Do we have free will?

[Chesterton]

Not necessarily. We are still capable of changing our minds (or, rather, we will change our minds, if that is how the atoms just so happen to dance). That it's beyond our control doesn't mean it stops happening.

I think you're expressing two opposing ideas in one sentence: "we will change our minds, if the atoms happen to do something". If the atoms are the sole agent of change, then there is no "we". Our consciousnesses don't exist, they're an illusion perpetrated by mindless atoms. (An illusion of mind perpetrated by mindless atoms upon themselves, mind you. What an impossibly bizarre, nonsensical idea that is. If it were presented as an outlandish bit of science-fiction, the purists of the genre would likely frown upon it for being too outlandish. Yet determinists must actually believe it.)

What are they otherwise?

Well those particular answers cannot be otherwise. That's part of my argument, that the statement "We have no free will" has to be a meaningless statement.

But the answer "yes" can be otherwise. "Yes" would still be physical output, but not merely physical output; it could correspond to something outside itself, to another reality, or to an aspect of this reality, where things are real, where there can really be true and false. And this aspect of reality must exist if we are even able to assert that the most basic logic idea is true, such as A = A. Otherwise, A = A cannot be truly said to be true; it can only be said to appear true due to accidents of brain physics and chemistry.

The answer given depends on whether the person asked believes we have free will. If we don't, then his answer is determined solely by atoms and electrical discharge: he hears sound, his brain's synapses fire in particular ways, his muscles move, and the sound "No, we don't" is produced. Just because we don't have free will doesn't mean we don't learn and think and ponder and philosophise. It just means we don't have any real control, despite what we may think to the contrary.

Again, I think the question really is "Do we have a soul? Are we merely physical, or do we have another quality or aspect"?

In the above, you use the word "we" in conjunction with verbs like "believe" and "ponder". If humans are purely physical, then there is no such thing as "we". There are ultimately only atoms performing verb actions, and one of those verb actions happens to be the creation within us of the illusion of "we".

Consider how "I think, therefore I am" is a most stupidly obvious idea. You can apply it to any noun and any verb - "The ball rolls, therefore the ball exists." Then consider the corollary of "I think, therefore I am": "I do not think, therefore I am not." If it's only the atoms physically comprising me which are doing the thinking, then I do not exist. Therefore asking if we have free will is the same as asking if we exist.

But, then again, we may actually have free will, in which case the answer is whatever you want it to be.

Agreed. Except that the response can be whatever you want it to be. For better or worse, the real answer can only be one thing or the other. "Eh? Two views? There are a dozen views about everything until you know the answer. Then there's never more than one." From That Hideous Strength by C.S. Lewis.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Okay, we are saying here that whenever God watches our future it never changes, like the video tape, which would make our lives determined.

If your definition of 'determined' is 'one future foreknown by God', then yes, the future is determined. If you think this is trivial, there's an important distinction that I'll get to in a minute.

Oh, and I'm playing Devil's advocate here. I don't believe in either God, free will, or determinism. But it's fun to wear new shoes.

So what is free will if our future is destined?

We make choices.

Just like the way the planets orbit the sun, our lives will go a particular way too, only difference really is the complexity of our lives and brain functions compared to a planet orbiting the sun.

The planets do not get to make a decision as to which way they spin. We, as humans, do. That God foreknows what we will choose doesn't take away from the fact that we made the decision. We exercised our freedom and chose option A instead of option B.

It brings us back to the definition of free will. What do you mean by freely make, how do you freely make a choice? Because the way I see it, all our choices and decisions are effected by both the make of the brain and past experiences we have had, I don't know how you can ever make a free choice?

You can't, in that scenario. But suppose there was some ineffable 'thing', let's call it a soul. What if there was a soul imbibed within every living human that could make a free choice. The mechanics of how it accomplishes this are irrelevant; if such a thing exists, then, though the rest of the universe is deterministic (quantum fluff aside), there is a wildcard in the form of this soul.

That's how we freely make a choice.

 

[underpressure]

The planets do not get to make a decision as to which way they spin. We, as humans, do. That God foreknows what we will choose doesn't take away from the fact that we made the decision. We exercised our freedom and chose option A instead of option B.

