David Gould said:
You are correct. I am 'in denial of my own consciousness'. The self does not exist.
I will draw on Daniel Dennett to asist me here. To examine and counter the zombie argument, which is the argument you are making here, he thought up the notion of zimboes. Zombies, Dennett argues, just do not cut it. To have a Daniel Dennett zombie operate in exactly the same way as a non-zombie Daniel Dennett it would have to have the same operating tools as him. For example, it would need to have the ability to detect and recognise other people. It would also need to be able to make judgements about its own judgements. And to do that, it would need to have a detection and pattern recognition machine that was pointed at its own judgements. For this to function correctly, it would need to detect itself.
This thing would believe itself to be conscious, and would act as though it were. Yet we have not added anything called 'consciousness' to it. It is a zimboe. Dennett's argument is that something that acts exactly like us would believe itself conscious.
We are zimboes. Or in other words, we are sophisticated zombies.
I find this argument lacking. I don't see a necessary logical connection between the last sentence of your second paragraph, and the first sentence of your third. The detection of oneself, or self-awareness, is not exactly the same thing as consciousness. Dennett's zimboes could be fully aware (in a "mechanical" sense) of themselves, taking their own considerations into account when making considerations, without having to "believe itself to be conscious". Is a computer program conscious when it calls a recursive function? Does it think it is?
I understand the argument Dennett is trying to make, and it would make perfect sense if it wasn't so blatantly contradictory to my personal experience. I know that under the theory, this contradiction is to be expected. I am a machine that thinks it's conscious, and thus I am saying the things I'm saying right now. But if consciousness is an illusion, an illusion to
whom? In an illusion, something is perceived consciously to be something else. If that very consciousness doing the perceiving is what is illusory, how can it be perceived consciously to begin with?
In my personal subjective experience, I don't just "think I'm conscious" because some law, concerning pattern recognition machines pointing at their own judgements, dictates that I must think so. I have personal experience, verified every single moment of my existence, that I am, in fact, a conscious entity. And I don't believe any amount of philosophical theorizing is going to nullify that experience.
That is why I said this subject is going nowhere.