Does the Logos suffer?

[hedrick]

Is there any offcial, or traditional understanding of what it means to say that the single divine-human person suffers?

With a human it's fairly easy. If my foot is injured, I'm injured as a person. But I have a unified consciousness, which would experience anything happenng to any part of me.

It's not so clear that this is true of the God-man. While consciousness in the modern sense probably isn't covered by theology, it seems likely that the human nature has a human consciousness. That would suffer when Christ suffers as a human. But Aquinas seems to say that the Logos can't suffer: "n the contrary, Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epict.): "The Word is impassible whose Nature is Divine." But what is impassible cannot suffer. Consequently, Christ's Passion did not concern His Godhead." It's not obvious that there is anything independent of those two natures that could support a whole-person experience. Now obviously theologians would assert that as a single person, the person of the God-man suffers when Jesus suffers. But I'm trying to get a sense of what that actually means.

 

[Maria Billingsley]

Is there any offcial, or traditional understanding of what it means to say that the single divine-human person suffers?

With a human it's fairly easy. If my foot is injured, I'm injured as a person. But I have a unified consciousness, which would experience anything happenng to any part of me.

It's not so clear that this is true of the God-man. While consciousness in the modern sense probably isn't covered by theology, it seems likely that the human nature has a human consciousness. That would suffer when Christ suffers as a human. But Aquinas seems to say that the Logos can't suffer: "n the contrary, Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epict.): "The Word is impassible whose Nature is Divine." But what is impassible cannot suffer. Consequently, Christ's Passion did not concern His Godhead." It's not obvious that there is anything independent of those two natures that could support a whole-person experience. Now obviously theologians would assert that as a single person, the person of the God-man suffers when Jesus suffers. But I'm trying to get a sense of what that actually means.

Theologians will make a simple act of God convoluted and confusing. The "Word became flesh".

John 1:14
"And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, and we beheld His glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth."

In essence, "the Word became flesh" means that the transcendent, eternal God chose to enter into human history and experience the fullness of human existence, without ceasing to be God, in order to accomplish salvation for humanity.

Blessings

 

[Hazelelponi]

Is there any offcial, or traditional understanding of what it means to say that the single divine-human person suffers?

With a human it's fairly easy. If my foot is injured, I'm injured as a person. But I have a unified consciousness, which would experience anything happenng to any part of me.

It's not so clear that this is true of the God-man. While consciousness in the modern sense probably isn't covered by theology, it seems likely that the human nature has a human consciousness. That would suffer when Christ suffers as a human. But Aquinas seems to say that the Logos can't suffer: "n the contrary, Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epict.): "The Word is impassible whose Nature is Divine." But what is impassible cannot suffer. Consequently, Christ's Passion did not concern His Godhead." It's not obvious that there is anything independent of those two natures that could support a whole-person experience. Now obviously theologians would assert that as a single person, the person of the God-man suffers when Jesus suffers. But I'm trying to get a sense of what that actually means.

You will enjoy this article from the Reformed Classicist on Divine Immutability

Divine Immutability — The Reformed Classicalist

God is depicted in Scripture as a Rock (Deut. 32:4), and his word as something that outlasts all created things (Mat. 24:35). We sing songs about Christ being our Solid Rock, as if he were our foundation, or the Word of God as if it were a firm foundation. But how easily do our hymns stand the test

www.reformedclassicalist.com

The author is Matt Marino who is Instructor of Theology for New Aberdeen College in Charlotte, North Carolina where classes will begin in the Fall of 2025. He presently serves as Pastor of Grace Church in the Associate Reformed Presbyterian Church (or ARP) in Winter Springs, Florida.

He obtained his B.A. in Philosophy and Apologetics from Trinity College in Newburgh, IN, his Master of Theological Studies from Columbia Evangelical Seminary in Longview, WA, his Master of Divinity from Reformed Theological Seminary in Orlando, FL, and his PhD at Puritan Reformed Theological Seminary in Grand Rapids, MI, presently at ABD status.

