Deism!

[Penumbra]

Yes, I agree with you here.

I really hope that's not how I came across, but I suppose if you think I did, then I did. I was outlining a "plan of attack". I said that, of these three options, two of them can be eliminated (as per earlier posts of mine in this thread), but there is no reason to think that the third is in any way incoherent, irrational, or illogical.

It's not really a matter of how you came across, it's a matter of reading what your arguments consist of. I'm not meaning to say you were arrogant or anything like that, I'm just saying that reading through your arguments, that's what they consist of- simply claiming that two of the three options were illogical and that one was not without any serious level of support.

You are correct to say that I did not give support to some claims, but in a way I was just outlining the direction I think things would go if we were to flesh it out. Perhaps you could be more precise as to why you think I'm saying "I'm right, so we can eliminate the other two options", and also where you think I've failed to support my claims. If so, then I can respond better. I thought I was actually saying, "the other options are wrong, and what remains is not obviously wrong, so what remains is our most rational choice".

I think I was pretty precise when I made that statement, since I quoted a particularly hand-waving part of one of your posts and then made my statement in response to it.

To re-quote it here,

We can, with not too much effort, eliminate the propositions that "something came from nothing" and "an infinite chain of events occurred with no beginning" (and indeed no sufficient reason). There is nothing inherently illogical about the claim "something has always existed". There is if we propose that this thing was the universe.

We can, without much effort, eliminate those two things? Questions and options such as those have existed for ages. They are not easily eliminated, so to attempt to eliminate one means to form a strong argument.

You've begun displaying more arguments in response to Wiccan Child so after this I'll response to some of those.

As the masterful Sherlock Holmes said:
"How often have I said to you that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?"

In a sense, I don't need to give any support to my option, if all alternatives are shown impossible. So I disagree with you about what my job is. If I show that, of our options, the alternatives to my view are more improbable - then in a way that acts favourably to my view (since it is more probable).

But I don't see how either of those two options were proven any more impossible than the remaining option, which is the problem.

Anyway, why do you find it illogical to think that something exists which had no beginning? I have given reasons why an infinite chain of events is problematic, and why something coming from nothing is problematic. I can give more reasons. I can't think of any reason why something existing without beginning is problematic.

Edit: made a change in my final sentence that was important!

I'll answer this in my next post as I address some of your recent content.

-Lyn

 

[Penumbra]

So what are the problems in thinking the universe always existed? It's late, and I'm getting tired, so I'll be very brief:
a) Hilbert's hotel (google it) - as a mathematical claim, it would seem that (at the very least) an infinitely old universe is deeply counter-intuitive, and at the very worst illogical and impossible

I don't see how Hilbert's hotel is any sort of argument against an infinitely old universe. It's simply a showcase of the unintuitive nature of what "infinity" is.

b) You can't get an infinite series of temporal events in the past by adding one to the next - yet that is precisely what history is, the unfolding of events, one after the next.

All of existence is not necessarily linear.

c) If the universe is infinitely old, then why hasn't what we are doing now already happened? Why now? This is quite a deep and puzzling question. If the universe is infinitely old, then everything should already have happened - yet it hasn't. It's worth reflecting on the possibility of our universe having always existed.

It doesn't have to be infinitely old in its current form. Existence could conceivably be cyclical, repetitive, ever-branching, etc.

d) Modern cosmology points strongest towards the universe having a beginning.

Modern cosmology only begins to describe what happens right after the Big Bang. That's a far cry from suggesting the universe had a beginning. And more importantly, I'm less concerned with only this particular universe, and more concerned with existence as a whole, whether it consists of this one universe or several universes, or past universes, and so forth.

Even if we posit (without evidence) universes that preceded our own, this doesn't avoid the problem. It can be demonstrated (mathematically) that all cyclic models of universes preceding our own must themselves originate in a singularity - ie, you find yourself at a beginning of a series of universes, rather than them continuing forever

Unless there are an infinite number of preceding universes, which hasn't been shown necessarily false.

Anyway, why do you find it illogical to think that something exists which had no beginning? I have given reasons why an infinite chain of events is problematic, and why something coming from nothing is problematic. I can give more reasons. I can't think of any reason why something existing without beginning is problematic.

There are two primary ways to look at this.

A) This "something" exists within time. If this is the case, then this something falls prey to any previous argument you have made against infinite causal chains.

B) This "something" exists outside of time. For one, this claim is rather foreign in the sense that being outside of time is a concept that doesn't, as of yet, hold any scientific weight. How does something exist outside of time, especially some active "something" that can suddenly create time or do something within time?

-Lyn

 

[Apolloe]

Hi guys, it might take me up to a day or two to respond due to these posts now getting long, and a busy day ahead for me. Please forgive me for any tardiness in a reply.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Hi guys, it might take me up to a day or two to respond due to these posts now getting long, and a busy day ahead for me. Please forgive me for any tardiness in a reply.

No worries Cut out whatever you want if/when you reply to mine, I tend to go off on tangents

 

[Inviolable]

To my deist friends, I'd like to ask the following question:


Are you guys serious? I don't know if you know, but the 18th century is over, and no one cares about the first cause argument anymore. And while no one has all the answers, it's pretty clear by now that science is better at coming up with better answers than any philosophy, and science does not require the supposition of any god. The god of deism is superfluous. Come into the fold; go get a red lightsabre, start eating kittens, and become atheists. (If you must, you can be agnostic, but we're just going to have to have this same talk again.)

Or have I missed something?

Do you post drunk all the time?

 

[Apolloe]

Agreed. Which is why I added the qualifier 'in the absence of prohibition'.
…
However, there are occasions when these laws do not describe precisely what will happen, only what can't happen. In these cases, what can happen may actually happen.
…
If it is possible, though by no means guaranteed, for a particle to pop into existence, then a particle may indeed pop into existence, uncaused and without purpose. It exists because it can exist, not because it must exist.

I'll make these remarks:
1. What you are saying now is very different from your original statement that "quantum mechanically, in the absence of any prohibition, anything that can happened will, eventually, happen."
2. My original point was that there is a sufficient reason/explanation for why something is. Quantum Mechanics does not provide a counter example (nor were you trying to give one - you were just trying to be clearer about what I meant, I think)
3. I think it is far too premature in our scientific endeavours to claim that these virtual particles are "uncaused". And causation is certainly not the only thing we must consider. There is a reason why the square root of two is irrational, but we wouldn't say something causes it. Even if they turn out uncaused, this doesn't spell a counter example to my claim if there is a sufficient reason. There is, for example, a sufficient reason why the square root of two is irrational
4. I think we would want to say more than just "It exists because it can exist". Though this is certainly part of the story, it is true for everything that exists. At the very least, things exist because they can exist, but that's a trivial claim. If you want to say that the sufficient reason why they exist is simply because they can, that's not the full story, and it certainly invites further scientific (or mathematical) enquiry. Perhaps the true story ends up being "there are n possible outcomes, each with probability p(n). The universe is at heart probabilistic, so nothing beyond raw randomness informed by these probabilities decides, and so the one that occurs occurred by a chance equal to p(x) of that event", or something like that. But that's more than just saying "It exists because it can exist". And then we would have the further question, "why is the universe probabilistic?", "what determines these probabilities?", etc. Especially because it seems that a deterministic universe could exist. Since it's not logically necessary that our universe be probabilistic at heart, and so this invites further questions. And personally, I'm not persuaded by the Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Physics, but even if it turns out to be right that doesn't present a problem for me.

That's quite a few thoughts actually Make of them what you will.

I remind you that my original point was simply this: positing a history that is infinitely long into the past does not escape some equivalent of a first cause. Perhaps you'll respond, "yes, but a first cause doesn't get you God anyway". Fine - we can discuss that instead if you like. But that doesn't do anything to counter my claim that an infinitely long history in the past doesn't escape a first cause equivalence. The universe being finite into the past is essential for the kalam cosmological argument, but not the leibnizian one.

