Evil Schmevil

[CTD]

Advocates of the problem of evil have definitions backwards. They define 'good' as simply and exclusively ''opposition to evil''. Of course we know the truth of the matter: Evil is properly defined as ''opposition to good.''

Advocates for theism need to stop letting this narrow, self-serving, and utterly worthless definition of 'good' pass. It is an abomination, and failing to point out its failure only serves to build the confidence of those who employ it. Here are some things to keep in mind the next time you encounter this ''problem of evil'' nonsense, okay?

There is much more to 'good' than merely opposing evil. Causing flowers to grow is good, whether or not any evil beings are present to resent their beauty. Generosity, mercy, patience, and grace are also good. Note the voluntary nature of these things.

If generosity were compulsory, it would be something other than generosity. Paying a debt you owe is not the same as voluntarily giving a gift. By definition generosity is voluntary rather than compulsory - by definition! No amount of weaseling with words, finite or infinite, can possibly make it otherwise.

The ''problem of evil'', in all its formulations, treats good as strictly compulsory, strictly and exclusively a matter of responding to evil. This is a set / subset fallacy. There are some obligations associated with being good, but not everything good is, or even can be compulsory. Compulsory good acts (duties) are only a subset of all possible good acts.

In order for the good act of forgiving to ever, even once, be performed, there must be something to forgive. With no sin, this is not the case. Forgiving is not possible if there is nothing to forgive. The temporary and transient existence of evil (not permanent, as scoffers happily presuppose) is the very prerequisite for this good act, for an entire class of potential good actions! That's the case under the true definition of 'good'.

So from a logical standpoint, ''the problem of evil'' is a trainwreck. The whole idea is to get people thinking about all the pain and suffering in the world, and then transfer the guilt from the responsible parties to the loving God who sent His Own Son to suffer and die for sinners. The consequences of sin are ugly, disgusting, vile, and repugnant. What do you expect to result from opposition to good?

The appeal of this trickery is blatantly superficial and strictly emotional, yet even there it fails. Which is better: our loving, living, caring, forgiving God, or the ''maximally good'' god they posit as being ''better''? The ''better'' god they propose isn't better at all! It never forgives, never shows mercy, never demonstrates love. How can anyone prefer such a being, even on an emotional basis?

In what twisted, misbegotten sense would things really be better if God immediately hammered everyone who committed any sin? Think about that. I don't think that's what you want. That's how these scoffers misdefine 'good'. Remember? That's their strict requirement: an instant and overwhelming response, without hesitation or mercy. That's what they insist would be ''better'' than the God some of us sinners have come to know and love. In my opinion, the deception fails emotionally almost as much as it does logically.

 

[The Nihilist]

You've used a lot of words, but I'm not all that sure what you're saying. I mean I'm not sure what you're specific problem is. Would you please present the problem of evil, and then criticize it specifically?

 

[ToddNotTodd]

I've stopped using the phrase "Problem of Evil" since it allows for pointless arguments about what "good" and "evil" are.

It's easier to say "Problem of Suffering" since we all have an idea of what would constitute suffering to us.

So the question can be asked "Why would an omnipotent, loving god create a universe where suffering could exist."

 

[ToHoldNothing]

The OP seems to think that the problem of evil argument suggests that good is defined as a compulsory opposition to evil, when in fact, the argument at its core simply notes that God being both all powerful and all loving seems to be contradictory in not using its power to negate unnecessary evil that is purely suffering for suffering's sake in some sadistic manner.

There isn't so much any argument that good as a whole is compulsory, but that with a God that supposedly cannot go against its own nature, it seems to be doing so when it allows suffering that it could otherwise intervene and stop it. The argument almost isn't focused at all on compulsory good, except perhaps in the notion that it is incumbent upon God to prevent unnecessary evil at the very least, even if we could accept that God allows basic evil in order to contrast it against basic good.

No one said that good was solely opposition of evil, but moreso that the quality of goodness in a world God created, even with the supposed post-lapsarian state of the world now, is inconsistent with the omnipotence God allegedly possesses. If God had all this power, it could conceivably stop unnecessary evil, equated potentially with undue suffering and such, without negating human free will, which is emphasized by Christians to be the cause of basic evil, distinguished from excessive evil.