It's really an article you'll enjoy to read in full, he raises point after point and the whole article is a treasure.

 

[hedrick]

You will enjoy this article from the Reformed Classicist on Divine Immutability

Divine Immutability — The Reformed Classicalist

God is depicted in Scripture as a Rock (Deut. 32:4), and his word as something that outlasts all created things (Mat. 24:35). We sing songs about Christ being our Solid Rock, as if he were our foundation, or the Word of God as if it were a firm foundation. But how easily do our hymns stand the test

www.reformedclassicalist.com

It's really an article you'll enjoy to read in full, he raises point after point and the whole article is a treasure.

Thanks, but doesn't deal with the question of what it means for Christ to suffer.

 

[zippy2006]

It's not so clear that this is true of the God-man. While consciousness in the modern sense probably isn't covered by theology, it seems likely that the human nature has a human consciousness. That would suffer when Christ suffers as a human. But Aquinas seems to say that the Logos can't suffer: "n the contrary, Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epict.): "The Word is impassible whose Nature is Divine." But what is impassible cannot suffer. Consequently, Christ's Passion did not concern His Godhead." It's not obvious that there is anything independent of those two natures that could support a whole-person experience. Now obviously theologians would assert that as a single person, the person of the God-man suffers when Jesus suffers. But I'm trying to get a sense of what that actually means.

In that same article Aquinas says that the person (hypostasis) of the Son suffers precisely through his human nature.

 

[jas3]

It's not obvious that there is anything independent of those two natures that could support a whole-person experience.

Wouldn't the hypostatic union be what supports a whole-person experience?

 

[The Liturgist]

Is there any offcial, or traditional understanding of what it means to say that the single divine-human person suffers?

With a human it's fairly easy. If my foot is injured, I'm injured as a person. But I have a unified consciousness, which would experience anything happenng to any part of me.

It's not so clear that this is true of the God-man. While consciousness in the modern sense probably isn't covered by theology, it seems likely that the human nature has a human consciousness. That would suffer when Christ suffers as a human. But Aquinas seems to say that the Logos can't suffer: "n the contrary, Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epict.): "The Word is impassible whose Nature is Divine." But what is impassible cannot suffer. Consequently, Christ's Passion did not concern His Godhead." It's not obvious that there is anything independent of those two natures that could support a whole-person experience. Now obviously theologians would assert that as a single person, the person of the God-man suffers when Jesus suffers. But I'm trying to get a sense of what that actually means.

The answer is yes, even among those who are not Theopaschites but rather subscribe to what I regard as the problematic alternative of Apthartodocetism, because of communicatio idiomatum.

The only ones who would deny that the person of the Word suffers would be the Nestorians who divide Christ’s humanity from His divinity, which is contrary to the Orthodox Christological principal agreed upon by a consensus of the Eastern Orthodox, Oriental Orthodox and the Assyrian Church of the East since antiquity, that in the Incarnation Christ put on our humanity while remaining fully God, His humanity and divinity united without change, confusion, separation or division, which excludes both the heresies of Nestorius and Eutyches (who was anathematized by the Oriental Orthodox, who are falsely accused of Monophysitism, for being a Monophysite, whereas some accuse the Church of the East of Nestorianism, and a few misguided laity of that church actually are Nestorians, because the church venerates Nestorius while rejecting his christological error).

Wouldn't the hypostatic union be what supports a whole-person experience?

Yes, and interestingly enough the idea of the hypostatic union is shared between Eastern and Oriental Orthodoxy.

 

[The Liturgist]

But I'm trying to get a sense of what that actually means.