The problem is you are using words like freedom without explaining what you mean. Did we really have any freedom if we were always destined to consider choice A but opt for B? If we are saying the definition of free will is just the thought process we go through to carry out a function then we do have free will. But I don't think this alone is what most people would say is free will, otherwise we may as well say a computer has free will too. Intuitively you might think while you were experiencing this thought process that you could have easily gone for choice A, but you couldn't have, you would have always gone for B all things the same.

You can't, in that scenario. But suppose there was some ineffable 'thing', let's call it a soul. What if there was a soul imbibed within every living human that could make a free choice. The mechanics of how it accomplishes this are irrelevant; if such a thing exists, then, though the rest of the universe is deterministic (quantum fluff aside), there is a wildcard in the form of this soul.

That's how we freely make a choice.

Yes, this reveals the absurdity of free will. The only way we can imagine free will might exist (or making a free choice) is if something that we don't know what it is, have no knowledge on, we can't see, we can't hear, we don't know anything about, in fact you may as well just say we've made it up, this thing that doesn't follow natural laws is causing this free will to happen. The worrying thing is though I could imagine someone reading something like that, and that being all the proof they need for both free will and souls. Not that believing in either is harmful, just a bit illogical (IMO).

In the past we've intuitively assumed a lot of things about the world, such as it being flat, the earth being the centre of the universe, as our knowledge has increased gone are many things we held to be true. I think it is safe to say our intuitive ideas about how things are, are not always accurate. We intuitively think we have free will, but if we could look at what actually happens, I think all neuroscientists would say the brain works in a very mechanistic way (although clearly more research needs to be done as we are still learning).

I know you are playing devil's advocate, but I think I've quite enough of this subject now, thanks everyone for the discussion!

 

[Chesterton]

I'm not sure why? I did say 100% predictable, if we are able to predict an event 100% I'd say it must be determined. For instance we can predict with great accuracy when the next solar eclipse is going to be, so you'd have to say the mechanisms that are moving the earth, moon etc are likely determined.

I agree, but my argument, at bottom, is really that we are not purely physical mechanisms like everything else.

I think you are going to have to give me a definition of what 'free will' or being able to freely choose means to you.

It's simply that - being able to freely choose, but given the physical/chemical input we have, not wholly because of it. We all agree that physical/chemical input influences us. If I feel hungry, that will probably cause me to choose to eat. But even that primal urge can't make me eat. People have died on hunger strikes.

If your future is known, to at least God, then I'm not sure how you could argue that your future isn't determined,.

It is determined, but determined by me; by my choices.

Again you are going to have to explain that.

If you remove the limitation of the dimension of time, it's just the same as me observing you freely act at any time. If you choose to say "pancakes" at any point in time - I heard you say pancakes (past), I hear you say pancakes (present), I will hear you say pancakes (future). If there's a God, it's not farfetched to suppose that He's bigger than dimensions and grammar.

 

[underpressure]

I agree, but my argument, at bottom, is really that we are not purely physical mechanisms like everything else.



It's simply that - being able to freely choose, but given the physical/chemical input we have, not wholly because of it. We all agree that physical/chemical input influences us. If I feel hungry, that will probably cause me to choose to eat. But even that primal urge can't make me eat. People have died on hunger strikes.



It is determined, but determined by me; by my choices.



If you remove the limitation of the dimension of time, it's just the same as me observing you freely act at any time. If you choose to say "pancakes" at any point in time - I heard you say pancakes (past), I hear you say pancakes (present), I will hear you say pancakes (future). If there's a God, it's not farfetched to suppose that He's bigger than dimensions and grammar.

Okay thanks for that, I understand your position as most people hold the same one. It just doesn't make much sense to me any more, the basic reason for that is I think the brain works in a mechanistic way like everything else in that we know of in the universe. If I'm wrong about that, and humans are somehow breaking the laws of physics, then I will be wrong.

I guess it doesn't really matter that much either way, but it's an interesting subject, thanks for the discussion!

 

[quatona]

Because it would be a proof that proofs are unreliable.

To me it seems like being able to "freely choose" an answer doesn´t make it any more reliable.
In fact (if we work from what you idea of determinism: a mechanistic world) I tend to think that a statement about this world that is determined by this world´s mechanisms is likely to be correct rather than one that you have "freely chosen".

It'd be reasoning which invalidated reasoning.

This may or may not be the case. However, unless you show how the fact that views are "freely chosen" would render them reliable or validated any more than the fact that we are determined to hold them, you haven´t succeeded in what you are trying to do: Picture something as being the implication of "determinism" as though the notion of "free will" wouldn´t come with the same problem.



