Free will and determinism

[Jo555]

Hey, I've graduated to "well known

It's not mine. I just agree with it.

I hear you Bradskii. I was just being lazy about looking up how it has been defined. My google mini is already working in overdrive with all the words I've asked it to define for me, and I'm already driving under the influence.

I took a shortcut. Now that i have been pulled over and given a citation, am i free to go?

Did I say free?

Who will free me from this cycle?

I'd be very interested to hear the non-human perspective. I've owned many dogs throughout my life, and not once has any of them expressed an opinion of the topic.

Isn't it you who is degrading the omnipotence of God? Why do you deny God the ability to create beings with free will? Do you believe we are created "in His image"?

Oh my goodness Chesterton. Are you in the no sense of humor camp?

I'm in deep trouble, wretched man (actually woman) that i am.

Just don't boot me out already. I may have more delicacies to offer, though some have no taste for it. So unfortunate.

 

[Jo555]

Hey, someone keeps posting my posts twice.

Who's doing that?

I need to stop driving for awhile and fix that mess while i sober up.

Carry on amigos. I bet you didn't know i was tri-lingual. Still trying to pick up that fourth language though.

 

[Jo555]

The bible doesn't even teach freewill. It does speak of choices, but those choices are not independent of influences.

Freewill actually, imo, does more damage than no freewill because it creates the perception that we are at liberty to make the right choice apart from God.

And then Christians keep trying to move forward partaking of the wrong tree and drowning in guilt and condemnation, thinking this is something good, and noble, and humble, and load others up with that stuff, when in actuality it is pride because it denies the fact that apart from Him we can do nothing.

Now I'm of the camp that while we are being perfected in love, God can use it as a motivation to stop us if we are not walking in love and ignoring the call of his Spirit, but it doesn't move us forward, and it is not meant to.

More i would love to say on this, but will have to take some time; the multi-layer (or dimensional) thing of spiritual and natural.

 

[DennisF]

Prediction has absolutely nothing to do with determinism. This has been addressed ad nauseum.

If you understand what modern science is about, you would know that if a process is deterministic, then it should be possible scientifically to predict its behavior. Prediction is necessary in confirming the validity of scientific theories.

This isn't a problem for free will. It's a problem in the concept of God.

Forget "God" and substitute "super-scientist", an infallible predictor of future choices an agent makes based on a deterministic understanding (which is not unless it is comprehensive).

No, we actually don't (and even if we did it wouldn't prove free will). We live our lives as if free will exists, as if we are the master of our own destiny, but we also know as a fact, that every decision we make is for a reason. A reason based on antecedent conditions. If we are asked 'why did you do that' then we will always have an answer (assuming it wasn't a subconscious reactive decision in which case free will doesn't come into it). You will always be able to answer 'I did it because...' and fill in the ellipses are required.

So where does determinism come into this in relation to free will?

 

[Jo555]

The bible doesn't even teach freewill. It does speak of choices, but those choices are not independent of influences.

Freewill actually, imo, does more damage than no freewill because it creates the perception that we are at liberty to make the right choice apart from God.

And then Christians keep trying to move forward partaking of the wrong tree and drowning in guilt and condemnation, thinking this is something good, and noble, and humble, and load others up with that stuff, when in actuality it is pride because it denies the fact that apart from Him we can do nothing.

Now I'm of the camp that while we are being perfected in love, God can use it as a motivation to stop us if we are not walking in love and ignoring the call of his Spirit, but it doesn't move us forward, and it is not meant to.

More i would love to say on this, but will have to take some time; the multi-layer (or dimensional) thing of spiritual and natural.

I, myself, have used the term "freewill". Although, i have for some time now agreed that there is no freewill, i never really looked up what it means so I still used the term at times.

Having a choice may be a more appropriate term.

 

[Bradskii]

If you understand what modern science is about, you would know that if a process is deterministic, then it should be possible scientifically to predict its behavior. Prediction is necessary in confirming the validity of scientific theories.

For very simple systems and only if you you have sufficient information.

Forget "God" and substitute "super-scientist", an infallible predictor of future choices an agent makes based on a deterministic understanding (which is not unless it is comprehensive).

This is a hypothetical based on the premise that if we knew the future (we can't, see above) then it would add all sorts of complications to the decision making process. And as far as I can see after reading both the papers, the prediction is not just about the conditions pertaining to a decision. It's a prediction of the decision itself.

The idea of hypotheticals is that you can map them on to reality. This doesn't qualify.

So where does determinism come into this in relation to free will?