To quote the Eastern Orthodox scholar Fr. John Behr, who now holds the chair on Eastern Christianity at Oxford once held by Metropolitan Kallistos Ware, memory eternal, Christ our True God died on the Cross to show us what it means to be human. Fast forward to about 50 minutes in this lecture:

Fr. John (who at the time of this lecture was dean of St. Vladimir’s Seminary, and is also the leading Patristics man today, without question) points out that this is extremely hard to hear, that Christ, being the definition (Logos) of God, in the image of the Invisible God, in whom the fullness of the Godhead dwelt Bodily, died in order to show us what it means to be human and what it is to be God in one hypostasis, one prosopon, and in the Crucifixion. He further points out that all of the ancient councils were dealing with heresies that were trying to avoid this truth. Docetism denies the humanity of Christ, Arianism denies the deity of Christ, and Nestorianism that divides the Prosopon and precludes communicatio idiomatum so that the humanity and deity are separated, and finally, those at present who argue that we have to some how look beyond the crucifixion in order to find the “historical Jesus.”

 

[Gregory Thompson]

Is there any offcial, or traditional understanding of what it means to say that the single divine-human person suffers?

With a human it's fairly easy. If my foot is injured, I'm injured as a person. But I have a unified consciousness, which would experience anything happenng to any part of me.

It's not so clear that this is true of the God-man. While consciousness in the modern sense probably isn't covered by theology, it seems likely that the human nature has a human consciousness. That would suffer when Christ suffers as a human. But Aquinas seems to say that the Logos can't suffer: "n the contrary, Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epict.): "The Word is impassible whose Nature is Divine." But what is impassible cannot suffer. Consequently, Christ's Passion did not concern His Godhead." It's not obvious that there is anything independent of those two natures that could support a whole-person experience. Now obviously theologians would assert that as a single person, the person of the God-man suffers when Jesus suffers. But I'm trying to get a sense of what that actually means.

In the section of the Roman Catholic Catechism on anointing the sick, there's a bunch of things written about the suffering of Christ.

This passage relates to how the union with the passion of Christ connects to today.

1521 Union with the passion of Christ. By the grace of this sacrament the sick person receives the strength and the gift of uniting himself more closely to Christ's Passion: in a certain way he is consecrated to bear fruit by configuration to the Savior's redemptive Passion. Suffering, a consequence of original sin, acquires a new meaning; it becomes a participation in the saving work of Jesus.

Paul expressed something similar:
Who is weak, and I do not feel weak? Who is led into sin, and I do not inwardly burn? (2 Corinthians 11:29)

 

[hedrick]

The answer is yes, even among those who are not Theopaschites but rather subscribe to what I regard as the problematic alternative of Apthartodocetism, because of communicatio idiomatum.

The only ones who would deny that the person of the Word suffers would be the Nestorians who divide Christ’s humanity from His divinity, which is contrary to the Orthodox Christological principal agreed upon by a consensus of the Eastern Orthodox, Oriental Orthodox and the Assyrian Church of the East since antiquity, that in the Incarnation Christ put on our humanity while remaining fully God, His humanity and divinity united without change, confusion, separation or division, which excludes both the heresies of Nestorius and Eutyches (who was anathematized by the Oriental Orthodox, who are falsely accused of Monophysitism, for being a Monophysite, whereas some accuse the Church of the East of Nestorianism, and a few misguided laity of that church actually are Nestorians, because the church venerates Nestorius while rejecting his christological error).



Yes, and interestingly enough the idea of the hypostatic union is shared between Eastern and Oriental Orthodoxy.

I appreciate the responses, but still haven't quite seen an answer to my question. In the hypostatic union, the two natures seem to have things like will and consciousness. There's no basis for experience of the person that doesn't come from one or both natures. It's obvious how suffering can apply to the human nature. If the divine nature is involved in suffering at the same time, then I can agree that the person does. However I've seen assertions that due to divine impassibility the Logos is incapable of suffering. In that case the claim that the whole person suffers seems problematic. That would be one aspect of the human that doesn't reflect God.

You refer to, and seem to reject, Theopaschites. Thus it sounds like you are agreeing that the Logos can't suffer. You refer to the communication of attributes. I'm aware that such a doctrine exists, but it has a different meaning for Lutheran and Reformed. If used in the Reformed sense, it doesn't answer anything, because it simply repeats the fact that anything that applies to either nature applies to the person. In a purely verbal way I can agree that suffering of the human applies to the person. But if the Logos doesn't actually experience suffering, then I don't think that assertion means very much. We still end up with a pretty critical human experience that doesn't reflect God.

