epistomological discussion

[quatona]

When I asked about dilemmas, i wasn't trying to get you to say what you thought was right, just, if you construct reality to reduce suffering, how do you construct reality in the face of delemmas concerning suffering. I think you answered that here . . .



I was just curious as to whether you had any guiding principles in mind. . . But you have answered my questions, and, since you like my reistatement of your beliefs, I think I understand them. I don't think I agree, although you have, yet again, prompted some good questions in my thinking,

Great! What more can we expect from a discussion?
OTOH, your questions have caused me to look at my notion from a different angle - so I had my share in benefits, as well.

Btw., one great advantage I see in my approach is that the fact that you disagree poses no problem.

 

[Silenus]

After doing some reading as per quatona's responses, I am putting forward the following statement as probably true for review and discussion. They seem to create, in my mind, a tension. Here are the premises that inform the tension I sense.

1) We form our noetic structures before we attain the ability to critically think, therefore our means of epistemological justification is socially built, therefore, there is some truth in constructivism.
2) Although we may be epistemologically constructed to some degree, we are all metaphysically individuals, and we have a critical and ontological capability to transcend our social constructs, either when they are constructed or when we find them undesirable, therefore, there is truth in realism.
3) There are self-evident beliefs, therefore rationalism has some truth
4) The senses cannot be denied without using them, therefore, there is some truth to evidentialism.
5) No facts or beliefs can be interpreted without a noetic structure.

If these premises are correct, we have reason to believe in an objective realism, but we also have reason to believe in some form of constructivism. How does a theory of epistemology attain knowledge under these premises?

 

[quatona]

Hi again, Silenus.

Let me commend you on your habit of stepping back from the discussion, reconsidering, doing some reading and then returning. However, for me, this poses a certain problem in that in the meantime (being in the statistically last third of my life and all) I have lost the details of the previous discussion, and currently I don´t have the time to go back and try to find my way back into it.

Anyways, I am not even sure I am the person you want to discuss with. Epistemology and "truth" aren´t even relevant issues in my notions, after all.

So, for, the time being I will just give you my spontaneous thoughts on your last post, in the awareness that it might not be a useful contribution to your considerations at this point.

1) We form our noetic structures before we attain the ability to critically think, therefore our means of epistemological justification is socially built, therefore, there is some truth in constructivism.

a. I fail to see how this follows. I am sensing that there´s still a fundamental misunderstanding as to what constructivism* says.
b.I´d be careful with using "constructivism"* and "truth" in the same sentence. Constructivism* doesn´t even aspire to make any truth claims or arrive at any truths. It is a thoroughly pragmatic approach.

2)

Although we may be epistemologically constructed to some degree,

Caveat: In case this is supposed to be a paraphrasing of the idea of constructivism*, I think you are on the wrong track.

we are all metaphysically individuals, and we have a critical and ontological capability to transcend our social constructs, either when they are constructed or when we find them undesirable, therefore, there is truth in realism.

I fail to see how this follows. Then again, I do not even seem to fully understand what you mean when saying "there is truth in realism".

3)

There are self-evident beliefs, therefore rationalism has some truth

I fail to see how that follows. Then again I am not even sure I know what you mean when saying "rationalism has some truth".

4)

The senses cannot be denied without using them, therefore, there is some truth to evidentialism.

I am not familiar with what evidentialism says.
I would, however, agree that all we can work from is what our senses tell us.

5)

No facts or beliefs can be interpreted without a noetic structure.

Don´t take it the wrong way, Silenus, but in almost every sentence of yours I am struggling with your use of language which appears to be very unprecise. "Interpreting beliefs" is not the issue, beliefs are the interpretations themselves. (I am undecided whether to call you upon each single of these unclarities - it may well be possible that they are just that (a mere semantics problem) in which case my permanent objections would come down to nitpicking; on the other hand I feel I must be cautious because you in the next step you might draw conclusions that are based on these very mistakes.)
On another note, you haven´t yet established that there are facts to interprete, in the first place. The entire problem you seem to be trying to contemplate on does not even become an issue until there´s disagreement about putative "facts".

If these premises are correct, we have reason to believe in an objective realism,

I fail to see how this follows. What does "believing in an objective realism" mean, anyways? As far as I know "realism" is the belief. I can´t seem to make sense of the wording "belief in an -ism".
All you seem to have established above is that there must be something. I won´t dispute this.

but we also have reason to believe in some form of constructivism.

I don´t think there is reason "to believe in constructivism"*. I think that constructivism is a useful pragmatic approach of dealing with the obvious problem that subjective perception doesn´t allow for discerning anything as "truth".

How does a theory of epistemology attain knowledge under these premises?

In that it gets rid of the idea of "truth" and "knowledge" (in the absolute/objecitve way you are thinking of) as something that a subjectively perceiving being can discern, for a start.
In that it embraces intersubjectivity whenever it can be achieved, and accepts that lack of intersubjective agreement poses an unsolvable problem to the above mentioned idea.

* Please note that I am not claiming to speak on behalf of "constructivism" in general nor on behalf of anyone who labels himself "constructivist". I myself have problems with such labels and I use this term here (for simplicity´s sake) for those notions that I have previously expressed as my understanding of "radical constructivism".

 

[Silenus]

[QUOTEDon´t take it the wrong way, Silenus, but in almost every sentence of yours I am struggling with your use of language which appears to be very unprecise. "Interpreting beliefs" is not the issue, beliefs are the interpretations themselves. (I am undecided whether to call you upon each single of these unclarities - it may well be possible that they are just that (a mere semantics problem) in which case my permanent objections would come down to nitpicking; on the other hand I feel I must be cautious because you in the next step you might draw conclusions that are based on these very mistakes.)
On another note, you haven´t yet established that there are facts to interprete, in the first place. The entire problem you seem to be trying to contemplate on does not even become an issue until there´s disagreement about putative "facts". ][/QUOTE]

At this point I'm taking a step back and saying what I think is true. Of course, I still hold to some realism and so true means something to me, although it doesn't to you. In this thread, I am in complete "feeler" mode, and so if you want to propose new definitions, play with terms, suggest another way to look at it, or crticise a premise. Feel free to basically do what you want with my language. Remember, one of my key epistomoligcal principles is to look at situations, facts, etc, from a multiplicity of noetic structures. Therefore, I am like a noetic spong. I encounter a strcuture I'm unfamier with, and I go into spong mode.

I am in explorer mode . . .

the statements i have provide are things I think i could agree with and I am putting them out there to be agreed or disagreed with and argued . . .

If I am using the terms wrong, propose the proper use . . . this is what I desire from this thread

so . . .

a. I fail to see how this follows. I am sensing that there´s still a fundamental misunderstanding as to what constructivism* says.
b.I´d be careful with using "constructivism"* and "truth" in the same sentence. Constructivism* doesn´t even aspire to make any truth claims or arrive at any truths. It is a thoroughly pragmatic approach.

feel free to give me a little schooling . . .