Read the op.

 

[DennisF]

So you are arguing terminology, not against the fact of causality, but against referring to what is necessarily effect, as, "determined". Nice.

There is a rational argument to be made and it is not merely terminology (semantic or grammatical triviality). All the same, it took me about a half year (in my younger days) to come to understand higher-order or self-referencing logic. It is what upended the formalist school of mathematics around the turn of the 20th century, culminating in Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead's renowned treatise, Principia Mathematica on the foundations of mathematics, the last gasping attempt of the formalist school before Kurt Goedel came along with his Incompleteness Theorem. A system of statements or an argument with its assumptions is complete if all true statements in it are provable; and it is logically sound if all provable statements are true. What is "incomplete" is that no (nontrivial) system can be both sound and complete. This showed a limit on what can be known logically, and it affects the free-will & determinism debate, though few have yet to see how.

 

[Bradskii]

Having a choice may be a more appropriate term.

No, it isn't more appropriate. You can't simply change the definition used in the claim if you find that you can't reject the claim.

 

[Bradskii]

A system of statements or an argument with its assumptions is complete if all true statements in it are provable; and it is logically sound if all provable statements are true.

No-one is trying to prove determinism. So the statement is not relevant. The op is based on the assumption that the universe is deterministic. It concludes with this (emphasis added):

'And if existence is deterministic...

 

[DennisF]

First up, kudos on presenting an argument for free will, as opposed to what we normally get. But firstly...this, from the link:

'MacKay's argument might appear to assume deterministic predictions and conclude free will for the agent. Instead it argues from free will by allowing the agent, who is assumed free to choose, to respond to the predictions. It is up to the agent to believe a prediction or not, and such an act of free will determines the truth-value of the prediction. The physical outcome depends on the choice of the agent.'

It is not up to the agent to believe anything. He cannot make a conscious decision to believe something. All he can do is decide whether to accept the evidence for a given proposal or not and then belief, or disbelief, will follow automatically. Let's say that someone says that your wife is being unfaithful because they saw her having coffee with a male work colleague. You probably wouldn't accept that as evidence so therefore wouldn't believe the claim. But if you were shown a video of her in flagrante delicto then you probably would accept that evidence and therefore believe the claim. But you can't accept the evidence and not believe or reject the evidence and believe.

So far as the essence of the argument goes, what defines an agent (Joe) is his ability to choose whether to believe the prediction about himself or not when offered to him. Whatever else is logically appended to this is not central to the argument. The rest of the argument is simply the logical consequence of Joe's choice in what to believe.

In any case, making a choice (in this case choosing to believe something) is not an example of free will. You make choices whether free will exists or not. The deciding factor is whether the choice was determined by antecedent conditions or not . Not the act of choosing.

MacKay's form of the argument (not mine) assumes free will as defined (involving freedom of choice) because it starts with the recognition that we go through life acting as though we have free will. The question the argument addresses is whether this is irrational if the world is deterministic as defined. The argument shows that it is not logical to conclude that we have no free will based on its definition of it.

My argument turns this around and assumes determinism, then shows that (like MacKay's conclusion) a self-referencing choice is semi-decidable. If true, then of course this is the trivial case; but if false, then the outcome is, like that of the Cretan liar, logically undecidable. Semi-decidability is a logical state that can be encountered in software, such as trying in AI problem-solvers to prove a negative universal.

The second point is that predicting a choice that someone will make is one of the antecedent conditions that determines your choice. Whether you believe it or not (and you have no choice in believing it or not - it either convinces you or it doesn't) it will determine your decision.

And this is the starting point for my argument. Read it carefully because it is somewhat demanding of the reader; nobody said self-referencing logic simplifies anything!

And this from the 'Closure':

'MacKay recognized that we think and behave as though we are free; and he argued that physical determinism does not deny this basic fact of our personal experience.'

I completely agree with that. But...

'The kind of physical determinism that MacKay's argument allows is limited to what can be predicted about A without interacting with A.'

Prediction is not relevant to determinism.

It is scientifically. The ability to predict correctly is a logical necessity for a deterministic scientific theory. This issue originally (in modern times) arose from Simon Pierre de Laplace's argument in the 18th century. He argued that given the correct theory of motion and initial conditions of an object that it is possible to predict all future behavior of the object. This is the origin of the debate on determinism, and it subsequently has been applied to humans and human decision-making.