I think of science as the acquisition of probable truth, asymptotically to the actual truth, whatever that truth might be. If magic is the true answer, then that is what science will, in principle, eventually conclude.

Again by magic I mean something insulting When you talk about science discovering magic, you're thinking of magic as being something accessible, able to be studied. When I say magic, I just mean things happening without any good reason, out of the blue. Perhaps a blatant *permanent* violation of conservation laws (ie, not virtual particles where the energy borrowed is later paid paid). The derogatory sorts of magic that atheists often accuse theists of believing in. The sort that resists scientific exploration. This sort of magic is not accessible by scientific means.

(Referring to Plantinga's argument)
I'm aware of the argument, but I consider it bunk. That our rationality is evolved doesn't negate its effectiveness.

I know you're just making a short response, but again this depends on your definition of effectiveness. The most obvious example of measuring effectiveness is survivability, if we're talking in an evolutionary context. Our rationality may or may not be effective given that question - but it's entirely irrelevant to what we are discussing. If you mean its effectiveness at arriving at true conclusions, or something like that - well - Plantinga's argument wasn't trying to show that our mind (given evolution) is not rational, or able to arrive at true conclusions. His point was that if evolution, naturalism, and atheism is true (or perhaps he had a different trio of assumptions), then we cannot trust our mind to arrive at true conclusions. It may very well turn out to be right most of the time, it may turn out wrong. The point is, we have no way of knowing, and indeed, the probability of it being poor at this kind of task is high. Therefore, his argument runs, we have a defeater for every one of our beliefs, including naturalism, if we hold to those beliefs. Moreover, this defeater cannot be defeated. Thus, if someone holds to that trio of beliefs, they have an undefeated defeater for virtually all their beliefs, including their ones that gave them this defeater. There is no escape from scepticism other than to reject some premise, such as atheism or naturalism.

Do you have a defence against his argument?

Philosophically, it's sound. I also think it successfully avoids the 'first cause' issue: it is a valid alternative to the idea that the universe began with a first cause.

It is neither philosophically sound, nor does it avoid something similar to the 'first cause' issue. Again - if you hold to something like the principle of sufficient reason, there must be a reason why this infinitely long history into the past exists, and exists in the way it does. What is the reason for that? I'm not sure that you've addressed that objection, other than to spring "because of Quantum Mechanics!" as some sort of get-out-of-jail-free card, which atheist's seem to do quite frequently when the mood suits

That's one of the major flaws of Aquinus' arguments: they arbitrarily leap from 'First Cause' to 'God' to 'God of Christianity'.

It's not at all arbitrary But quite often, it's not fleshed out. That's not the same as to say there are no such arguments, or that they're bad. But it might be good if we focus on the main contention.

Hmm, that wasn't exactly what I was asking. I was asking why God can exist forever but the universe can't. But let's go down this route anyway.

That's the key, isn't it? If God is atemporal, you don't say "God can exist forever", because that implies He is a temporal being that extends all of time. You say, "God is timeless", for example. The "eternity" you propose for the universe is fundamentally different to that proposed for God. The universe you propose is temporal, and extends throughout all time. Whereas for God, it is claimed that He is timeless/atemporal, and that is the sense in which He is "eternal".

I'm not sure what Hilbert's hotel has to do with anything

The universe being infinitely old into the past is a case of an actual infinity of things. Hilbert's hotel shows, at the very least, the absurdities involved in an actual infinity - and at the very best, the downright impossibility of an actual infinity of things. We have infinity in mathematics - but in reality? That's a whole different ball game. That's the relevance of Hilbert's hotel.

I disagree. If the past is infinitely long, then we have an infinite amount of moments which, when summed with appropriate limits, reach any finite number we choose. This is the fundamental principle of calculus.

There is, again, a key difference here. Let us say your function is y = 2. Now let's simulate the past being infinitely old. Our sum goes from negative infinity (the past) until now (0, or any absolutely specified value). This integral will not produce a finite number at all.

Now why is this relevant? Because when we're talking about the real world, we're talking about steps that take a minimum finite amount. And if our function y has a minimum greater than 0, it will sum to infinity in the integral. Time is considered to have a smallest unit, so is energy. The universe appears quantised in many important areas.

Consider Zeno's paradox. To get from a to b you must cross half the distance between them, and then half the remaining distance, and half whats left again, so on until infinity. Therefore, you never reach the destination.

The problem with this paradox involves the infinite divisibility of the distances involved. When we sum the distance to travel, even though the distance is infinitely divisible, the distance itself sums to a finite number. But this is absolutely not true in the case of a universe infinitely old. The amount we measure is not "reducing" commensurately fast enough to keep the final value finite.

Now to my original point that an infinity cannot be obtained by adding one to the other. To say this is possible is to say that it's possible (for example) to enumerate all negative numbers, ending at 0. Clearly absurd. The simple fact is, we cannot get an infinity by adding one thing to the next.

This argument is tantamount to disproving all of continuous statistics! For shame!
Consider a continuous variable x that can take any value in a given range of finite length. We measure the variable, and it comes up as having the value X. But wait! The odds that x would turn out to be X is exactly zero!

But that's the problem with a continuous variable: there's an infinite number of possibilities, so the odds that any particular one would arise is zero. But one value must nonetheless arise.

I would say it's a highly questionable claim that time is continuous rather than discrete. Certainly in most cases we can treat it as continuous (classical mechanical situations, for example), but this doesn't hold for all scales.

At any rate, I don't quite understand your argument that my claim amounts to disproving all of continuous statistics. Perhaps I'm a bit tired - could you make the reductio ad absurdum more clear please?

I disagree. At best, the evidence shows the universe appears to have expanded from a singularity for approximately 13.5 billion years - otherwise known as the Big Bang. There is nothing in cosmology that suggests this singularity was the beginning of the universe.

Not only does it imply a beginning of the universe, but a beginning of time itself. This is the current theory. There are many attempts to try to avoid this, but from my last look, none are considered successful.

Regarding the argument that demonstrates that cyclical universe models must lead to a "singularity" of universes, the paper I was thinking of is actually talking about inflationary models of the universe. The problem with cyclical universes is one of entropy. Anyway, to the articles for inflationary model(I must confess I have not read nor tried to understand their arguments):
Arvind Borde and Alexander Vilenkin, "Eternal inflation and the initial singularity", Phys. Rev. Lett. 72, 3305 (1994)

Arvind Borde, "Open and closed universes, initial singularities, and inflation", Phys. Rev. D 50, 3692 (1994)


And for cyclic universes:
I D Novikov and Y B Zel'dovich, "Physical Processes Near Cosmological Singularities" Annual Review of Astronomy and Astrophysics, Vol. 11: 387-412 (particularly pages 401-402

At the very least, it is not clear that the universe is infinite in the past, that that is even possible, or that it escapes the 'first cause' in 'first cause' style arguments for God's existence. And making assumptions about the universe which attempt to avoid a beginning will commit the atheist to cosmological models with a certainty well beyond what the evidence allows.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

I've had to cut some bits out because it's too long! Madness.

3. I think it is far too premature in our scientific endeavours to claim that these virtual particles are "uncaused". And causation is certainly not the only thing we must consider. There is a reason why the square root of two is irrational, but we wouldn't say something causes it. Even if they turn out uncaused, this doesn't spell a counter example to my claim if there is a sufficient reason. There is, for example, a sufficient reason why the square root of two is irrational

I'm not sure I agree that there's a reason the square root of two is irrational. It is irrational, and we can prove it in a hundred different ways, but that doesn't mean there's a reason. But, again, perhaps this is just semantics. Likewise, I don't think it's premature to say virtual particles are uncaused: the theory that predicted their existence in the first place implies that they are uncaused, everything we know about them (and, indeed, other, related phenomena) points to them being uncaused. Sure, the theory may be wrong, but there's nothing to suggest that it is, especially with regard to this specific detail.
Newtonian mechanics is wrong in its entirety, but it still gets some things right.