Therein is a more nuanced "problem of evil" argument: God is being inconsistent in permitting evil in excess when it has the power to prevent evil in excess without negating human free will and also has humanity's best interests in mind as a benevolent deity.

 

[jayem]

Which is better: our loving, living, caring, forgiving God, or the ''maximally good'' god they posit as being ''better''?

Why do you think God is loving and caring?

 

[CTD]

You've used a lot of words, but I'm not all that sure what you're saying. I mean I'm not sure what you're specific problem is. Would you please present the problem of evil, and then criticize it specifically?

I'm not confident adding more words will help the situation. I don't see where I've employed any difficult terms, and I suggest you try reviewing. That's what I do when I have difficulties with a stretch of text, and I find it often helps.

 

[CTD]

Why do you think God is loving and caring?

It appears you might also profit from the review procedure.

 

[The Nihilist]

I'm not confident adding more words will help the situation. I don't see where I've employed any difficult terms, and I suggest you try reviewing. That's what I do when I have difficulties with a stretch of text, and I find it often helps.

Excuse me, I think you've missed my meaning. Your criticism is unclear. So we're all on the same page, please present the problem of evil that you're attacking, and then present why you think that argument is unsound.

 

[CTD]

I've stopped using the phrase ''Problem of Evil'' since it allows for pointless arguments about what ''good'' and ''evil'' are.

It's easier to say ''Problem of Suffering'' since we all have an idea of what would constitute suffering to us.

So the question can be asked ''Why would an omnipotent, loving god create a universe where suffering could exist.''

You're confusing a legitimate problem Christians and others acknowledge with a scoffer non-problem. Suffering as a genuine issue to be dealt with in earnest - not in a logic-defying, mocking manner.

I doubt one can find a Christian who hasn't struggled to understand God's purposes at some time or another. This is not at all the same as arrogantly insisting ''I know better than God.''

 

[CTD]

Excuse me, I think you've missed my meaning. Your criticism is unclear.

I've missed nothing. I haven't missed the fact that you have the potential to perpetually claim you don't understand. It's a popular custom, almost as popular as perpetually claiming not to see evidence.

So we're all on the same page, please present the problem of evil that you're attacking, and then present why you think that argument is unsound.

I have presented a general case which applies to all scoffer ''problem of evil'' arguments. I shall not assist in creating the misconception that it only applies to one specific example.

I suggest if anyone wants to meet the case I presented, they might start addressing the questions. They aren't hidden. How, for example, is our loving, forgiving God inferior to the scoffer's non-loving, non-forgiving god?

 

[CTD]

The OP seems to think that the problem of evil argument suggests that good is defined as a compulsory opposition to evil, ...

Presuppositions are not always stated openly. When the context requires them, they are a component of an argument. All these arguments attempt to dictate what God must do based upon the misdefinition of ''good''. Without it, there is nothing compelling God to immediately react to evil. It is also presupposed that evil is not merely temporary, as I pointed out.

when in fact, the argument at its core simply notes that God being both all powerful and all loving seems to be contradictory in not using its power to negate unnecessary evil that is purely suffering for suffering's sake in some sadistic manner.

There isn't so much any argument that good as a whole is compulsory, but that with a God that supposedly cannot go against its own nature, it seems to be doing so when it allows suffering that it could otherwise intervene and stop it. The argument almost isn't focused at all on compulsory good, except perhaps in the notion that it is incumbent upon God to prevent unnecessary evil at the very least, even if we could accept that God allows basic evil in order to contrast it against basic good.

No one said that good was solely opposition of evil, but moreso that the quality of goodness in a world God created, even with the supposed post-lapsarian state of the world now, is inconsistent with the omnipotence God allegedly possesses. If God had all this power, it could conceivably stop unnecessary evil, equated potentially with undue suffering and such, without negating human free will, which is emphasized by Christians to be the cause of basic evil, distinguished from excessive evil.

