Epistemology or "E did what to Imself?"

[Uber Genius]

Wait, did you miss my Plantinga joke??

"functioning properly" as in "proper function"

yikes. I missed it. And I'm a 100 on the MBTI for intuition.

Nicely done.

 

[public hermit]

W

I read warrant and proper function or tried... and couldn't get past his aversion to Chisholm. Couldn't quite understand it.

Interesting. I haven't read it either, but just guessing he wants to reject Chisholm's internalism to make his case for proper function.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Wait, did you miss my Plantinga joke??

"functioning properly" as in "proper function"

Ok. Alright. I did miss it for some reason, maybe cause I'm scrambling right now to get around to go pay the ol' car tax and title registration stuff. So, here's credit where functional credit is due: !

There. Justice.

 

[Uber Genius]

Interesting. I haven't read it either, but just guessing he wants to reject Chisholm's internalism to make his case for proper function.

Proper functionality seems to really sell it. The idea that just as a dog is able to chase cars in the real world, means that in he is operating properly, as designed, when he successfully chases said car.

That is my analogy not Alvin's. But that a loving God would endow his creatures he expects to act with agency, with faculties to understand truths about God's world, including a set of objective moral values and duties, and God's existence and a handful of attributes of same, was an idea I never intuited one time.

That faculty, just like sight, allows me to navigate the real world, a sense of God's existence allows me to equally navigate the real world, is not intuitively obvious, at least not to me.

 

[public hermit]

So, here's a question for this thread. I have noticed a tendency among some CF folks to embrace a kind of evidentialism as concerns justification. I'm up for correction on this, but isn't evidentialism generally consider a species of foundationalism, or maybe better, a feature of foundationalism? If so, what I have noticed is an out-of-hand rejection of self-evident or basic beliefs. But foundationalism doesn't work without them. When I brought this up it was assumed I was talking about Plantinga, which I completely understand. However, even Aristotle was committed to basic beliefs, by virtue of the fact that without them it becomes an infinite regress, hence no foundation.

Is there a form of evidentialism that is not committed to foundationalism that can be embraced by empiricists?

Foundationalism - Wikipedia

 

[Daniel Marsh]

Ok. Alright. I did miss it for some reason, maybe cause I'm scrambling right now to get around to go pay the ol' car tax and title registration stuff. So, here's credit where functional credit is due: !

There. Justice.

If you are ordained, get ordained online and declare your property a religious corporation.

 

[Daniel Marsh]

Proper functionality seems to really sell it. The idea that just as a dog is able to chase cars in the real world, means that in he is operating properly, as designed, when he successfully chases said car.

That is my analogy not Alvin's. But that a loving God would endow his creatures he expects to act with agency, with faculties to understand truths about God's world, including a set of objective moral values and duties, and God's existence and a handful of attributes of same, was an idea I never intuited one time.

That just like sight allows me to navigate the real world, a sense of God's existence allows me to equally navigate the real world, is not intuitively obvious, at least not to me.

What will the dog do with the car at a stop sign?

 

[Daniel Marsh]

What are some good philosophy books?

 

[public hermit]

That just like sight allows me to navigate the real world, a sense of God's existence allows me to equally navigate the real world, is not intuitively obvious, at least not to me.

Does Plantinga's proper function, as concerns religious belief, work without the sensus divinitatis? I can see how proper function is an effective rendering of warrant, in general. If my cognitive faculties are working according to function in the appropriate environment, then I am warranted believing x, etc. But, when he shifts to theistic belief, he seems to rely on the sensus divinitatis to do the work he needs done. In other words, so long as my sensus divinitatis is working according to function then my theistic belief is warranted?

 

[public hermit]

What are some good philosophy books?

Richard Feldman's book on epistemology was the one we used in college. It is thorough and accessible. I still use my copy as a reference.

Amazon.com: richard feldman epistemology: Books

Edit: I just noticed, that's a bit pricey and I know it's thin, haha. Hmm.

