Does preknowledge of sin = creating sin?

[holyrokker]

This is actually almost correct.

All future events are the result of earlier obtaining conditions whose occurrence is sufficient for the occurrence of the event. Said differently, it must be the case that if these earlier conditions obtain, then the future event will occur.

I don't know if this will help or not, but try and think of it like this: either it will rain here on March 30th or it will not. Statements of the future are either true or false of when spoken today.

OK - I can accept this (for the most part).

Now what of moral choice? Can God know, from all eternity past, what each individual person will choose; or does He simply know what each individual can, or may, choose and all the subsequent results of each possible choice?

 

[elopez]

OK - I can accept this (for the most part).

Now what of moral choice? Can God know, from all eternity past, what each individual person will choose; or does He simply know what each individual can, or may, choose and all the subsequent results of each possible choice?

What part still troubles you? You know that is essentially what determinism is, correct?

Both. Consider it like this. If God knows what each individual can or may choose and all the other possibilities, then He would also know what each individual would actually choose and not just what he could possibly choose. That is if God's knowledge is infallible and perfect.

 

[ittarter]

I just want to say you are being clear. I'm hearing you man. I don't think you're hearing me though. Could you explain in my last post what exactly you disagreed with? I don't see how you could if you believe in foreknowledge.

I don't actually believe in any of this stuff because I don't accept an anthropomorphic model of God that would require me to ask a question about divine knowledge, at least not in these terms. I'm just trying to understand the argument and help out the OP.

Foreknowledge means that God knew of an event prior to it's happening, correct? Does that not mean that knowledge of the event precedes the event? If not, explain how not.

Correct. Knowledge precedes the event.

If so, it is knowledge that determines the event as this knowledge not only, one, precedes the actuality of the event but two, must be infallible lest we say that God's knowledge is incorrect.

Neither of these arguments works. One. Just because one thing happens before another thing doesn't mean one determines (causes) the other. Two. Assumes that God is infallible, and there are many arguments to be considered (biblical and otherwise) before this may be assumed. Better to argue it this way: IF God is infallible THEN divine knowledge determines events. Much stronger argument.

If we say that God foreknows of event x, but then something other than x happens, God's foreknowledge would be in error. Do you follow that and agree?

Nope. Don't agree. See below.

So let me say this. You are correct to say that knowledge is not a causal relation, well because it isn't. I agree. But that''s not what I'm saying, rather that that knowledge must be certain and infallible which means the event must happen and nothing other than that event can happen. If God foreknows x, x must come to transpire. That is what I mean that God's knowledge is deterministic. Not that God directly sets the future Himself, but by foreknowing the future it must happen.

"Determine" = causality, in my books. It sounds like this is a mere semantic war we are having.

I want to add one more thing. The notion of foreknowledge isn't compatible with the libertarian meaning of free will. There is only one future, and that is the future that God infallibly knows from eternity. This means free will should be defined differently, in the compatible sense were determinism and free will co - exist.

There has been a lot of philosophical debate on this and basically runs into the chicken-and-the-egg problem. If you know that x is going to happen, then that means y cannot happen. But if y cannot happen, then x cannot be a free event (so the argument runs). Frankly I'm not convinced but this is way above my pay grade so I'm going to duck out of this one. Otherwise my brain gets all twisty and I fall over or forget to eat dinner....

 

[elopez]

I don't actually believe in any of this stuff because I don't accept an anthropomorphic model of God that would require me to ask a question about divine knowledge, at least not in these terms. I'm just trying to understand the argument and help out the OP.

Gotcha. I don't think I can be blamed for taking you as someone who does believe this though, as it was totally unclear.

Correct. Knowledge precedes the event.

Yup.

Neither of these arguments works. One. Just because one thing happens before another thing doesn't mean one determines (causes) the other. Two. Assumes that God is infallible, and there are many arguments to be considered (biblical and otherwise) before this may be assumed. Better to argue it this way: IF God is infallible THEN divine knowledge determines events. Much stronger argument.

That's not precisely what I'm saying. I'm saying that if all future events are the result of earlier obtaining conditions whose occurrence would be sufficient for the occurrence of the event. That condition here is God's foreknowledge, which is sufficient enough to ensure that the event He foreknows of will happen. Why would we be arguing against an infallible God? Unless you're here suggesting God may arguably be fallible? I hardly doubt that can be derived from scripture.

Nope. Don't agree. See below.

So you think that God could have incorrect foreknowledge of something?

"Determine" = causality, in my books. It sounds like this is a mere semantic war we are having.

