Does determinism really negate free will?

[zippy2006]

Thanks, because I had never actually considered that idea, it's quite interesting. It's gonna take me a while to wrap my head around it. I can see how it could be argued that it's not deterministic, and yet not completely random either. But I'm still trying figure out how this whole process would work such that the conscious mind ends up being the final arbiter in the process. If you have any further thoughts on it feel free to share them, otherwise I'm gonna sleep on it, it's fascinating.

Regarding free will, the more relevant corollary than dualism would be "theism," or more precisely, the complement of materialism.

If you follow OB and start with a materialistic axiom, then a mechanistic and deterministic worldview tends to follow. But very many philosophers throughout history, religious and non-religious alike, rejected materialism, believed in spiritual realities, and believed that mind is more fundamental to reality than matter (and that matter itself is in some sense infused or guided by a foundational mind). Obviously Idealism was the most extreme example, but the various schools of Platonism constitute more moderate examples. On that view the existence of minds and agent causation isn't strange at all.

 

[SelfSim]

.. If a mistake were a disadvantageous action then rats, amoebae, and grass would make mistakes, but that's absurd.

A rat in my roof space committed a disadvantageous action the other day .. he ate the rat-bait I put there.

 

[zippy2006]

Hmm ... In order to strengthen OB's point from an objective viewpoint, I'd reword your original descriptions of "D" and "P" from:

• D1: Everything which exists in the entire universe is reducible to nothing more than deterministic laws.
• P1: Things like personality, bias, guilt, and innocence exist.

to:

• D2: Objective existence makes practical use of the notion of determinism in order to make predictions;
• P2: Personality, bias, guilt, and innocence are then predictions from that objective existence.

A few quick points:

1. You are shifting OB's axiom from metaphysical determinism to methodological determinism, but I think his inferential exclusion of free will requires metaphysical determinism. Methodological determinism won't be sufficient. D1 is therefore required, but I think it is also an accurate characterization of OB's claim.
   
2. In D2 I would prefer "causation" to "determinism."
   
3. I don't think things like personality, bias, guilt, and innocence can be said to be predictions or conclusions. We encounter them much more like facts of existence than as conclusions of methodological determinism (or as remote deductions of any kind). This is of course my point, but I think it is also uncontroversial. Most determinists are happy to admit that we are deeply deceived when it comes to such 'facts'.

 

[SelfSim]

You are shifting OB's axiom from metaphysical determinism to methodological determinism, but I think his inferential exclusion of free will requires metaphysical determinism. Methodological determinism won't be sufficient. D1 is therefore required, but I think it is also an accurate characterization of OB's claim.

Ok .. fair enough.

In D2 I would prefer "causation" to "determinism."

I think in science, the physical notion of cause and effect involves information and prediction, so on that basis, I agree with your change there.

I don't think things like personality, bias, guilt, and innocence can be said to be predictions or conclusions. We encounter them much more like facts of existence than as conclusions of methodological determinism (or as remote deductions of any kind). This is of course my point, but I think it is also uncontroversial. Most determinists are happy to admit that we are deeply deceived when it comes to such 'facts'.

Hmm .. I'll have think about that one.

 

[SelfSim]

I don't think things like personality, bias, guilt, and innocence can be said to be predictions or conclusions. We encounter them much more like facts of existence than as conclusions of methodological determinism (or as remote deductions of any kind). This is of course my point, but I think it is also uncontroversial. Most determinists are happy to admit that we are deeply deceived when it comes to such 'facts'.

Can we objectively define broad sets, (or combinations), of characteristics and then test for, say, the frequency of those across a human population? I think we can (and has already been done in the field of psychology).
Bias could also be done a similar way (and I'm sure already has been, too).

Guilt and innocence however, is generally dealt with by the judicial system, which is based more on logic tests than the scientific method, (ie: for eg, when compared with scientific research on causality and objective existence)?

