Does determinism really negate free will?

[SelfSim]

Are you saying that you reject the reality of time?

No .. what I'm saying is that the meaning of 'there 'reality is whatever we decide it means. There are two ways known for doing that. One is way is believing that time is real (ie: by way of beliefs). The other way is via the scientific method (objective testing).

Science's definition (or meaning for time) is arrived at in a completely different way from some wishy-washy philosophical one (the latter of which ends up being completely impractical).

Here is a formal argument adapted from E. J. Lowe's Metaphysics:

1. Determinism is true {premise}
2. There are some free actions {premise}
3. My typing into the computer is a free action {premise}
4. All causation is event causation {From 1}
5. All events have causes {From 1}
6. My typing into the computer has an event cause, e1 {From 4, 5}
7. e1 has an event cause, e0 {From 4, 5, 6}
8. e0 has an event cause... {From 4, 5, 7}
9. e-50 is an event cause prior to my birth {Temporal reduction}
10. e-50 is outside of my control {From 9}
11. If x is outside of my control, and x causes y, then y is outside of my control
12. If x is outside of my control, then I do not cause it freely
13. Contradiction; throw out 1, 2, or 3​

Regarding responsibility, guilt, and innocence, consider the fact that we could substitute for (3) any human action. It does not need to be typing into the computer. On determinism all human actions will be outside of our control, and like the person who pleads insanity, one cannot be held responsible for actions which are outside their control. If no one can be held responsible for any of their actions, then no one can be guilty of anything at all; and if no one can be guilty, then no one can really be innocent either (for these terms are co-implicative). Thus if determinism is true, things like responsibility, guilt, and innocence do not exist. (Note that Frumious is driving in this direction as well, for neither are passive entities like LeafFilter, computers, or rats held (morally) responsible for their "actions.")

Aquinas, as usual, is more concise, "Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain" (ST I.83.1).

It'll take me a while to digest that ... I have no comment on it at the moment.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

All you'd get there is an expert's opinion (or belief).
My point is that there is no objective evidence that any of these emotions (eg: 'pleasure') or even 'mistakes' exist independently from humans' own (subjective) perceptions of what those emotions 'are'.

I agree we don't have access to other creature's subjective experience (even other people's), so we can only use behaviour as a guide. An expert might have observed that the behaviour is part of some social signalling (mating, dominance, etc), so is probably not a solitary 'just for the fun of it' behaviour. If not, it might be possible to monitor the physiological state of the bird to see whether it has a similar profile to ours when we're having fun; e.g. vertebrate brains share common reward neurotransmitters (dopamine, etc).

Same goes for 'mistakes' until we model what a mistake is (like what you did previously in defining 'truth' correspondence or correlation .. which I thought was cool).

I think we just have to agree on what we mean by 'mistake' in some context. Some people refuse to entertain any meaning that isn't consistent with their argument.

The philosophy of truth is quite extensive (and contentious) - I rather like idea that science is associated with 'convergence truth', i.e. that ideal model or explanation that all unbiased, objective independent observers will eventually converge on, given unlimited time

Which is all about what those people want .. and not about the dog.

I suspect a happy family dog reciprocates by seeing them as its pack. But judging by the unfortunate number of baby & child maulings, quite a few families have very little understanding of dog behaviour.

 

[Neogaia777]

I have a question for you all...?

If even one thing on one level can be definitely determined as being deterministic, say on the level of atoms in this case, how cannot everything that is built up upon it, or anything that makes up it, not be definitely determined to be absolutely deterministic also...?

God Bless!

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

My claim all along has been that the determinist will necessarily contradict himself, for it is not possible, even in principle, for him to avoid all self-contradiction.

And I have agreed that it's only possible to avoid some behavioural contradictions. But, as I said, failure to always live up to one's beliefs about how the world is or should be is not uncommon - I suspect it is universal.