Therein is a more nuanced ''problem of evil'' argument: God is being inconsistent in permitting evil in excess when it has the power to prevent evil in excess without negating human free will and also has humanity's best interests in mind as a benevolent deity.

Well, if you want to assemble a ''more nuanced'' argument I suppose you're at liberty to do so. What I see here is not a good start, and the strategy is likely to backfire since you'll lose a lot of emotional pull - the only thing any rot of this species ever had going its way.

In order to paint God as negligent, you need to demonstrate compulsion. Your logical burden of proof is nigh on impossible, and I suspect that's why you omit any attempt to meet it.

Temporary evil has no potential to be problematic, for God has the capacity to make all things right in the end. Emotionally, suffering 40 years of intense, chronic pain may really have some pull. Logically if it is balanced against 400 (or even 40) years of bliss, it is a non-issue. Indeed, the math can very easily work in God's favour!

Finally I'll say I've never seen Christians inventing any classes of evil, designating one ''excessive'' or ''unnecessary'', and I can imagine no reason for one who was not an agent doing a poor job of acting to try.

 

[The Nihilist]

Ugh, nevermind. I'll let ToHoldNothing handle this.

 

[ToHoldNothing]

Presuppositions are not always stated openly. When the context requires them, they are a component of an argument. All these arguments attempt to dictate what God must do based upon the misdefinition of ''good''. Without it, there is nothing compelling God to immediately react to evil. It is also presupposed that evil is not merely temporary, as I pointed out.

Defining good would therefore be the bigger difficulty here, though there's also the difficulty of divine command morality. Is something good merely because God commands it and/or permits it, or does God permit it because it is good? But again, this seems to boil down to what we mean by good, and there are reasonably going to be disagreements about it.

The main two theories that come to mind are the notion that good is the default and evil is a privation or twisting of the good, by general Abrahamic theories, the other being that good and evil are two halves of the same whole, interrelated and not able to be separated as if one is better than the other. I believe there's another one somewhere in the middle, but my memory can fail me when I type fervently about a subject. Seems to be the notion that evil doesn't exist except as you believe it is evil, though there might be more nuance than my summary gives it credit for.

I don't see how you can demonstrate that evil is anything but temporary. Even if evil is just temporary, it doesn't mean atheists are somehow not compelled to try to stop it in some way. You seem to be implying that, though I could be wrong. Evil is still a problem even if it is temporary. I don't see how you can claim this except by invoking God

Well, if you want to assemble a ''more nuanced'' argument I suppose you're at liberty to do so. What I see here is not a good start, and the strategy is likely to backfire since you'll lose a lot of emotional pull - the only thing any rot of this species ever had going its way.

There's no need to be hostile or pessimistic about humanity just because some people use pathos rhetoric. But then, you can't wholly eliminate the emotional aspect of this any more than you can eliminate the emotional aspects of many things in life. Just because you use an emotional example does not mean you say that the emotional response proves your argument.

Here's a few arguments based on an evidential problem of evil. This is distinct from the logical problem of evil in saying that while evil might be consistent with God, it lowers God's probability of existing by virtue of the evidence being assessed in a way that doesn't require God and therefore, God's existence with evil not making sense, which is closer to the issue you've brought up from a Christian perspective



A version by William L. Rowe:

1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
3. (Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.[2]

Another by Paul Draper:

1. Gratuitous evils exist.
2. The hypothesis of indifference, i.e., that if there are supernatural beings they are indifferent to gratuitous evils, is a better explanation for (1) than theism.
3. Therefore, evidence prefers that no god, as commonly understood by theists, exists.[13]

In order to paint God as negligent, you need to demonstrate compulsion. Your logical burden of proof is nigh on impossible, and I suspect that's why you omit any attempt to meet it.

Part of this argument is based on standards established by philosophical theists. If you separate yourself from them, then you have no reason to criticize the argument, because you don't even agree with the theist's established philosophical ideas of god in some classical theological sense.

It's not that this argument paints God as negligent, but observes that God's existence along with evil doesn't make sense. The logical problem of evil alleges the contradiction, this argument merely says the evidence doesn't follow to the conclusion that evil can make sense alongside God's existence, even if it might be logically consistent with a general formulation of God permitting evil for a greater good.