Then what is/are the determining agents? Aren't you an atheist?[/quote]

 

[quatona]

Because it would be a proof that proofs are unreliable.

To me it seems like being able to "freely choose" a "proof" doesn´t make this "proof" any more reliable.
In fact (if we work from what you idea of determinism: a mechanistic world) I tend to think that a statement about this world that is determined by this world´s mechanisms is likely to be correct rather than one that you have "freely chosen".

In short: Please explain how
determined = unreliable
freely chosen =/ unreliable.

Attempts at metaphysical proofs are unreliable. I have no idea how the idea of "freewill" eliminates this problem.

It'd be reasoning which invalidated reasoning.

This may or may not be the case. However, unless you show how the fact that views are "freely chosen" would render them reliable or validated any more than the fact that we are determined to hold them, you haven´t succeeded in what you are trying to do: Picture something as being the implication of "determinism" as though the notion of "free will" wouldn´t come with the same problem.

Then what is/are the determining agents?

There is no such thing as "the determining agent" or "the determining factor".

Aren't you an atheist?

I am. What´s that got to do with anything (except that when not believing in a god I obviously don´t believe that a god is the determinator)?
You would have to explain why you expect me to accept the dichotomy underlying your question ('either god is the determining agent or the atoms are').

 

[tanzanos]

.........

 

[quatona]

Actually there is. All the brain's decision making is determined by countless of factors. The "IF THEN ELSE" algorithm has to do with chemical and mechanical factors which in turn affect the physiological and psychological condition of a person.

Like me, you seem to say that there is are multiple (actually countless, interdependent) factors. Thus, I am not sure why you voice disagreement when I say that there isn´t "the determining factor".

Thus we can conclude that free will is not actually free will since it is affected by so many conditions. What we have is the ability to make decisions. Decisions which are not based on free will but are the result of many conditions that indirectly or directly affect the choices we make.

I´m trying hard to come up with a significant difference between the meaning of "action/event" and the meaning "choice"/"decision" in this scenario, but I can´t seem to find one.
Of course, I could also say that an apple makes the decision/choice to fall off the tree, but it doesn´t seem to add any useful information to simply saying "it falls off the tree".

Free will can only function if the brain's decisions are free of all and any conditions that may effect its decision making. This could only happen in a state of utopia.

Actually, I don´t even know why anyone would find this a desirable state.

 

[Chesterton]

To me it seems like being able to "freely choose" a "proof" doesn´t make this "proof" any more reliable.
In fact (if we work from what you idea of determinism: a mechanistic world) I tend to think that a statement about this world that is determined by this world´s mechanisms is likely to be correct rather than one that you have "freely chosen".

In short: Please explain how
determined = unreliable
freely chosen =/ unreliable.

Attempts at metaphysical proofs are unreliable. I have no idea how the idea of "freewill" eliminates this problem.

This may or may not be the case. However, unless you show how the fact that views are "freely chosen" would render them reliable or validated any more than the fact that we are determined to hold them, you haven´t succeeded in what you are trying to do: Picture something as being the implication of "determinism" as though the notion of "free will" wouldn´t come with the same problem.

I think I'm already getting a bit redundant in this thread. I think I've addressed the above in other posts. If you've read the whole thread and don't see any value in what I've said, then okay.

There is no such thing as "the determining agent" or "the determining factor".

My exact question was "Then what is/are the determining agents?" I'm not limiting you to anything.

I am. What´s that got to do with anything (except that when not believing in a god I obviously don´t believe that a god is the determinator)?
You would have to explain why you expect me to accept the dichotomy underlying your question ('either god is the determining agent or the atoms are').

I present a dichotomy because personally I can't imagine a third choice, and I've never heard of one (except for pantheism, I guess, which combines the two and basically says the atoms are God). But I want to be open-minded. That's why I'm asking you what the other choices are.

 

[Greg1234]

Yes, we do. Free will is the ability of the will to divert from the will of the creator.

 

[Washington]

Yes, we do. Free will is the ability of the will to divert from the will of the creator.

Interesting. And just how did you come upon this rather unique definition?