I'm still trying to get to the essence of much of what's being discussed here. I suspect the missing link here is a non-meeting-of-the-minds about 'Objectivity'(?) Which for me, is more about process than the believed/posited existence of these things independently from human minds ..

 

[durangodawood]

So a man who argues for a position he believes in is to be discounted because he believes in it? Therefore logically the only reliable man would be the one who argues for a position he doesn't believe in. That's pretty weird, except according to the ethics of Clown World I guess.

Secondly, you complain that there's nothing there, then also complain that there're too many sources. You said you'd like some evidence. I gave you some. You claim to be a "seeker", but I guess you aren't a very enthusiastic seeker, or else that means that what you're seeking is to avoid ideas outside of your ideological comfort zone.

1. his avowed goal is to uphold Christian ideology rather than to just follow where truth leads. He puts the conclusion first.

2. Halfway in and we have no evidence for the beyond brain mind. Just one piece of evidence would be terrific.

3. There's no good way for me to discuss with you what you find compelling about the proposed evidence, as its a youtube bouncing from study to study with no depth and no good way to quote it. Its exceedingly difficult to even explain to you this insufficiency given the grab-bag format. Just one piece of evidence with a brief explanation of why it compels you would be great.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

No, there is no empirical evidence, only philosophical arguments.

The whole field of neuroscience disagrees with you.

That's lovely. If you could have made the words rhyme it would make a nice Hallmark greeting card for a teenage girl upon graduation from school or something, but I was half-hoping for a serious response from a highly intelligent man of science such as yourself.

Oh dear, I'm sorry to disappoint you.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

It is. That's how logic works. Either it is in principle possible for the determinist to avoid all self-contradictions, or else it isn't. The disjunction represents a contradictory pair, and is therefore exhaustive. There are no other options.

My point was that is possible to avoid some contradictions. I'm surprised you missed that.

Suppose you try to run with the Oxford definition to philosophically defend determinism. The first problem is that consequential thinking is counterfactual. Unintentional results are something like, <(P->Q); P; ∴ R>. Q was expected, but R was actualized. The first problem you run into is that the consequence premise involves counterfactual possibility (P->Q). The implicit claim is, "If I bring about P, then Q will occur; if I do not bring about P, then Q will not necessarily occur." Such consequential thinking makes no sense without the underlying premise that you are free to either bring about P or not bring about P, and that premise is excluded by determinism.

I don't see a problem: you know what you want to happen, so you take an action with the intent that it will achieve what you want (typically beneficial). If it doesn't achieve what you wanted but something else, that something else was unintended.

For the second problem, suppose an entity commits act A and an undesirable effect follows. You would presumably say that the next time the entity faces a similar decision they will decide whether, in light of the prior undesirable effect, they should commit act A or not commit act A. But to decide whether to do A or ~A also presupposes a counterfactual freedom that determinism excludes.

Not really. At the time of the subsequent opportunity to do A or ~A, the entity evaluates the situation and decides whether, in the new circumstances, A is likely to be successful. If the evaluation is positive, they do A, if not, they do not do A.

Note that in risk-averse individuals, the influence of the previous failure at doing A may be sufficient to bias the evaluation against doing A even if the new circumstances suggest a high probability of success ('once bitten, twice shy'). Alternatively, in risk-tolerant individuals, the previous failure at doing A may be discounted such that even if the new circumstances don't suggest a significantly greater chance of success, A is attempted again ('if, at first, you don't succeed...'). Of course, it depends on the individual's biases, the value of success doing A and how undesirable the previous failure was.

In any case, there is no problem with a deterministic entity evaluating both the potential outcome of doing A and the potential outcome of not doing A - or evaluating the potential outcome of many possible choices. Even hard-coded chess programs can do that.

It seems to me that the freedom you invoke is just the ability to take account of experience in the light of new information.

I think rats avoid the problem, but I don't think rats can actually be said to make mistakes.

So, presumably, it's not a mistake if a rat eats rat poison mistaking it for food...