Temporary evil has no potential to be problematic, for God has the capacity to make all things right in the end. Emotionally, suffering 40 years of intense, chronic pain may really have some pull. Logically if it is balanced against 400 (or even 40) years of bliss, it is a non-issue. Indeed, the math can very easily work in God's favour!

This presumes that people will easily forget such suffering, which seems naive and even if the person forgets, it is not because they have genuinely overcome the suffering, but have simply become desensitized by centuries of exposure only to good. It's psychologically devastating.

The problem with God making things right in the end is that God thinks that solving the problems it set in place by foreknowledge of the outcome of creation and the fall will relieve it of culpability for not approaching those problems and taking a convenient non intervention period until people come to heaven and are rehabilitated.

Finally I'll say I've never seen Christians inventing any classes of evil, designating one ''excessive'' or ''unnecessary'', and I can imagine no reason for one who was not an agent doing a poor job of acting to try.

It's not a matter of whether a Christian does it or not, it stands to reason that evil should be classed at the very least into those that are understandable on some level and those that are incomprehensible in the face of an entity that supposedly cares about our wellbeing enough to supposedly intervene on some level without losing its greatness or the opportunity to make good of some evil.

You seem to think that God intervening would somehow remove God of its power, but that isn't what the argument is saying or even implying that Christians claim that: it's saying God's choosing to not act doesn't make ethical sense given the qualities it possesses, especially omniscience and omnipotence.

 

[ToHoldNothing]

How, for example, is our loving, forgiving God inferior to the scoffer's non-loving, non-forgiving god?

I think you misunderstand the argument's presumptions from the side of nonbelief. Skeptics don't believe in God, they reserve judgment on that. And even if they did believe in a God, it doesn't automatically become the negation of the Christian formulation of a loving and forgiving God.

The claim from the argument is that it appears that God is not loving or forgiving by evidence of the evil in the world, when god, while not compelled, is hardly free of responsibility for managing the world it created in some sense.

A skeptic could just as easily say that we don't need God in the equation and thus your accusation is pointless, since there is no God that the skeptic believes in for you to criticize.

 

[CTD]

Defining good would therefore be the bigger difficulty here, though there's also the difficulty of divine command morality. Is something good merely because God commands it and/or permits it, or does God permit it because it is good? But again, this seems to boil down to what we mean by good, and there are reasonably going to be disagreements about it.

The main two theories that come to mind are the notion that good is the default and evil is a privation or twisting of the good, by general Abrahamic theories, the other being that good and evil are two halves of the same whole, interrelated and not able to be separated as if one is better than the other. I believe there's another one somewhere in the middle, but my memory can fail me when I type fervently about a subject. Seems to be the notion that evil doesn't exist except as you believe it is evil, though there might be more nuance than my summary gives it credit for.

Without compelling definitions of 'good' and 'evil', no logical problem can be constructed. The ones claiming a problem exists have the burden. For the rest of us, the issue is merely the ordinary one of assigning words to corresponding concepts. We are not obligated to invent something problematic.

I don't see how you can demonstrate that evil is anything but temporary. Even if evil is just temporary, it doesn't mean atheists are somehow not compelled to try to stop it in some way. You seem to be implying that, though I could be wrong. Evil is still a problem even if it is temporary. I don't see how you can claim this except by invoking God

On the contrary, I maintained temporary evil can never suffice to create a logical problem.

Temporary evil has no potential to be problematic, for God has the capacity to make all things right in the end. Emotionally, suffering 40 years of intense, chronic pain may really have some pull. Logically if it is balanced against 400 (or even 40) years of bliss, it is a non-issue. Indeed, the math can very easily work in God's favour!

 

[ToHoldNothing]

Without compelling definitions of 'good' and 'evil', no logical problem can be constructed. The ones claiming a problem exists have the burden. For the rest of us, the issue is merely the ordinary one of assigning words to corresponding concepts. We are not obligated to invent something problematic.

