Euthyphro's Dilemma (for atheists)

[zippy2006]

Tasty grass is what Id call instrumentally good for the cow. Its what works. And its basically objective.

Does that tell the whole story about whats morally good? Or is morally good something else?

The first point is that we have identified something which is <intrinsically good>. The intrinsic cow-property of a grass-ordered appetite is good.

 

[durangodawood]

The first point is that we have identified something which is <intrinsically good>. The intrinsic cow-property of a grass-ordered appetite is good.

When the notion of "intrinsically good" was hot here, I though he was talking about good in a moral sense. But instrumentally, is it reasonable to say that grass is intrinsically healthy for cows? Perhaps. Something seems off about that particular usage tho.

If moral goodness is really just instrumental goodness.... well ok. But I sense he (and you) are holding out for something extra.

 

[Hans Blaster]

But I don't want to get too off topic. We have other threads about objective morality.

I get it, this thread is about cows eating rocks.

 

[zippy2006]

When the notion of "intrinsically good" was hot here, I though he was talking about good in a moral sense. But instrumentally, is it reasonable to say that grass is intrinsically healthy for cows? Perhaps. Something seems off about that particular usage tho.

If moral goodness is really just instrumental goodness.... well ok. But I sense he (and you) are holding out for something extra.

Paraphrasing, Orel said that goodness is not an intrinsic property of ice cream, because goodness is not an intrinsic property of anything. I said that "Most people would disagree with your claim that goodness is never an intrinsic quality," and you quoted me in #151 in order to disagree. Now, none of that was about morality. Orel is not of the mind that ice cream might be morally good.

So now it seems we both agree that you were mistaken in #151. The cow that eats grass possesses an intrinsic property that makes it good.

---------------

Now that that is out of the way, we can ask whether there exist intrinsic properties that are morally good. Actually, I am just going to start omitting the adjective 'intrinsic', since most properties are intrinsic to their possessors. Your notion of a purely subjectively projected 'property' is rare (and I would call it a pseudo-property).

The goodness of a cow is not moral because it does not involve <intellect and will>. Nevertheless, moral qualities inhere in moral agents in the same way that the grass-eating property inheres in a cow. For example, when we talk about just men or unjust men, we are talking about real qualities that inhere in the men.

If moral goodness is really just instrumental goodness.... well ok. But I sense he (and you) are holding out for something extra.

I'm not sure. You would have to say more because people use those terms in different ways. Orel would probably say that all instrumental ends are purely subjective, and therefore goodness is always a function of preference or intention.

(To link back, Orel thinks that option #1 entails real, preference-independent moral properties)

 

[durangodawood]

Paraphrasing, Orel said that goodness is not an intrinsic property of ice cream, because goodness is not an intrinsic property of anything. I said that "Most people would disagree with your claim that goodness is never an intrinsic quality," and you quoted me in #151 in order to disagree. Now, none of that was about morality. Orel is not of the mind that ice cream might be morally good.

So now it seems we both agree that you were mistaken in #151. The cow that eats grass possesses an intrinsic property that makes it good.

Now that that is out of the way....

Not so fast. Back to the ice cream truck....

"Ice cream is good" invokes yet another sense of good. So here are the ones on the table:
1. morally good. "charity is good"
2. instrumentally good. "regular oil changes are good for your car."
3. preferentially good, what I like. "Ice cream is good".

I'm getting a little tired of using one to pave to way for equivocations to the others as being real in the same way.

...The goodness of a cow is not moral because it does not involve <intellect and will>. Nevertheless, moral qualities inhere in moral agents in the same way that the grass-eating property inheres in a cow. For example, when we talk about just men or unjust men, we are talking about real qualities that inhere in the men.

Really real? So you say. The only real things that I see in those men are desires and actions. "Just" is an overlay I apply to my observations of them.

 

[zippy2006]

Not so fast. Back to the ice cream truck....

"Ice cream is good" invokes yet another sense of good. So here are the ones on the table:
1. morally good. "charity is good"
2. instrumentally good. "regular oil changes are good for your car."
3. preferentially good, what I like. "Ice cream is good".

I'm getting a little tired of using one to pave to way for equivocations to the others as being real in the same way.