4. I think we would want to say more than just "It exists because it can exist". Though this is certainly part of the story, it is true for everything that exists. At the very least, things exist because they can exist, but that's a trivial claim. If you want to say that the sufficient reason why they exist is simply because they can, that's not the full story, and it certainly invites further scientific (or mathematical) enquiry.

Nonetheless, that might be the entire story. The only reason the particle exists could very well be because it can exist. The sheer lack of prohibiting laws allows it to be, and that is enough to let it be.

Perhaps the true story ends up being "there are n possible outcomes, each with probability p(n). The universe is at heart probabilistic, so nothing beyond raw randomness informed by these probabilities decides, and so the one that occurs occurred by a chance equal to p(x) of that event", or something like that. But that's more than just saying "It exists because it can exist". And then we would have the further question, "why is the universe probabilistic?", "what determines these probabilities?", etc. Especially because it seems that a deterministic universe could exist. Since it's not logically necessary that our universe be probabilistic at heart, and so this invites further questions. And personally, I'm not persuaded by the Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Physics, but even if it turns out to be right that doesn't present a problem for me.

Well, that all boils down to whether or not quantum mechanical randomness is correct. I believe it is, as I believe it is the best explanation we have for things like radioactive decay, the Casimir effect, Hawking radiation, virtual particles, and so on. Everything I know about quantum mechanics points to there being true randomness in the world; the universe really is probabilistic.

I know you're just making a short response, but again this depends on your definition of effectiveness. The most obvious example of measuring effectiveness is survivability, if we're talking in an evolutionary context. Our rationality may or may not be effective given that question - but it's entirely irrelevant to what we are discussing. If you mean its effectiveness at arriving at true conclusions, or something like that - well - Plantinga's argument wasn't trying to show that our mind (given evolution) is not rational, or able to arrive at true conclusions. His point was that if evolution, naturalism, and atheism is true (or perhaps he had a different trio of assumptions), then we cannot trust our mind to arrive at true conclusions. It may very well turn out to be right most of the time, it may turn out wrong. The point is, we have no way of knowing, and indeed, the probability of it being poor at this kind of task is high. Therefore, his argument runs, we have a defeater for every one of our beliefs, including naturalism, if we hold to those beliefs. Moreover, this defeater cannot be defeated. Thus, if someone holds to that trio of beliefs, they have an undefeated defeater for virtually all their beliefs, including their ones that gave them this defeater. There is no escape from scepticism other than to reject some premise, such as atheism or naturalism.

Do you have a defence against his argument?

Yes, several. Epistemological uncertainty is inherent to any human mind, be they atheist, theist, communist, or whatever. Solopistic scepticism doesn't mean you reject objectivity, but rather simply acknowledge the (slim) possibility that your periphery is wrong. I acknowledge that. Descartes acknowledged that with his famous Demon. Virtually everyone will acknowledge that, given time to think about it. That doesn't mean our basis for believing reality is flawed, or implausible, any more than acknowledging the possibility of gravity-causing magic gnomes invalidates the theory of relativity.
Furthermore, the triumvirate of evolution, naturalism, and atheism, is not any more suspect to this than, say, creationism, supernaturalism, and theism.

It is neither philosophically sound, nor does it avoid something similar to the 'first cause' issue. Again - if you hold to something like the principle of sufficient reason, there must be a reason why this infinitely long history into the past exists, and exists in the way it does. What is the reason for that? I'm not sure that you've addressed that objection, other than to spring "because of Quantum Mechanics!" as some sort of get-out-of-jail-free card, which atheist's seem to do quite frequently when the mood suits

And theists use the 'Goddidit' card with equal abandon. Point is, a quantum mechanical 'poof' is an entirely valid possibility, free of the 'first cause' (since it's beyond time, the concept of a 'first' cause is meaningless), free of an intelligence, and free of any satisfying reason. I think you're arbitrarily restricting yourself to reasons that must be satisfying. I don't see why the universe has to be particularly amiable to the human mind. It might very well be that the 'real' reason is utterly inconceivable to use, or so stunningly obvious that we reject it as 'unsatisfying'. There might not even be a reason at all.

That's the key, isn't it? If God is atemporal, you don't say "God can exist forever", because that implies He is a temporal being that extends all of time. You say, "God is timeless", for example. The "eternity" you propose for the universe is fundamentally different to that proposed for God. The universe you propose is temporal, and extends throughout all time. Whereas for God, it is claimed that He is timeless/atemporal, and that is the sense in which He is "eternal".

I disagree. Why can the universe not be eternal in the same sense as God? If God interacts with the universe (e.g., healing amputees), he is part of it, and is not atemporal. If the universe is atemporal, then that explains how it can appear to us, temporal beings to be eternal. We experience time and causality, but the universe does not.

The universe being infinitely old into the past is a case of an actual infinity of things. Hilbert's hotel shows, at the very least, the absurdities involved in an actual infinity - and at the very best, the downright impossibility of an actual infinity of things. We have infinity in mathematics - but in reality? That's a whole different ball game. That's the relevance of Hilbert's hotel.

The hotel doesn't show that it's absurd in the philosophical sense, and it especially doesn't show that it's impossible. It just shows that it's counter-intuitive. Mathematicians are careful to explicitly state that this counter-intuitivity doesn't mean it's false, or impossible. It's entirely possible, both mathematically and ontologically. People reject the idea of infinity because they don't understand it. They try to treat it as a single number (albeit a large one), subject to addition and multiplication. There are many kinds of infinity (an infinite number of infinities, in fact), with all sorts of peculiar conclusions. That doesn't mean an infinite past is impossible.

There is, again, a key difference here. Let us say your function is y = 2. Now let's simulate the past being infinitely old. Our sum goes from negative infinity (the past) until now (0, or any absolutely specified value). This integral will not produce a finite number at all.

Now why is this relevant? Because when we're talking about the real world, we're talking about steps that take a minimum finite amount. And if our function y has a minimum greater than 0, it will sum to infinity in the integral. Time is considered to have a smallest unit, so is energy. The universe appears quantised in many important areas.

Consider Zeno's paradox. To get from a to b you must cross half the distance between them, and then half the remaining distance, and half whats left again, so on until infinity. Therefore, you never reach the destination.

The problem with this paradox involves the infinite divisibility of the distances involved. When we sum the distance to travel, even though the distance is infinitely divisible, the distance itself sums to a finite number. But this is absolutely not true in the case of a universe infinitely old. The amount we measure is not "reducing" commensurately fast enough to keep the final value finite.

Now to my original point that an infinity cannot be obtained by adding one to the other. To say this is possible is to say that it's possible (for example) to enumerate all negative numbers, ending at 0. Clearly absurd. The simple fact is, we cannot get an infinity by adding one thing to the next.

There are a number of problems here. Your latter point, that you can't enumerate all the negative numbers to get something ending at zero, is superficially correct, but there are another interesting sums that you might want to look at:

1 - 2 + 3 - 4 + 5 - ... = 0.25.

1 - 1 + 1 - 1 + 1 - ... = 0.5.

Adding up an infinite number of finite things can lead to very weird results. This doesn't mean it can't be done. And don't forget that, for an infinite past, we're adding up an infinity of infinitesimal slivers of time. This sort of summation most certainly can converge to a finite number.

Furthermore, it is quite speculative as to whether time and energy are discrete. There are quantum mechanical limits as to how close two events can be before they will always appear simultaneous, but that's about it - and there's nothing about discrete energy.

Basically, an infinite sum of infinitesimally small terms - which is what we have if the universe is eternal, regardless of whether time is continuous or discrete - is not a paradoxical sum. It is entirely possible, and is known to exist in other fields of science (particle physics, optics, etc).

At any rate, I don't quite understand your argument that my claim amounts to disproving all of continuous statistics. Perhaps I'm a bit tired - could you make the reductio ad absurdum more clear please?