But the determinists I know just see it as a fact about the world, they don't feel they have to live it as a lifestyle or religion; IOW, the knowledge that the world is deterministic is not sufficient to significantly change long-established habits of thought and behaviour, particularly how it feels, and how it feels is a major behavioural driver.

In a society where determinism was widely accepted and children grew up with that understanding, their behaviour would probably be more in keeping with it.

I already explained the problem and you are not addressing it. You have two possible logical responses to my argument: 1) deny that the consequence premise is present, or 2) deny that the consequence premise involves counterfactual possibility.

I'm afraid I don't understand the problem you seem to see. AFAICS there is nothing in the examples of decision-making previously given that is not already done by artificial systems.

I see two options here: 1) You are yet again failing to address the argument at hand, and are merely asserting that they magically choose between A and ~A, or 2)

There's no magic, just deterministic evaluation. As I said, if a chess program can do it, it is not a problem for deterministic systems.

You are talking about rats (in which case the words "evaluation" and "decision" are anthropomorphic word games). I assume you really are talking about rats here, no? Or did you intend this explanation to be beyond rats?

I wasn't talking about rats in particular - your example introduced an 'entity', so I followed suit. It was you that first introduced rats, for some reason that remains unclear...

By 'evaluation' I mean 'to judge or calculate the quality, importance, amount, or value of something'. In this context, the value of some course of action; e.g. is the outcome likely to be rewarding or not.

By 'decision' I mean a choice. For intelligent creatures, I don't consider them anthropomorphisms; for simple artificial systems, they probably are (the Dennettian 'intentional stance'); for complex ones, probably not, it's a fine line - did Alpha Go decide to play its surprising match-winning move to defeat the world champion on the basis of its evaluation of the position? Yes, I think that's an acceptable way to describe it - unless you want to define the words as something only humans, or conscious entities can do. I don't have a problem with it.

What I said applies to any creature with a brain complex enough for explicit modelling of consequences (projecting into the past and future) - which may require some degree of consciousness.

Again, you'll have to answer the question about rats above. If we want to play word games and we are talking about rats (or qualitatively equivalent entities), then <There is no problem with a deterministic entity "evaluating" both the potential outcome of doing A and the potential outcome of not doing A - or "evaluating" the potential outcome of many possible "choices."> If we don't want to play word games then yes, there is a problem with deterministic entities presupposing counterfactual possibility.

We can talk about rats if you want. So what, exactly is the problem you see with deterministic modelling of counterfactual scenarios?

Let's use a simpler example. Suppose I write a very simple computer program to feed my dog. Each day when the dog steps on a large scale, the computer distributes 235g of food if the dog weighs more than 60 lbs, or it distributes 265g of food if the dog weighs less than 60 lbs.

Apparently you would say that such a program is "evaluating" and "deciding" and perhaps even "thinking." But these really are word games. The computer is a passive instrument, and is not in truth evaluating or deciding, for such terms imply activity. It would be similarly false to claim that gutter sieve systems, such as LeafFilter, "evaluate" and "decide" when to let things pass into the rain gutter, depending on whether they are leaves or water.

Computers make decisions no more than LeafFilter does. You are becoming confused by the idea of a metaphorical predication. Saying that a computer decides or a rat makes mistakes is like saying that LeafFilter evaluates or that a basketball jumps. Such is not a coherent case for determinism; it is just sloppy philosophy of language.

I think it's more a matter of utility. When some system, natural or artificial, exhibits behaviour recognisably or sufficiently similar to human behaviour in some context, I think it's reasonable to use the same words to describe that behaviour. The question for me is where the line is drawn, i.e. what counts as sufficiently similar behaviour. That's a matter of judgement & preference. YMMV.

I'd say you're engaged in anthropomorphic word games, but it is helpful to know that you really do think rats make mistakes in the same way humans do. Apparently I was right all along, and you see humans as complex rats.