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

A rat in my roof space committed a disadvantageous action the other day .. he ate the rat-bait I put there.

Dang! - I just posted that in a response (we really did have a problem with 'roof rabbits' earlier in the year).

 

[Chesterton]

1. his avowed goal is to uphold Christian ideology rather than to just follow where truth leads. He puts the conclusion first.

You should judge any content on the merits of the content. Anyway, that's unfair to him, because he often makes videos where he raises and addresses views opposing his own. Back when the New Atheists were a thing, I read them and listened to them, and I didn't dismiss them out of hand because of what I already knew they were. And I can't recall anyone of them raising opposing views, and they'd only address them when they were forced to in live debate.

2. Halfway in and we have no evidence for the beyond brain mind. Just one piece of evidence would be terrific.

Then pick one from those available. There's lots referenced in the video, and other videos of his. This seems like a bizarre attempt at gaslighting me.

3. There's no good way for me to discuss with you what you find compelling about the proposed evidence, as its a youtube bouncing from study to study with no depth and no good way to quote it. Its exceedingly difficult to even explain to you this insufficiency given the grab-bag format. Just one piece of evidence with a brief explanation of why it compels you would be great.

He's got a nice website (InspiringPhilosophy.org), if you're interested, which often deals with cutting-edge science and philosophy. He always includes screenshots of scientific papers he mentions so you can see titles, authors and dates. And if you're an anti-video snob the site also includes a recommended reading list.

 

[SelfSim]

Dang! - I just posted that in a response (we really did have a problem with 'roof rabbits' earlier in the year).

My post my have sounded amusing but it really did happen because I heard his death throws (from below). I chickened out in removing his dead remains though.
I found last season's definitely dead one there too, before I set this season's bait.

PS: I've seen birds make flying mistakes too!

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

My post my have sounded amusing but it really did happen because I heard his death throws (from below). I chickened out in removing his dead remains though.
I found last season's definitely dead one there too, before I set this season's bait.

I'm pretty sure one died somewhere in the cavity wall recently - there was a rash of big black flies in and around the place - no smell, so it may have been next door...

PS: I've seen birds make flying mistakes too!

Yes, me too - very funny.

 

[SelfSim]

Yes, me too - very funny.

What's 'funny' there, to me, is that its me telling myself that its funny. I don't know what the bird would think about it .. but so what? .. after all, 'funny' is a human word and its ridiculous to think a bird would know what 'funny' was. For the exact same reason its also ridiculous to think that a bird would even 'think' there also.

I have the same feeling whenever people tell me their dogs are their children.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

What's 'funny' there, to me, is that its me telling myself that its funny. I don't know what the bird would think about it .. but so what? .. after all, 'funny' is a human word and its ridiculous to think a bird would know what 'funny' was. For the exact same reason its also ridiculous to think that a bird would even 'think' there also.

I often see birds flying in a way that suggests they're doing it that way just for pleasure - maybe an expert could tell me otherwise, but it looks that way.

I have the same feeling whenever people tell me their dogs are their children.

I think it just means they have a strong emotional attraction to them so that they see them as members of the family.

 

[SelfSim]

I often see birds flying in a way that suggests they're doing it that way just for pleasure - maybe an expert could tell me otherwise, but it looks that way.

All you'd get there is an expert's opinion (or belief).
My point is that there is no objective evidence that any of these emotions (eg: 'pleasure') or even 'mistakes' exist independently from humans' own (subjective) perceptions of what those emotions 'are'.
Same goes for 'mistakes' until we model what a mistake is (like what you did previously in defining 'truth' correspondence or correlation .. which I thought was cool).

I think it just means they have a strong emotional attraction to them so that they see them as members of the family.

Which is all about what those people want .. and not about the dog.

 

[zippy2006]

Can we objectively define broad sets, (or combinations), of characteristics and then test for, say, the frequency of those across a human population? I think we can (and has already been done in the field of psychology).
Bias could also be done a similar way (and I'm sure already has been, too).