I do see a problem in that the forms of constructivism to assert something about how humans work, and therefore, makes a statement about correspondence to reality. Therefore, there is at least some statement about truth in the system, isn't there?

anyway, if you want to criticize, go ahead. It's what I want.



</IMG>

 

[quatona]

At this point I'm taking a step back and saying what I think is true. Of course, I still hold to some realism and so true means something to me, although it doesn't to you.

It would be a great help for me if you could simply say what your actual premise is instead of constantly using phrases like "hold to some realism" or "belief in [insert label for a beliefsystem]". It´s overly abstract, and I have problems understanding which of the meanings of those labels you are thinking of.
I personally can think of occasion where the term "true" is usable - in a down-to-earth meaning of "accurate" or "intersubjectively observable". I am not sure, though, that this is what you have in mind when using this term. Correct me if I am wrong, but it is my impression that you are concerned with a different concept of "truth".

In this thread, I am in complete "feeler" mode, and so if you want to propose new definitions, play with terms, suggest another way to look at it, or crticise a premise.

I can´t criticise your premises if I don´t understand what they are saying. I have no interest in proposing new definitions (and the last I would want is playing with terms), I would like you to define your terms in a way that helps me get an idea what you are actually saying.

Feel free to basically do what you want with my language.

I would like to get rid of some problems introduced by language. When I stumble over something you say that doesn´t make sense to me (e.g. in that it operates with apparent redundancy like "belief in a beliefsystem"), I basically have three options:
a. assuming that this is just careless wording, and silently "correcting" the statement (by e.g. removing the redundant parts) so that it has a discernable meaning to me, hoping this is what you mean.
b. assuming that your thinking is as confused as the wording you use
c. assuming that what I perceive as e.g. mere redundancy in fact has a significance that I simply don´t comprehend.
d. asking you to clarify.

I prefer to go with option d because I want to make sure that I address what you actually mean (as far as this is possible, anyways) instead of addressing my own assumptions.

Remember, one of my key epistomoligcal principles is to look at situations, facts, etc, from a multiplicity of noetic structures. Therefore, I am like a noetic spong. I encounter a strcuture I'm unfamier with, and I go into spong mode.

I am in explorer mode . . .

Sounds great to me. However, I think this is a hell of a task, and it seems you do not entirely succeed in it (not that I would blame you for it). As far as I can tell, you keep looking at things from your noetic structure and impose its paradigms (that may not be shared by those noetic structures you are trying to understand) onto them.
(Actually, I doubt that what you are attempting to do may not be possible at all)

the statements i have provide are things I think i could agree with and I am putting them out there to be agreed or disagreed with and argued . . .

I would be happy if I would understand them, for a start.

If I am using the terms wrong, propose the proper use . . . this is what I desire from this thread

I have no interest in making you use my definitions for your statements. I merely would like to understand in which meaning you use the abstract terms you use.

I do see a problem in that the forms of constructivism to assert something about how humans work, and therefore, makes a statement about correspondence to reality. Therefore, there is at least some statement about truth in the system, isn't there?

Yes, if you will. In the same way as it can be said that you (as in "one") always and necessarily make a statement about "truth in the system" as soon as you open your mouth and try to form a meaningful sentence.

I think, though, that it merely accepts the "tension" you perceive between attempting to make objective statements despite having nothing that is not brought to you by your own perception/mind/brain, and in the next step tries to find a useful way of dealing with this problem.
As soon as you have resolved this problem or "tension" (of which I think it can´t be resolved), I will reconsider this approach (which indeed accepts the problem as a given, by definition of the terms "subjective"/"objective". Something perceived (no matter whether there exists this "something" as an object outside the perception or not) is, by definition, subjective. I don´t see a way around this.)

 

[Silenus]

1) We form our noetic structures before we attain the ability to critically think, therefore our means of epistemological justification is socially built

2) Although we may be epistemologically constructed to some degree, we are all metaphysically individuals, and we have a critical and ontological capability to transcend our social constructed noetic structures.

3) There are self-evident, undeniable beliefs

4) The senses cannot be denied without using them

5) No facts or beliefs can be interpreted without a noetic structure.


okay, here I have removed the abstractions . . . what is your response to these statements sans any reference to realism or constructivism.

Yes, if you will. In the same way as it can be said that you (as in "one") always and necessarily make a statement about "truth in the system" as soon as you open your mouth and try to form a meaningful sentence.

this, to me, should give anyone pause who wishes to deny the external realities existence or its accessbility.

between attempting to make objective statements despite having nothing that is not brought to you by your own perception/mind/brain

having things brought and having things produced are two different things, but that is a whole different ball game.

 

[quatona]

1) We form our noetic structures before we attain the ability to critically think, therefore our means of epistemological justification is socially built

a. How do we do that - "form our noetic structure"?
b. I´m not sure I know what exactly you mean when saying "noetic" (structure). "Noetic", in the way I understand it, means "related to intellect", but if applying this meaning your sentence doesn´t seem to make sense. "Noetic structure" would be our "ability to (critically) think". So I guess you mean something different.
c. I don´t see how "is socially built" necessarily follows from "was formed before critical thinking".

2)

Although we may be epistemologically constructed to some degree,

What does "epistemoligically constructed" mean? Constructed by what, whom? "Constructed" as opposed to what?

we are all metaphysically individuals, and we have a critical and ontological capability to transcend our social constructed noetic structures.

What we can and can not transcend has yet to be established.
I would agree in that our opinions can change, though. I´m not sure how and at which point this equals "transcending noetic structures".
Just for clarification: What is the difference between being "indidvidual" and being "metaphysically individual"?
(And just because I would like to avoid misunderstandings: Constructivism is about ourselves constructing our realities, not about social - as opposed to individual - construction of realities).

3)

There are self-evident, undeniable beliefs

Such as? What do you mean?
Beliefs that person A holds and cannot deny? (agreed)
Beliefs that person A holds and B cannot deny? (not agreed)

4)

The senses cannot be denied without using them

You are begging the question here. In the "mind theater" or "solipsistic" view it´s entirely possible that there aren´t such things as senses.

5)

No facts or beliefs can be interpreted without a noetic structure.

I can´t make sense of the wording "interpreting a belief". The belief itself is the interpretation.
If you presuppose that there are facts, it´s no wonder you arrive at the conclusion that there must be facts.

okay, here I have removed the abstractions . . . what is your response to these statements sans any reference to realism or constructivism.

To be honest, I seem to have lost track a bit of what you are trying to find out, and where exactly you see the "tension" you´ve mentioned in your earlier post.

this, to me, should give anyone pause who wishes to deny the external realities existence or its accessbility.