Semantic war over the word "determine"? I've defined it, what exactly of the definition do you disagree with?

There has been a lot of philosophical debate on this and basically runs into the chicken-and-the-egg problem. If you know that x is going to happen, then that means y cannot happen. But if y cannot happen, then x cannot be a free event (so the argument runs). Frankly I'm not convinced but this is way above my pay grade so I'm going to duck out of this one. Otherwise my brain gets all twisty and I fall over or forget to eat dinner....

I don't see how this runs into the chicken-egg issue because we have already agreed that knowledge precedes the event. We know which came first. I'm not convinced by this argument at all either. The argument merely assumes what free will is without actually showing what free will is.

 

[ittarter]

Gotcha. I don't think I can be blamed for taking you as someone who does believe this though, as it was totally unclear.

No blame implied. I never mentioned it before.

That's not precisely what I'm saying. I'm saying that if all future events are the result of earlier obtaining conditions whose occurrence would be sufficient for the occurrence of the event.

Check your grammar. This is a sentence fragment. I don't see the apodosis.

That condition here is God's foreknowledge, which is sufficient enough to ensure that the event He foreknows of will happen.

I don't see how foreknowledge ensures anything. Sorry if I'm being dense. Divine foreknowledge could function as the basis for someone else knowing, by derivation, what will happen. However I maintain that even divine knowledge must derive from the event -- unless we begin to speak of determinism and the predetermination of events according to the divine will. From your language I continue to understand you to be saying that it is BECAUSE of the knowledge that the event will happen, and to me this is jabberwocky.

Why would we be arguing against an infallible God? Unless you're here suggesting God may arguably be fallible? I hardly doubt that can be derived from scripture.

Well, you'd be wrong. The biblical texts, as in most areas theological, are not unanimous. The books of Genesis and Samuel are probably the strongest advocates for the conception of a fallible God. If you are interested, start a new thread and we can talk about it in depth.

So you think that God could have incorrect foreknowledge of something?

That is contradictory to the concept of foreknowledge. So, for the purposes of this argument, no.

Semantic war over the word "determine"? I've defined it, what exactly of the definition do you disagree with?

I don't know where you defined 'determinism' but your usage seems at variance with mine. I defined as synonymous to causality.

I don't see how this runs into the chicken-egg issue because we have already agreed that knowledge precedes the event. We know which came first. I'm not convinced by this argument at all either. The argument merely assumes what free will is without actually showing what free will is.[/quote]Then perhaps I misunderstood you. Please explain how determinism and free can exist in the same universe.

We seem to be experiencing an inordinate amount of miscommunication. I'm hoping the situation will improve.

 

[elopez]

No blame implied. I never mentioned it before.

I know, it's just that you came off as believing what you were talking about. It was confusing.

Check your grammar. This is a sentence fragment. I don't see the apodosis.

I'm sorry, I missed that somehow. Anyway, if those earlier sufficient conditions obtain then the future event will occur.

I don't see how foreknowledge ensures anything. Sorry if I'm being dense. Divine foreknowledge could function as the basis for someone else knowing, by derivation, what will happen. However I maintain that even divine knowledge must derive from the event -- unless we begin to speak of determinism and the predetermination of events according to the divine will. From your language I continue to understand you to be saying that it is BECAUSE of the knowledge that the event will happen, and to me this is jabberwocky.

When you say that divine knowledge must derive from the event it sounds as if that means the event precedes the knowledge. The event is not yet an actuality so how can it be said that the knowledge derives from it, also when the event does not precede the knowledge? Now let me further explain why I believe that and why I think you shouldn't be calling it jabberwocky, as the later agreement of foreknowledge being incorrect will reveal.

Well, you'd be wrong. The biblical texts, as in most areas theological, are not unanimous. The books of Genesis and Samuel are probably the strongest advocates for the conception of a fallible God. If you are interested, start a new thread and we can talk about it in depth.

Why would I make a new thread for that when it pertains to this conversation? Sounds unnecessary, as this would be support for your claim.

That is contradictory to the concept of foreknowledge. So, for the purposes of this argument, no.

Okay, here is why I think knowledge of the event means that it must happen. If it is contradictory to the concept of foreknowledge for it to be in error, then nothing other than what God foresees can happen. If nothing other than what God foresees can happen, then the event God foresees is going to happen necessarily. So if it is antithetical to claim that God's foreknowledge is in error, then the event God foreknows of must happen. Get it now?

I don't know where you defined 'determinism' but your usage seems at variance with mine. I defined as synonymous to causality.