 

[Wiccan_Child]

I think you're expressing two opposing ideas in one sentence: "we will change our minds, if the atoms happen to do something". If the atoms are the sole agent of change, then there is no "we". Our consciousnesses don't exist, they're an illusion perpetrated by mindless atoms. (An illusion of mind perpetrated by mindless atoms upon themselves, mind you. What an impossibly bizarre, nonsensical idea that is. If it were presented as an outlandish bit of science-fiction, the purists of the genre would likely frown upon it for being too outlandish. Yet determinists must actually believe it.)

I guess this is another instance where your Christianity and my atheism lead us in different directions. I consider 'we' to be the atoms that make up our bodies, or, rather, the conciousness that emerges from those atoms. You consider 'we' to be the soul, the willing agent, separate and apart from the physical body; more importantly, it survives the destruction of the body.

Well those particular answers cannot be otherwise. That's part of my argument, that the statement "We have no free will" has to be a meaningless statement.

But the answer "yes" can be otherwise. "Yes" would still be physical output, but not merely physical output; it could correspond to something outside itself, to another reality, or to an aspect of this reality, where things are real, where there can really be true and false. And this aspect of reality must exist if we are even able to assert that the most basic logic idea is true, such as A = A. Otherwise, A = A cannot be truly said to be true; it can only be said to appear true due to accidents of brain physics and chemistry.

On the contrary, A = A is true regardless of whether or not anyone is around to appreciate its truthiness. Besides, not having free will doesn't mean we aren't concious entities: I cannot deny my conciousness exists (indeed, I can deny the existence of everything but my conciousness), but I can deny that I have free will.

Again, I think the question really is "Do we have a soul? Are we merely physical, or do we have another quality or aspect"?

In the above, you use the word "we" in conjunction with verbs like "believe" and "ponder". If humans are purely physical, then there is no such thing as "we". There are ultimately only atoms performing verb actions, and one of those verb actions happens to be the creation within us of the illusion of "we".

Consider how "I think, therefore I am" is a most stupidly obvious idea. You can apply it to any noun and any verb - "The ball rolls, therefore the ball exists." Then consider the corollary of "I think, therefore I am": "I do not think, therefore I am not." If it's only the atoms physically comprising me which are doing the thinking, then I do not exist. Therefore asking if we have free will is the same as asking if we exist.

Ah, no, "I think, therefore I am" doesn't imply "I don't think, therefore I am not": I could very well be even if I don't think, depending on how we define the 'I'. 'I' could be a concious entity with no control over my own actions.

Agreed. Except that the response can be whatever you want it to be. For better or worse, the real answer can only be one thing or the other. "Eh? Two views? There are a dozen views about everything until you know the answer. Then there's never more than one." From That Hideous Strength by C.S. Lewis.

Which is where the illusion of free will comes in: did you ever really have a choice? You say you could have picked any option you wished, but we can never know if that is really the case, because we cannot run back time and see.

 

[Greg1234]

Interesting. And just how did you come upon this rather unique definition?

The way I see it is will is desire. Just desire. Whether events lead one into making a choice or not making a choice, will or desire is somewhat independent of that. Its weird.

Suppose for example you join the military and the sergeant says "you will crawl in the mud and you will like it." What happens then? Yes the event which follows is you're crawling in the mud (you'd better be), yet you still dont desire to crawl in the mud. The will hasn't changed. Maybe sooner or later it will grow on you, and you may end up liking to crawl in the mud. You may desire it. But thats an internal change, which was completely you. It was all you. Completely internal, with a slight yet insignificant external factor.

At the same time, if you had no desire to be at the gulag in the first place, you may never have been here. If you had been drafted, you would be there, yet the will would not. Who knows, it may grow on you, or you may serve your entire time without the desire or will.

So yes, I do believe that we have free will. If the sergeant had said "you will crawl in the mud and you will like it" and I automatically desired to crawl in the mud then no, our will is not free. Suppose the creator was the sergeant. He said "I created you for a reason this is what you will do. You will do it and you will like it". What happens if you dont want to, you dont have the will to, or you dont desire to do it. Are you forced to? I dont believe so.

Had his orders been able to alter the will or desire on command then I believe that we would not have free will. Yet man was told "do not to eat the apple". Ate it anyways. Desired to eat it. The will was not in line with the will of the creator. Amazingly, not even the creator can alter the will. Nothing can. Its like a stallion on the plains. Completely free from any factor, any force.