How so? Saying that something exists doesn´t make it so, and making statements about its properties doesn´t make it so, either.

having things brought and having things produced are two different things, but that is a whole different ball game.

Indeed, the question whether there is something (which you may call "objective physical reality") of which our perception/mind/ideas are a reflection, and the question whether there can be congruence between this assumed something and our reflection of it are two distinct questions. A third question (once we would have established or assumed for the sake of the argument that the first two questions can be answered "yes") is: Can we discern when and when not our reflection is congruent with the something?

As said above, I am not really sure what we are discussing. Given that the topic is "epistemology" I guess it´s the second and third question. If this is the case, I am willing to concede for the sake of the argument that there is something (an "external physical reality"). I don´t see anything that possibly allows us to answer the questions 2 and 3 "yes".
If you see three apples on this table there and I see four, we have a problem. However, when it comes to justly sharing them, you will only ask for one and a half, and I can eat two and a half although I only expected to get two. Or I leave you two, being satisfied with what is just in my reality, and giving you the opportunity to consider me generous.

 

[quatona]

Silenus,


instead of permanently answering the questions you ask based on your paradigms – questions that often don´t make sense if working from the paradigms of my view – I think it might be a good idea to simply summarize my approach in my own words, hoping that it will give you at least a rough idea.

It is a view in which the idea of „objective reality“ aka „truth“ plays no part and isn´t missed. It is a view that is mainly interested in keeping things as simple as possible and, in the first place, manageable. It is a view that avoids mindgames and assumptions. Now, you may say „So what are you doing in a philosophy forum (philosophy is the search for truth, after all) in general, and what are you doing in a thread about epistomology in particular (since epistemology is necessarily linked to the idea of „objective reality“ aka „truth“, after all) anyways, and you would certainly have a point there. So I think you´d be perfectly justified in saying „Just go away, will you?“ and I would respect this request.
However, I have already in my first post left no doubt that I can´t offer anything that helps with the idea of epistemology, and that all I can do is offer an alternative approach to that which to me appears to be a pointless mindgame. Add to that, for the time being, apparently nobody else is interested in discussing epistemology with you. So I´ll just take my chance.
It may or may not be of interest to you that for decades I have been obsessed with the idea of „objective reality“ myself, I have always run into unsolveable logical and practical problems, conflicts and „tensions“, and I personally found it quite liberating to finally replace it with a different approach.

I start from my reality. I can´t seem to do without this idea, and it is everything I have. Likewise, everything all my experiences, thoughts, feelings necessarily are part of this my reality. There is nothing for me that is not part of my reality.
It is all I have. It is the only reality relevant for me. As soon as something becomes relevant or accessible to me, it becomes (part of ) my reality.

All I´m interested in is to keep my reality manageable or consistent, if you will.

Now, there are two remarkable things about this my reality:

• It is permanently changing. On top I experience myself as being able to purposely modify it (within certain limits), and I experience that I can even seem to modify it without physically touching anything (also within certain limits).
• My reality is populated by other beings that appear to be similar to myself in many respects, and different in others. In my reality they also have their realities. Whilst I find quite some comfort and manageability in the fact that their realities are, in many parts, similar to my own, I also have to face the somewhat irritating and often downright frustrating fact, that they differ from mine and from each other. My ability to modify my reality doesn´t seem to go so far that I can make them disappear. So I find myself urged to find a way of dealing with what quite obviously are different realities, at least if I want to interact and communicate with those persons who populate my reality.

I notice that sometimes I succeed in integrating those divergent parts of their reality into my reality (make them become part of my reality, beyond the fact that they are already have been somewhat part of my reality in that they are held by persons who populate my reality, anyways), and I also notice that they sometimes succeed in doing the same vice versa.
However, sometimes our realities clash and prevent the interaction or communication I am interested in. In which case I have found the problem to be unsolvable, anyways, no matter whether I introduce the idea of an „objective reality“ or not.
In my reality this is a 100euro banknote. Now, if the shop owner who populates my reality tells me about his (diverging) reality: „Hey, you have not seriously been thinking for only one moment that I consider this old piece of paper the apppropriate countervalue to all the goods you want me to give you, are you?“, there is a bug in my reality. The shop owner in my reality and the banknote in my reality don´t fit each other. Either I succeed in helping him integrate my reality into his (i.e. that this is not a worthless piece of paper but a 100euro banknote easily worth everything I have in my cart, or I´ll find myself – among all those shop owners who populate my reality another one whose reality matches mine in this particular question. If everything else fails, I am left with the option of regaining manageability and consistency of my reality by changing it, in that I reframe what I used to think of as a worthy 100euro banknote into a piece of paper that is worthless in the overall context of my reality.

 

[Silenus]

Add to that, for the time being, apparently nobody else is interested in discussing epistemology with you. So I´ll just take my chance.

I guess my approach sucks, although I have noticed that threads on epistomology don't get very far. I guess no one really ever wants to analyse presuppositions.

By the way, i am using noetic structure how it has been used reciently in epistomology and can be used synonomously with presuppositions.

A noetic structure is a person&#8217;s system of beliefs. Some beliefs will be based on other beliefs and so be higher up in the structure. But at the foundation of the structure will be a collection of basic beliefs which are not inferred from other beliefs but are taken immediately to be true in various circumstances in which a person exists

</IMG>I'll get back to you shortly . . .

on the side note, your noetic approach is interesting for me because all the other presupppositions I have encountered believe in a objective reality as a properly basic belief, whether that reality is completely accessable or not . . . your belief does not seem to hold to that, so It'll take me some time to learn how to speak your language, so to speak.

 

[Mjallhvit]

Silenus, your own statements on the nature of logic and positivism put you squarely in the Neo-Aristotilean camp (insofar as you are consistent). George H. Smith has some excellent (though incidental) work on this in "Atheism: The Case Against God". To paraphrase the basic positions:
1. Equating knowledge with infallibility or absolute certainty is nonsense, since neither can be imagined and have no logical meaning. Knowledge and science are only necessary because of uncertainty.
2. Causation and logic are inescapable corelarries of existence.
3. Skepticism (and the related solopsism) are untenable since it is irrational to assume an impression of reality is incorrect, especially in spite of evidence.
4. Therefore, both induction and deduction are possible and assumption of error (as opposed to proof) is untenable.

A good criticism of scepticism by Smith and a bit of positive information can be found here: http://www.rit.org/essays/think/skepticism.html

 

[quatona]

I guess my approach sucks, although I have noticed that threads on epistomology don't get very far. I guess no one really ever wants to analyse presuppositions.

Although "no one ever really" might be quite a bit of an exaggeration I tend to agree.
The closer the investigation gets to our most basic presuppositions, the greater the desire to simply shelter them.
On the other hand I think we need to realize that there are limitations to analyzing our presuppositions. The analysis itself requires presuppositions. Thus, while I agree that a lot of people are amazingly unable or unwilling to take a closer analytical look at their own beliefs, I´d also submit that beyond a certain point this could be due to the unwillingness to waste time on a logically impossible task rather than merely the inconvenience of questioning one´s views.