The Lutheran tradition uses the communication of attributes to cause the two natures to exchange properties. Hence Christ's body can be present everywhere, because the divine property of ubuiquity is transferred to the human nature. The communication has caused the human nature to gain an ability it wouldn't normally have. If this allows the divine nature to suffer for real because the ability to suffer is communicated to it, then it probably resolves the issue. But in that case it's no longer impassible, since the ability to suffer has been transferred to it.

I'd be willing to argue that this reading makes sense. The point of impassibility is that suffering normally indicates damage or some other kind of change, and that makes no sense for God. But in experiencing the man's suffering, the Logos isn't changing or being damaged. But at least in a literal sense it violates divine impassibility, not to mention confusing the natures. It is also Theopaschite, though that label has been used for both orthodox and heretical views.

 

[The Liturgist]

I appreciate the responses, but still haven't quite seen an answer to my question. In the hypostatic union, the two natures seem to have things like will and consciousness.

Forgive me, are you saying that they have divergent wills and consciousness? Because while it is true that in rejecting the heresy of Monothelitism, the Eastern Orthodox, Oriental Orthodox and ancient Western church did affirm that our Lord had a human and a divine will, but this does not mean that His consciousness is divided in such a way that he ceases to be hypostatically and personally integrated without change, confusion, separation or division of His humanity and divinity. Conversely, hyper-Nestorianism actually requires Christ to have one will only, even as it splits him into two separate persons, because the hyper-Nestorian position (which exceeds that of Nestorius himself but which was the implication of his writings, and which was also the direction some of the more problematic writings of other Nestorians were headed into, as well as certain problematic speculations by Mar Theodore of Mopsuestia, who in my opinion was unfairly blamed for Nestorianism despite being best friends with St. John Chrysostom and being a man whose orthodoxy was unquestioned in his own lifetime, not unlike Origen, who only came under fire in the fourth century when some people erroneously supposed that Arius got the idea from some problematic writings of Origen, who was in fact a confessor who died in the peace of the church.

Although a common thread of both Origen and Theodore of Mopsuestia is they did both push the extremes of their preferred exegetical technique, with Origen taking the Alexandrian mode to the limit and Theodore taking the Antiochian mode to the limit, whereas most church Fathers used a blend of the two modes, so that there are strong historical-literal components in the writings of St. Athanasius of Alexandria and the Cappadocians and likewise strong typological-prophetic components in the writings of St. John Chrysostom.

 

[hedrick]

Forgive me, are you saying that they have divergent wills and consciousness? Because while it is true that in rejecting the heresy of Monothelitism, the Eastern Orthodox, Oriental Orthodox and ancient Western church did affirm that our Lord had a human and a divine will, but this does not mean that His consciousness is divided in such a way that he ceases to be hypostatically and personally integrated without change, confusion, separation or division of His humanity and divinity. Conversely, hyper-Nestorianism actually requires Christ to have one will only, even as it splits him into two separate persons, because the hyper-Nestorian position (which exceeds that of Nestorius himself but which was the implication of his writings, and which was also the direction some of the more problematic writings of other Nestorians were headed into, as well as certain problematic speculations by Mar Theodore of Mopsuestia, who in my opinion was unfairly blamed for Nestorianism despite being best friends with St. John Chrysostom and being a man whose orthodoxy was unquestioned in his own lifetime, not unlike Origen, who only came under fire in the fourth century when some people erroneously supposed that Arius got the idea from some problematic writings of Origen, who was in fact a confessor who died in the peace of the church.

Although a common thread of both Origen and Theodore of Mopsuestia is they did both push the extremes of their preferred exegetical technique, with Origen taking the Alexandrian mode to the limit and Theodore taking the Antiochian mode to the limit, whereas most church Fathers used a blend of the two modes, so that there are strong historical-literal components in the writings of St. Athanasius of Alexandria and the Cappadocians and likewise strong typological-prophetic components in the writings of St. John Chrysostom.