Lol!, no. Humans are primates, complex mammals. We share a common mammalian ancestor with rats, but the capabilities we've been discussing are widespread among vertebrates - even birds (e.g. corvids, parrots).

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Here is a formal argument adapted from E. J. Lowe's Metaphysics:

1. Determinism is true {premise}
2. There are some free actions {premise}
3. My typing into the computer is a free action {premise}
4. All causation is event causation {From 1}
5. All events have causes {From 1}
6. My typing into the computer has an event cause, e1 {From 4, 5}
7. e1 has an event cause, e0 {From 4, 5, 6}
8. e0 has an event cause... {From 4, 5, 7}
9. e-50 is an event cause prior to my birth {Temporal reduction}
10. e-50 is outside of my control {From 9}
11. If x is outside of my control, and x causes y, then y is outside of my control
12. If x is outside of my control, then I do not cause it freely
13. Contradiction; throw out 1, 2, or 3​

Regarding responsibility, guilt, and innocence, consider the fact that we could substitute for (3) any human action. It does not need to be typing into the computer. On determinism all human actions will be outside of our control, and like the person who pleads insanity, one cannot be held responsible for actions which are outside their control. If no one can be held responsible for any of their actions, then no one can be guilty of anything at all; and if no one can be guilty, then no one can really be innocent either (for these terms are co-implicative). Thus if determinism is true, things like responsibility, guilt, and innocence do not exist. (Note that Frumious is driving in this direction as well, for neither are passive entities like LeafFilter, computers, or rats held (morally) responsible for their "actions.")

Yep. Premises 2 & 3 are either ill-defined or contradict premise 1. Free will, moral responsibility, guilt, and innocence are terms to describe how we are accustomed to perceive behaviour in a social context.

Aquinas, as usual, is more concise, "Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain" (ST I.83.1).

No, that doesn't follow. As already explained, all those actions can influence future behaviour under either regime (determinism or non-determinism). Although experience shows that they are, nevertheless, often in vain...

 

[Neogaia777]

I have a question for you all...?

If even one thing on one level can be definitely determined as being deterministic, say on the level of atoms in this case, how cannot everything that is built up upon it, or anything that makes up it, not be definitely determined to be absolutely deterministic also...?

God Bless!

And if you do see everything as being deterministic maybe, then there is ever only one way a thing (or anything) (or everything) can ever go, correct?

So there never is/was, etc, ever any such thing as any other kinds of possibles or possibilities of ways things can or ever could go, correct?

And this in my mind, should make it very, very much easier to comprehend of a "God", or a "consciousness or mind or intelligence", etc, behind it all, and that may have initiated it all, etc, from the very beginning of it all, correct? And would also pretty easily explain its knowledge of it all, and powers of prediction over or about it all, as well, correct? Or at least it makes it far more simple at least, etc, correct? Everything goes in a "straight line", correct?

Unless you want to get into some kind of theory about other universes or a multiverse, or that this universe crosses other universes/multiverses and they cross ours, etc, then that is the only way that I can see to shoot this theory down, or account for any other kinds of possible possibilities ever being real and/or possible, correct?

But those are way off in the left field of even being real or even remotely possible as even theories right now, as there is absolutely no evidence that can even begin to support a or any kind of proof of them right now, correct?

Anyway, just some of my thoughts, etc...

God Bless!

 

[Neogaia777]

And if you do see everything as being deterministic maybe, then there is ever only one way a thing (or anything) (or everything) can ever go, correct?

So there never is/was, etc, ever any such thing as any other kinds of possibles or possibilities of ways things can or ever could go, correct?

And this in my mind, should make it very, very much easier to comprehend of a "God", or a "consciousness or mind or intelligence", etc, behind it all, and that may have initiated it all, etc, from the very beginning of it all, correct? And would also pretty easily explain its knowledge of it all, and powers of prediction over or about it all, as well, correct? Or at least it makes it far more simple at least, etc, correct? Everything goes in a "straight line", correct?