Basically, you said, if the universe is eternal, why is it now? Why do we exist in this particular point in time? My response was that this is exactly the case for any and all continuous variable: a continuous variable can fall on any one of an infinite number of points, but it falls nonetheless. A radioactive atom can decay at any point in time, so why does it decay when it decays?
Just because something's infinitely improbable, doesn't mean it cannot happen, nor indeed that we should surprised if it does. If I shuffle a pack of cards and deal them out, the odds that they come up in that precise order is about one in 10[sup]66[/sup]. But it happened.
Likewise, the odds that we exist in this particular point in time is infinitely improbable, given an eternal universe. But, in an eternal universe, we have to exist somewhere, and no matter where we exist, that point will be just as improbable. So, we shouldn't be surprised that we exist anywhere at all, if the universe is eternal, since such an event is a guaranteed improbability.

Not only does it imply a beginning of the universe, but a beginning of time itself. This is the current theory.

No, it's not. It's a common misconception, and a popular belief, perhaps even among scientists, but that's not what the theory says.

At the very least, it is not clear that the universe is infinite in the past, that that is even possible, or that it escapes the 'first cause' in 'first cause' style arguments for God's existence. And making assumptions about the universe which attempt to avoid a beginning will commit the atheist to cosmological models with a certainty well beyond what the evidence allows.

But we're not committing to such a model. I myself believe the universe is temporally finite (admittedly more out of aesthetic than evidence). I'm simply arguing that it's possible for the universe to be eternal, and that this possibility negates 'first cause' arguments for God. Besides, it's not like that's the only criticism of such arguments.

 

[Apolloe]

I've had to cut some bits out because it's too long! Madness.

Apologies. I get carried away sometimes I will try to be briefer this time, but no promises!

I'm not sure I agree that there's a reason the square root of two is irrational. It is irrational, and we can prove it in a hundred different ways, but that doesn't mean there's a reason. But, again, perhaps this is just semantics.

I suspect (agree with you) that it is an issue of semantics between us. Or perhaps a slightly different reflection on how we address these questions of reasons. I may be tempted to say that the reason why the square root of two is irrational is simply because there is no rational number which is equal to the square root of two - and this is known via a proof by contradiction (or whatever other poofs one has). And that is enough to say there is a sufficient reason why the square root of two is irrational.

And this leads us to the question of "uncaused" virtual particles. For me, the word "cause" can lead us astray (and is a difficult term to define). It may be that there is no "cause" in the traditional sense, yet there is a sufficient reason, in a similar way that there is a sufficient reason that the square root of two is irrational.

And this is the point of the Leibnizian cosmological argument. There is not necessarily a cause for the universe in a common sense of the word "cause", but there is a sufficient reason for why it is the way it is. There is a sufficient reason why virtual particles come into existence and disappear again - even if we can't call them "caused". Again, this comes down to semantics, but it's not a true lack of causation simpliciter (since we may define causation quite broadly if we wish).

Nonetheless, that might be the entire story. The only reason the particle exists could very well be because it can exist. The sheer lack of prohibiting laws allows it to be, and that is enough to let it be.

I already outlined the reason why it is NOT the whole story. There's commensurate probabilities to consider, for example. And the things I outlined is by no means to be taken as an exhaustive analysis. There are doubtless other things we would need to say as well.

Do you have a defence against his argument?

Yes, several. Epistemological uncertainty is inherent to any human mind, be they atheist, theist, communist, or whatever. Solopistic scepticism doesn't mean you reject objectivity, but rather simply acknowledge the (slim) possibility that your periphery is wrong. I acknowledge that. Descartes acknowledged that with his famous Demon. Virtually everyone will acknowledge that, given time to think about it. That doesn't mean our basis for believing reality is flawed, or implausible, any more than acknowledging the possibility of gravity-causing magic gnomes invalidates the theory of relativity.

It seems quite clear that you don't in fact understand Plantinga's argument. What you say here is no refutation to the argument he has made. In fact, I agree with almost everything you say here - enough for me to not really argue against the small areas I disagree. I could attempt to reiterate Plantinga's argument, but I'm not sure if it interests you. If it does, perhaps you could tell what *you* think his argument is, and therefore why what you say counts as a refutation.

Furthermore, the triumvirate of evolution, naturalism, and atheism, is not any more suspect to this than, say, creationism, supernaturalism, and theism.

It's not really appropriate to precede this sentence with the statement "furthermore", since what follows is in fact what Plantinga's trying to argue against (ie, it sounds like you are begging the question). This is the very thing being claimed - that (eg) Christianity puts someone in a MUCH better position with regards to being able to trust our mind, and in large part, our senses.

Since you mention Descartes, you are probably aware that he argued (he thought) from first principles that my mind exists, God exists, God is not evil (and would not deceive), and therefore we can trust our mind and (in large part) our senses for the domain in which our senses are meant to be trusted. His program may not be successful, but that's not so important - the point here is where one stands given what one believes. The person who holds beliefs similar to Descartes is in a much better position to trust his senses than someone who believes our mind and senses arose from unguided processes of evolution in a godless universe. This is part of the essence of Plantinga's argument, and you haven't presented any argument against that. Something that you say a bit later tempts to lead you into this very scepticism Plantinga says you cannot escape. You say, "I don't see why the universe has to be particularly amiable to the human mind." Precisely.

I disagree. Why can the universe not be eternal in the same sense as God? If God interacts with the universe (e.g., healing amputees), he is part of it, and is not atemporal. If the universe is atemporal, then that explains how it can appear to us, temporal beings to be eternal. We experience time and causality, but the universe does not.

You say, "Why can the universe not be eternal in the same sense as God?" This seems to have a compellingly obvious answer - because it isn't! The universe is temporal. It has its extension in space-time. It just isn't eternal in the same way as God is claimed to be by some.

As for your argument, it seems reminiscent of the objection Elisabeth raised against Descartes dualistic views. She asked (simplified perhaps), how can an immaterial mind move something physical? For the physical world is extended, and only extended objections can affect objects with extension. An immaterial mind has no extension, and cannot interact with the physical world. In other words, the immaterial cannot affect the material.

I just don't accept this - it doesn't seem obvious to me at all, and in fact seems to defy my intuitions. The same applies to how an atemporal being could affect a temporal world. All that's needed for a counter-example is to show how something fundamentally external to a particular world can yet have an influence on it. I like to think of simulated worlds in a computer game. Pick your favourite game - the game supervenes upon the physical hardware, the electricity, the code. In this simulated world we can create our own laws. Time may flow backwards, things may pop into or out of existence, may obey conservation laws or may not. It may be a world of one dimension or 5000. We can choose the rules that our system obeys. And, once the simulated world is running, it is upheld at every moment by our world. Yet we are not a part of it - we do not depend on it, and if we were to shut it down or destroy it, we would continue to exist. And, importantly, we are free to interact with that world in whatever ways we were pleased to implement. Summon wizards from distant realms, create the most powerful weapon seen in the world, and more. This is how I see God and our universe - like a computer simulation, He created this world (universe), and upholds it and its laws at every moment. Much like the computer hardware, electricity, and programming of the simulated world in our game. And if He should shut it down, He would be in no way diminished. He is free to interact with this world in any way He pleases, since it is He that "coded" it, and upholds it at every moment.

A computer game could code in a space-time like Einstein's relativity, such that no thing (not even information) can travel faster than light. Yet that would still not prevent us outside the system of being aware of what is going on in two separate places, outside that "cone of events" (I assume here you know what I refer to by "cone of events"). We have fundamental external access to and knowledge of the world and the system it supervenes upon.

I hope that makes some sense. The short of it is - I see no problem at all with an immaterial or atemporal being interacting with a material and/or temporal universe.

The hotel doesn't show that it's absurd in the philosophical sense, and it especially doesn't show that it's impossible. It just shows that it's counter-intuitive.

