Please don't say 'we'. I know how things happen (or at least, in my opinion, I know how things happen). I've spent enough time explaining it. So what you are saying is that you don't think that you know. Which is fair enough. You don't have an alternative.
But bear this in mind. I can't prove I'm right. But you can prove me wrong. By giving a single example of a decision that was not determined by anything at all.
Very likely, given the subject under discussion, it is impossible to prove, establish, demonstrate your requested negative of “example of a decision that was
not determined by anything at all.”
Now, you might reply establishing “a decision that was” a result of the freedom of a person to act or refrain from acting, necessarily excludes Determinism and renders the free decision to act or refrain from acting as a “decision that was not determined by anything at all.” Yet, considering the inherent metaphysical composition of the subject matter of free will and/or Determinism, then at best a presumption, the degree of confidence for the presumption may vary, free will exists which isn’t strong enough to establish the negative of “giving a
single example of a decision that was not determined by anything at all.”
I find the definition of Free Will by the famed Christian apologist, renowned philosophy professor Alvin Plantinga, at my beloved University of Notre Dame, a suitable, adequate, and sensible meaning. From his book, “God, Freedom, and Evil,” Plantinga defined free will as, “
If a person is free with respect to a given action, then he is free to perform that action and free to refrain from performing it; no antecedent conditions and/or causal laws determine that he will perform form the action, or that he won't. It is within his power, at the time in question, to take or perform the action and within his power to refrain from it.”
— God, Freedom, and Evil by Alvin Plantinga
I’m unaware of evidence establishing or showing my actions, or refraining from acting, is determined by someone or something else. I’m equally unaware of evidence someone or something other than myself is determining to act or not to act. Ostensibly, I am the entity deciding when to act, how to act, or when to not act as there isn’t any evidence something or someone, is strongly causing, or I am
thinking of what to do, or not to do, and then deciding which and then deciding the action or inaction, thereby establishing the Cogito, thanks Des Cartes, and my Cogito the cause for the action/inaction. To be sure, I’m not advocating a lack of evidence for Determinism is evidence for free will and what I did articulate does not make this point.
Preceding causes, such as Big Bang, God created us and is omniscient of what we will do or not, do not necessarily establish or show our actions or inactions are determined for us.
Whether there must exist at least some alternative for free will, to run or not to run/ride a bike/hop/skip, known as Principle of Alternative Possibilities, is a fascinating topic that has occupied academia and philosophy since at least the 70s. William Lane Craig, invoking inspiration from the Frankfurt Case(s)/Illustrations has espoused the interesting proposition alternatives are not necessary to free will.
According to Craig,
“I am explicitly a libertarian about freedom of the will, and so there should be no doubt about that. I just deny the so-called Principle of Alternative Possibilities, that the ability to do otherwise in a given situation is a necessary condition of libertarian freedom….This suggests that
what is critical to free will is not the ability to choose differently in identical circumstances but rather not being caused to do something by causes other than oneself. It is up to me how I choose, and nothing determines my choice. Sometimes philosophers call this agent causation. The agent himself is the cause of his actions.”
Craig’s POV is fascinating to me, and its logic possesses a persuasive quality but his view isn’t ineluctable. I’m ambivalent as to the veracity of his specific POV but worth sharing given the subject matter.