Unless you want to get into some kind of theory about other universes or a multiverse, or that this universe crosses other universes/multiverses and they cross ours, etc, then that is the only way that I can see to shoot this theory down, or account for any other kinds of possible possibilities ever being real and/or possible, correct?

But those are way off in the left field of even being real or even remotely possible as even theories right now, as there is absolutely no evidence that can even begin to support a or any kind of proof of them right now, correct?

Anyway, just some of my thoughts, etc...

God Bless!

Oh, and about the whole "God/mind/consciousness/intelligence" part of it, I am not saying there is 100% absolute proof of that right now either, other than maybe just the intelligence in the design, or that one supposes they see in the design, which is subjective to the views of the beholder, and so is not 100% absolute proof right now, etc...

Just so I'm not misunderstood here, etc...

I think I see intelligence behind it, and I think it is by design, or I see design, etc, but others may not, and that's fine for right now I guess, etc...

IOW's, that part, is part of what I "believe", and beliefs are subjective, etc...

God Bless!

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

And if you do see everything as being deterministic maybe, then there is ever only one way a thing (or anything) (or everything) can ever go, correct?

So there never is/was, etc, ever any such thing as any other kinds of possibles or possibilities of ways things can or ever could go, correct?

Well, that's a tricky philosophical and scientific question. For example, if you do a measurement of a quantum system that is in a superposition of states with respect to the property you are measuring, the outcome will be that you will observe the system to be in one of those states. The probability that you will observe it in some particular state is well-defined, but that's all you know. So you might know that there's a 70% chance of observing state X and 30% chance of observing state Y, but there's no way to predict which one you'll observe. It seems random.

So if you observe state X, it's reasonable to say it could have been different, i.e. you could have observed state Y. But there is also a deterministic way to interpret this.

When the measuring instrument interacts with the quantum system to measure it, it becomes entangled with it (quantum entanglement has been demonstrated, and the measuring device is also a quantum system) and effectively joins the superposition of states, becoming a superposition of 'measuring device that observes state X' and 'measuring device that observes state Y'. When you observe the measuring device to see what the outcome was, you, as a quantum system yourself, also become entangled with it, becoming 'you observing device showing X' and 'you observing device showing Y'.

This entanglement rapidly spreads to include the whole universe, so everything is in a superposition of 'universe where the quantum system was observed to be in state X' and 'universe where the quantum system was observed to be in state Y'. For the 'you' in the superposition that observed state X it seems like you observed the most likely state X at random (70% probability), and for the 'you' in the superposition that observed state Y, it seems like you observed the less likely state Y at random. When the universe is entangled this way, both outcomes of the observation have occurred, and each is effectively in a separate universe - this is (very roughly) the 'Many Worlds' interpretation of QM, which is completely deterministic and observers only see randomness because they're are entangled in multiple separate 'worlds' too.

So no one knows whether the universe is fundamentally random or fundamentally deterministic; either things happen randomly and could have been different, or all allowable outcomes happen and it just looks random because we're part of a larger ensemble. Either way, we don't experience it as fully deterministic. Other QM interpretations are available, both random and deterministic, so those examples aren't exhaustive.

And this in my mind, should make it very, very much easier to comprehend of a "God", or a "consciousness or mind or intelligence", etc, behind it all, and that may have initiated it all, etc, from the very beginning of it all, correct?

I don't see how that follows at all, and why would it be easier to comprehend a god that makes a simple universe rather than a very complex one?

 

[Neogaia777]

Well, that's a tricky philosophical and scientific question. For example, if you do a measurement of a quantum system that is in a superposition of states with respect to the property you are measuring, the outcome will be that you will observe the system to be in one of those states. The probability that you will observe it in some particular state is well-defined, but that's all you know. So you might know that there's a 70% chance of observing state X and 30% chance of observing state Y, but there's no way to predict which one you'll observe. It seems random.

So if you observe state X, it's reasonable to say it could have been different, i.e. you could have observed state Y. But there is also a deterministic way to interpret this.