As I said originally (I hope), these points are not each irrefutable proofs sufficient on their own to establish the conclusion. They are pointers, indications that something is awry here - and while individually not strong enough, together they might persuade someone. I think that there are too many problems with the idea of an infinitely old universe for me to hold that. Maybe I am mistaken, but it seems unlikely.

There are a number of problems here. Your latter point, that you can't enumerate all the negative numbers to get something ending at zero, is superficially correct, but there are another interesting sums that you might want to look at:
…
Adding up an infinite number of finite things can lead to very weird results. This doesn't mean it can't be done. And don't forget that, for an infinite past, we're adding up an infinity of infinitesimal slivers of time. This sort of summation most certainly can converge to a finite number.

Why do you think I don't know this? I don't understand. I would have thought from all that I've written so far that you would realise I am aware that some summations of infinite series' of finite numbers is a finite number. It's just not relevant. The case of an infinitely old universe is one of those cases of an infinite series that does *not* sum to a finite number. Any finite series within that infinite past will be finite (eg, if we measure time passed from x to y) , but the series as a whole is infinite (if we measure, eg, time transpired, events occurred).

How does your objection at all show that you can get an actual infinity by adding one thing to the other? I don't understand where you're going.

What seems to me to be the case (forgive me if this seems rude) is that you have learned that some infinite summations of finite values (such as the integral of an equation) leads to a finite number. You've caught on to the words "infinity leads to finite", and assumed that's somehow relevant. I just don't see the connection. I know of both types of series, and had them in mind when I responded to you.

An infinitely old universe is one of those series' where the integral "blows up" when we take it to infinity.

Also, quantum mechanics is so named because of the insight that energy is "quantised".

Basically, you said, if the universe is eternal, why is it now? Why do we exist in this particular point in time? My response was that this is exactly the case for any and all continuous variable: a continuous variable can fall on any one of an infinite number of points, but it falls nonetheless. A radioactive atom can decay at any point in time, so why does it decay when it decays?

I think discussions like this highlight the difference between science motivated by Christianity vs science motivated by atheism. Christians assume there is a reason, and that's what motivates us to explore the universe and understand. By exploring the universe, we are in a sense exploring the mind of God, and uncovering His handiwork. The atheist, on the other hand, has no expectation that:
a) The universe makes sense
b) The universe will make sense to humans
And it worries me how it has been assumed that there is no reason for things like why a radioactive atom decays at the moment it does, and not some other moment. I'm happy to accept this is the extent of our knowledge for now - but the atheist seems too happy to assume that this is the end of the story. Same goes for the inherent probabilistic nature of the quantum world. What if it turns out that there's some deeper laws or as yet undiscovered factors? It *seems* probabilistic, but let's not hang our hats on that point yet.

Likewise, the odds that we exist in this particular point in time is infinitely improbable, given an eternal universe. But, in an eternal universe, we have to exist somewhere, and no matter where we exist, that point will be just as improbable. So, we shouldn't be surprised that we exist anywhere at all, if the universe is eternal, since such an event is a guaranteed improbability.

It seems like you're trying to fit the poor counter-arguments to certain Intelligent Design arguments (I see elements of objections to both specified complexity, and the fine tuning argument here) into a completely different point, where it doesn't work. The question is (perhaps phrased badly by me) is why is what is happening, happening now - given that the universe is infinitely old, it should already have happened. Everything should have already happened, given infinite time in the past.

No, it's not. It's a common misconception, and a popular belief, perhaps even among scientists, but that's not what the theory says.

Perhaps you could reference something to support your claim that this is a misconception, and not what the theory says.

But we're not committing to such a model. I myself believe the universe is temporally finite (admittedly more out of aesthetic than evidence). I'm simply arguing that it's possible for the universe to be eternal, and that this possibility negates 'first cause' arguments for God. Besides, it's not like that's the only criticism of such arguments.

I'm glad you're trying to stick on topic. I am taking many tangents in this conversation

I am arguing both that it is not possible for the universe to be infinitely old, AND even if it was it wouldn't escape something similar to the usual 'first cause' arguments.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

I could attempt to reiterate Plantinga's argument, but I'm not sure if it interests you. If it does, perhaps you could tell what *you* think his argument is, and therefore why what you say counts as a refutation.

As far as I'm aware, Plantinga argues that the truth of evolution undermines the truth of naturalism: we evolved for survival, not necessarily for believing true things. What we believe may be only believed because it is evolutionarily beneficial for us to believe it, rather than having any basis in reality.
My counter-argument is that this inherent uncertainty in knowledge (and belief) has already been addressed by past philosophers, to the conclusion that the reality of our periphery is probable (or, at least, we have no alternative). That our minds are evolved doesn't undermine the naturalism, inasmuch as it is still quite probable that our periphery, our beliefs, and our knowledge, are all based on valid rationale.
If I've got Plantinga's argument wrong, I apologise, and invite you to explain what it actually is. Perhaps I'm confusing his argument with a different one, or I'm just misunderstanding him.

Since you mention Descartes, you are probably aware that he argued (he thought) from first principles that my mind exists, God exists, God is not evil (and would not deceive), and therefore we can trust our mind and (in large part) our senses for the domain in which our senses are meant to be trusted. His program may not be successful, but that's not so important - the point here is where one stands given what one believes. The person who holds beliefs similar to Descartes is in a much better position to trust his senses than someone who believes our mind and senses arose from unguided processes of evolution in a godless universe. This is part of the essence of Plantinga's argument, and you haven't presented any argument against that. Something that you say a bit later tempts to lead you into this very scepticism Plantinga says you cannot escape. You say, "I don't see why the universe has to be particularly amiable to the human mind." Precisely.

That hardly undermines our entire system of belief. That we can't imagine what an atom looks like doesn't mean we are unjustified in believing that the Sun will rise tomorrow. The universe has no onus to be comprehensible to our minds, because our minds evolved to only comprehend that which it dealt with: the classical scale. Dawkins calls this 'middle world' (different to Middle-Earth ). In this world, things are medium-sized and move at medium speeds, so we never, in our day-to-day lives, encounter quantum or relativistic effects - our brains never evolved to cope with them, since they never cropped up. Or, to be more accurate, they did, but a comprehension of classical mechanics sufficed just fine. Our brains evolved to comprehend position and speed in classical terms, since that is what we encounter - the lion is there, and soon it will be here, so I should rapidly attempt to not be here, whither I would be et.

You say, "Why can the universe not be eternal in the same sense as God?" This seems to have a compellingly obvious answer - because it isn't! The universe is temporal. It has its extension in space-time. It just isn't eternal in the same way as God is claimed to be by some.

That isn't an answer, that's a de dicto necessary qualifier that's only true if there's an answer. I could just as easily state that the universe can be eternal in the same sense as God because of a compellingly obvious answer: because it is! I could even state that God himself cannot be eternal. But that doesn't get us anywhere. Why can't the universe be eternal in the same way God is?

As for your argument, it seems reminiscent of the objection Elisabeth raised against Descartes dualistic views. She asked (simplified perhaps), how can an immaterial mind move something physical? For the physical world is extended, and only extended objections can affect objects with extension. An immaterial mind has no extension, and cannot interact with the physical world. In other words, the immaterial cannot affect the material.

I would agree, for given definitions of 'physical' and 'material'. The only meaningful definition of 'physical' is, to me, that which can at least potentially indirectly interact with us. Thus, if it isn't physical, it can't interact with us.

I just don't accept this - it doesn't seem obvious to me at all, and in fact seems to defy my intuitions. The same applies to how an atemporal being could affect a temporal world. All that's needed for a counter-example is to show how something fundamentally external to a particular world can yet have an influence on it. I like to think of simulated worlds in a computer game. Pick your favourite game - the game supervenes upon the physical hardware, the electricity, the code. In this simulated world we can create our own laws. Time may flow backwards, things may pop into or out of existence, may obey conservation laws or may not. It may be a world of one dimension or 5000. We can choose the rules that our system obeys. And, once the simulated world is running, it is upheld at every moment by our world. Yet we are not a part of it - we do not depend on it, and if we were to shut it down or destroy it, we would continue to exist. And, importantly, we are free to interact with that world in whatever ways we were pleased to implement. Summon wizards from distant realms, create the most powerful weapon seen in the world, and more. This is how I see God and our universe - like a computer simulation, He created this world (universe), and upholds it and its laws at every moment. Much like the computer hardware, electricity, and programming of the simulated world in our game. And if He should shut it down, He would be in no way diminished. He is free to interact with this world in any way He pleases, since it is He that "coded" it, and upholds it at every moment.