By the way, i am using noetic structure how it has been used reciently in epistomology and can be used synonomously with presuppositions.

Thanks for the definition. Sounds like a useful concept, to me.
However, upon revisiting the statement in which you introduced it (post#26), it doesn´t seem to help me with understanding the term "we build our noetic structures" (how exactly do we do that?).
Neither do I see how this definition implies or suggests that our rationalizations are "socially built".

We have to work from presuppositions. As far as I can see there is no way around this. Every epistemological attempt requires presuppositions. And I agree that this fact poses not only a "tension" but an unsurmountable obstacle for the idea of epistemologically discovering (objective) "truth" (beyond any presuppositions). If honestly digging ever deeper and deeper what you will discover are actually your presuppositions rather than the "truth".
Well, that´s quite something, anyways.
However, the - no doubt honorable - idea that at some point you can remove all presuppositions (and this is the idea that I think lies at the core of the search for "truth") is a logical impossibility.

I'll get back to you shortly . . .

Looking forward to it.

on the side note, your noetic approach is interesting for me because all the other presupppositions I have encountered believe in a objective reality as a properly basic belief, whether that reality is completely accessable or not . . . your belief does not seem to hold to that, so It'll take me some time to learn how to speak your language, so to speak.

Just for clarification I´ll repeat: If it helps sorting the discussion I am, although not convinced that this is so, willing to work from the presupposition that there is an "objective reality" outside my mind (as in a "physical world").
My position is that this assumption makes no difference, anyways, since all we have (about this presupposed external reality) are our ideas about it. Whether I am dealing with ideas about an "objective reality" or merely with my dream theater makes no difference, for all practical purposes.

 

[Silenus]

• It is permanently changing. On top I experience myself as being able to purposely modify it (within certain limits), and I experience that I can even seem to modify it without physically touching anything (also within certain limits).
• My reality is populated by other beings that appear to be similar to myself in many respects, and different in others. In my reality they also have their realities. Whilst I find quite some comfort and manageability in the fact that their realities are, in many parts, similar to my own, I also have to face the somewhat irritating and often downright frustrating fact, that they differ from mine and from each other. My ability to modify my reality doesn´t seem to go so far that I can make them disappear. So I find myself urged to find a way of dealing with what quite obviously are different realities, at least if I want to interact and communicate with those persons who populate my reality.

Its the within certain limits part that I find interesting. When i first started exploring philosophy and encountered the various forms of solipsim, I noticed something and it cooresponds to your first point. That there are things within a persons reality that cannot be eltered. I once wrote in a journal, "it seems that an objective reality or the appearence thereof, the functioning of that which cannot be in controlled by the subject . . . therefore, the question seems to yeild something objective, and an objective reality is the best explination, not solopsim."

It brought me to a similar point that you made here . . .

My position is that this assumption makes no difference, anyways, since all we have (about this presupposed external reality) are our ideas about it. Whether I am dealing with ideas about an "objective reality" or merely with my dream theater makes no difference, for all practical purposes.

My point being that, however it is couched, objectivity must in some way be part of the equation. To even say that I am engaged in mind theater is to claim that mind theory corresponds to how things are. I have yet to encounter a theory that explains away "the how things are" of mental processes.

As for the second point, why not csimply say different concepts or different thoughts. To say different realities already assumes that all of perception is an internal process, which is something we disagree about . . . but that is off topic . . .

However, the - no doubt honorable - idea that at some point you can remove all presuppositions (and this is the idea that I think lies at the core of the search for "truth") is a logical impossibility.

I agree, the task is difficult, and it is impossible to remove presuppositions, but i think it is a kep principle in a adequate epistemology to be able to look at things from the vantage point of various presuppositions, and I don't think this is impossible. Already, as we dialogue, I am beginning more and more to be able to see things from you sight. Of course, it seems my whole project here is something that "your noetic structure" finds interesting only in regards to your goals of reducing suffering. I do find your comments very helpful in clearing some poor wording . . . I'm going to try again.

1) Our noetic structures are formed before we attain the ability to critically think, therefore our means of epistemological justification is socially built.

2) Despite the fact that our initial presuppositions are not completely chosen, we have a critical and ontological capability to transcend our social constructed noetic structures.

3) There are self-evident, undeniable beliefs

4) The senses cannot be denied without using them

5) No facts or beliefs can be interpreted without a noetic structure.


I kept 3 because I still think things like logic cannot be denied without paying them homage. and i kept four for the aforementioned reasons

Five I kept without change. beliefs is there because, as the definitions I provided pointed out, some beliefs exist because of more foundational beliefs which are interpreted through those foundational beliefs. Of course, the noetic structure are beliefs, but I am drawing a distinction between basic beliefs and subsequent beliefs.

 

[Silenus]

1. Equating knowledge with infallibility or absolute certainty is nonsense, since neither can be imagined and have no logical meaning.

I'm not sure I agree with this. I do think there are things that are undeniable or unaffirmable. These things, however small they are, would be properly basic beliefs.

Knowledge and science are only necessary because of uncertainty.

How is science nessessary because of uncertainlty? It, itself, must be justified, the scientific method isn't properly basic, I wouldn't think.

2. Causation and logic are inescapable corelarries of existence.

Well, of the concious apprasal of existence anyway.

3. Skepticism (and the related solopsism) are untenable since it is irrational to assume an impression of reality is incorrect, especially in spite of evidence.

also, that, for the skeptic to be truely a skeptic, he must hold his own skepticism in doubt. skepcism in it spure form is unaffirmable.

4. Therefore, both induction and deduction are possible and assumption of error (as opposed to proof) is untenable.

Both are nessessary, but both exist within a noetic structure, and how is it that we jusge between them?

put you squarely in the Neo-Aristotilean camp (insofar as you are consistent

I feel a prodding or at least an attack on my theism coming on . . .

 

[quatona]

Hi Silenus,
seems like we are discussing question 1 here again (?).

Its the within certain limits part that I find interesting. When i first started exploring philosophy and encountered the various forms of solipsim, I noticed something and it cooresponds to your first point. That there are things within a persons reality that cannot be eltered.

I´ll try to be consistent and talk only about myself. I, too, find the question interesting whether and where the limits of my ability to change my reality are. The older I grow I the more I tend to think there aren´t any. There are certain things in my reality that I can´t seem to alter arbitrarily or willfully at a certain point in time, though. But already if only considering how thoroughly my reality changes from every second to the next, I am amazed about the lack of limits. Even upon long consideration I find it impossible to write down one thing about my reality that I feel I am permanently unable to alter.

I once wrote in a journal, "it seems that an objective reality or the appearence thereof, the functioning of that which cannot be in controlled by the subject . . . therefore, the question seems to yeild something objective, and an objective reality is the best explination, not solopsim."

