Find me an Absolute

[Dracil]

While not exactly about ethical relativism, Searle does have a refutation of relativism about truth. http://philosophy.berkeley.edu/searle/articles/rtf/refutationofrelativism.rtf

But some of the arguments may apply here.

 

[Brimshack]

I'm inclined to agree with your critique Jayem. To do the greatest good for everyone requires some means of comparing various goods and bads, and this not only heads us down the road to ends and means games, it presumes a means of comparing all these individual goods that probably isn't there.

mpshiel : I really couldn't care less about Plato, andyour objection gets to the heart of my point. A universal moral principle is not even a moral principle if a human being cannot state it clearly, and outline its implications. The fact that so many absolutists have been content to speak of absolutes as an abstract possibility demonstrates the degree to which they are themselves uninterested in ethics at all. It's a shell game, promising an absolute, and delivering us from all responsibility to that absolute, or even to be clear about what we are saying. In practice most absolutisms are actually shameless subjectivisms, and the only way that I can see to reconstruct them is to start by asking genuine questions about real points of morality.

I assume your suggestions about dumping upstream, etc. were not meant in a serious vein, but your description of my method bears little resemblance to the method itself. I am hardly attacking the nature of language. rather the point is to reveal theunderpinnings of the language in question, which reveals its particularity, but that hardly amounts to an attack. And of course the point is precisely that the particularity of a value is itself variable. I am not making a categorical rejection of universal values; I am instead treating the scope of a value as an empirical question in itself. And yet you seem intent on reading my approach as a reletivist gambit. In short, I think you have missed the point.

Magisterium: I was impressed because it was a genuine attempt to answer the question. Your critique and a few others were substantive, but after a round of read the Bibles and a pitch for Objectivism, I was happy to see someone take a shot at answering the question. I do agree, however, that the answer ultimately fails for precisely the reasons that you have brought up.

To say that a value is based on a precept is fine with me, and we can follow this out, turtles all the way down, so to speak, but the notion that a value is based on a precept does nothing to establish either that it is wrong or that it is particular in its intent. If you wish to examine the particularity of the precept as a sort of meta-analysis, then so be it, but even then the prospect of ubiquitous semiotic values should suggest at least the possibility of a universal. Since all languages have a means of negation, could not all cultures express some core values?

Cultural relativism need not cancel absolutism, especially not of cultural patterns are construed as re-arrangments of cognitive structures (e.g. Levi-Strauss). It is easy enough to show that some ethical principles can be reduced to culture. I can for example marry my mother's mother's mother's mother's mother's mother's sister's daughter's daughter's daughter's daughter's, daughter, whereas most Navajos would freak at the idea (same clan, hence incest whereas for me it's a cousin so far removed I would never even know). On the other hand Culture does not resolve all values. Some Navajos will say you can marry into your Grandfathers' clans, no problem, whereas others will say that's horrible. Some Anglos will say you can marry your second cousins whereas others will say that's incest. In short, cultural context is a relevant contextual matter. It is not, however, a final determinant of value. So, it is possible to suggest there might be statements which cut across (to varying degrees) cultural differences. Cultures may vary, for example in their construction of incest taboos, but they all seem to have them. This points to at least the possibility of a general (if not entirely universal) moral value.

Dracil: I am reluctant to enter into an epistemological debate when I am trying to discuss absolutes. But in any event, a critique of relativism does nothing to validate absolutism, and more importantly, it does nothing to provide us with a workable absolute. (BTW: I don't think we really have to exempt the claim that "all things are relative" from it's own entailments. That assumes relative = negated, whereas in fact it merely suggests a form of contingency - often revealed only by addressing the language of an expression. I see no reason why one could not assert that statement relative to the context at hand, while still accepting that its value is contingent. …guess I did get into it after all.)

 

[Shane Roach]

For a Christian, the fundamental moral absolute is to love God. For general purposes, a workable stab at it might be something along the lines of the golden rule, or "Love your neighbor as yourself." Or, to obey the set of guidelines you set down, "One ought to love one's neighbor as ones self."

You may find it imprecise, but then anything can be judged as imprecise, and besides it fits the qualification of having definite consequences.