When the measuring instrument interacts with the quantum system to measure it, it becomes entangled with it (quantum entanglement has been demonstrated, and the measuring device is also a quantum system) and effectively joins the superposition of states, becoming a superposition of 'measuring device that observes state X' and 'measuring device that observes state Y'. When you observe the measuring device to see what the outcome was, you, as a quantum system yourself, also become entangled with it, becoming 'you observing device showing X' and 'you observing device showing Y'.

This entanglement rapidly spreads to include the whole universe, so everything is in a superposition of 'universe where the quantum system was observed to be in state X' and 'universe where the quantum system was observed to be in state Y'. For the 'you' in the superposition that observed state X it seems like you observed the most likely state X at random (70% probability), and for the 'you' in the superposition that observed state Y, it seems like you observed the less likely state Y at random. When the universe is entangled this way, both outcomes of the observation have occurred, and each is effectively in a separate universe - this is (very roughly) the 'Many Worlds' interpretation of QM, which is completely deterministic and observers only see randomness because they're are entangled in multiple separate 'worlds' too.

So no one knows whether the universe is fundamentally random or fundamentally deterministic; either things happen randomly and could have been different, or all allowable outcomes happen and it just looks random because we're part of a larger ensemble. Either way, we don't experience it as fully deterministic. Other QM interpretations are available, both random and deterministic, so those examples aren't exhaustive.

I don't see how that follows at all, and why would it be easier to comprehend a god that makes a simple universe rather than a very complex one?

Well, to the first, the quantum world/realm/level is the "building blocks" (basically) of atoms, correct?

And if atoms (always) behave deterministically, then how cannot what makes it/them (up) also be so also, to some degree, etc, or perhaps at every degree, etc?

And as to the last, having only one possible way things can ever happen or go, etc, "ever", etc, makes causing things/determining things/predetermining things, predicting/foretelling things, etc, much more simpler, and far, far easier to see/ and/or understand to the finite mind, correct?

I see you liked my post #203, but in it, I did not just mean the things that atoms make on the larger levels, etc, but also what they are made up of or from on the smaller ones also, etc...

Do you think it is all deterministic? and that there ever was/is/is still, etc, only one way things ever could, or can, or do always, etc, "go", etc, at all ever, or from the very beginning at all ever...?

Do you think there is only one path...? or that there are multiple different possibilities, etc...?

God Bless!

 

[Kylie]

It seems as if most people believe that if reality is deterministic then there's no such thing as free will, which seems like a fairly straight forward assumption, but is it in fact true?

Does determinism mean that under the same circumstances you couldn't have made any other choice or does it simply mean that under the same circumstances you wouldn't have made any other choice? You would still have free will, it's just that given the same circumstances you would freely make the same choice, and this would hold true in every set of circumstances. So deterministic or not, you would always make the same choice.

To argue that determinism negates free will seems to suggest that there's some neurotic form of you that's never sure what it's going to do. That's totally unpredictable. Would you rather that that's the case, that your will is totally neurotic? Or would you prefer that determinism simply means that what you choose to do, would always be what you would choose to do.

So, then the question becomes even harder, how do you tell the difference between a reality in which you're forced to always make the same choice, and one in which you would always freely make the same choice, wouldn't they look the same?

I think the difference between the two options you present is irrelevant.

If there is free will, then there must be at least two different options I can pick, and each option must be capable of being chosen.

For example, if I have to decide between a pizza or a burger for dinner, then if I have free will, the chances of me picking each one must be greater than 0%. If for any reason, the chances of me picking the burger drop to 0% before I pick one, then I am no longer making a free choice.

 

[Neogaia777]

@FrumiousBandersnatch

Because, as far as quantum entanglement goes, if we ever get there one day, I think we will discover, eventually, that the way that everything becomes "entangled", was already predisposed, or was already determined/predetermined already, deterministically.