I don't see how that's the same. The hardware is not fundamentally external to the program: the program ultimately is the hardware. Specific parts of malleable hardware, sure, but hardware nonetheless. Besides, God manifested in the flesh as Jesus, you can't get much more physical than that.

As I said originally (I hope), these points are not each irrefutable proofs sufficient on their own to establish the conclusion. They are pointers, indications that something is awry here - and while individually not strong enough, together they might persuade someone. I think that there are too many problems with the idea of an infinitely old universe for me to hold that. Maybe I am mistaken, but it seems unlikely.

Perhaps, but the Hilbert hotel doesn't even do that. That's my point: all it shows is that infinity needs to be treated carefully, not that an eternal universe is particularly improbable.

Why do you think I don't know this? I don't understand. I would have thought from all that I've written so far that you would realise I am aware that some summations of infinite series' of finite numbers is a finite number. It's just not relevant. The case of an infinitely old universe is one of those cases of an infinite series that does *not* sum to a finite number. Any finite series within that infinite past will be finite (eg, if we measure time passed from x to y) , but the series as a whole is infinite (if we measure, eg, time transpired, events occurred).

Agreed.

How does your objection at all show that you can get an actual infinity by adding one thing to the other? I don't understand where you're going.

Because the point of calculus is that you can get an actual infinity by adding one thing to another.

Also, quantum mechanics is so named because of the insight that energy is "quantised".

For electrons in an atom, energy is quantised. For particles that are not in such a bound state, energy is continuous - a photon, for instance, can have any energy it likes.

I think discussions like this highlight the difference between science motivated by Christianity vs science motivated by atheism. Christians assume there is a reason, and that's what motivates us to explore the universe and understand. By exploring the universe, we are in a sense exploring the mind of God, and uncovering His handiwork. The atheist, on the other hand, has no expectation that:
a) The universe makes sense
b) The universe will make sense to humans
And it worries me how it has been assumed that there is no reason for things like why a radioactive atom decays at the moment it does, and not some other moment. I'm happy to accept this is the extent of our knowledge for now - but the atheist seems too happy to assume that this is the end of the story. Same goes for the inherent probabilistic nature of the quantum world. What if it turns out that there's some deeper laws or as yet undiscovered factors? It *seems* probabilistic, but let's not hang our hats on that point yet.

Whoever says that's the end of the story? All scientists worth their salt, be they atheists or theists, acknowledge that science is on-going. The atheist is happy to accept that it might be the end of the story, not that it is. Thus far, quantum mechanics is the best theory there is, so I'm happy to hang my hat on it. Should a better one come along, I'll move my hat there.
What's interesting, however, is that you admit that the atheist has no preconceptions about the universe, while the theist does: she expects it to make sense, to be intuitive and understandable. If anything violates Darwin's quote in my signature, it is this sort of worldview.

It seems like you're trying to fit the poor counter-arguments to certain Intelligent Design arguments (I see elements of objections to both specified complexity, and the fine tuning argument here) into a completely different point, where it doesn't work. The question is (perhaps phrased badly by me) is why is what is happening, happening now - given that the universe is infinitely old, it should already have happened. Everything should have already happened, given infinite time in the past.

I know they're typically used to address ID, but I consider them equally apt here, or, at least, as I understood your question. In any case, I don't see why an eternal universe cannot have a 'now'. 'Now' is whenever we happen to find ourselves. That an eternal universe implies an infinite amount of time has preceded this precise moment, doesn't make much difference, as far as I can tell. To cite calculus once again, the fact that f(x)=1/x has a sensible value at x=3 doesn't change the fact that f(x) extends to minus infinity.

Perhaps you could reference something to support your claim that this is a misconception, and not what the theory says.

I realise I was being blunt, but I didn't want to derail this thread any more than it already is. However, Wikipedia puts it better than me:


"The Big Bang is the prevailing cosmological theory of the early development of the universe. Cosmologists use the term Big Bang to refer to the idea that the universe was originally extremely hot and dense at some finite time in the past and has since cooled by expanding to the present diluted state and continues to expand today."

In other words, the Big Bang theory states that the universe has been expanding and cooling for the past 13.5 billion years. What, if anything, occurred before then is as yet unknown to science, since no theory or evidence exists to tell us. As Stephen Hawking put it, if anything did happen before then, it may as well not have, since it makes no difference as to what came after. For all intents and purposes, 13.5Gya may as well be the start of the universe, though it may very well not be.

 

[Chesterton]

What's interesting, however, is that you admit that the atheist has no preconceptions about the universe, while the theist does: she expects it to make sense, to be intuitive and understandable. If anything violates Darwin's quote in my signature, it is this sort of worldview.

But you've said elsewhere that logic rules; that everything that could possibly be, must be logical (to your mind). Isn't that a wish or affection of your own? I don't see how that's different from saying "I expect things to make sense".

 

[Christian-Catholic]

The problem with atheism is that it is nonsensical and it goes against logic itself. This is why the biggest atheist philosopher of the 20th century came to believe that there is a god and turned into a deist. Its not that there werent good arguments for christianity but his main objection to a personal god is that Flew was scared of living forever. In his limited scope of understanding eternal life from a materialistic standpoint he thought he would gte bored in heaven. He even said if he was going to cross the line all the way he would choose christianity because of the respect he had for Jesus Christ. When his fellow atheists asked what changed his mind to go away from atheism he said that he simply followed the evidence and there was simply too much powerful evidence to lead him to believe in God.

Atheists basically just repeat everything they hear in a few lines and pass it around and hope that after its repeated a few thousand times that people will believe it. They are the ultimate conspiracy theorists who believe that order arose from chaos. The atheists philosophy crumbled a long time ago and the conversion of flew sealed it for any sort of logical atheism. Basically most atheists spout out angry diatribes which shows that they are leading with anger and rebellion againsy God rathr then any kind of logic.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

The problem with atheism is that it is nonsensical and it goes against logic itself. This is why the biggest atheist philosopher of the 20th century came to believe that there is a god and turned into a deist.

No, it's not. Flew was a firm advocate of holding atheism as the default in the absence of evidence. To him, such evidence presented itself and he changed his beliefs accordingly - as every good scientist does. Flew and I disagree on the evidence (he believed good evidence exists for God, I do not), but I commend him on his staunch empiricism. Flew's conversion has nothing to do with an internal inconsistency in atheism.

Its not that there werent good arguments for christianity but his main objection to a personal god is that Flew was scared of living forever. In his limited scope of understanding eternal life from a materialistic standpoint he thought he would gte bored in heaven.

Source?

He even said if he was going to cross the line all the way he would choose christianity because of the respect he had for Jesus Christ.

Source? He explicitly stated that he did not believe in the Judaeo-Christo-Islamic god.

They are the ultimate conspiracy theorists who believe that order arose from chaos.

By and large, though this is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for atheism.

The atheists philosophy crumbled a long time ago and the conversion of flew sealed it for any sort of logical atheism.

Hardly. Flew's conversion was a personal one. Atheism didn't rest on Flew and Flew alone. It's the absence of belief in deities, nothing more.

Basically most atheists spout out angry diatribes which shows that they are leading with anger and rebellion againsy God rathr then any kind of logic.

Atheists basically just repeat everything they hear in a few lines and pass it around and hope that after its repeated a few thousand times that people will believe it.

Unjustified slander does not an argument make. If you have an actual argument against atheism, then by all means present it. Ad hominem attacks are neither novel nor interesting; we've seen them all before.