Of course not. I'm simply indicating that, while ancient discussions didn't include consciousness and experience in the modern sense, the indications would be that the numan nature would have a separate human consciousness, just as a separate will and natural actions. I didn't mean to imply that there were contradictory.

 

[The Liturgist]

If the divine nature is involved in suffering at the same time, then I can agree that the person does. However I've seen assertions that due to divine impassibility the Logos is incapable of suffering. In that case the claim that the whole person suffers seems problematic. That would be one aspect of the human that doesn't reflect God.

Well then it seems your theology has an affinity for the Theopaschite position of St. Severus of Antioch, and for Oriental Orthodoxy, of which I am a strong supporter precisely because of the issues you raise.

That being said even the Theopaschites among the Oriental Orthodox (which do not include the ancient Armenians, who paradoxically avoided Theoapschitism, which has the effect of undermining attempts to accuse the Oriental Orthodox of heresy on the basis of the “Theopaschite clause” added to the Trisagion hymn by St. Peter the Fuller; rather, the Trisagion hymn is understood to be Christological in the Oriental Orthodox church rather than Triadological, which was the source of the historic confusion with the Byzantine theologians who regarded the hymn as being obviously Trinitarian in nature; in this respect it was a classic historical misunderstanding. Later this pattern would be tragically repeated with the persecution of the Russian Orthodox Old Believers, who made the sign of the Cross with two fingers, that reflected the full humanity and divinity of Christ our True God, rather than with three fingers for each person of the Sign of the Cross, which when you think about it actually makes sense because in the sign of the Cross the Trinity is evoked in the verbal formula that accompanies the gesture “In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.”

This all being said, even the Oriental Orthodox Theopaschites like St. Severus of Antioch affirm divine impassability. The suffering of the whole person is due to communicatio idiomatum.

As an aside St. Severus was the author of the hymn Ho Monogenes, which is the standard confession of Christological Orthodoxy used by all Orthodox churches; the Syriac Orthodox Church, being descended from that of the Miaphysites in the Syro-Byzantine Church of Antioch and the anti-Nestorians in the Church of the East, a group which includes St. Severus of Antioch, actually begin the Divine Liturgy with Only Begotten Son. Emperor Justinian added this hymn to the Eastern Orthodox liturgy, as part of the Second Antiphon, before whatever event occurred that caused the persecution of what became the Syriac Orthodox Church, back when he was definitely an ally of the Syriac Orthodox, to the extent of marrying a Syriac-speaking woman, St. Theodora, who is venerated in both the Eastern and Oriental Orthodox churches as a saint (and who intervened to ensure the safety of the last remaining Syriac Orthodox bishop not to have been imprisoned or executed, St. Jacob bar Addai, who then consecrated under emergency conditions a hundred bishops for the Church of Antioch making what would become the Syriac Orthodox Church impossible to decapitate, hence the derogatory term Jacobite, which is used with pride by Indian members of the Syriac Orthodox Church of Antioch. From there, it made its way into the Armenian liturgy; the Armenians erroneously attribute it to St. Athanasius, but it clearly postdates the writings of St. Athanasius, and had St. Athanasius written it, we would expect to see it use more prominently in the Coptic Orthodox Church (which uses it, but only on Great and Holy Friday), which is, as one would expect, strongly influenced by St. Athanasius and St. Cyril of Alexandria to the same extent that the Eastern Orthodox are strongly influenced by St. John Chrysostom and St. Romanos the Melodist (all of whom are venerated by both the Eastern and Oriental Orthodox).

 

[The Liturgist]

Of course not. I'm simply indicating that, while ancient discussions didn't include consciousness and experience in the modern sense, the indications would be that the numan nature would have a separate human consciousness, just as a separate will and natural actions. I didn't mean to imply that there were contradictory.