 

[Chesterton]

I guess this is another instance where your Christianity and my atheism lead us in different directions. I consider 'we' to be the atoms that make up our bodies, or, rather, the conciousness that emerges from those atoms. You consider 'we' to be the soul, the willing agent, separate and apart from the physical body; more importantly, it survives the destruction of the body.

Okay, but would you agree that if your consciousness is produced solely by those atoms, then that is similar to your consciousness being produced by Descarte's demon; and if that is the case, then we cannot rely on any of our perceptions of reality?

On the contrary, A = A is true regardless of whether or not anyone is around to appreciate its truthiness. Besides, not having free will doesn't mean we aren't concious entities: I cannot deny my conciousness exists (indeed, I can deny the existence of everything but my conciousness), but I can deny that I have free will.

No, A = A would appear to your mind to be true regardless of anyone being around to appreciate it. Because everything would have to be mere appearance, corresponding to nothing true or real. My view leaves a loophole for a thing to be true; yours does not. My view upholds and asserts logic; your view renders it moot and meaningless.

I don't think I said consciousness doesn't exist; if I implied that I didn't mean to. But if it's seen as mere output of atoms, well, an apple growing on a tree is the same type of phenomenon. And the fact that 6 billion humans might all produce the perception that A has to equal A, is of no more significance than that 6 billion apple trees would all produce apples.

Ah, no, "I think, therefore I am" doesn't imply "I don't think, therefore I am not": I could very well be even if I don't think, depending on how we define the 'I'. 'I' could be a concious entity with no control over my own actions.

You're right, it's not a direct implication. But it is a possible corollary, and I think it's a valid corollary in terms of what we're discussing. There's either an "I" thinking, or there are atoms "thinking" through creating the illusion of "I". If I am not thinking, then it's because I am not.

Which is where the illusion of free will comes in: did you ever really have a choice? You say you could have picked any option you wished, but we can never know if that is really the case, because we cannot run back time and see.

Yes, but there's really no evidence that we don't make choices, is there? It's basically a simplistic deduction from the fact that we're made of matter. We don't need to perform a going-back-in-time experiment. The proof is within us now.You and I both absolutely know that at this moment we can choose to say "poop" or "pancakes", do we not?

 

[Gracchus]

When the sergeant says, "You will crawl in the mud and you will like it.", he is informing you that you will like crawling in the mud better than you will like the consequences of not crawling in the mud. Whether those consequences involve only the sergeant's ire or a bullet in your anatomy, he is probably right.

Now whether you choose to crawl or not is dependent on factors determined by genetic heritage and environmental experience. Free will, if there is such a thing, does not enable you to flap your ears and fly to the moon. Given limited choice you will always choose what you most want to do, and what you most want is determined by nature and nurture.

Neurologists have demonstrated that we make our choices before we ever begin to rationalize why we have chosen the way we made them.

 

[Washington]

The way I see it is will is desire. Just desire. Whether events lead one into making a choice or not making a choice, will or desire is somewhat independent of that. Its weird.

Suppose for example you join the military and the sergeant says "you will crawl in the mud and you will like it." What happens then? Yes the event which follows is you're crawling in the mud (you'd better be), yet you still dont desire to crawl in the mud. The will hasn't changed. Maybe sooner or later it will grow on you, and you may end up liking to crawl in the mud. You may desire it. But thats an internal change, which was completely you. It was all you. Completely internal, with a slight yet insignificant external factor.

At the same time, if you had no desire to be at the gulag in the first place, you may never have been here. If you had been drafted, you would be there, yet the will would not. Who knows, it may grow on you, or you may serve your entire time without the desire or will.

So yes, I do believe that we have free will. If the sergeant had said "you will crawl in the mud and you will like it" and I automatically desired to crawl in the mud then no, our will is not free. Suppose the creator was the sergeant. He said "I created you for a reason this is what you will do. You will do it and you will like it". What happens if you dont want to, you dont have the will to, or you dont desire to do it. Are you forced to? I dont believe so.

Had his orders been able to alter the will or desire on command then I believe that we would not have free will. Yet man was told "do not to eat the apple". Ate it anyways. Desired to eat it. The will was not in line with the will of the creator. Amazingly, not even the creator can alter the will. Nothing can. Its like a stallion on the plains. Completely free from any factor, any force.

Okkkay, but this doesn't address my question as to how you came up with the definition of free will as "the ability of the will to divert from the will of the creator." All you've said is that will---and not even "free will"---is synonymous with desire. And that you believe in free will, which I take to mean the freedom to desire.