The part I forgot to post.

Then perhaps I misunderstood you. Please explain how determinism and free can exist in the same universe.

I just don't understand how you are saying the issue of foreknowledge relates to the chicken-egg thing. In light of foreknowledge which implies there are no other alternatives that could happen than what God has foreseen, free will ought to be defined as the ability to do what we want or will to do without external and internal factors preventing us from acting. This naturally entails that one must poses the mental coherence to understand and evaluate the reasons and motives that one wish's to act upon.

We seem to be experiencing an inordinate amount of miscommunication. I'm hoping the situation will improve.

I'm having no problem understanding you. I don't really think it is that big a deal.

 

[ittarter]

When you say that divine knowledge must derive from the event it sounds as if that means the event precedes the knowledge.

In a universe where foreknowledge is possible, the future must be set; therefore the event precedes knowledge logically but not chronologically. Thus the future is not set (determined) by the knowledge in question, but rather by whatever factors are said to determine events generally (e.g. decisions, previous events, the butterfly flapping its wings).

The event is not yet an actuality so how can it be said that the knowledge derives from it, also when the event does not precede the knowledge?

If the event is not in some sense actual then the future cannot be known and foreknowledge as a concept is jabberwocky. The future is not yet a present reality, true, but the future must be said to "exist" or "be real" in a way that allows foreknowledge to be possible.

Why would I make a new thread for that when it pertains to this conversation? Sounds unnecessary, as this would be support for your claim.

For the purposes of this conversation it is only necessary for me to point out that many Christians disavow the belief in divine infallibility and as such cannot be presumed in an argument for foreknowledge.

I'd recommend leaving divine infallibility as a condition of the argument because it is complex in its own right and cannot be done justice as a subset of our own conversation.

Okay, here is why I think knowledge of the event means that it must happen. If it is contradictory to the concept of foreknowledge for it to be in error, then nothing other than what God foresees can happen. If nothing other than what God foresees can happen, then the event God foresees is going to happen necessarily. So if it is antithetical to claim that God's foreknowledge is in error, then the event God foreknows of must happen. Get it now?

To you, does saying the future MUST happen the same as saying the future WILL happen? If yes, then I disagree with the above. If no, then I probably agree with the above.

I just don't understand how you are saying the issue of foreknowledge relates to the chicken-egg thing. In light of foreknowledge which implies there are no other alternatives that could happen than what God has foreseen, free will ought to be defined as the ability to do what we want or will to do without external and internal factors preventing us from acting. This naturally entails that one must poses the mental coherence to understand and evaluate the reasons and motives that one wish's to act upon.

Free will cannot be defined on these terms, because that means if I want to fly and gravity stops me, free will is immediately disproven.

 

[elopez]

In a universe where foreknowledge is possible, the future must be set; therefore the event precedes knowledge logically but not chronologically. Thus the future is not set (determined) by the knowledge in question, but rather by whatever factors are said to determine events generally (e.g. decisions, previous events, the butterfly flapping its wings).

None of this is clear to me. You say the future is set because of foreknowledge but then the future is not set by foreknowledge but by other factors. Well, which is it? How is it that the event would precede the knowledge logically? I don't find this a coherent explanation because if the knowledge precedes the event chronologically then it cannot be said that other factors determined the event.

If the event is not in some sense actual then the future cannot be known and foreknowledge as a concept is jabberwocky. The future is not yet a present reality, true, but the future must be said to "exist" or "be real" in a way that allows foreknowledge to be possible.

All I'm saying is that the event doesn't exist as an actuality just yet, however that doesn't mean the event wouldn't "exist" conceptually and necessarily in the mind of God. We cannot confuse the meaning of existence here, as the event again wouldn't "exist" as an actuality when God foreknew of it.

For the purposes of this conversation it is only necessary for me to point out that many Christians disavow the belief in divine infallibility and as such cannot be presumed in an argument for foreknowledge.

I'd recommend leaving divine infallibility as a condition of the argument because it is complex in its own right and cannot be done justice as a subset of our own conversation.

Then I can point out the same, that many Christians do not believe God is fallible. And this is why we cannot leave infallibility out of the conversation: You've already agreed that the foreknowledge of God cannot be incorrect, as that is what it means for God's foreknowledge to be infallible. If God's foreknowledge cannot be incorrect, it is infallible knowledge of the future.

To you, does saying the future MUST happen the same as saying the future WILL happen? If yes, then I disagree with the above. If no, then I probably agree with the above.