I don’t think we can say that the humanity of Christ has a separate human consciousness without violating Chalcedonian and Oriental Orthodox unity. It contradicts the principle of union of the human and divine without change, separation, confusion, or division, which is agreed upon even by the Church of the East (despite its connections to ancient Nestorianism).

It might be that our Lord has a discrete human consciousness, but not a separate human consciousness. This would violate the principle of hypostatic unity. Since our Lord has only one hypostasis, that is to say, one foundation of being (the Holy Trinity consists of three persons and three hypostases - interestingly, the Greek word hypostasis can be literally translated as “understanding” but it is not synonymous with understanding in the modern sense of the word, in that it does not refer to comprehension, but literally, to that which stands beneath. Thus if we interpret the word Prosopon based on its original Greek usage, to mean persona, mask, face, visage, or personality, the use of Prosopon together with hypostasis equates to a unified personal identity in the modern English understanding of the word Person.

It is also extremely important from a Christological perspective that we not attempt to amend the Christological consensus patrum by extending its decisions into modern categories like consciousness that were not considered by the early church Fathers, at least not using the same terminology that we use. As it happens, they did consider these concepts, but tended to use words like noos.

At any rate, we can tell we are at risk of Nestorianizing our Lord, that is to say, of dividing him between His humanity and divinity, which we must avoid (his humanity and divinity are distinct in that they are not confused, nor do we say one changes the other, but are not separate nor divided).

Thus the principle of communicatio idiomatum is the means by which we address the issue of Theopaschitism. Communicatio idiomatum is a doctrinal consequence of the Orthodox Christology of St. Athanasius and St. Cyril of Alexandria. It is the result of a rejection of Arianism and Nestorianism. It implies the full unity of Christ with us, as a human being, and with God, for in him the fullness of God dwells bodily, and when seeing Him scourged Pontius Pilate is said by St. John the Beloved to have said “Ecce homo” - “Behold the Man.”*


* Because of the importance of this and the widespread belief in Pontius Pilate's later conversion to Christianity, he is widely venerated as a saint in by Eastern Christians, particularly the Ethiopians.

 

[The Liturgist]

You refer to, and seem to reject, Theopaschites

No, I don’t reject Theopaschitism at all. I prefer Theopaschitism to the alternative of Apthartodocetism.

 

[Gregory Thompson]

So I read through that. I was thinking through the read, how does this relate to the bible verse that says He lives to intercede for us?

Also, in terms of suffering what was lacking on the cross?

 

[The Liturgist]

You refer to the communication of attributes. I'm aware that such a doctrine exists, but it has a different meaning for Lutheran and Reformed. If used in the Reformed sense, it doesn't answer anything, because it simply repeats the fact that anything that applies to either nature applies to the person. In a purely verbal way I can agree that suffering of the human applies to the person. But if the Logos doesn't actually experience suffering, then I don't think that assertion means very much. We still end up with a pretty critical human experience that doesn't reflect God.

I don’t know how the Reformed use it; I believe my Lutheran friends such as our mutual and beloved friend @MarkRohfrietsch , who has attested to your wisdom and character, and who told me you were one of the founders of the Traditional Theology forum, for which I thank you and admire you, use the phrase in the same way that the Early Church Fathers and the Orthodox use it.

The Lutheran tradition uses the communication of attributes to cause the two natures to exchange properties. Hence Christ's body can be present everywhere, because the divine property of ubuiquity is transferred to the human nature.

It would be more correct to say that the Lutheran and Patristic tradition allows the two natures to communicate attributes, so that what one says about Jesus Christ is true with respect to both His deity and His humanity. This is a consequence of the Council of Ephesus and the rejection of Nestorianism. The Blessed Virgin Mary is the Mother of God because she gave birth to Christ, who is God, when He put on our human nature and she conceived by means of the supernatural interaction of the Holy Spirit with her, while remaining a virgin perpetually (a fact affirmed even by John Calvin, who also reluctantly acknowledged the technical accuracy of the term Theotokos with regards to the Blessed Virgin Mary despite the fact that, in contrast to Martin Luther, Calvin was, for some reason, opposed to the veneration of the Theotokos, whereas Luther strongly supported her veneration, in respect of which Luther was correct, but unfortunately most contemporary Protestants including many members of Lutheran churches ignore him on this point and inadvertently engage in what amounts to crypto-antidicomarianism and in some cases, crypto-Nestorianism, and in a few cases such as John MacArthur, what can only be regarded as neo-Nestorianism.