Sure, I suppose we could use statistical methods to test for bias.

Guilt and innocence however, is generally dealt with by the judicial system, which is based more on logic tests than the scientific method, (ie: for eg, when compared with scientific research on causality and objective existence)?

Well, we're not talking about legal standing, but rather the very existence of guilt and innocence in themselves. For example, we hold that insanity removes guilt because an insane person is not responsible for their actions. But if determinism is true, the same thing holds for everyone. If determinism is true then every human action was unavoidably predetermined from the time before any humans even existed, and there can be no guilt in failing to do the impossible.

 

[SelfSim]

Sure, I suppose we could use statistical methods to test for bias.

Or perhaps more accurately, produce test results which would give more meaning to any inference based conclusions of 'bias' that we already do know about there.

Well, we're not talking about legal standing, but rather the very existence of guilt and innocence in themselves.

Again, I think the legal process is used to add more meaning to any inference based conclusions of 'guilt' or 'innocence' that we already do know about, there.

Our minds constantly update our knowledge with more meaning(s) whenever new consistent data allows us to draw agreed logical inferences.

Otherwise: I don't understand what you mean by 'existence in {of} themselves'.

For example, we hold that insanity removes guilt because an insane person is not responsible for their actions. But if determinism is true, the same thing holds for everyone.

Well, everyone also (demonstrably) shares in a common mind type too, so drawing inferences about determinism being true, doesn't seem to produce evidence for discounting that objective observation there(?)

If determinism is true then every human action was unavoidably predetermined from the time before any humans even existed, and there can be no guilt in failing to do the impossible.

So I say the concept denoted by the term: 'time' there, is a human mind concept (just like all other word meanings .. no different). So 'time before any humans' is also just a mind model we use to imagine (envisage) such a scenario. It never gets objectively tested, so its just an untestable hypothetical .. same as the one you propose above, so therefore the condition: 'if determinism is true' will also remain an untestable hypothetical condition, (or just a belief, if you prefer).

 

[zippy2006]

My point was that is possible to avoid some contradictions. I'm surprised you missed that.

Well then your point was not to the point, for you were responding to my claim that <"The relevant question is whether it is possible to avoid [self-contradiction]."> As I already said, <"Responding to the claim that deterministic self-contradiction is impossible to avoid with analogies of self-contradictions that are possible to avoid is just more of the false equivalence I already pointed out.">

I don't deny that there exist possible contradictions that the determinist can avoid, and I never did. That is a very weak claim. My claim all along has been that the determinist will necessarily contradict himself, for it is not possible, even in principle, for him to avoid all self-contradiction.

I don't see a problem: you know what you want to happen, so you take an action with the intent that it will achieve what you want (typically beneficial). If it doesn't achieve what you wanted but something else, that something else was unintended.

I already explained the problem and you are not addressing it. You have two possible logical responses to my argument: 1) deny that the consequence premise is present, or 2) deny that the consequence premise involves counterfactual possibility.

Not really. At the time of the subsequent opportunity to do A or ~A, the entity evaluates the situation and decides whether, in the new circumstances, A is likely to be successful. If the evaluation is positive, they do A, if not, they do not do A.

I see two options here: 1) You are yet again failing to address the argument at hand, and are merely asserting that they magically choose between A and ~A, or 2) You are talking about rats (in which case the words "evaluation" and "decision" are anthropomorphic word games). I assume you really are talking about rats here, no? Or did you intend this explanation to be beyond rats?

In any case, there is no problem with a deterministic entity evaluating both the potential outcome of doing A and the potential outcome of not doing A - or evaluating the potential outcome of many possible choices. Even hard-coded chess programs can do that.

Again, you'll have to answer the question about rats above. If we want to play word games and we are talking about rats (or qualitatively equivalent entities), then <There is no problem with a deterministic entity "evaluating" both the potential outcome of doing A and the potential outcome of not doing A - or "evaluating" the potential outcome of many possible "choices."> If we don't want to play word games then yes, there is a problem with deterministic entities presupposing counterfactual possibility.