We all have the burden. Just because you can create a simple solution by relegating the issue to God belief doesn't mean you have no responsibility to respond to our alternate models of good and evil that don't involve God.

It's not an invention of something problematic if we find your definitions of good and evil neither reasonable nor compelling ethically.

Christians create some problem when they (hypothetically) think that stopping a particular type of prayer in school means you are against all prayer, which isn't the case at all.

And related to the issue of good and evil, you would potentially create some problem of ethical relativism when you see our ideas of good and evil aren't the same as yours, am I wrong?

On the contrary, I maintained temporary evil can never suffice to create a logical problem.

If there existed a god. If there doesn't exist a god, then there logically isn't a problem. The issue is people claiming there is a god with no evidence and with arguments to the contrary unanswered.

 

[CTD]

Here's a few arguments based on an evidential problem of evil. This is distinct from the logical problem of evil in saying that while evil might be consistent with God, it lowers God's probability of existing by virtue of the evidence being assessed in a way that doesn't require God and therefore, God's existence with evil not making sense, which is closer to the issue you've brought up from a Christian perspective



A version by William L. Rowe:

1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
3. (Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.[2]

Another by Paul Draper:

1. Gratuitous evils exist.
2. The hypothesis of indifference, i.e., that if there are supernatural beings they are indifferent to gratuitous evils, is a better explanation for (1) than theism.
3. Therefore, evidence prefers that no god, as commonly understood by theists, exists.[13]

Okay, unless we're just supposed to accept premises, there's nothing there. They're basically just presupposing the existence of a ''logical problem of evil'', and backing off from the claim it's absolutely provable to a stance of ''it's likely''. The premises need to be proven and this includes everything they presuppose.

Part of this argument is based on standards established by philosophical theists. If you separate yourself from them, then you have no reason to criticize the argument, because you don't even agree with the theist's established philosophical ideas of god in some classical theological sense.

Not so. The ''problem'' is frequently presented independently and must stand independently on its own. If we apply the standards of Christianity, we see immediately that only a straw god could ever be vulnerable. Our God is good by any and all proper definitions, even such as are honest attempts yet fail by a small margin.

It's not that this argument paints God as negligent, but observes that God's existence along with evil doesn't make sense. The logical problem of evil alleges the contradiction, this argument merely says the evidence doesn't follow to the conclusion that evil can make sense alongside God's existence, even if it might be logically consistent with a general formulation of God permitting evil for a greater good.

I'm not impressed. No amount of wordplay will make the situation different, and it certainly doesn't add to the emotional appeal. Continually reinventing and reformulating the ''problem'' isn't necessarily consistent with confidence that the original ''problem'' was sound.

 

[ToHoldNothing]

Okay, unless we're just supposed to accept premises, there's nothing there. They're basically just presupposing the existence of a ''logical problem of evil'', and backing off from the claim it's absolutely provable to a stance of ''it's likely''. The premises need to be proven and this includes everything they presuppose.

They presuppose your God exists, or did you miss that part? The observation is that God's existence by these standards is nonsensical when you compare it to the evident reality we can see around us. They don't need to prove premises that are alleged by other theists in philosophical discussion.

If you want to try to phrase a response to the argument or counter arguments of some form or another, you'd either have to resort to theology, which isn't philosophical, but rhetorical, or you'd have to try to formulate YOUR god in philosophical terms, so it would therefore conform to philosophical rigor.

Not so. The ''problem'' is frequently presented independently and must stand independently on its own. If we apply the standards of Christianity, we see immediately that only a straw god could ever be vulnerable. Our God is good by any and all proper definitions, even such as are honest attempts yet fail by a small margin.

Can you prove it's presented frequently by philosophers as opposed to people who aren't philosophers of that caliber? Somehow I doubt it. People presenting forms of the argument don't equate to those who are potentially much more familiar with the arguments and those presented by theists of equal philosophical caliber.

If you reject the philosophical theists' definition, just say it, don't denigrate them by condescending as if they're inferior to you in some way.