Whereas I would suggest that you yourself aren't even sure what you mean by these three options or how they differ. For example, many moral theories are based on instrumentality and preferences are always instrumental qua happiness (e.g. "Ice cream is instrumentally pleasurable or instrumentally happiness-achieving").

Let's look back if you want to avoid equivocation.

• Orel: Ice cream has no property that makes it good, because the goodness of something is never dependent on a property that it possesses.
• Zippy: Most people would disagree with the idea that goodness is never an intrinsic quality.
• Durangoda: Goodness is never an intrinsic property of anything. (#151)
• Zippy: Sure it is. See: cows.
• Durangoda: I'm talking about moral goodness, not "instrumental" goodness.
• Zippy: Orel wasn't limiting himself to moral goodness, and my comment was a response to his claim. You're moving the goalposts.

In fact you are the one who has committed an equivocation. My comment to Orel, which you quoted, was very clearly about all forms of goodness. You contradicted my claim to Orel, but then later equivocated between "all goodness" and "moral goodness." In order to avoid that equivocation you should have said, "Okay, so I was wrong in #151. Some forms of goodness are intrinsic properties. My new claim is that moral goodness is never an intrinsic property."

 

[durangodawood]

Whereas I would suggest that you yourself aren't even sure what you mean by these three options or how they differ. For example, many moral theories are based on instrumentality and preferences are always instrumental qua happiness (e.g. "Ice cream is instrumentally pleasurable or instrumentally happiness-achieving").

Let's look back if you want to avoid equivocation.

• Orel: Ice cream has no property that makes it good, because the goodness of something is never dependent on a property that it possesses.
• Zippy: Most people would disagree with the idea that goodness is never an intrinsic quality.
• Durangoda: Goodness is never an intrinsic property of anything. (#151)
• Zippy: Sure it is. See: cows.
• Durangoda: I'm talking about moral goodness, not "instrumental" goodness.
• Zippy: Orel wasn't limiting himself to moral goodness, and my comment was a response to his claim. You're moving the goalposts.

In fact you are the one who has committed an equivocation. My comment to Orel, which you quoted, was very clearly about all forms of goodness. You contradicted my claim to Orel, but then later equivocated between "all goodness" and "moral goodness." In order to avoid that equivocation you should have said, "Okay, so I was wrong in #151. Some forms of goodness are intrinsic properties. My new claim is that moral goodness is never an intrinsic property."

I certainly didnt mean to attribute to you anything you didnt mean.

I've now lost track of what we're discussing. Basically this thread is about morality. This subforum is about morality. If we want to discuss what kind of maintenance is "good" for our cars there's probably an automotive subforum for that, same for cows and farming practices, and for how much we like ice cream and country music etc.

My claim about the morally good is that its strictly a judgement. Thats an appropriate spot for the goalpost in this subforum I think. I might not have appreciated that you two were playing a different game.

 

[zippy2006]

I certainly didnt mean to attribute to you anything you didnt mean.

I've now lost track of what we're discussing. Basically this thread is about morality. This subforum is about morality. If we want to discuss what kind of maintenance is "good" for our cars there's probably an automotive subforum for that, same for cows and farming practices, and for how much we like ice cream and country music etc.

My claim about the morally good is that its strictly a judgement. Thats an appropriate spot for the goalpost in this subforum I think. I might not have appreciated that you two were playing a different game.

Okay, fair enough. I assume we now both agree that the cow that eats grass possesses an intrinsic property that makes it good.

My claim about the morally good is that its strictly a judgement.

Presumably by "strictly a judgment" you mean that it is purely subjective. What do you mean by morally good? Ideally you should give a defense of this claim:

"When someone calls something morally good, there is nothing in that thing that makes it morally good."​

 

[durangodawood]

Okay, fair enough. I assume we now both agree that the cow that eats grass possesses an intrinsic property that makes it good.

The correct non-shorthand way to put it is: grass is good for the cow. When you say its just "good" that opens the door for every kind of confusion and equivocation to the moral sense of good, even though thats not your intent.

Presumably by "strictly a judgment" you mean that it is purely subjective. What do you mean by morally good? Ideally you should give a defense of this claim:

"When someone calls something morally good, there is nothing in that thing that makes it morally good."​

I would say "When I call something morally good there are things about it that I judge to be morally good".