 

[Tinker Grey]

Flew's conversion seems overblown: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/04/magazine/04Flew-t.html

 

[Apolloe]

As far as I'm aware, Plantinga argues that the truth of evolution undermines the truth of naturalism

It does not undermine the truth of naturalism. Maybe this is just poor wording on your behalf, or maybe this is what you actually think. What Plantinga's argument shows it that it is ultimately irrational to hold to Naturalism and Evolution (N&E). Specifically, our belief in the truth of naturalism and evolution gives us a defeater for that very conjunction of beliefs. To quote Plantinga,

Now for the argument that it is irrational to believe N&E: P(R/N&E) is either low or inscrutable; in either case (if you accept N&E) you have a defeater for R, and therefore for any other belief B you might hold; but B might be N&E itself; so one who accepts N&E has a defeater for N&E, a reason to doubt or be agnostic with respect to it. If he has no independent evidence, N&E is self-defeating and hence irrational.

(from hisdefense.org/articles/ap001.html Alvin Plantinga - Audio Lecture Notes [The Academy of Christian Apologetics)
Showing that holding a particular belief is irrational is not the same as saying that the proposition asserted by those beliefs is false. ie, it is not to say that naturalism & evolution are, in fact, untrue.

My counter-argument is that this inherent uncertainty in knowledge (and belief) has already been addressed by past philosophers, to the conclusion that the reality of our periphery is probable (or, at least, we have no alternative)

It has been addressed - some of these philosophers claim that a belief in the existence of God, and His creating us as rational beings, gives one such answer to this problem of uncertainty of knowledge. But that's irrelevant to Plantinga's argument - his argument shows that *no* solution is possible if you hold to N&E. Your counter-argument amounts to, "someone else over there somewhere has given a solution to this problem". Well, which solutions might work? I can’t think of any - Plantinga’s argument seems pretty solid to me here. Plantinga's argument goes this far:

Is there any sensible way at all in which he can argue for R? Any argument he might produce will have premises; and these premises, he claims, give him good reason to believe R. But of course he has the very same defeater for each of those premises that he has for R

so this defeater can't be defeated.

I agree there are solutions to problems of uncertainty in knowledge. But none of the successful solutions work with N&E.

That hardly undermines our entire system of belief. That we can't imagine what an atom looks like doesn't mean we are unjustified in believing that the Sun will rise tomorrow.

In fact, it does. You give the example of "the lion is there, and soon it will be here, so I should rapidly attempt to not be here, wither I would be et." But there is possibly an infinite number (and if not infinite, then a very large number) of false beliefs that serve just as well in getting you safely away from the lion. Moreover, in a way what you actually believe is irrelevant, because it's how you act that is important. It is equally beneficial if we form the belief "I should approach the lion and stick my head in its mouth", so long as our actions end up being, "I flee from the lion" - or whatever the appropriate action to take in such a circumstance is. There is no reason at all to suppose that even in this "middle world" our beliefs approximate the truth. It certainly *seems* they do, but that counts as no evidence since that's using the very faculty we want to test. We have no reason to expect our mind will be able to comprehend the quantum or the astronomical worlds, but neither do we have a reason to expect it will in the “middle world”. True beliefs just aren’t that important, even to survival. There’s plenty more alternative ways to evolve that don’t involve forming true beliefs.

That isn't an answer, that's a de dicto necessary qualifier that's only true if there's an answer. I could just as easily state that the universe can be eternal in the same sense as God because of a compellingly obvious answer: because it is! I could even state that God himself cannot be eternal. But that doesn't get us anywhere. Why can't the universe be eternal in the same way God is?

What I was saying is quite simple. The claim is that God, if He exists, might be eternal in the sense that He is atemporal. If we determine that the universe is temporal, then it just isn’t eternal like God is claimed to be. In another possible world, maybe the universe is eternal in the same sense - who knows? But that is irrelevant. The important question is, is THIS universe eternal in that sense? And no it isn’t, since it is temporal and (if eternal) eternal in the sense that it is infinitely old, while God is claimed to be eternal in the atemporal sense.

I don't see how that's the same. The hardware is not fundamentally external to the program: the program ultimately isthe hardware. Specific parts of malleable hardware, sure, but hardware nonetheless. Besides, God manifested in the flesh as Jesus, you can't get much more physical than that.

I agree with you that the program is not external to the hardware. The program is a particular arrangement of matter - so in a sense it is hardware too. Absolutely agree with you.

But the sword inside a simulated world is not made of bronze or iron atoms (or whatever a sword is made of), despite the fact that in that simulated world it might be called a “bronze” or “iron” sword. This sword is not a material sword made of atoms at all. And so the same question remains: how can something material influence this immaterial simulated world? Well, one simple answer is that it rearranges atoms in our physical world, which causes a change in that simulated world which supervenes upon the physical world. Such a movement of atoms allows one to do nearly anything, things that within the rules or confines of this simulated world might be deemed impossible or miraculous, and are done without any of the seemingly appropriate connection between cause and effect.

And so the analogy is finished - there seems to me no logical problem in thinking that an immaterial world can influence a physical one. It may be that our physical world supervenes upon the mental world, particularly upon the mind of God. And while there are certain physical laws that prevent certain actions within our world, God is free to do as He pleases within this creation of His that He upholds at every moment - He can do the equivalent of what in our world amounts to modifying the hardware or program directly: He can perform virtually any miracle or feat that is not logically impossible.

Because the point of calculus is that you can get an actual infinity by adding one thing to another.

Why do you say this? Before you were saying that the fundamental theory of calculus gives you a finitude by adding an infinite amount. Now you’re saying that it gives you an infinitude by adding a finite amount? Or an infinite amount? I’m not even sure what your point is. Perhaps you could give a clear example of an *actual* infinity gained by adding one to another.

I’m trying to think of just what example you may raise. Perhaps you’ll say that measuring the surface area of a sphere using calculus involves adding an infinite amount of infinitesimals, that add up to a finitude. I thought perhaps this is the point that your original statement was trying to make. But if that is your point, this represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the problem being raised. The idea is not to add up something and get a finite amount. Despite being a theoretical infinite amount of infinitesimal distance additions within the integral, the total area is finite. In the end you have a *finite* surface area of the sphere. What is asked for is to, by adding one thing to another, get an actual infinity. For an eternally old universe, the past is infinite - not finite like the surface of a sphere. Yet history advances one moment of time after the next...adding one moment of history to the next. How can such a process result in infinity?

Consider the future, and let’s assume that time will progress on and on and never cease. This means that the future is potentially infinite. Yet there will be no time in the future where we have a potentially infinite universe become an actually infinite one. We start our measurement from any arbitrary moment in the timeline, and ask ourselves “how long from here until we get an actual infinite?” Well, it doesn’t matter how much time passes, we cannot get an actual infinite future. It will always only be potential, never realised. The past infinitely old cannot have risen by adding one thing to another, yet that is supposedly what it is.

For electrons in an atom, energy is quantised. For particles that are not in such a bound state, energy is continuous - a photon, for instance, can have any energy it likes.

I will defer a response to this, since you may be right and my ignorance on this matter is a little embarassing. At any rate, my point was that it’s not clear whether these things are continuous or discrete, and at any rate it didn’t matter for my argument at the time.

Whoever says that's the end of the story? All scientists worth their salt, be they atheists or theists, acknowledge that science is on-going. The atheist is happy to accept that it might be the end of the story, not that it is.

This is precisely the point. The atheist may be satisfied that what he has may be the end of the story, *despite* the fact that there are explanatory gaps. This attitude doesn’t drive science or human understanding, and is counter-productive in a scientific culture. What Christianity offers, as I said before, is a reason to pursue answers further, and to fill these explanatory gaps with a deeper understanding.

What's interesting, however, is that you admit that the atheist has no preconceptions about the universe, while the theist does: she expects it to make sense, to be intuitive and understandable. If anything violates Darwin's quote in my signature, it is this sort of worldview.

