@Bradskii +
@Mark Quayle: it appears that you both are highly skeptical of the claim that there can be a "me" somehow embedded inside the human person that can make decisions that are not otherwise determined. So when someone claims that they can make a decision that is, at least in some measure, not determined, you understandably ask for an account as to how that decision was arrived at. And, when other posters claim it is a mystery, you suggest, if I understand you correctly, that such an appeal to mystery is not legitimate.
I should think that if there is a "me" embedded inside, instead of "this person IS me", it still comes to the same thing. This 'me' is not independent of causation. I am not self-existent first cause. 'Me' is the result of antecedent causes.
An appeal to mystery is not as good an argument as axiomatic logic upon which scientific and philosophical investigation (not to mention everyone's everyday thought processes) have depended for millennia. If the 'fact' of uncaused choices is self-evident, it is only because it is how it seems to us --"face value" experience, as someone here called it-- which is hardly a measure of truth, even though it is more handy than the conclusions of abstract thinking drawn upon axiomatic principle.
There is no such thing as decisions that are not in some measure not determined. And maybe there is where the difference in our views lies. I hear in arguments with Christian proponents of 'libertarian' freewill, the same thing, that everyone has "limited autonomy". Autonomy, in this context (i.e. not meaning autonomy from one-another) either is, or is not. There is no partway. If one has influences to which he gives way, or influences against which he rebels, they had influence and his choice is determined by those influences, be they external, internal, or whatever else one may use to describe them or attach to them. To insist on self-determination, in this case, is only to insist on choice --not on autonomy.
Are you sure this is fair? My current position on all this is that the evidence leans very strongly in the direction that all our actions and decisions are fully determined. Or, they are the result of deterministic forces supplemented by randomness. Either way, I see no "place" for free will, at least based on the current mainstream "scientific" understanding of the world.
Apparent 'randomness' only. There it is again, that "face value" presumption. There is no such thing as randomness, any more than there is such a thing as chance. To the human observer, it is considered chance, or random, only because we don't have the sight and intellectual capacity to know all the causes behind what we see happening. As RC Sproul said (and I don't know if it was his originally), "Chance is just a shortcut for, 'I don't know.'."
But notice how these arguments are made. You ask if we are being fair. What do you mean by that? Are you thinking that we should admit to some amount of mystery that departs from causation, merely because we don't know all the causes? Are you thinking that we should admit to some lack of causation, because we don't know the "spark" of being that transitions to self-aware sentience "across the bridge" from causes? If there even IS such a thing, it, too, is caused to be. Even for the believer, if there is something transcendent and independently unique in each of us, it/she/he is still caused to exist. I can find no intellectually honest escape from the simple logic of causation.
However, I wonder whether you are assuming that it is in principle impossible for there to be a "me" that is, at least to some degree, free to make decisions.
Strawman. We believe there is a "me" that makes the decisions. We just don't believe the me is uncaused, nor that the workings of the mind of that "me", or even the "self-ness" of that "me", are independent of causation.
I see no reason for ruling out the a priori possibility that inside each of us there dwells a "me" that is indeed free to, for example, decide whether or not to steal a candy bar. Let's say I see a candy bar that I want to eat, but I have no money. Is it not at least possible that there is a "me" that feels the lure of the candy bar but is able to choose, on the basis of moral principles, to not steal it.
Of course! But how is that independent of causation? How is that even independent of --let's call it, an "oracle's",-- prediction (based on having all the facts), as to exactly what that choice will be?
I want to end by emphasizing something really important. It is one thing to say that the scientific evidence strongly supports the idea that my choice to not steal the candy bar is, in fact, determined. But it is quite another to rule out, a priori, repeat a priori, the possibility that there is a "me" that can, through some means that we do not understand (and hence can be called a mystery) "freely" elect to not steal it.
My objection here is several-fold:
1) I'm calling this the first, so I won't forget to include it. For the Christian believer, the notion that there is such a thing as good, apart from God, should be understood as a pagan notion. For the non-believer, the notion that there is such a thing as good, whether there actually even is such a thing objectively or not, it is still the result of antecedent causes, as also are subjective decisions on the matter.
2) Also, so that I won't forget: For the believer also, I will admit --in fact, I claim-- that the human mind cannot altogether rationally conceive --(thus, 'mystery')-- how there can be any particular individuality or self-ness, once transformed into whatever we will be in Heaven, in which God will have such particular delight, and to whom God finds reason to give independent reward, and whom scripture says is given a name that only that person and God himself knows. But I will tell anyone that if we are there literally "members" of the "Body of Christ", as scriptures say, perhaps roughly analogous to cells in the human body, or, if you wish to make any other word-pictures or representations of whatever it is to be independently "me", here, or there, IT IS STILL CAUSED TO BE, and therefore, also every particularity derived from it, is not of 'first-causal' ontology.
3) For the rest of us, or for the believers who wish to discuss this from a 'naturalistic' perspective,
Axiom demands that if something is an effect, it is caused. If we are effects --no matter how you wish to describe the "me" within-- we are caused, to include our individuality and our "self-ness".
Logic demands that we are effects, since to not be effects demands self-existent status, and the self-existence of these little beings is a rationally void proposition. Ontology is about what a thing is --only description-- not its very being, and whatever comes to be has antecedent cause for its being.
4-100) The rest of this I will leave out, as you probably get the idea --it doesn't matter what you come up with: If we are not ourselves first cause(s), we are caused, and therefore, everything we do is caused, to include our choosing and our choices. Then, if 'caused', then "determined".