I've been getting into this topic heavily in GT and Soteriology recently, and it strikes me that there seem to be two major and quite different Reformed positions about how free will interacts with predestination, but I wanted to run this past the rest of us before I start spouting off stuff that doesn't actually reflect the state of Reformed Theology accurately.
In my little corner of the Reformed world (otherwise known as the Jonathan Edwards fan club), the will may be said to be free so long as the one who wills chooses his greatest immediate want. This is thought to be compatible with deterministic predestination.
The other position, following language found in Augustine and Luther (at least these are the two whose writings I've seen quoted the most), seems to accept the Arminian/libertarian notion of free will as autonomy, however free will was lost in the fall, and now the will is in bondage to sin. God then overrides man's free will to irresistibly bring him to faith. This position is non-deterministic.
The major difference I perceive to be that in the former, all man's decisions are free, even though determined, and when a man is regenerated and irresistibly brought to faith by God, he still may be said to be exercising free will. In the latter, man's decisions are free, except while he is enslaved to sin, and except when God ordains conversion.
You can correct me on my phrasing if you take issue with the way I've said something, I'm just using the kind of language I've seen used before. My major question is, is this a fair assessment of the spectrum of Reformed thought on the will?
In my little corner of the Reformed world (otherwise known as the Jonathan Edwards fan club), the will may be said to be free so long as the one who wills chooses his greatest immediate want. This is thought to be compatible with deterministic predestination.
The other position, following language found in Augustine and Luther (at least these are the two whose writings I've seen quoted the most), seems to accept the Arminian/libertarian notion of free will as autonomy, however free will was lost in the fall, and now the will is in bondage to sin. God then overrides man's free will to irresistibly bring him to faith. This position is non-deterministic.
The major difference I perceive to be that in the former, all man's decisions are free, even though determined, and when a man is regenerated and irresistibly brought to faith by God, he still may be said to be exercising free will. In the latter, man's decisions are free, except while he is enslaved to sin, and except when God ordains conversion.
You can correct me on my phrasing if you take issue with the way I've said something, I'm just using the kind of language I've seen used before. My major question is, is this a fair assessment of the spectrum of Reformed thought on the will?