 

[Greg1234]

When the sergeant says, "You will crawl in the mud and you will like it.", he is informing you that you will like crawling in the mud better than you will like the consequences of not crawling in the mud. Whether those consequences involve only the sergeant's ire or a bullet in your anatomy, he is probably right.

True. Yet, knowing that you will get killed for not crawling in the mud doesnt seem to make you want to, or desire to crawl in the mud. And still, you may crawl in the mud just because you desire to live. This desire didnt come from knowing that you would get killed but its just you and a will you possessed long before you came to camp. And though you desire to live, you still dont desire to crawl in the mud. If you had a death wish, of what use is the threat?

Now whether you choose to crawl or not is dependent on factors determined by genetic heritage and environmental experience. and what you most want is determined by nature and nurture.

I would have to disagree. Not even hunger can alter the will or desire to eat. If im on a hunger strike, and there is the urge to eat, then the desire or will to maintain that strike will overshadow that external factor. I may desire to eat when im not hungry, or for no reason at all. Similarly, I may have the genes of my mother who is a doctor, my father who is a pastor, grow up watching only bible study programs, yet desire to be a serial killer.The environment and genes are completely useless. Will or desire, cannot be altered by the immediate environment but through a conglomerate of pre existing conditions which suggest viable pathways, yet it seems, only through the consent of the individual is one chosen.

Free will, if there is such a thing, does not enable you to flap your ears and fly to the moon. Given limited choice you will always choose what you most want to do,

True. I may want to or desire to, or have the will to fly. But even though I cant grow wings, the desire to fly is still present. It doesnt seem to change change unless I discard it.

Neurologists have demonstrated that we make our choices before we ever begin to rationalize why we have chosen the way we made them.

Determined by a preexisting desire. This desire to make that choice may or may not arise from the present environment. Who knows. But it seems like the entity is always in control.

 

[SamTP77]

Basically I said if we are presented with a choice then we are free to make a choice. Which does sound like a tautology but I think that it is a good tautology like it is either raining or not raining, or married men are not bachelors, or men of marriageable age who are not married are bachelors except the Pope.

Sounds like a circular tautology to me. Are we free to choose?

I have to admit I am intrigued with this discussion on free will and I thought I would ask you what are your thoughts on how free are you to reply to this post? You are being presented with a choice, and you are totally free to choose. You could respond to this post or not and I have no idea how likely you are to respond either way. You could or you couldn't who knows what chance there is that you will or you won't?

However I believe you are free to respond and you own your choice. You are responsible for how you respond or if you respond at all. I feel that free will is an important aspect to being a human. It is important that choices be our own and that we never get anchored in as always a brave human or always a cowardly human. Just because we do the right thing one day doesn't mean we will always do the right thing in our lives. It is a constant struggle for myself to be a brave human being conscious of negative consequences but always sure to act smartly and bravely, and I feel I own my choices.

If you respond Wiccan Child think about the processes that went into the forming of your response and your motivations for holding those view points. My motivations for responding, were it seems like a lively discussion here and people get along here and I love reading those books by Dr. Daniel Dennet. I actually sent him a fan e-mail and he wrote back and said "thanks," I totally love this topic on free will.

Take care,

Sam

 

[quatona]

I have to admit I am intrigued with this discussion on free will and I thought I would ask you what are your thoughts on how free are you to reply to this post?

I would like you to define "free" for purposes of this question. Free from what?
I also would like to point out - for the sake of clarity in this discussion - that freedom to exert your will is something completely different than the freedom of the will ("free will").
Furthermore I want to repeat what I have said earlier in this thread: If my will is free I am not.

To at least try to answer your question: I can´t even tell whether I was free to will or not will to respond. I wouldn´t know how to tell the difference between my will being determined and being free (random). I did respond, and I have no clue what "I could have not responded" actually means.

You are being presented with a choice, and you are totally free to choose.

I´m not at all sure that I am free in this matter, but I am sure that I am not "totally free".
E.g. an important factor that determines my actions is my will - and my will has been shaped by countless factors that were and are not within my control or making.

You could respond to this post or not and I have no idea how likely you are to respond either way. You could or you couldn't who knows what chance there is that you will or you won't?

The same can be said about the apple on the tree: It will fall off the tree or it won´t, and I have no idea how likely it is to fall or not to fall.