Essence and attributes

[Robbie_James_Francis]

This was one of the ideas I was asked about during my recent philosophy interview at Oxford, and I was wondering what everyone thought about it, especially given that I totally screwed up!

Emma is not the same person before she took up yoga. Therefore she is not responsible for what she did before she took it up.

It led to a general discussion of the possibility of two persons with identical psychological makeup (through some undiscovered surgery), and whether or not they were therefore the same person.

Thoughts?

peace

 

[Maxwell511]

Emma is not the same person before she took up yoga. Therefore she is not responsible for what she did before she took it up.

Is this a bundle vs substance theory thing?

 

[The Nihilist]

I kind of think this is an identity theory question, rather than an essence question. What makes an identity? I kind of think it's the same memories, and maybe some other stuff.

 

[quatona]

This was one of the ideas I was asked about during my recent philosophy interview at Oxford, and I was wondering what everyone thought about it, especially given that I totally screwed up!

Emma is not the same person before she took up yoga. Therefore she is not responsible for what she did before she took it up.

Like always, first steps would be asking for clear definitions. Let alone that the concept "responsibility" may have its merits in everyday life for some, I have never understood what it means philosophically.

But, more important, what makes a "person"? (Besides, it has to be investigated whether the second statement is not based on an equivocation). Is there something stable, continous, persistent about a person, or is "person" a helpless, clumsy attempt to make a process appear as an object for pragmatic purposes? When thinking of the 6 year old quatona, what makes me think of him as "me"? What do I have in common with him, apart from the fingerprints and the DNA structure?
The statement "Emma is not the same person..." apparently acknowledges that a person is subject to constant change (and this would imply that Emma is not only not the same person before she took up yoga, but also not the same person she used to be one second ago), i.e. that change is an essential and necessary attribute of a person. In which case the assertion that a person is not the same person because it has changed doesn´t make sense.
Either we consider a person a stable, fixed, continuous object - then becoming a different person is impossible.
Or we define it as subject to permanent change - then a change doesn´t allow the conclusion that it is not the same person anymore.

I´ll skip the "responsibility" part for the time being.

 

[Eudaimonist]

Emma is not the same person before she took up yoga. Therefore she is not responsible for what she did before she took it up.

The Emma of noon today may not be the same snapshot in time as the Emma of noon yesterday, but she is the same process. If personhood is understood dynamically, across time, then she may be held responsible for her actions. Indeed, since actions take place across time, this is the only sensible intepretation.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[The Nihilist]

Eudaimonist, are you thinking about Heraclitus, just out of curiousity?

 

[Eudaimonist]

Eudaimonist, are you thinking about Heraclitus, just out of curiousity?

Yes, Heraclitus did cross my mind as I wrote that.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[elman]

This was one of the ideas I was asked about during my recent philosophy interview at Oxford, and I was wondering what everyone thought about it, especially given that I totally screwed up!

Emma is not the same person before she took up yoga. Therefore she is not responsible for what she did before she took it up.

It led to a general discussion of the possibility of two persons with identical psychological makeup (through some undiscovered surgery), and whether or not they were therefore the same person.

Thoughts?

peace

We are all the products of our experiences and are therefore never the same person as the day before. Some experiences result in more differences than others.

 

[Robbie_James_Francis]

Thanks for the responses everyone...it's been very informative.

Yes, Heraclitus did cross my mind as I wrote that.

Now there's a name I've just realised I should've mentioned in my interview! Oh well, hindsight is always pretty useless!

peace out

 

[Blackguard_]

Heraclitus

Wasn't he the guy who thought we'd all be be perfect spheres in the Ressurection ?

It led to a general discussion of the possibility of two persons with identical psychological makeup (through some undiscovered surgery), and whether or not they were therefore the same person.

Thoughts?

I'd have talked about the soul.The soul solves a lot of problems in identity theory (unless you're a materialist).

If "they have different souls"is too easy for you, you could have mentioned that the 2 do not actually share the same pereceptions. For example, You A will wake from the surgery looking at a light while You B wakes up and is looking at a surgeon. You B and A are having seperate perceptions and so are seperate people.

Let's take it to the extreme and say they melded you and your copy to the point your share a body and thoughts, so if tboth minds were both displayed on a screen you would see/hear the same from each. I would say they are different since being exactly similar is not the same as being identical. This can be demonstrated by the ability to always be able to anticipate having the experience of the 'other', which while it might seem to be the case here it is not, as the perception of the two could theoretiically be seperated again, such as if one is destroyed or the process to 'unite' them is reversed.

To perhaps so that better, let's say you are playing a video game, and you turn on a second monitor (of the same model) so the same thing is on Moniter A as Moniter B. The 'mind' of Moniter B is not the same as moniter A's since while both are 'experiencing' the same thing, one can be acted on without affecting the other. That is, I can turn one moniter off and still have the other on.

In short, would the death or injury of the mind clone affect your mind? You you be able to feel it's pain? Would it's death make your vision go half dark and half muddle your thoughts?

 

[billwald]

Straw man argument. She is the same person. Criminals who "get saved" are the same people.

 

[quatona]

Straw man argument. She is the same person. Criminals who "get saved" are the same people.

Actually, it can´t be a strawman argument, because it doesn´t even pretend to dispute someone else´s claim.