To be honest, I find that a poor argument.
Points of criticism:
1. You start with &#8222;objective reality or the appearance therof&#8220; and somehow manage to simply omit the option that it is a merely internal appearance in the rest of your argument.
2. You work from the false dichotomy &#8222;objective reality vs. solipsism&#8220;. (There are a lot more possibilities)
3. We would first need to establish how we determine that something &#8222;can not be in controlled of the subject&#8220; (as opposed to, for example: &#8222;something that I have at a given point in time no interest in altering&#8220.
4. I don´t see how the conclusion follows. Assuming for a moment that there are indeed things that are not in my control, there still remain the options that this is an internal issue or an external issue. Your reasoning actually but begs the question.

My point being that, however it is couched, objectivity must in some way be part of the equation. To even say that I am engaged in mind theater is to claim that mind theory corresponds to how things are.

You are trapped by the fallacy of equivocation, i.e. you change the definition of &#8222;objective reality&#8220; midgame.
Whilst originally we were discussing &#8222;objective reality&#8220; as something that is external to the mind and to which our senses and perception need to connect appropriately, you are now redefining it so that it would even include the internal internal processes of my mind.

I have yet to encounter a theory that explains away "the how things are" of mental processes.

I neither can explain my mental processes nor am I interested in explaining them away. They just are a different topic than the &#8222;objective external reality&#8220; that you started out to epistemologically investigate at the beginning of our discussion.

As for the second point, why not csimply say different concepts or different thoughts.

Because a distinction between my concepts/thoughts and reality would already assume an objective external reality. :razz:

To say different realities already assumes that all of perception is an internal process, which is something we disagree about . . . but that is off topic . . .

Well, this just shows the absurdity of such self-referential assumptions, and it shows that both preconceptions (external reality vs. no external reality) allow both of parties to refute the arguments of the other if subjecting them to their own preconceptions.
That´s the very reason why I insist this discussion is pointless: all we could possibly discover are our preconceptions. That´s also why I (following the approach of making as little unwarranted assumptions as possible) don´t make that decision and simply try to concentrate on those parts for which the answer to this question makes no difference.

I agree, the task is difficult, and it is impossible to remove presuppositions, but i think it is a kep principle in a adequate epistemology to be able to look at things from the vantage point of various presuppositions, and I don't think this is impossible.

I think we are encountering the limits of this approach in this very discussion: You arrive at the conclusion that there is an external objective reality only because that is your very presupposition. That´s what I am trying to show you.

Already, as we dialogue, I am beginning more and more to be able to see things from you sight. Of course, it seems my whole project here is something that "your noetic structure" finds interesting only in regards to your goals of reducing suffering.

Only if we take &#8222;reducing suffering&#8220; in the very broadest meaning possible. For me it would be &#8222;keeping my reality consistent&#8220; (which surely is away of reducing suffering), but if we really want to use the term in this broad sense it would also include the motive for your epistemological approach (in that it attempts to reduce your suffering from the idea that your concepts or thoughts might not match the external reality you assume to exist).

1) Our noetic structures are formed before we attain the ability to critically think, therefore our means of epistemological justification is socially built.

I still have no idea how &#8222;socially built&#8220; follows from the premises.
On another note I am again confused as to what question we are actually discussing. If it´s (as it seemed to be above) still question #1 (does an objecitve reality exist out there?) the assumption there such a thing as a society is a premise based on the conclusion you actually have yet to draw.

2) Despite the fact that our initial presuppositions are not completely chosen, we have a critical and ontological capability to transcend our social constructed noetic structures.

This is so far merely an assumption.
Taking out the &#8222;socially constructed&#8220; part (because I don´t see it substantiated by #1), I don´t even know how to tell that which you call &#8222;initial presuppositions&#8220; from the assumed rest of my noetic structure.

3) There are self-evident, undeniable beliefs

Just give me one example of a belief I cannot deny.

I kept 3 because I still think things like logic cannot be denied without paying them homage.

Logic is neither a belief nor a reality out there. The wording &#8222;logic cannot be denied&#8220; has no discernable meaning for me. Logic appears to be a very useful tool for keeping my reality/thoughts consistent, but it doesn´t help with testing the presuppositions/premises. It is merely a way to get from the premises/presuppositions to conclusions cosistent with the premises. Logic is how my mind works (or hopefully works ;-, that is).

4) The senses cannot be denied without using them

My previous objection to this point still stands.
As I said previously, we need to be more precise in determining which question we are actually discussing. Else this is just too confusing for me. If it´s still question #1 (is there an external objective reality?) your assumption that there are senses simply begs the question and puts the cart before the horse.

5) No facts or beliefs can be interpreted without a noetic structure.
Five I kept without change. beliefs is there because, as the definitions I provided pointed out, some beliefs exist because of more foundational beliefs which are interpreted through those foundational beliefs. Of course, the noetic structure are beliefs, but I am drawing a distinction between basic beliefs and subsequent beliefs.[/quote]
Although I tend to find the concept of a noetic structure very useful, I think drawing a line between &#8222;basic&#8220; and &#8222;subsequent beliefs&#8220; and the rest as an essential distinction is so far a bit arbitrary.
I think it would be helpful if you pointed out one of those subsequent beliefs I can not do without.
In any case, even if following the assumption that I hold unalienable &#8222;foundational beliefs&#8220; it appears to me as though any &#8222;epistemological&#8220; approach at best results in detecting my foundational beliefs (as opposed to detecting reality out there). As I said before, that is quite something, but certainly not that which you aspire to arrive at.

 

[Aradia]

I am opening this thread with the intent of starting a dialogue to improve my understanding of epistemology.

I've read through this entire thread with interest, particularly due to the similarity between quatona's beliefs and my own. And while there have been some great questions, I find one very important question missing.

What is your purpose for improving your understanding of epistemology?

I'll try to keep up with this thread, but forgive me if days go by without a response.

 

[Silenus]

To be honest, I find that a poor argument.
Points of criticism:
1. You start with „objective reality or the appearance thereof“ and somehow manage to simply omit the option that it is a merely internal appearance in the rest of your argument.
2. You work from the false dichotomy „objective reality vs. solipsism“. (There are a lot more possibilities)
3. We would first need to establish how we determine that something „can not be in controlled of the subject“ (as opposed to, for example: „something that I have at a given point in time no interest in altering“).
4. I don´t see how the conclusion follows. Assuming for a moment that there are indeed things that are not in my control, there still remain the options that this is an internal issue or an external issue. Your reasoning actually but begs the question.

You are trapped by the fallacy of equivocation, i.e. you change the definition of „objective reality“ midgame.
Whilst originally we were discussing „objective reality“ as something that is external to the mind and to which our senses and perception need to connect appropriately, you are now redefining it so that it would even include the internal internal processes of my mind.