 

[DennisF]

Poking around Google looking at Mackay I found this which might be of interest:

On the modal indeterminacy of a free choice

The relationship between determinism and free will is still vigorously debated. However, despite the activity one contribution from around 70 years ago has been largely ignored. In the 1950's Donald M. Mackay presented a position he called

www.academia.edu

However, it requires a decent understanding of modal logic, which I don't have.

Well, don't despair; it isn't anything too esoteric. In the Middle Ages there were multiple different "modal logics" developed, including some that are relevant today in robotics for real-time AI, such as temporal logic. (Something true now might not be true then.) The logic of Aristotle (which has a finite number of starting statements in it and as inferences are made adds to the set of proven statements as conclusions) or of its infinite extension as "first-order predicate calculus", which adds existential ("for every x in the set of statements") and universal ("for all ...") quantifiers, is not sufficient in that it does not include statements that refer to themselves.

Bertrand Russell (whom you will be glad to know was a famous 20th-century atheist) demonstrated the same self-referencing logic of the free-will-determinism arguments of MacKay and mine by asking of mathematical set theory: Is every set of sets that are members of themselves a member of itself? Trying to reason about self-referencing logic can drive you mentally crazy (and Goedel spent time in a mental institution in Maine), so it is not surprising that it wasn't applied to Laplace's proposition until the later 20th century, by MacKay.

(I knew MacKay, a Scottish highlander; he wrote books on this topic. One is titled The Clockwork Image after the 18th-century mechanistic determinism of the time. He also debated B. F. Skinner, the deterministic psychologist, on William F. Buckley's Firing Line program on PBS a few decades ago.)

 

[Jo555]

No, it isn't more appropriate. You can't simply change the definition used in the claim if you find that you can't reject the claim.

Oh Bradskii, are you going to make me look up what choice means?

Jo: Hey google? What is the definition of choice?

Google: Here is the definition of choice. An act of choosing between two or more possibilities.

Says nothing of apart from influences. I'm holding my ground Bradskii, unless you can prove to me that there is a different definition.

Just give me one example. Just one.

 

[Bradskii]

So far as the essence of the argument goes, what defines an agent (Joe) is his ability to choose whether to believe the prediction about himself or not when offered to him. Whatever else is logically appended to this is not central to the argument. The rest of the argument is simply the logical consequence of Joe's choice in what to believe.

I'm unsure about what you mean when you say 'prediction'. If you mean that Laplace's Demon (LD) has all the information needed to accurately predict Joe's decision then I won't argue with that. LD has knowledge of all the antecedent conditions that will determine it. But you are changing the antecedent conditions by telling him what he is going to do. So you'd have to re-predict the choice by noting his reaction to being told. But (you can probably see where this is going) you haven't included this new prediction in the information that he has. So you have to re-predict it again. You get an infinite chain.

MacKay's form of the argument (not mine) assumes free will as defined (involving freedom of choice) because it starts with the recognition that we go through life acting as though we have free will. The question the argument addresses is whether this is irrational if the world is deterministic as defined. The argument shows that it is not logical to conclude that we have no free will based on its definition of it.

I don't like the 'freedom of choice'. Free will is not defined simply by having, and making, a choice. And we'd go through life exactly the same, to all intents and purposes, if free will existed or not. I'd choose to have tea instead of coffee because it was more convenient. I'd decide not to go to the beach because it's raining. I decide to pout the heating on because I'm feeling cold. If you say that we have free will, then you'd still choose those things. If you agree that we don't then you'd still choose those things.

The logical conclusion, assuming that there's an agreement on determinism, is that the choices we make are therefore determined.

My argument turns this around and assumes determinism, then shows that (like MacKay's conclusion) a self-referencing choice is semi-decidable. If true, then of course this is the trivial case; but if false, then the outcome is, like that of the Cretan liar, logically undecidable. Semi-decidability is a logical state that can be encountered in software, such as trying in AI problem-solvers to prove a negative universal.

And this is the starting point for my argument. Read it carefully because it is somewhat demanding of the reader; nobody said self-referencing logic simplifies anything!

Well, this may take some time. It didn't make a lot of sense the first time I read it. Semi-decidable? It doesn't help that I woke up this morning with a rotten head cold, so you may have to give me some time to investigate further.

It is scientifically. The ability to predict correctly is a logical necessity for a deterministic scientific theory.

For simple systems. If I throw a brick at the window I can predict what's going to happen. But I can't predict where I'll be in a year's time.

This issue originally (in modern times) arose from Simon Pierre de Laplace's argument in the 18th century. He argued that given the correct theory of motion and initial conditions of an object that it is possible to predict all future behavior of the object.