The communication has caused the human nature to gain an ability it wouldn't normally have. If this allows the divine nature to suffer for real because the ability to suffer is communicated to it, then it probably resolves the issue. But in that case it's no longer impassible, since the ability to suffer has been transferred to it.

That would be streching it a bit, since communicatio idiomatum does not change the humanity or deity of our Lord. It merely prevents their division.

Thus, the principle of communicatio idiomatum prevents us from denying that the Blessed Virgin Mary gave birth to God, and it prevents us from saying that Jesus Christ was not God in the flesh, and it allows us to say of Christ’s resurrection that it is a fulfillment of the prophetic Psalm “Arise O God, and let Thy enemies be scattered,” the enemies of God being death and sin.

What it does not do is change the humanity or divinity of Christ.

 

[Gregory Thompson]

I am reminded of another saying "if we suffer with Him we will be glorified with Him." Does that mean God is presently suffering with us, or something else?

 

[Lukaris]

Is there any offcial, or traditional understanding of what it means to say that the single divine-human person suffers?

With a human it's fairly easy. If my foot is injured, I'm injured as a person. But I have a unified consciousness, which would experience anything happenng to any part of me.

It's not so clear that this is true of the God-man. While consciousness in the modern sense probably isn't covered by theology, it seems likely that the human nature has a human consciousness. That would suffer when Christ suffers as a human. But Aquinas seems to say that the Logos can't suffer: "n the contrary, Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epict.): "The Word is impassible whose Nature is Divine." But what is impassible cannot suffer. Consequently, Christ's Passion did not concern His Godhead." It's not obvious that there is anything independent of those two natures that could support a whole-person experience. Now obviously theologians would assert that as a single person, the person of the God-man suffers when Jesus suffers. But I'm trying to get a sense of what that actually means.

God is said to be long suffering in Psalm 86:15. The Word is God ( John 1:1-3) the Word was made flesh ( John 1:14, per John 1-18). Doesn’t the sense of suffering for us be included with grace, mercy, compassion etc as David refers to in Psalm 86?

 

[The Liturgist]

Hence Christ's body can be present everywhere, because the divine property of ubuiquity is transferred to the human nature.

With regards to this Eucharistic question, it is not communicatio idiomatum that facilitates the miracle of the Real Presence; rather Orthodox and Lutherans generally agree that this is a sacred mystery, a supernatural miracle. Additionally, from an Orthodox perspective, we would not say, and I don’t think Lutherans or Anglo Catholics would say, that we partake only of the human body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist, because St. Peter refers to us as partakers of the Divine Nature.

Theodore of Mopsuestia proposed a unusual Eucharistic theology, which I don’t agree with, but which might give you something interesting to chew on: he suggested that the Prothesis, the liturgy of preparation, transforms the bread and wine into the crucified body and blood of Christ, and the Epiclesis then causes them to become His resurrected body and blood, which also points to the reality that in the Resurrection, Christ, having become fully human on the Cross and in so doing having recreated us in his own image, as prophesied in Genesis 1, did rise, as we will, uncorruptible, and in His uncorruptible form, demonstrated even more dynamic supernatural capabilities than we saw before His crucifixion, for example, our Lord appears suddenly, and disappears, and He is not immediately recognized in most cases, and furthermore, He also passes through closed doors, yet he is not a spectre, for St. Thomas touches His wounds and He does eat a luncheon including, interestingly enough, fish, with the disciples (this suggests CS Lewis was in error, or perhaps I misunderstood him, when he appeared to suggest that in the eschaton we will entirely transcend the gastronomic, since if that were the case, our Lord would not have dined with the disciples).