 

[Brimshack]

Actually those aren't bad. I don't buy it, but that should come as no surprise. Off-hand I can't think of too many relativizing contingencies on the first one (other than that those who have not heard of God will have a hard time believing in Him). The main problem would simply be the metaphysical question of whether or not the object of this obligatory love actually exists.

Loving one's neighbor as oneself?

- Just your neighbor? (OK, I assume this is to be more general than that. Other people?)
- What if someone doesn't love himself?
- What does love entail as far as actual behavior? I have known some people who'se love was genuinely harmful. Might it be that an obligation to love is itself simply too fuzzy to count as a moral principle. I'm inclined to think it is.

Anyway, thank you for the suggestions.

 

[Shane Roach]

Well, you can take it and meddle with it so that you don't have to go through the hocus pocus of defining neighbor and all. "Love others as you would love yourself."

You keep bringing up objections and then instinctively correcting for them. For example, "What if someone doesn't love himself?" Then he is probably deranged, and his definition of 'love' is not to be considered. "I have known some whose love is genuinely harmful." Then it wasn't love really, was it? Love is a wide ranging term but it is not so difficult as all that. One could approximate it further as "One ought to treat others as one wants to be treated assuming one is not mentally ill."

If you are going to begin discussing relativism as it pertains to defining such things as mentally ill or whatever, then it seems you open the door to some of the discussion you seem to be trying to avoid.

 

[Brimshack]

"others" works fine, though I fail to see why my own efforts to rewrite the matter qualify as "hocus pocus." The objection wa admittedly technical, but just the same.

And the remainder of my objections, I did not myself correct, instinctively or otherwise.

- Lack of love for oneself is hardly evidence of derangement. Many a neurosis could be described in such a manner, and I do not see much hope in an ethics that applies only to those in perfect mental health.

You may choose to say that love is not love if it is harmful, but that doesn't square with my experience. People often lsh out at those they love, some more than others, and some to the point where it is best to avoid their love, but I certainly wouldn't deny that such individuals are experiencing love. In any event, this all begs the question of what is meant by love.

Note: I am not sure what you meant by discussing relativism in the context of mental illness, but my position needn't rest on a relativistic view of what is and is not mental illness. I would however point out that a variety of self-destructive behaviors are evident in a large number of people. One could describe these as illnesses, but if you wish to define morality as pertaining only to those without such tendancies, then the bulk of humanity is removed from the force of your assertions, …which would make them rather particular and hence relative.

Your latest rewrite is more promising. It gets us out of trying to gauge the practical implications of an emotion, but it has problems. Does it pertain to every manner in which I would want to be treated? What about identity-specific features of the manner in which I would want to be treated? Can I adjust for maleness versus femaleness, age, height, social status, etc.? If not, then the principle does not really dictate specific courses of action.

 

[Risen Tree]

Well heck, I'll just take a shot into the wild blue here:

Thou shalt not judge.

 

[Brimshack]

Welcome aboard:

I assume you mean that one shouldn't judge others, not that one should not use judgement at all. OK, but are there not contexts in which someone should do that? can you not mke judgements about who you want in your life and who you won't? And will these judgements not entail some ostensibly objective judgements about the natur of the people involved? Is a positive judgement that someone is a good person not also a judgement? And what of actual judges; are they allowed to pass judgements?

 

[Risen Tree]

Welcome aboard:

I assume you mean that one shouldn't judge others, not that one should not use judgement at all.

Let us define judging here as the action of belittling another person for his or her beliefs or actions.

OK, but are there not contexts in which someone should do that? can you not mke judgements about who you want in your life and who you won't? And will these judgements not entail some ostensibly objective judgements about the natur of the people involved? Is a positive judgement that someone is a good person not also a judgement? And what of actual judges; are they allowed to pass judgements?

Well? What do you think?

 

[Brimshack]

Your new wording is a little more precise (albeit perhaps a completely different rule altogether), though I'm inclined to think belittling can be a rather effective means of social control. In some societies it is a fundamental part of how they keep people in line, and if that seems ugly, it's certainly better than use of physical force. It strikes me as culture-specific after all.

What do I think: I think the princples you advance are pretty good, but each of my questions points to a contingency. …hence, not a universal and not absolute.