Yes, what God foresees in the future will happen. Again we can only say that the future will not happen or something other than what God foreknows could happen unless God's foreknowledge is incorrect, a premise to which you already said is contradictory to the concept of foreknowledge.

Free will cannot be defined on these terms, because that means if I want to fly and gravity stops me, free will is immediately disproven.

Is it? I do not think it is as immediate as you think. I think you missed my definition of free will or perhaps have misunderstood it. I've defined it as the ability to do what we want or please. We do not have the ability or power to fly, so free will wouldn't be applicable in this situation. Put it this way:

Do you think because of your inability to fly that you could be held morally accountable if you do not fly when attempted to do so?

I am guessing you would think not. So if we cannot apply moral responsibility in respect to the laws of nature, neither can we with free will. Just because we cannot hold our breathe under water if we wanted or cannot fly doesn't mean one could not be free. You're basically confusing our ability and power to do something with a physical necessity or impossibility given the laws of nature.

 

[ittarter]

How is it that the event would precede the knowledge logically?

How could it be otherwise? If I know something is going to happen, the something has to be set before I am able to know it. Otherwise there's nothing to know. That's my understanding of the most basic premise of foreknowledge.

You say the future is set because of foreknowledge but then the future is not set by foreknowledge but by other factors

I mean "we know" that the future is set, if we are describing a world in which foreknowledge exists. Hence, we know this because of foreknowledge. NOT "we know this is because of foreknowledge." Important difference. The future itself is set by other factors. Unless we are describing a world in which the future is divinely DETERMINED, i.e., God decides what will happen and what won't happen.

All I'm saying is that the event doesn't exist as an actuality just yet, however that doesn't mean the event wouldn't "exist" conceptually and necessarily in the mind of God. We cannot confuse the meaning of existence here, as the event again wouldn't "exist" as an actuality when God foreknew of it.

Right. That's what I mean. The future exists conceptually -- in the mind of whoever knows it (e.g. God).

Then I can point out the same, that many Christians do not believe God is fallible. And this is why we cannot leave infallibility out of the conversation: You've already agreed that the foreknowledge of God cannot be incorrect, as that is what it means for God's foreknowledge to be infallible. If God's foreknowledge cannot be incorrect, it is infallible knowledge of the future.

Uhh..... I think I'm going to have to agree, again for the purposes of this conversation, as long as infallibility does not mean that God decided the event would occur -- only that he KNOWS the event will occur. That was why I disagreed the first time you brought this up -- you were connecting infallibility with God's own determining of future events, which, as far as I can tell, is distinct from mere foreknowledge.

So if we cannot apply moral responsibility in respect to the laws of nature, neither can we with free will. Just because we cannot hold our breathe under water if we wanted or cannot fly doesn't mean one could not be free. You're basically confusing our ability and power to do something with a physical necessity or impossibility given the laws of nature.

So free will assumes that our decisions are not determined by physical necessity or natural laws. Therefore we have the ability to choose, e.g., to pick up a fork or drop it, supposedly. No preexisting reality determines what I'm going to do. (I'm not sure I believe it, but in the end I have to live as if I have free will, so I'm not sure it's worth discussing.)

 

[elopez]

How could it be otherwise? If I know something is going to happen, the something has to be set before I am able to know it. Otherwise there's nothing to know. That's my understanding of the most basic premise of foreknowledge.

To me it just sounds the same as saying that the event precedes the knowledge chronologically. Are you saying that the future must exist in order for God to know it? I'm thrown off a little from your basic premise there.

I mean "we know" that the future is set, if we are describing a world in which foreknowledge exists. Hence, we know this because of foreknowledge. NOT "we know this is because of foreknowledge." Important difference. The future itself is set by other factors. Unless we are describing a world in which the future is divinely DETERMINED, i.e., God decides what will happen and what won't happen.

I honestly don't see the important difference, so could you explicitly state that difference? And couldn't this huge important difference be a matter of me accidentally typing "is"? And I think the future being set by other factors issue is cleared up once you have agreed that infallible simply means that God knows what will happen in the future and not decide for the event to occur. The world is in a sense determined because nothing other than what God foreknows can happen. There is only one future which God has foreknown infallibly. I think we could say the future event is causally related to one's desires and wants, as again this would be where the free will applies to God's foreknowledge: What God foreknows of is what man ultimately desires.

Right. That's what I mean. The future exists conceptually -- in the mind of whoever knows it (e.g. God).