No, that was not my intent. What I am playing with how would "internal theater" differ from objective reality. If that internal theater presents things which cannot be altered, then that internal theater would operate as if it were an objective reality, even if totally of my mind. I'm simply considering the fact that I haven’t met anyone who believes they can completely or even predominately control phenomena, no matter where it is found . . .

If you have experiences differently, feel free to give me experience and anecdote.

Well, this just shows the absurdity of such self-referential assumptions, and it shows that both preconceptions (external reality vs. no external reality) allow both of parties to refute the arguments of the other if subjecting them to their own preconceptions.
That´s the very reason why I insist this discussion is pointless: all we could possibly discover are our preconceptions. That´s also why I (following the approach of making as little unwarranted assumptions as possible) don´t make that decision and simply try to concentrate on those parts for which the answer to this question makes no difference.

1. the discovery of one's preconceptions is extremely valuable.

2. I'm not saying I've provided an argument against believing all perception is an internal process, I'm just letting you know that I don't agree that perception is all internal. If I were trying to convince you of my belief, the discussion would obviously turn to whether or not perception is entirely internal. I do admit that this may be for me a basic belief and not a secondary one (one that follows from others), I don't know, I'd have to think it through.

3. Although you don't believe in truth (in the sense of correspondence theory) but something more based on coherence and consistency, (I haven’t misrepresented you here, correct?)you have introduced an epistemological term that has gained ground in contemporary epistemology . . . warrant. What, for you, defines a warranted belief?

I think we are encountering the limits of this approach in this very discussion: You arrive at the conclusion that there is an external objective reality only because that is your very presupposition. That´s what I am trying to show you.

Yes, I agree that this might be a true . . . I've already started giving it some thought. I understand that objective reality is something you'd rather not assume (in keeping to a more parsimonious approach) and that you also think it cannot be proven. However, you are willing to speculate within the confines of granting this assumption. Is that correct?

Quote: 1) Our noetic structures are formed before we attain the ability to critically think, therefore our means of epistemological justification is socially built. I still have no idea how „socially built“ follows from the premises.
On another note I am again confused as to what question we are actually discussing. If it´s (as it seemed to be above) still question #1 (does an objective reality exist out there?) the assumption there such a thing as a society is a premise based on the conclusion you actually have yet to draw.

If we can't critically think, our presupposition come from our society, i.e. parents, school, etc. this seems pretty obvious, most children believe what they are taught by authority as long as it is somewhat consistent and the critical thinking function comes later. How does this statement about the way children form belief relate to your experiences?

Remember, I'm playing with concepts, I feel like you are looking at this like its a syllogistic argument. Take each one on its own and tell me you opposition or approval. The question I am considering is whether these statements are reliable. I am more than willing to hear what you are willing to assume . . . for me, because I believe in objective reality, am asking truth statements, but I am also trying to consider them from other perspectives, which from your I am guessing will be whether they are useful . . . right?

Quote: 2) Despite the fact that our initial presuppositions are not completely chosen, we have a critical and ontological capability to transcend our social constructed noetic structures. This is so far merely an assumption.
Taking out the „socially constructed“ part (because I don´t see it substantiated by #1), I don´t even know how to tell that which you call „initial presuppositions“ from the assumed rest of my noetic structure.

I think it would be difficult but possible. In fact, when you said that you try to make as few assumptions as possible, you are already identifying which beliefs stem from those assumptions, which beliefs are assumptions unproven, and which are not based on anything, i.e. properly basic.

The wording „logic cannot be denied“ has no discernable meaning for me. Logic appears to be a very useful tool for keeping my reality/thoughts consistent, but it doesn´t help with testing the presuppositions/premises. It is merely a way to get from the premises/presuppositions to conclusions consistent with the premises. Logic is how my mind works (or hopefully works ;-, that is).

This was my point earlier in the thread . . . logic can test for consistency, but cannot judge between noetic structures except to expose the inconstancy between basic beliefs (i.e. if a noetic structure has beliefs that lead to an inevitable contradiction)

Although I tend to find the concept of a noetic structure very useful, I think drawing a line between „basic“ and „subsequent beliefs“ and the rest as an essential distinction is so far a bit arbitrary.
I think it would be helpful if you pointed out one of those subsequent beliefs I can not do without.

Well, when I was reading this, I thought the definition of foundational beliefs as those beliefs believed without deductive or inductive justification. For a Cartesian, I would, without putting too much thought into it, think a foundational belief would be logic and cognition? Anyway, you yourself mentioned using as few assumptions as possible . . . I would think an assumption, if it is an assumption you consistently use, could be considered a foundational belief

In any case, even if following the assumption that I hold unalienable „foundational beliefs“ it appears to me as though any „epistemological“ approach at best results in detecting my foundational beliefs (as opposed to detecting reality out there). As I said before, that is quite something, but certainly not that which you aspire to arrive at.

Well, that's one of the things I'm trying to discern. Is there a way to judge between noetic structures. You seem to think that there isn't, which would make sense if we are all locked in our own realties. I'm not sure that lock is there . . . In fact, I entertaining the idea that the belief in that lock is an unaffirmable belief.

If the lock isn't, we could begin to entertain Searle's concept of objective epistemology, defined as such . . .

n epistemology, a statement (claim, assertion, proposition) is epistemologically objective if its truth value can be determined intersubjectively by generally-agreed methods or procedures. To say a statement is epistemologically objective is not to say the statement is true; it's just to say we could figure out a public method for determining whether or not the statement is true.

I'm not sure that I agree with him, but I'm exploring the concept.

 

[Silenus]

What is your purpose for improving your understanding of epistemology?

1. I think my understanding of this field of study is weak.

2. I enjoy it.

 

[quatona]

No, that was not my intent. What I am playing with how would "internal theater" differ from objective reality.

Which is a futile point when we haven´t yet agreed what it is that we experience. You can at best compare what you feel is &#8222;objective reality&#8220; (or how you think it should be) to that which you feel &#8222;dream theater&#8220; would be like.
If I &#8211; as the devil´s advoctate &#8211; say that all we experience is &#8222;dream theater&#8220;, then I can´t compare &#8222;dream theater&#8220; to anything, and certainly not &#8222;objective reality&#8220; which doesn´t even exist.
Once again you are putting the cart before the horse, as would a &#8222;dream theater&#8220; advocate.

If that internal theater presents things which cannot be altered, then that internal theater would operate as if it were an objective reality, even if totally of my mind.

The definition of &#8222;objective reality&#8220; as that which can not be altered appears to be spontaneously made up, based on that which you feel you experience as &#8222;objective reality&#8220;.
Again: since either &#8222;external reality&#8220; and &#8222;dream theater&#8220; would be the way our experiences are explained (depending on which premise one works from), under the premise of dream theater there is no such thing as &#8222;external reality&#8220; that one could possibly compare it to.