 

[Risen Tree]

Your new wording is a little more precise (albeit perhaps a completely different rule altogether), though I'm inclined to think belittling can be a rather effective means of social control. In some societies it is a fundamental part of how they keep people in line, and if that seems ugly, it's certainly better than use of physical force. It strikes me as culture-specific after all.

We need a precise definition. Judging, as you pointed out, can mean one of many things.

What do I think: I think the princples you advance are pretty good, but each of my questions points to a contingency. …hence, not a universal and not absolute.

So are there instances where it might be justifiable to judge per the definition in my last post? If so, it would refute the claim that we should not judge regardless of circumstance.

 

[Shane Roach]

"others" works fine, though I fail to see why my own efforts to rewrite the matter qualify as "hocus pocus." The objection wa admittedly technical, but just the same.

And the remainder of my objections, I did not myself correct, instinctively or otherwise.

- Lack of love for oneself is hardly evidence of derangement. Many a neurosis could be described in such a manner, and I do not see much hope in an ethics that applies only to those in perfect mental health.

You may choose to say that love is not love if it is harmful, but that doesn't square with my experience. People often lsh out at those they love, some more than others, and some to the point where it is best to avoid their love, but I certainly wouldn't deny that such individuals are experiencing love. In any event, this all begs the question of what is meant by love.

Note: I am not sure what you meant by discussing relativism in the context of mental illness, but my position needn't rest on a relativistic view of what is and is not mental illness. I would however point out that a variety of self-destructive behaviors are evident in a large number of people. One could describe these as illnesses, but if you wish to define morality as pertaining only to those without such tendancies, then the bulk of humanity is removed from the force of your assertions, …which would make them rather particular and hence relative.

Your latest rewrite is more promising. It gets us out of trying to gauge the practical implications of an emotion, but it has problems. Does it pertain to every manner in which I would want to be treated? What about identity-specific features of the manner in which I would want to be treated? Can I adjust for maleness versus femaleness, age, height, social status, etc.? If not, then the principle does not really dictate specific courses of action.

I'm really at a loss to figure out what "objective" means if it has to also qualify for people who are suffering from neurosis or mental illness. There could easily be a clear and obvious moral absolute that some people simply would not percieve, just a blind person doesn't percieve something unless it can be sensed by somethng besides sight.

I think, "do unto others as you would have them do unto you," would also indicate that yes, you take into account their specifics just as you would hope another would take into account your own specifics. I don't see this as subjective in and of itself, rather it is just taking into account the subjectivity of peoples' preferences in how to be treated when applying the principle.

The 'hocus pocus' comment was just me being silly in my word choice, just trying to point out that the form of the phrase can be played with by either you or me to better fit whatever definition of objective morality you're trying to lay a hand on. Sorry for the confusion.

 

[Shane Roach]

- Just your neighbor? (OK, I assume this is to be more general than that. Other people?)
- What if someone doesn't love himself?
- What does love entail as far as actual behavior? I have known some people who'se love was genuinely harmful. Might it be that an obligation to love is itself simply too fuzzy to count as a moral principle. I'm inclined to think it is.

I had to go back to this post to figure out about the concept of you instinctively correcting yourself, and what I was referring to is you already narrowed in on the concept of a situation where loveing someone wouldn't work if someone was basically hurting someone under the supposed auspices of 'love'. All I can say is that I have apparently a narrower understanding of what love means than you do. The feeling you seem to be describing is affection and need, but I wouldn't put the stamp of love on it since in my estimation love seeks the welfare of the beloved by definition.

 

[Faith In God]

The bible says that love is giving up our lives for wretched people, like Jesus did. Does your 'love' reflect this attitude?

 

[Risen Tree]

So did I find an absolute? If not, what situations prevent "Thou shalt not judge" from being an absolute?

 

[SonofYah]

 

[SonofYah]

Hi there, brothers & sisters!

That which you are asking, can be answered rather easily, and it is found right there within the Scriptures. There is only one absolute governing principle that will last forever, and that is the Principle of Agape, which plainly stated, is that all recognize that their reason for existence is to serve all. Such a Government will be installed when, having come back from the Third Heaven, and after the souls of all of the unjust, and their leader, are destroyed forever, then Father Yahweh will sit upon a Throne which is a Throne of Service! Everyone in the Universe will again go back to that which was, before the rebellion of the covering cherub, Lucifer, who, having found that there was a law that all the angelic realm kept unknowingly, questioned the reason for law amidst perfect creatures. This led to rebellion in Heaven, one third of the angelic realm siding with him, and the planet earth going down into rebellion, due to mankind's progenitors also following after the quest of Lucifer, now called Satan. His quest: A universe where all would laud and honor him, while he too would only laud and honor himself.