Even hard-coded chess programs can do that.

Let's use a simpler example. Suppose I write a very simple computer program to feed my dog. Each day when the dog steps on a large scale, the computer distributes 235g of food if the dog weighs more than 60 lbs, or it distributes 265g of food if the dog weighs less than 60 lbs.

Apparently you would say that such a program is "evaluating" and "deciding" and perhaps even "thinking." But these really are word games. The computer is a passive instrument, and is not in truth evaluating or deciding, for such terms imply activity. It would be similarly false to claim that gutter sieve systems, such as LeafFilter, "evaluate" and "decide" when to let things pass into the rain gutter, depending on whether they are leaves or water.

Computers make decisions no more than LeafFilter does. You are becoming confused by the idea of a metaphorical predication. Saying that a computer decides or a rat makes mistakes is like saying that LeafFilter evaluates or that a basketball jumps. Such is not a coherent case for determinism; it is just sloppy philosophy of language.

So, presumably, it's not a mistake if a rat eats rat poison mistaking it for food...

I'd say you're engaged in anthropomorphic word games, but it is helpful to know that you really do think rats make mistakes in the same way humans do. Apparently I was right all along, and you see humans as complex rats. As George MacDonald gestured, it is difficult to persuade a someone who has convinced himself that he is a beast, that he is in fact a man (or that men really do exist).

 

[SelfSim]

It would be similarly false to claim that gutter sieve systems, such as LeafFilter, "evaluate" and "decide" when to let things pass into the rain gutter, depending on whether they are leaves or water.

Well that's right because they either don't work, or they make way too many mistakes!
What with rats .. and now not-fit-for-purpose LeafFilters, I gotta ask: Have you been visiting my home without my knowing about it?
(Sorry .. couldn't resist).

 

[zippy2006]

So I say the concept denoted by the term: 'time' there, is a human mind concept (just like all other word meanings .. no different). So 'time before any humans' is also just a mind model we use to imagine (envisage) such a scenario. It never gets objectively tested, so its just an untestable hypothetical .. same as the one you propose above, so therefore the condition: 'if determinism is true' will also remain an untestable hypothetical condition, (or just a belief, if you prefer).

Are you saying that you reject the reality of time?

Otherwise: I don't understand what you mean by 'existence in {of} themselves'.

Well, everyone also (demonstrably) shares in a common mind type too, so drawing inferences about determinism being true, doesn't seem to produce evidence for discounting that objective observation there(?)

Here is a formal argument adapted from E. J. Lowe's Metaphysics:

1. Determinism is true {premise}
2. There are some free actions {premise}
3. My typing into the computer is a free action {premise}
4. All causation is event causation {From 1}
5. All events have causes {From 1}
6. My typing into the computer has an event cause, e1 {From 4, 5}
7. e1 has an event cause, e0 {From 4, 5, 6}
8. e0 has an event cause... {From 4, 5, 7}
9. e-50 is an event cause prior to my birth {Temporal reduction}
10. e-50 is outside of my control {From 9}
11. If x is outside of my control, and x causes y, then y is outside of my control
12. If x is outside of my control, then I do not cause it freely
13. Contradiction; throw out 1, 2, or 3​

Regarding responsibility, guilt, and innocence, consider the fact that we could substitute for (3) any human action. It does not need to be typing into the computer. On determinism all human actions will be outside of our control, and like the person who pleads insanity, one cannot be held responsible for actions which are outside their control. If no one can be held responsible for any of their actions, then no one can be guilty of anything at all; and if no one can be guilty, then no one can really be innocent either (for these terms are co-implicative). Thus if determinism is true, things like responsibility, guilt, and innocence do not exist. (Note that Frumious is driving in this direction as well, for neither are passive entities like LeafFilter, computers, or rats held (morally) responsible for their "actions.")

Aquinas, as usual, is more concise, "Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain" (ST I.83.1).