Compare that to "When I call something orange there reflections off it we measure to be orange".

 

[zippy2006]

The correct non-shorthand way to put it is: grass is good for the cow. When you say its just "good" that opens the door for every kind of confusion and equivocation to the moral sense of good, even though thats not your intent.

Oh? I think good is always "good for." The idea that there is a good that is good for nothing or good in a non-referential way strikes me as nonsensical, and I think it is a common strawman in discussions of morality. But yes, grass is good for cows but not for lions. I said as much in that <linked post>.

I would say "When I call something morally good there are things about it that I judge to be morally good".

Compare that to "When I call something orange there reflections off it we measure to be orange".

Okay... I still think you need to defend the claim I identified, since that is precisely the claim that we disagree on.

 

[durangodawood]

...Okay... I still think you need to defend the claim I identified, since that is precisely the claim that we disagree on.

I dont think so.

"When someone calls something morally good, there is nothing in that thing that makes it morally good."

Most people would find that nonsensical, as if Im judging something to be both morally good and not morally good at the same time. Strictly speaking its correct. But its an uncharitable way of framing it, leveraging conventions of speech against me to make a point. It requires me to do a lot of unpacking to show precisely how its correct, and to dispel wrong notions the casual speaker would glean from it. So here how I put it:

"When I call something morally good there are things about it that I judge to be morally good".

Does that seem precise, reasonable, and correct to you?

 

[zippy2006]

I dont think so.

"When someone calls something morally good, there is nothing in that thing that makes it morally good."

Most people would find that nonsensical, as if Im judging something to be both morally good and not morally good at the same time. Strictly speaking its correct, but its an uncharitable way of framing it, leveraging conventions of speech against me to make a point. It requires me to do a lot of unpacking to show precisely how its correct, and to dispel wrong notions the casual speaker would glean from it. So here how I put it:

"When I call something morally good there are things about it that I judge to be morally good".

Does that seem precise, reasonable, and correct to you?

Yes, it seems correct and tautologous. I intentionally gave a proposition that we disagree on in order to move the conversation forward and understand your view and your justifications for your view.

"When someone calls something morally good, there is nothing in that thing that makes it morally good."

Most people would find that nonsensical, as if Im judging something to be both morally good and not morally good at the same time. Strictly speaking its correct. But its an uncharitable way of framing it, leveraging conventions of speech against me to make a point. It requires me to do a lot of unpacking to show precisely how its correct, and to dispel wrong notions the casual speaker would glean from it.

I don't think the proposition is uncharitable. I think it expresses the disagreement in a straightforward way without technical terminology.

You are free to try to restate the crux of our disagreement in a different way, but the trouble is that most people would find your position to be nonsensical, so it's always going to be difficult for you to defend it.

 

[Moral Orel]

I certainly didnt mean to attribute to you anything you didnt mean.

I've now lost track of what we're discussing. Basically this thread is about morality. This subforum is about morality. If we want to discuss what kind of maintenance is "good" for our cars there's probably an automotive subforum for that, same for cows and farming practices, and for how much we like ice cream and country music etc.

My claim about the morally good is that its strictly a judgement. Thats an appropriate spot for the goalpost in this subforum I think. I might not have appreciated that you two were playing a different game.

In my discussion with Zippy, "good" is "good". There is no equivocating because it doesn't mean different things in different contexts. It always means to say, in essence, "I like this thing". Chocolate ice cream is good because I like it, and preventing murder is good because I like that too. I see absolutely no need for any different meanings to be used.

Of course, I would only say that "This thing is good" in casual conversation; I won't be so imprecise in these more formal discussions. But when I do use it, it always means to say the same thing.

 

[durangodawood]

...You are free to try to restate the crux of our disagreement in a different way, but the trouble is that most people would find your position to be nonsensical, so it's always going to be difficult for you to defend it.

When I look at people doing their things I see actions, and I infer or am told about motivations. But the only place I find the notions of good and bad are in my own judging mind, as I compare the act or motive against the norms I'm taught to respect, or against deeper biological conditioning about what feels right.

That is sufficient to explain the existence of moral right and wrong. Right and wrong dont need to inhere in the act. AND no one can show me the "right" or "wrong" in the act. All they can demonstrate is actions and inferred motivations. Meanwhile I can see right and wrong flashing as judgements in my own mind. So its reasonable to conclude, thats where right and wrong live.