I'm simply considering the fact that I haven&#8217;t met anyone who believes they can completely or even predominately control phenomena, no matter where it is found . . .

Whether I can or can not control all or most phenomena would be an interesting discussion of its own. For the time being I will submit that even if I can´t control all phenomena in my dream theater this is not sufficient evidence that it is not dream theater. It would just be dream theater in which not everything is in control of my arbitrary will.

I have noticed that your argument originally was about &#8222;the ability to alter reality&#8220;, now you have shifted the goalposts towards &#8222;the ability to control reality&#8220;.

If you have experiences differently, feel free to give me experience and anecdote.

That would be an unparsimonous approach. My reality changes from second to second, and if assuming that it´s my dream theater, this is my product. So I could name billions of things that change in my reality.
The simpler would be for you to give an example of something that doesn´t change in my reality.
And there lies the problem: Since &#8211; under the assumption of dream theater &#8211; everything I experience (including all changes, developments and alterings) would be product of my mind by virtue of the premise, &#8222;dream theater&#8220; is unfalsifiable. Just as the premise &#8222;external reality that our mind connects to&#8220; is unfalsifiable.

1. the discovery of one's preconceptions is extremely valuable.

Yes, I have emphasized this a couple of times myself already.

2. I'm not saying I've provided an argument against believing all perception is an internal process, I'm just letting you know that I don't agree that perception is all internal.

That has been clear since your OP.
I have asked you multiple times now, whether you want me to accept that premise for purposes of this discussion, and for whatever reason you haven´t yet given me a clear answer.
Instead you keep arguing against &#8222;internal theater&#8220;, so I am assuming this is what you want to discuss.
I ask you again and urgently: What do you want to discuss with me at this point?
My approach depends on the answer of this question.
If you want a discussion based on the premise that &#8222;external reality&#8220; exists, fine with me.

3. Although you don't believe in truth (in the sense of correspondence theory) but something more based on coherence and consistency, (I haven&#8217;t misrepresented you here, correct?)

I´m not sure &#8211; bear with me, but I am very cautious when someone paraphrases my views with words and expressions I wouldn´t use.
I don´t believe that we could possibly distinguish &#8222;external reality to which our ideas correspond&#8220; from &#8222;internal theater without external reality&#8220;.

you have introduced an epistemological term that has gained ground in contemporary epistemology . . . warrant. What, for you, defines a warranted belief?

Please keep in mind that I am not a native speaker. It´s easily possible that I have used this term wrongly. From what I know about it it is not a term that is used only in epistemology.
Whatever &#8211; let me (in order to avoid a semantics discussion) replace it with the term that I have used previously for the same idea: &#8222;I want to use as few preassumptions as possible.&#8220;

Yes, I agree that this might be a true . . . I've already started giving it some thought. I understand that objective reality is something you'd rather not assume (in keeping to a more parsimonious approach) and that you also think it cannot be proven. However, you are willing to speculate within the confines of granting this assumption. Is that correct?

Yes, this is correct.
I am just waiting for you to tell me whether this is what you want me (or us) to do.
Once we have agreed that we base this premise upon this assumption, we can discuss the next question: How can we possibly discern, detect or acknowledge &#8222;objective external reality&#8220; if all we have is our inner reflection of it, anyways? And, other than in the question (&#8222;external objective reality vs. dream theater&#8220 I do have an opinion here: We can´t.

If we can't critically think, our presupposition come from our society, i.e. parents, school, etc. this seems pretty obvious, most children believe what they are taught by authority as long as it is somewhat consistent and the critical thinking function comes later. How does this statement about the way children form belief relate to your experiences?

Just for clarification: At this point you are already not only assuming that an external reality exists, but also that we can detect and discern it (else you couldn´t speak of things like parents or society, presuming they exist as you feel they exist).
I haven´t included this into my concession that there is an external reality.

Anyways, in my experience there is a correlation between beliefs of society and beliefs of children. Causality would be hard to determine, though. And even if we could show that a lot of beliefs are conditioned into children societally this would still not allow your conclusion that this is the only way beliefs are acquired by children. In context of this question children like Kaspar Hauser would be an interesting subject to research: Do children who do not grow up in a society acquire beliefs nonetheless? If so (which I am actually convinced of without having studies to support it), your point would be refuted.

Remember, I'm playing with concepts, I feel like you are looking at this like its a syllogistic argument. Take each one on its own and tell me you opposition or approval. The question I am considering is whether these statements are reliable.

I have understood this (and I am assuming that you want to establish these as points to work from). If I am asked to consider those points, I actually don´t see a better way than looking at these points, trying to understand what you mean (which often poses the first problem), and then giving you my opinion to each of them. I don´t seem to understand what else you would expect me to do.

I am more than willing to hear what you are willing to assume . . . for me, because I believe in objective reality, am asking truth statements, but I am also trying to consider them from other perspectives, which from your I am guessing will be whether they are useful . . . right?

When it comes to my reality the question &#8222;is this assumption useful&#8220; is indeed the predominant question. However, when it comes to discussion like these, all I can do is

• tell you which of your preassumptions I agree with
• investigate whether your conclusions follow from your preassumptions (regardless whether I agree with them are not)

However, one of my most basic objections (even under the assumption that an &#8222;objective external reality exists) is your idea that a subjectively experiencing being like me has access to this objective reality. This is a contradiction in terms. All I perceive, experience is by definition subjective, as soon as I perceive it it becomes my idea of it, and that´s that.
Under the premise of an &#8222;external reality&#8220; I think it is reasonable to postulate that we interprete it in the way that is meaningful, useful to us. IOW: every statement about something in this external reality beyond &#8222;It is what it is&#8220; is not a statement about how this reality objective is, but about what I want or need it to be. This external reality becomes more than just being &#8222;what it is&#8220; by virtue of me giving it meaning.

This was my point earlier in the thread . . . logic can test for consistency, but cannot judge between noetic structures except to expose the inconstancy between basic beliefs (i.e. if a noetic structure has beliefs that lead to an inevitable contradiction)

Seems like this is something we agree upon. Partytime.

Well, when I was reading this, I thought the definition of foundational beliefs as those beliefs believed without deductive or inductive justification.

Agreed. (In which we would have to keep in mind that even those beliefs that can be deduced or induced from them have as little justification as those basic beliefs.)

For a Cartesian, I would, without putting too much thought into it, think a foundational belief would be logic and cognition?

You would have to ask a Cartesian what a Cartesiona thinks.
I personally don´t even seem to understand what &#8222;belief in logic and cognition&#8220; means.
I do believe that certain conclusions follow logically from certain premises, and others don´t.
Could you please give me your definition of &#8222;cognition&#8220;? I can´t seem to find a definition in reference to which the wording &#8222;belief in cognition&#8220; makes any sense.