When Yahweh's Kingdom rules the Universe, then all will laud and honor a Father who although perfectly powerful, is also perfectly loving in His service for His creation; and, so too will all of creation recognize in existence, that to live, means to serve, and they derive perfect peace and happiness by daily looking into the faces of all who feel exactly the same about life! HalleluYah!

 

[Brimshack]

RT: We do need a precise definition> I would add that I see no definite link between judging and belittling. So, I would prefer not to go back and forth between them. I'll be happy to discuss either , or both, provided we are clear on the difference, but judging (right or wrong) need not entail belittling, or I think, visa versa. On your second question, I thought I already indicated some contingencies where such behavior would be justified. I would add that I'm skeptical of the notion that any such particulars could be universal or absolute. One might ask what the real harm is behind the behavior you wish to proscribe, and then try to fashion a more solid answer based on the answer to that question.

Shane: I'm not sure that "objectivity is really the issue here, but if accounting for the problems of neutotic people, you might find that element of subjectivity is rooted in your own prospective ethic. You are asking people to love others (which is an emotional quality), and to treat them as they would be treated themselves, also a direct reference to personal values. The subjectivity is built into your approach, hence the problems I have pointed out. One could certainly say that the obligation is universal whereas the specific implications might be subjective, but then I am still inclined to think that some people ought not to follow this principle. Thnk you for the clarification. Your definition of love is indeed more narrow than mine, and I am skeptical that you are talking about love at all. Human emotions of any kind just aren't logical functions though; you just can't derive such consistent emotions from them.

butxifxnot: Not sure where you're going.

RT: Sorry for the delay, but seriously. Taking judging as a candidate, then all the original contingencies I think show that judging is often good. As to belittling, I am inclined to wonder why one should accept this.

SonofYah: I do not know how to serve all. The prospect that God will eventually resolve this holds little weight for me, but adduming you are correct about that, it does little to tell us how to live ine the meanwhile. It is therefore an ethics for the future, and the present is itself a contingency which negates its force. …hence not an absolute.

 

[Risen Tree]

RT: We do need a precise definition> I would add that I see no definite link between judging and belittling. So, I would prefer not to go back and forth between them. I'll be happy to discuss either , or both, provided we are clear on the difference, but judging (right or wrong) need not entail belittling, or I think, visa versa. On your second question, I thought I already indicated some contingencies where such behavior would be justified. I would add that I'm skeptical of the notion that any such particulars could be universal or absolute. One might ask what the real harm is behind the behavior you wish to proscribe, and then try to fashion a more solid answer based on the answer to that question.

It looks like we've devolved into a semantics war here.... You do understand the concept that I am getting at, right? Do you have a better definition?

RT: Sorry for the delay, but seriously. Taking judging as a candidate, then all the original contingencies I think show that judging is often good. As to belittling, I am inclined to wonder why one should accept this.

See above.

 

[Shane Roach]

Shane: I'm not sure that "objectivity is really the issue here, but if accounting for the problems of neutotic people, you might find that element of subjectivity is rooted in your own prospective ethic. You are asking people to love others (which is an emotional quality), and to treat them as they would be treated themselves, also a direct reference to personal values. The subjectivity is built into your approach, hence the problems I have pointed out. One could certainly say that the obligation is universal whereas the specific implications might be subjective, but then I am still inclined to think that some people ought not to follow this principle. Thnk you for the clarification. Your definition of love is indeed more narrow than mine, and I am skeptical that you are talking about love at all. Human emotions of any kind just aren't logical functions though; you just can't derive such consistent emotions from them.

In the post where I use the coment about neurotics, I was using the phrase about treating others as one would have them treat you. The love post was just a clarification because I had said something that seemed to have started out to get under your skin some, so I was at pains to try to explain where I was coming from. The sentence that you actually mention the neurotics I have to tell you is, what with a few typos and some questionable grammar coupled with the difficulty of the subject matter, somehow evading my comprehension.

Sorry.