. But free will proponents claim that there is a difference, and a mechanism that is neither deterministic nor random. Define how.

Can the same computer chose to love you or not love you?

Again, just to be clear: I know there are vast differences between computer and men regarding their actual functionality. This discussion only touches on free will.

That is the main difference between a machine and a man. Free will as in the ability to love or not love.

 

[Hnefi]

Love has absolutely nothing to do with free will. They are two completely separate subjects of discussion. In fact, love seems to counteract any free will we may or may not have as, in my experience, very few people - if any - are able to choose whom they fall in love with. On the contrary, it is usually a strict involuntary action.

Also, "love" is one of those famous things that people have long claimed that machines can never do. It is usually brought up among a list of other things that machine can never do (learn, adapt, show initiative etc). However, most of that list has already been shown false by machines actually doing them. Therefore, that no machine has yet loved is not sufficient reason to believe no machine ever could, only that love is complex and/or not a useful function to build into a machine.


In my experience, "love" is usually brought up when people don't have any further basis on which to form an argument. Since love is difficult to define and people think it is difficult to explain (though it's really not particularly so compared to other emotions), it's used as a one-line non-argument.

To use love in an argument such as you have tried, you must both strictly define it AND show that nothing except humans are able to love.

 

[elman]

=Hnefi;32974889]Love has absolutely nothing to do with free will. They are two completely separate subjects of discussion. In fact, love seems to counteract any free will we may or may not have as, in my experience, very few people - if any - are able to choose whom they fall in love with. On the contrary, it is usually a strict involuntary action.

The word love is not about emotional romantic sexual feelings. In the Christian context it is about helping your neighbor when he needs help. It has everything to do with free will. It is a choice. You either chose to help people or you chose to not get involved or you chose to hurt them.

Also, "love" is one of those famous things that people have long claimed that machines can never do. It is usually brought up among a list of other things that machine can never do (learn, adapt, show initiative etc). However, most of that list has already been shown false by machines actually doing them.

What machine has made the choice to help you when you were in trouble?

Therefore, that no machine has yet loved is not sufficient reason to believe no machine ever could, only that love is complex and/or not a useful function to build into a machine.

When you have a machine that can chose to love your or not love you we will talk about it.

In my experience, "love" is usually brought up when people don't have any further basis on which to form an argument. Since love is difficult to define and people think it is difficult to explain (though it's really not particularly so compared to other emotions), it's used as a one-line non-argument.

Love is not difficult to define. Jesus did it in the parable of the good samaritan.

To use love in an argument such as you have tried, you must both strictly define it AND show that nothing except humans are able to love.

I have defined it and I have not claimed that other animals are incapable of love, although they are not capable of it to the extent that we are.