God Bless!

 

[durangodawood]

....Aquinas, as usual, is more concise, "Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain" (ST I.83.1).

Depends what he means "in vain". All those would still be part of the cause-effect chain in a deterministic world. And so every instance would have an effect.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Consider determinism by looking at randomness - sort of a philosophical opposite to determinism. The concept of randomness has also created problems for the human mind. In information theory we say that randomness can only be understood in the context of what one knows about the phenomenon. Since two people may know different things, it is possible that something is random to one person, but not to another person. Today this is best illustrated in the field of encryption. In really good encryption systems, the encrypted message appears totally random, if you do not know the decryption key. But to those who have the decryption key, the message makes perfect sense, and is obviously not random.

Applying this way of thinking to the present problem, we can say that the choices people make in life are their free-will choices. They are not "determined" in any sense that we can detect from our own knowledge. However we do see certain aspects of creation are subject to determinism through the laws of nature: a dropped object falls to the ground - water evaporates in dry air - etc. Some aspects of creation are deterministic (to us) and some aspects of creation are not (to us). I use the qualifier, "to us," in light of the understanding from the previous paragraph where randomness (and therefore determinism) depends on who is doing the perceiving.

We believe that God created the universe and is not bound by time, so He sees all outcomes. In the mind of God, everything has been determined. Does that mean we should think of our choices as "pre-determined"? Not necessarily. If we use the qualified understanding of what determinism means, we can still say that to us, we have free will and should continue to act as if we have free will. To imagine that our choices are constrained is to try to imagine what creation looks like from the eye of God. But that is impossible. There are some things we just were not meant to know. The fact that God knows these things does not mean we can act as if those things are known from the human perspective.

As a side note, even Jesus said of the future "only the Father knows". This might seem contradictory to the belief that Jesus is the second person of the Trinity, and is also God. But in taking on a human form, the second person of the Trinity willingly emptied himself of so many aspects of divinity, so as to relate more perfectly with humanity. I assume this includes emptying himself of that perfect knowledge of the future, so that would lead him to say "only the Father knowns." Obviously he did not empty himself of all knowledge of the future, for he still could predict the destruction of the temple and other events, including, for example, Peter's denial.

Now that I think of it, Peter's denial is a perfect example of the determinism / free-will debate. Jesus predicted that Peter would deny him three times before the [bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse] crowed. So from God's perspective, Peter's choice was determined. But I still think Peter was not forced to make that choice by anything outside of his free-will control. He freely choose to deny Jesus, despite the fact that he was sure he would not do it just a few hours earlier.

Getting back to information theory, suppose God is all knowing has designed the universe with infinitely secure encryption. But rather than make all of creation appears as chaos to us, he embedded certain patterns into creation that are readily observable by the mind of man. These scientists would eventually call the "Laws of Nature." They are only "laws" because they seem to be predictable - repeatable. They are not laws in any other sense. In fact, many of these so-called laws were found to be slightly or grossly in error, and were superseded by better and more accurate laws. Einstein's Theory of Relativity is an example. This understanding of the laws of nature puts God above those laws. He is not bound by them, since He created them in the first place, and they are not actually laws except that God made those patterns to look like laws.

 

[Neogaia777]

@LeafByNiggle

My conversation with Cormack here in this thread: "Is faith a gift, or a choice...?, Cause it cannot be both..." Predestination and free will...?" might be of some use here, it starts with this post linked here (#78) and goes to about post #90, I am recommending that all of you check it out and comment on it either here or there if you like...?

Posts #84, #87, and #90 are probably the more or most important ones pertaining to this discussion and this topic here, and what you posted just now @LeafByNiggle here...

Our perspective of choice comes from not knowing, etc...

God Bless!

 

[partinobodycular]

For example, if I have to decide between a pizza or a burger for dinner, then if I have free will, the chances of me picking each one must be greater than 0%. If for any reason, the chances of me picking the burger drop to 0% before I pick one, then I am no longer making a free choice.