I haven't read Jennifer Nagel's book on epistemology, but I know she's a top notch philosopher and her book is not as pricey as Feldman's

https://www.amazon.com/Knowledge-Ve...nagel+knowledge&qid=1581025157&s=books&sr=1-1

 

[Uber Genius]

What will the dog do with the car at a stop sign?

One of the great questions of our day. I live in the country and there isn't a stop sign for over a mile. It is in the same category as how many licks it takes to get to the center of a tootsie roll tootsie pop, I think.

 

[Uber Genius]

Richard Feldman's book on epistemology was the one we used in college. It is thorough and accessible. I still use my copy as a reference.

Amazon.com: richard feldman epistemology: Books

Edit: I just noticed, that's a bit pricey and I know it's thin, haha. Hmm.

I haven't read Jennifer Nagel's book on epistemology, but I know she's a top notch philosopher and her book is not as pricey as Feldman's

https://www.amazon.com/Knowledge-Ve...nagel+knowledge&qid=1581025157&s=books&sr=1-1

Thanks. Great advise. I saw some videos from Nagel somewhere years ago on some philosophy site. They were very accessible.

 

[Uber Genius]

1st entry on youtube for "epistemology." I never claimed my research on epistemology was deep. But here is Jennifer Nagel as recommended above by PH.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

What are some good philosophy books?

If we're talking about Epistemology, my main reference for this is a rather seemingly 'thin' book by Ralph Baergen, titled, Contemporary Epistemology. But, it all kind of depends on what area within philosophy you want to study.

As I'm sure you know, there's a lot on-line now, for free.

 

[Uber Genius]

So, here's a question for this thread. I have noticed a tendency among some CF folks to embrace a kind of evidentialism as concerns justification. I'm up for correction on this, but isn't evidentialism generally consider a species of foundationalism, or maybe better, a feature of foundationalism? If so, what I have noticed is an out-of-hand rejection of self-evident or basic beliefs. But foundationalism doesn't work without them. When I brought this up it was assumed I was talking about Plantinga, which I completely understand. However, even Aristotle was committed to basic beliefs, by virtue of the fact that without them it becomes an infinite regress, hence no foundation.

Is there a form of evidentialism that is not committed to foundationalism that can be embraced by empiricists?

Foundationalism - Wikipedia

I am a recovering evidentialist as I followed Josh McDowell's approach in the late 1970s and 1980s. By the 1990s however, I had accumulated such a significant amount of what anyone other than Hume would describe as miraculous experiences that I spent little time with evidence. For the last 10 years I have rejected evidentialism in favor of reformed epistemology. It seems obviously false given that the majority of the church age has been mostly without evidence and argument. The majority of believers could neither read or write. Finally, if we look across history we find the majority of the world's population seems to be without a witness or testimony of Christianity. If evidence and argument were at all exclusive in nature, then following Christ would be impossible for most of the world over most of history. Now that would be a good argument for the atheist. It could easily be used as an undercutting defeater for God's omni-benevolent nature.

 

[public hermit]

I am a recovering evidentialist as I followed Josh McDowell's approach in the late 1970s and 1980s

Yeah, McDowell is definitely an evidentialist, along the same strand as Lee Strobel.

I am more curious about the person committed to naturalism, and I would be happy for anyone on CF with such a commitment to chime in on these questions. Someone with a metaphysical commitment to naturalism is going to be an evidentialist and foundationalist, I would think. Assuming that's the case, and I could be wrong, then what is the foundation? What are the self-evident beliefs they hold? Is it sense experience, possibly coupled with the intuitive truth of mathematical principles? In order to avoid a regress, there has to be a stopping point. Does that make sense? Isn't this why so many twentieth century empiricists spent so much time talking about qualia?

 

[public hermit]

Often I have arrested people's scientistic flourishes and defense of non-belief by doing a reductio ad absurdum and asking them to prove that there own grandmother had existed given she had died and all the records of her existence had disappeared and people whom had knew her personally had also died. Of course this approach mechanically reduces the data to one's own experience data. But brings to the fore how memory, introspection, even testimony often play important roles in forming what we take to be unquestionably true about the real world. Then I ask them why they use special pleading to produce a different epistemic standard in the case of religious beliefs.

