Part II:
So physics isn't quantum mechanics and classical mechanics?
It's just an odd word to use. It certainly isn't common to refer to physical systems as "mechanical" outside the context of traditional "machines" in the sense of classical mechanics. And this is despite the use of "mechanics" in the areas of "quantum mechanics" or "fluid mechanics". It is seen largely as an archaic usage.
What other word is appropriate for scientific modeling besides mechanical?
Stuff to do.
You may not be interested in discussing it, but you have beliefs regarding it. All not discussing it does is removes those beliefs from criticism.
(defer)
Physics doesn't, but taking it as an exclusive means of gathering knowledge does since physics involves assuming some flavor of materialism and modeling the universe according to that metaphysical understanding.
We are talking about physical objects (humans).
I haven't proposed a theory of how free will operates, simply denied that the claim that it doesn't exist is a reasonable inference that forces the universe to fit to a philosophical framework rather than adjusting our philosophies to fit reality as we experience.
That seems convenient. You don't like it when you think *I* am taking a "conveinent stand".
@Bradskii himself admitted that the basis of his argument is materialism, because materialist assumptions combined with no material conscious substance requires that free will(and consciousness) must be in some way an illusion. Hand-waving away difficulties because they don't fit with philosophies is not following the evidence, quite the opposite.
I don't really know what his position is. I only skim the posts not direct to me. If I see something of interest, I might respond. That's how I got into this...
Naturalism is a largely useless ontological term because it can be conformed to fit any phenomenon, and when a term can explain anything it explains nothing.
It's people like you obsessed with these "worldview" labels that insist on such things. To be clear my operating mode is best described by the term "philosophical naturalism", but it is just some conclusion that I came to eventually. And for that "worldview" I would describe it as such:
"The Universe and the things inside it operate on a regular system of physical laws. All may not be known, but there is no need to invoke anything that does not fit this paradigm." I don't know if this is absolutely true, but it is for all practical purposes and I proceed as if it was.
As a commitment to certain approaches it can have some utility, but that sort of naturalism neither affirms nor denies atheism or theism.
(a)theism (neither of which are philosophies or world views) is a dull question about if you believe in a god or not. I'm not looking for an approach to nature "confirming" either. (TL;DR: So what?)
However, taking scientific modeling as the exclusive approach to epistemics automatically brings in metaphysical commitments such as causal closure and a materialist/physicalist ontology. While you're correct I have no idea what you have or haven't critically examined, your flat denial of having metaphysical commitments raises doubt as to whether you've critically engaged with them.
I don't see any point in spending time such naval gazing. It works and I've got lots of unknowns in the Universe to explore.
Ultimately, whether the phenomenon is described as emergent or a more basic phenomenon the fundamental reality remains the physical operations of the brain and the conscious phenomenon we experience are a byproduct of that physical phenomenon. So the problem is kicked up a level and calling it emergent serves little function other than to call it mysterious.
Placing mind functions in their proper scale is important to their study. No need to poke around looking for transitions of nuclei, etc. Understanding an emergent property as emerging from the "level below" makes it easier to study it.
All of this is rather irrelevant to the question at hand, because I'm not denying that there is such a thing as emergent phenomenon. But emergent phenomenon are byproducts of the physical realities that lie beneath them, rather than fundamental realities in themselves.
That *is* the point. And mind is clearly a behavior of brain. Is free will a property of mind, or not? That is the question.
I base it on a number of sources, from physicists to neurobiologists to philosophers of science. Nuerobiology has shown that not only are our brains efficacious on our thoughts, but our thoughts are efficacious on our brains. Which means that somehow the abstract semantic content and qualia is interacting with the physical matter and altering its structure and composition. So writing off the interaction problem as nothing more than an illusion is a failure to take into consideration the full body of evidence and instead cherry pick a couple of provacative studies that seem to indicate that there is lag between the electrical impulses in our brains and our conscious awareness of our decisions as being definitive evidence of a simple direct causal relationship between our brain activity and our conscious thought.
This is all several levels of complexity and emergent phenomena above my ken. I know nothing of neurobiology.
Seems to me we have to deal with what does and doesn't constitute evidence and how truth is demonstrated before we can determine what has and hasn't been demonstrated. You know, the philosophical stuff that you are so loathe to engage in.
I find it all rather pointless. My needs in this area are practical. Does it work? Yes. OK. I certainly have no need for extra-physical inputs to anything I'm trying to understand. When one is demonstrated to be needed, then we can talk about it. Until then it is a waste of my time.