 

[Astrid]

In my discussion with Zippy, "good" is "good". There is no equivocating because it doesn't mean different things in different contexts. It always means to say, in essence, "I like this thing". Chocolate ice cream is good because I like it, and preventing murder is good because I like that too. I see absolutely no need for any different meanings to be used.

Of course, I would only say that "This thing is good" in casual conversation; I won't be so imprecise in these more formal discussions. But when I do use it, it always means to say the same thing.

Is it good if you win the lottery?

 

[zippy2006]

When I look at people doing their things I see actions, and I infer or am told about motivations. But the only place I find the notions of good and bad are in my own judging mind, as I compare the act or motive against the norms I'm taught to respect, or against deeper biological conditioning about what feels right.

This is much like saying, "When I look at people doing mathematics I see calculations, and I infer or am told about motivations. But the only place I find the notion of numbers are in my own judging mind, as I compare the equation against the mathematical norms I'm taught to respect."

That is sufficient to explain the existence of moral right and wrong.

Well, no. It's sufficient to explain away the existence of moral right and wrong. It would be the same in the above case to assume that numbers don't exist or don't have any objectivity because you found them in your mind.

Right and wrong dont need to inhere in the act. AND no one can show me the "right" or "wrong" in the act. All they can demonstrate is actions and inferred motivations. Meanwhile I can see right and wrong flashing as judgements in my own mind. So its reasonable to conclude, thats where right and wrong live.

"Numbers/quantities don't need to inhere in things. And no one can show me the 'numbers' in the things. All they can demonstrate is things and inferred quantity. Meanwhile I see the numbers and calculations flashing as judgments in my own mind. So it's reasonable to conclude, 'That's where numbers live.'"

This is all non-sequitur reasoning based on poor understandings of how the mind judges reality.

 

[Moral Orel]

Is it good if you win the lottery?

I sure would like to.

 

[durangodawood]

...."Numbers/quantities don't need to inhere in things. And no one can show me the 'numbers' in the things. All they can demonstrate is things and inferred quantity. Meanwhile I see the numbers and calculations flashing as judgments in my own mind. So it's reasonable to conclude, 'That's where numbers live.'"...

Excellent example! (for my case)

I mean surely you know that the question of the reality of numbers, apart from our minds, and in things themselves is far from settled. The question of the reality of mathematical objects has quite serious arguments on both sides of the issue. So its a terrible analogy to use if youre trying to make the case that the inherence of moral truths is settled or obvious.

 

[zippy2006]

I mean surely you know that the question of the reality of numbers, apart from our minds, and in things themselves is far from settled. The question of the reality of mathematical objects has quite serious arguments on both sides of the issue. So its a terrible analogy to use if youre trying to make the case that the inherence of moral truths is settled or obvious.

"Two plus two doesn't actually make four or mean anything objectively, because numbers are just in our heads, and our heads have nothing to do with the realities they purport to describe."

It's just a bad argument; a weird form of extreme nominalism. You're conflating the fact that there are different theories about the ontological nature of numbers with the idea that pure nominalism with respect to numbers is a real position. It's not. Hardly anyone holds to such a thing.

It is part and parcel of a moral claim that something objective is being asserted. The reason people find your position so nonsensical is because you are telling everyone who makes moral claims that they are hopelessly confused, and that they are not doing what they think they are doing when they claim to be making a moral judgment. For example, when someone says that Ted Bundy is morally evil you would respond by saying there is nothing about Ted Bundy that is morally evil, because moral evil can't exist in persons or actions, and all these claims about moral evil are "only in our heads."

Given that we have gotten hung up on this tangential topic, and you are proposing a form of moral neutrality and subjectivism, it is likely that our conversation would fit better in the thread on moral neutrality or one of the threads on moral objectivism.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Euthypro's Dilemma, now for ATHEISTS!
(agnostics too)

Just pick the poll answer that is true. Simple as that. Leave comments explaining your choice if you like.

This is not an apologetic topic. For the sake of this discussion, it will be assumed that God(s) do not exist and never have. Any discussion of how God would answer this poll will be considered off topic.

My conception of morality has changed again.