Classic!

 

[dlamberth]

Why a strange philosophical specialty known as "Epistemology," matters to everyone trying to discover what is true about their world.

Epistemology is the study of human understanding. That is it answers the question, "What can we call knowledge?" There are several differing views of the limits of human understanding and each view limits what can be labeled "Knowledge." I am starting this thread because often members are engaging one another with differing epistemic assumptions that are the root cause of the disagreement in their respective claims. Yet they make no progress in gaining understanding because epistemological differences are so foundational, they can't seem to address where their true differences lay.

This is a controversial subject and as such no matter what I would write in summary about the subject could be shown to be wanting by some expert at some school. Please be generous in that I am trying to open a rich dialog valuable to all at CF.

Since at least Socrates we have had discussions of what can be known and how it can be known or justified. There are various views ranging from we can know next to nothing about this world (Cartesian skepticism) including whether there is a real external world, or other minds (people), a real past (this world could have just popped into existence with the appearance of age), to fideism (that faith must be separate from reason).

I would like to ask participants to start to research this obscure field and develop their own account of how on can gain knowledge.

Here is a starter kit. Perhaps someone else could post somewhat of a range of epistemic positions link to help people identify what assumptions and entailments their epistemic positions makes.

Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The account above suggests we have 5 ways of perceiving the world: Senses, Memory, Rationality, Testimony, Introspection.

Are there sources of knowledge you privilege over others?

Are there sources of knowledge you discount over others?

If we were to reason with induction, abduction or deduction, how would these 5 ways play a role? Would any be excluded from say scientific method? Religious inquiry?

How would Consciousness fit into the ways of perceiving the world?

 

[InterestedAtheist]

... if I may be so bold, I'd at least like to say one thing on behalf of atheists here on CF: they no longer are telling me "epistemology" isn't relevant, like they were doing just a few years ago here.

So, while I know I'm still in dispute with various atheists about the how, the why and the wherefore of the epistemological 'inner workings' of the Christian Faith, at least I can see some philosophical progress (and learning?) has been made among them. And on that count, I applaud. It might be a two-clapper applause, but I'm still clapping anyway!

.... wow, the lights just went off! What happened?!

Meh. Generally, Philo, I find that you just use "epistemology" as a tactic to avoid answering a question.

 

[muichimotsu]

The epistemic foundation of my dog Rae Rae is one of "entitlement."

No, she does not claim her beliefs are true as a result of being a millennial, a la AOC. I grant that my dog has absolutely no justification regarding the external world whatsoever. Nevertheless she is able to chase cars without getting run over, knows which of several similar bags contains her food, is able to chase down rabbits, and accurately follow blood trails of injured deer for miles.

Are human abilities to engage the external world just a few hundred higher branches into the evolutionary tree? Which of the methods of understanding our world highlighted in the Stanford article above might be hard to explain naturalistically?

Hundred branches seems an understatement by how much more evolved we are than dogs, but again, that falls into a trap of language that suggests us having more sentience, sapience, etc, makes us superior, rather than evolving in a way that is beneficial to us as a species and population, while dogs have also done that (at least in the initial point to canine, versus human animal husbandry that gets the various dog breeds we've seen for centuries). A dog, or cat, has superior senses to us in many respects (hearing, touch, smell) but we tend to have better sight in some respect (at least in seeing more colors, etc) and better taste (cats supposedly can't taste sugar).

Our ability to engage the external world is better because our brains are far more developed in developing a sense of self and introspection about the world in those rational considerations of causality, etc. Animals can correlate some of that, but supposedly they have far less object permanence, among other aspects of human thought that allow us to understand things much better

A difficulty to explain something doesn't render it less reliable when we can point out the self correcting and generally beneficial in improving understanding with correlation to others in our accounts. Not sure why the metaphysics of our epistemological aspects is entirely relevant to whether those methods of learning are more or less reliable except as one is trying to tear down something that's an imagined opponent based on concluding that your approach is "better" in some way