So you're discounting the possibility that the will itself can be "biased" in some manner. Such that given the same options it would make the same choice. For example it would always choose pizza over a bowl of live worms. The fact that you would always make the same choice doesn't mean that you don't have free will. It just means that the will itself can somehow be biased.

On the other hand, if free will isn't biased in some manner then aren't its choices simply random? And if its choices are random then it's not really free will at all. It can't freely "choose" anything.

Thus it would seem that free will requires biases? The only difference being that with free will those biases must somehow be internally generated and not externally generated. Thus you can have free will yet theoretically always make the same choice given the same circumstances.

Another option would be that the will itself is indeterminate and unpredictable, thus the idea that it's neurotic, you never know what it's going to do. It still has biases, but they change.

Doesn't free will require biases, because without them one's choices are simply random. And if one has biases then isn't it possible that given the same circumstances one would always make the same choice?

 

[partinobodycular]

This understanding of the laws of nature puts God above those laws. He is not bound by them, since He created them in the first place, and they are not actually laws except that God made those patterns to look like laws.

But is God truly above those laws? Or is He too constrained by them?

What I mean by this isn't that God is subject to the law of gravity for example, but rather that as the Creator of reality He's constrained to the laws that underpin reality.

One of the arguments for God comes from idea of fine-tuning, that if the fundamental laws of nature were even slightly different then we wouldn't exist. So God had no choice about how to create reality, only about if to create reality.

I recognize that this is in essence Euthypro's dilemma. But how is it incorrect?

 

[Chesterton]

And I have agreed that it's only possible to avoid some behavioural contradictions. But, as I said, failure to always live up to one's beliefs about how the world is or should be is not uncommon - I suspect it is universal.

But the determinists I know just see it as a fact about the world, they don't feel they have to live it as a lifestyle or religion; IOW, the knowledge that the world is deterministic is not sufficient to significantly change long-established habits of thought and behaviour, particularly how it feels, and how it feels is a major behavioural driver.

In a society where determinism was widely accepted and children grew up with that understanding, their behaviour would probably be more in keeping with it.

Zippy writes about the problem of the contradictions, and you reply with contradictions. I have to admit, you're very good at choosing your words carefully, but not good enough to hide the fact that you're saying the knowledge that the world is deterministic is not enough to make people behave deterministically, which is a non-sensical contradiction.

 

[BNR32FAN]

It seems as if most people believe that if reality is deterministic then there's no such thing as free will, which seems like a fairly straight forward assumption, but is it in fact true?

Does determinism mean that under the same circumstances you couldn't have made any other choice or does it simply mean that under the same circumstances you wouldn't have made any other choice? You would still have free will, it's just that given the same circumstances you would freely make the same choice, and this would hold true in every set of circumstances. So deterministic or not, you would always make the same choice.

To argue that determinism negates free will seems to suggest that there's some neurotic form of you that's never sure what it's going to do. That's totally unpredictable. Would you rather that that's the case, that your will is totally neurotic? Or would you prefer that determinism simply means that what you choose to do, would always be what you would choose to do.

So, then the question becomes even harder, how do you tell the difference between a reality in which you're forced to always make the same choice, and one in which you would always freely make the same choice, wouldn't they look the same?

This seems very similar to the age old question does a tree that falls in the forest when no one is around make a sound? All we can really do is speculate.

 

[partinobodycular]

This seems very similar to the age old question does a tree that falls in the forest when no one is around make a sound? All we can really do is speculate.

True, no matter how skillfully employed reasoning isn't always an effective tool. Sometimes people put a little too much stock in it.

 

[BNR32FAN]

True, no matter how skillfully employed reasoning isn't always an effective tool. Sometimes people put a little too much stock in it.

I agree it would be interesting to understand the mechanism by which we make choices but I just don’t see how we can arrive at any sort or definitive conclusion on the subject.