Anyway, you yourself mentioned using as few assumptions as possible . . . I would think an assumption, if it is an assumption you consistently use, could be considered a foundational belief

Would you mind spelling out this assumption you are speaking of in a complete sentence?
&#8222;Belief in logic and cognition&#8220; doesn´t seem to tell me what exactly you think I believe about them.

Well, that's one of the things I'm trying to discern. Is there a way to judge between noetic structures. You seem to think that there isn't, which would make sense if we are all locked in our own realties. I'm not sure that lock is there . . . In fact, I entertaining the idea that the belief in that lock is an unaffirmable belief.

I don´t see how it is necessary to assume we are &#8222;locked in our own realties&#8220; in order to come to the conclusion that we can´t judge between noetic structures.

I think that e.g. your own submission that all our beliefs are either foundational beliefs (without deductive or inductive justification) or beliefs that we are taught by society or beliefs that are deduced or induced from these two leads necessarily to the conclusion that we can not judge between noetic structures. For that we would have to discuss the justification of foundational beliefs, and this is &#8211; by virtue of the very way you have defined them &#8211; impossible.

n epistemology, a statement (claim, assertion, proposition) is epistemologically objective if its truth value can be determined intersubjectively by generally-agreed methods or procedures. To say a statement is epistemologically objective is not to say the statement is true; it's just to say we could figure out a public method for determining whether or not the statement is true.

Mm, ok. &#8222;Objective&#8220; comes with a lot of different meanings, and the way it is defined here is completely different from your initial idea of an &#8222;objective external reality&#8220;. &#8222;Objective&#8220; and &#8222;true&#8220; defined as basically synonyms for &#8222;intersubjective&#8220; or &#8222;generally agreed upon&#8220; are fine with me. I still would prefer the terms &#8222;intersubjective&#8220; and &#8222;agreed upon&#8220; over &#8222;true&#8220;, simply for the purpose of avoiding misunderstandings and conflations with other meanings of &#8222;true&#8220;.
I myself have proposed &#8222;intersubjectivity&#8220; and &#8222;agreement&#8220; for useful approaches early and several times in this thread. Searle seems to hold a similar notion.
The word &#8222;objective&#8220; has always been used in that definition in science.
I don´t think that in traditional terminology &#8222;true&#8220; and &#8222;publicly believed to be accurate&#8220; are considered the same, but, oh well, if he insists on that redefinition, no skin off my nose. Language evolves. Words mean what the person using them means by them.

 

[Silenus]

The definition of „objective reality“ as that which can not be altered appears to be spontaneously made up, based on that which you feel you experience as „objective reality“.
Again: since either „external reality“ and „dream theater“ would be the way our experiences are explained (depending on which premise one works from), under the premise of dream theater there is no such thing as „external reality“ that one could possibly compare it to.

maybe. Just thinking through the process of how one would tell the difference. If all of these things begin in my mind, I would think it would be highly likely that I could control it because I am the source . . . but if I can't control it, then the source must be elsewhere . . .

I have asked you multiple times now, whether you want me to accept that premise for purposes of this discussion, and for whatever reason you haven´t yet given me a clear answer.
Instead you keep arguing against „internal theater“, so I am assuming this is what you want to discuss.
I ask you again and urgently: What do you want to discuss with me at this point?
My approach depends on the answer of this question.
If you want a discussion based on the premise that „external reality“ exists, fine with me.

sorry, I thought you were trying to keep the discussion on an argument about objective reality. I must have not been reading the thread carefully. I want to discuss the five points and also get your viewpoint on things (more on that in a moment). I think it would be easier to assume objective reality, but the fact that your approach depends on my answer makes me not want to give it. If there is a difference in your approach, I want both or all three. I'm greedy. I'm assuming this is between whether we assume reality, theater, or neither?

hatever – let me (in order to avoid a semantics discussion) replace it with the term that I have used previously for the same idea: „I want to use as few preassumptions as possible.“

Yes, but you mentioned a belief could be warranted . . . I simply want to know what the criteria are that warrants a belief. . . and more importantly, what your preassumptions are. I'd like to know for comparison purposes. In fact, I'd like to wait to respond to some of your other things until after that.

 

[quatona]

maybe. Just thinking through the process of how one would tell the difference. If all of these things begin in my mind, I would think it would be highly likely that I could control it because I am the source . . . but if I can't control it, then the source must be elsewhere . . .

The question would be: How can I tell whether I can control it?
If for a moment assuming that what some constructivists say (and which you seem to be referring to here): "I am the creator of my reality.", then I have an interest in keeping my reality the way that makes sense to me. If I have a faible for logical consistency I will do every effort in keeping it logically consistent. I´d say it´s not so much that I am unable to alter my reality randomly, and arbitrarily, but that I do not want to make certain alterations to it.

sorry, I thought you were trying to keep the discussion on an argument about objective reality. I must have not been reading the thread carefully. I want to discuss the five points and also get your viewpoint on things (more on that in a moment). I think it would be easier to assume objective reality, but the fact that your approach depends on my answer makes me not want to give it. If there is a difference in your approach, I want both or all three. I'm greedy. I'm assuming this is between whether we assume reality, theater, or neither?

You can have all three, but you can´t have them simultaneously. We must define a common ground in order to be able to discuss each question meaningfully. We can´t discuss question #2 meaningfully without having defined a common ground on question #1 (and even if only by means of me agreeing with your premise for the sake of becoming able to discuss #2), and we can´t discuss #3 meaningfully without having common ground on #2 and #3.

Yes, but you mentioned a belief could be warranted . . . I simply want to know what the criteria are that warrants a belief. . .

And I told you that I either misspoke (due to poor knowledge of the meaning of this word) or that I was using it in a different meaning than you feel I used it. So please forget about that wording, and work from the wording that is clear and apparently not misunderstandable.

and more importantly, what your preassumptions are. I'd like to know for comparison purposes.

Well, in my post with the exhaustive description of my approach to "reality" I think I have revealed them to the best of my ability. I think it comes down to the starting point: I have a reality, and I must deal with that reality. I notice that this reality changes permanently. My reality is populated by persons whose reality occasionally differs from mine. I have problems explaining this to myself. (And so on - I won´t repeat the entire post which was meant to give you a good idea about my noetic structure).
Another point that is close to a preassumption (although I personally feel it follows directly from the - by definition - impossibility of a subjective being to overcome its subjectivity ) was in my last post: what I perceive as meaning in reality (no matter whether it´s dream theater or my perception of an external reality) is the product of my needs/desires rather than a property of this reality.
I´ll post the passage again:
IOW: every statement about something in this external reality [added: and this would be true for dream theater as well] beyond &#8222;It is what it is&#8220; is not a statement about how this reality objective is, but about what I want or need it to be. This reality becomes more than just being &#8222;what it is&#8220; by virtue of me giving it meaning.