Christianity and philosophical theism are not the same thing, so don't try comparing them. Philosophers who are Christians would tend to take that route, since, unlike you, they realize that Christianity is a matter of faith and not arguments, whereas philosophical theism requires establishing an argument according to rules of logic, not simply asserting things with scriptural basis.

I'm not impressed. No amount of wordplay will make the situation different, and it certainly doesn't add to the emotional appeal. Continually reinventing and reformulating the ''problem'' isn't necessarily consistent with confidence that the original ''problem'' was sound

There are multiple problems alleged in each argument. one is logical consistency of God's concept as related to good and evil, the other is whether that concept makes sense even if we accept the basic premises as true. There was no effort to impress you, since logic is not about popularity, it's about consistency to the rules.

 

[CTD]

Temporary evil has no potential to be problematic, for God has the capacity to make all things right in the end. Emotionally, suffering 40 years of intense, chronic pain may really have some pull. Logically if it is balanced against 400 (or even 40) years of bliss, it is a non-issue. Indeed, the math can very easily work in God's favour!

This presumes that people will easily forget such suffering, which seems naive and even if the person forgets, it is not because they have genuinely overcome the suffering, but have simply become desensitized by centuries of exposure only to good.

No it doesn't. Even in scoffer philosophy the importance of contrast is stressed, sometimes to the exclusion of knowing anything. Remembering the suffering might well enhance the pleasant experience which follows. Who appreciates warmth more: he who has been cold, or he who has always been comfortable?

It's psychologically devastating.

Permanently? Is there some reason to think God cannot heal something? Talk about whopping presumptions!

The problem with God making things right in the end is that God thinks that solving the problems it set in place by foreknowledge of the outcome of creation and the fall will relieve it of culpability for not approaching those problems and taking a convenient non intervention period until people come to heaven and are rehabilitated.

You know better than what you believe God thinks? Care to prove this?

Finally I'll say I've never seen Christians inventing any classes of evil, designating one ''excessive'' or ''unnecessary'', and I can imagine no reason for one who was not an agent doing a poor job of acting to try.

It's not a matter of whether a Christian does it or not,

Well the context seemed misleading, and you just got don trying to lade upon me the views of ''theologists'' and whatnot. You seem indecisive.

... it stands to reason that evil should be classed at the very least into those that are understandable on some level and those that are incomprehensible in the face of an entity that supposedly cares about our wellbeing enough to supposedly intervene on some level without losing its greatness or the opportunity to make good of some evil.

Superficial, and logically without merit. You might also decide whether you're appealing to logic or emotion at some point. I'm prepared to deal with either, and I can follow if you want to dance back and forth. Logically there is no reason to suppose a man might not learn and profit from things he does not initially understand, or even a lesson it takes an entire lifetime to complete. Emotionally the prospect of the latter may seem unappealing.

You seem to think that God intervening would somehow remove God of its power, but that isn't what the argument is saying or even implying that Christians claim that: it's saying God's choosing to not act doesn't make ethical sense given the qualities it possesses, especially omniscience and omnipotence.

''God intervening would somehow remove God of its power''? I have no idea why you suppose such a suggestion can be projected upon me. I suggest you review what I've actually said. There is no rush. If you are sleepy or intoxicated or something, you might get some rest.

You persist in trying to change the terms. 'Ethical sense' will serve you no better than 'good', and the lack there of will serve you no better than 'evil'.

 

[ToddNotTodd]

You're confusing a legitimate problem Christians and others acknowledge with a scoffer non-problem. Suffering as a genuine issue to be dealt with in earnest - not in a logic-defying, mocking manner.

That was mocking? You have an odd definition of mocking. And you'll have to show me where the question is "logic defying"...

I doubt one can find a Christian who hasn't struggled to understand God's purposes at some time or another. This is not at all the same as arrogantly insisting ''I know better than God.''

Sooooo, are you suggesting that the problem of suffering can be solved by saying that "god works in mysterious ways"? If so, then I think the most you can say is that you believe that your god is loving, but not using a definition of "loving" that corresponds to what humans understand as loving, given the property of omnipotence that many Christians ascribe to your god. And at that point the word becomes meaningless and it's silly to use it at all in reference to your god.