But not only does it exist conceptually but also necessarily being that foreknowledge cannot be incorrect. I believe it is this necessity that God must be right that 'determines' the event. This is consistent in saying that knowledge precedes the event chronologically and given the definition of determinism I gave earlier.

Uhh..... I think I'm going to have to agree, again for the purposes of this conversation, as long as infallibility does not mean that God decided the event would occur -- only that he KNOWS the event will occur. That was why I disagreed the first time you brought this up -- you were connecting infallibility with God's own determining of future events, which, as far as I can tell, is distinct from mere foreknowledge.

No, it does not mean that and this is something I've continuously been saying is not connected. You can go back and read the posts where I've made this distinction. I don't know why you disagreed with me in the first place because nothing what I said then has changed now, I've only further expounded my earlier statements.

So free will assumes that our decisions are not determined by physical necessity or natural laws. Therefore we have the ability to choose, e.g., to pick up a fork or drop it, supposedly. No preexisting reality determines what I'm going to do. (I'm not sure I believe it, but in the end I have to live as if I have free will, so I'm not sure it's worth discussing.)

Only in some instances are our decisions determined by physical necessities or natural laws. I am saying free will assumes that we are not held liable for whatever determined physical necessities may happen. Free will in turn assumes we do not poses the ability to fly so it cannot be said that we have no free will because of that.

This doesn't mean that natural laws cannot determine our decisions, just that when or if they do we cannot be said to be free, which doesn't mean we do not have free will in general.

 

[ittarter]

To me it just sounds the same as saying that the event precedes the knowledge chronologically. Are you saying that the future must exist in order for God to know it?

Yes.

And I think the future being set by other factors issue is cleared up once you have agreed that infallible simply means that God knows what will happen in the future and not decide for the event to occur. The world is in a sense determined because nothing other than what God foreknows can happen. There is only one future which God has foreknown infallibly. I think we could say the future event is causally related to one's desires and wants, as again this would be where the free will applies to God's foreknowledge: What God foreknows of is what man ultimately desires.

Yes, I think we're on the same page.

But not only does it exist conceptually but also necessarily being that foreknowledge cannot be incorrect. I believe it is this necessity that God must be right that 'determines' the event.

Backwards. The event is going to happen. Foreknowledge is correct because the future will happen; God is right because the event will occur. The event does not happen BECAUSE God is infallible.

Only in some instances are our decisions determined by physical necessities or natural laws. I am saying free will assumes that we are not held liable for whatever determined physical necessities may happen. Free will in turn assumes we do not poses the ability to fly so it cannot be said that we have no free will because of that.

This doesn't mean that natural laws cannot determine our decisions, just that when or if they do we cannot be said to be free, which doesn't mean we do not have free will in general.

I dunno how you got to ethics and morality and responsibility. All we were talking about was free will.

One correction. In ALL instances our decisions are affected by natural laws. We have a range of possibilities within the realm of the possible, and (taking libertarian free will as our subject) we choose freely within that range.

Are we going somewhere with all this, or just talking?

 

[elopez]

Yes.

If the future must exist first in order for God to foreknow it, then knowledge does not precede the event chronologically as you have already agreed to. I've never came across an adherent of foreknowledge to believe that the future must exist in order for it to be known by God, so to me this isn't a basic premise. Remember though, we cannot equivocate what we mean here by "existence." I believe the future does exist conceptually for God but not as an actuality, but that still means the knowledge precedes the event in every way.

Yes, I think we're on the same page.

Good.

Backwards. The event is going to happen. Foreknowledge is correct because the future will happen; God is right because the event will occur. The event does not happen BECAUSE God is infallible.

Again I highly disagree unless you say the event precedes the knowledge chronologically which you already said it wouldn't. Why is the event going to happen? Is it because God's knowledge is infallible or for some other reason? If some other reason what is that reason?

I dunno how you got to ethics and morality and responsibility. All we were talking about was free will.

One correction. In ALL instances our decisions are affected by natural laws. We have a range of possibilities within the realm of the possible, and (taking libertarian free will as our subject) we choose freely within that range.

Are we going somewhere with all this, or just talking?

So are you suggesting that ethics and morality and responsibility are concepts that are to be excluded from the discussion of free will? One could not understand free will without understanding moral responsibility. On what terms do you think these concepts should be precluded from one another?

I guess it depends on if you want to take it anywhere. I was simply defining free will in which you argued against that definition, so what I was doing was replying to your argument. That's about as far as I was planning to take it unless you have further objections. And I have not defined a libertarian free will or am defending such but a compatiblist idea of free will.