In which case determinism would be true. But not being able to make those predictions doesn't mean it's false. In every situation an effect has a cause. So, on the assumption that determinism is true (nobody has given an example when it isn't)...the OP stands.

 

[Bradskii]

Google: Here is the definition of choice. An act of choosing between two or more possibilities.

Says nothing of apart from influences.

'Apart from influences' refers to free will. Not to the ability to make a choice. The point of the thread is to show that you cannot make a choice without it being determined by some influence or other.

Of course, you can always try giving us an example of a choice that wasn't.

 

[Mark Quayle]

I'd be very interested to hear the non-human perspective. I've owned many dogs throughout my life, and not once has any of them expressed an opinion of the topic.

Isn't it you who is degrading the omnipotence of God? Why do you deny God the ability to create beings with free will? Do you believe we are created "in His image"?

Are you also going to ask me if God can make a rock too big for him to pick up?

I deny God no self-contradictory abilities, nor do I attribute him any. They are only figments of the mind of man, and have no relevance to God's ability. They are bogus notions.

Is being 'uncaused causers' what you think being made in his image means?

 

[Mark Quayle]

There is a rational argument to be made and it is not merely terminology (semantic or grammatical triviality). All the same, it took me about a half year (in my younger days) to come to understand higher-order or self-referencing logic. It is what upended the formalist school of mathematics around the turn of the 20th century, culminating in Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead's renowned treatise, Principia Mathematica on the foundations of mathematics, the last gasping attempt of the formalist school before Kurt Goedel came along with his Incompleteness Theorem. A system of statements or an argument with its assumptions is complete if all true statements in it are provable; and it is logically sound if all provable statements are true. What is "incomplete" is that no (nontrivial) system can be both sound and complete. This showed a limit on what can be known logically, and it affects the free-will & determinism debate, though few have yet to see how.

I only see that it affects the thinking of some, not that it actually impinges on truth, or defines truth. It only works on notions concerning truth.

Whether or not we know anything or speculate is of no relevance to what IS the truth.

But my point is that changing what is meant by 'determined' and other terms of the argument, no matter how valid the change, doesn't change the facts being argued about. "What we are currently calling, 'choices'" are still "what we are currently calling 'dependent on' what we are currently calling 'causes' which 'causes'" are the reason that we reference what we are currently calling 'determined'". That is what I mean.

Description is not IS. (But we do our best.)

 

[Jo555]

'Apart from influences' refers to free will. Not to the ability to make a choice. The point of the thread is to show that you cannot make a choice without it being determined by some influence or other.

Of course, you can always try giving us an example of a choice that wasn't.

I got that Bradskii, after 155 pages. I'm not that dumb, although some may disagree. No problema here ... Self-deprecating sense of humor.

I thought i established that i agreed on the freewill thing, even prior to joining this invigorating topic.

I'm just saying that choice still exists, even if we choose under the influence.

I thought you, of all people, would appreciate that i would try and equip my people with an alternative term, rather than freewill.

Capiche?

Did i misjudge you?

 

[Chesterton]

Are you also going to ask me if God can make a rock too big for him to pick up?

I deny God no self-contradictory abilities, nor do I attribute him any. They are only figments of the mind of man, and have no relevance to God's ability. They are bogus notions.

I don't see how creating free will beings involves any contradiction. It's what husbands and wives do whenever they produce a child.

Is being 'uncaused causers' what you think being made in his image means?

No.

 

[Mark Quayle]

DennisF said:
The ability to predict correctly is a logical necessity for a deterministic scientific theory.

Not exactly. The falsifiability of a theory may be considered necessary, but your statement doesn't even say WHOSE ability it is. Certainly no human ability to predict is necessary for causes to determine choices and outcomes, according to our current use of the word, "determine". That, to me, rings of the pompous question, "If a tree falls in a forest.....[and so on]".

In which case determinism would be true. But not being able to make those predictions doesn't mean it's false. In every situation an effect has a cause. So, on the assumption that determinism is true (nobody has given an example when it isn't)...the OP stands.

 

[Mark Quayle]

I don't see how creating free will beings involves any contradiction. It's what husbands and wives do whenever they produce a child.

By the meaning common in this thread for "free will" --that is, 'uncaused will', or 'uncaused choice'-- the notion that God could cause something uncaused is a bit ridiculous, isn't it?

And no, both the child and the cause of the child's existence are caused. Husbands and wives are not uncaused causers. Not creators. Not God.