Pure nonsense! I admitted to no such thing. Many atheists have a preconception that there *are* things that exist without reason, which commits them to the anti-scientific view that some things happen without any sufficient reason. The Christian does indeed hold the preconceived notion that the universe makes sense, and is accessible to human inquiry - and THAT view is precisely the one that will be most productive in science. If that’s a problem, it’s certainly not a problem for scientific endeavours. What are the consequences of such a preconceived notion? If it turns out that the atheist is right and some things just do happen for no sufficient reason, then what will the Christian have lost in trying to find a reason for these things? He won’t find an answer, but it’s certainly worth the effort to look. And since the atheist is likely to be mistaken (it seems to me) in most cases where he thinks we may have reached the end of the story, the Christian will be the one who makes a new breakthrough.

If you want to talk about preconceived notions, the typical atheist has already committed himself or herself to the view that there can be no explanations for things that are rooted in the spiritual, or by the hand of God. That rules out a VAST class of possible explanations for things, a weakness which the theist does not share. Consider this example: I believe that most (if not all) supposed claims of miraculous healings today can be explained in terms of psychology, wishful thinking, and other natural explanations. But I am not committed to such a view. If the evidence should show a non-material explanation, I am quite able to accept that. The atheist, however, is already committed to a rejection of any non-natural explanation. He must seek any other answer than the non-material one, or forego his atheism. It’s just silly for you to think that the atheist has no anti-scientific preconceived notions, and likewise silly that you thought I admitted any such thing.

Christians are more open in terms of the kinds of scientific explanations they can accept, AND they hold a worldview that is conducive to scientific pursuit. Atheists, on the other had, rule out many explanations that they really ought not, and their worldview gives them at least one reason to suppose science is ultimately a doomed enterprise - that it can only take us a small distance, if any.

In fact, humans already understand (so we think) FAR more than one would expect given the supposed evolutionary origin of our minds. The depths to which we understand quantum mechanics and relativity, and other fields of physics (even if we still think our understanding shallow) is far more than is required or explainable by our origins. The evidence is already there: either our minds understand far more than evolution can explain (designed by God), or we are mistaken about far more things than we currently suppose (N&E). We have in a real sense exceeded the expectations or needs of our evolved survival traits.

 

[Apolloe]

Wow, now I'm too long to post in one message. The rest:

I realise I was being blunt, but I didn't want to derail this thread any more than it already is. However, Wikipedia puts it better than me:


"The Big Bang is the prevailing cosmological theory of the early development of the universe. Cosmologists use the term Big Bang to refer to the idea that the universe was originally extremely hot and dense at some finite time in thepast and has since cooled by expanding to the present diluted state and continues to expand today."

In other words, the Big Bang theory states that the universe has been expanding and cooling for the past 13.5 billion years. What, if anything, occurred before then is as yet unknown to science, since no theory or evidence exists to tell us. As Stephen Hawking put it, if anything did happen before then, it may as well not have, since it makes no difference as to what came after. For all intents and purposes, 13.5Gya may as well be the start of the universe, though it may very well not be.

That’s hardly an answer. I made the claim that modern science shows a beginning of time logically after the singularity of the big bang begins expanding. Your quote doesn’t do anything to establish an answer against that claim, which you said was “a common misconception, and a popular belief, perhaps even among scientists, but that's not what the theory says.”

Hawking has allegedly written (and I can’t verify this at the moment) that “Today almost everyone believes that the universe, and time itself, had a beginning at the big bang” (Stephen Hawking and Roger Penrose, The Nature of Space and Time,The Isaac Newton Institute Series of Lectures (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 20.)

This doesn’t mean this conclusion is right. I’m open to the possibility that science discovers time did not begin with the big bang.

 

[Apolloe]

Just as a final thought, back on topic.

I still maintain that we should desire that there be a sufficient reason for everything, and that to hold otherwise is anti-scientific (and indeed seems to be strongly linked to atheistic worldviews).

Thus, positing a universe that is infinitely old (assuming such is possible) does NOT give you an escape from a "first cause" type argument formulated in a manner like Leibniz did.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

1 of 2 - Plantinga and Infinity

"Now for the argument that it is irrational to believe N&E: P(R/N&E) is either low or inscrutable; in either case (if you accept N&E) you have a defeater for R, and therefore for any other belief B you might hold; but B might be N&E itself; so one who accepts N&E has a defeater for N&E, a reason to doubt or be agnostic with respect to it. If he has no independent evidence, N&E is self-defeating and hence irrational."

Which seems to amount to a non sequitur: why is P(R|N&E) low? The criticisms of Plantinga I've read generally point out that he arbitrarily evaluates P(R|N&E) as being very low. For example, Plantinga claims that false beliefs (that just so happen to have beneficial outcomes) can evolve for the same reasons that true beliefs (which have beneficial outcomes) can evolve. This article argues that this is not how evolution works:

"This means that Plantinga’s argument that Pr(R|E&N) will be low in category (v) situations is inadequate. Plantinga might reply that witch-beliefs and other systems of adaptive false beliefs were available ancestrally. However, we don’t see any reason to think that this substantive claim about the past can be successfully defended. By ignoring the question of availability, Plantinga, in effect, assumes that natural selection acts on the set of conceivable variants. This it does not do; it acts on the set of actual variants."

It goes on to say:

"In general, the way to have two (logically independent) properties be wellcorrelated is to have one cause the other, or to have each trace back to a common cause. If belief and action failed to be causally connected in either of these two ways, then it would be surprising for selection on action to lead cognitive mechanisms to evolve that are highly reliable. However, if belief and action are causally connected, then it takes a more detailed argument than Plantinga provides for concluding that reliable belief formation devices are unlikely to evolve via selection on actions. Proposition R is improbable under scenario (i), but that’s about all one can say."

In other words, Plantinga merely asserts that false beliefs can lead to good outcomes. From an evolutionary point of view, this isn't necessarily the case: there is a causal relationship between a trait (i.e., a particular belief) and its benefit. Believing that putting one's head in a lion's mouth is unlikely to lead to one's survival, while believing that running away from a lion has obvious benefits for survival. Plantinga fails to establish this.

Indeed, Plantinga himself admits this:

"Of course the argument for a low estimate of P(R/N&E) is pretty weak. In particular, our estimates of the various probabilities involved in estimating P(R/N&E) with respect to that hypothetical population were pretty shaky. So perhaps the right course here is simple agnosticism: that probability is inscrutable; we just can't tell what it is."

He goes on to argue, somewhat arbitrarily, that even if P(R|N&E) is inscrutable, R should not be affirmed.

I think I understand his argument better now, though I still find it too arbitrary to be taken seriously; too many things need to be assumed, such as P(R|N&E) being anything but substantial.

In fact, it does. You give the example of "the lion is there, and soon it will be here, so I should rapidly attempt to not be here, wither I would be et." But there is possibly an infinite number (and if not infinite, then a very large number) of false beliefs that serve just as well in getting you safely away from the lion. Moreover, in a way what you actually believe is irrelevant, because it's how you act that is important. It is equally beneficial if we form the belief "I should approach the lion and stick my head in its mouth", so long as our actions end up being, "I flee from the lion" - or whatever the appropriate action to take in such a circumstance is. There is no reason at all to suppose that even in this "middle world" our beliefs approximate the truth. It certainly *seems* they do, but that counts as no evidence since that's using the very faculty we want to test. We have no reason to expect our mind will be able to comprehend the quantum or the astronomical worlds, but neither do we have a reason to expect it will in the “middle world”. True beliefs just aren’t that important, even to survival. There’s plenty more alternative ways to evolve that don’t involve forming true beliefs.

Such as? You say that it is equally beneficial to believe "I should stick my head in the lion's mouth", but in what way is that belief going to increase your odds of survival? There really are people in this world with these self-destructive beliefs (Christians who handle poisonous snakes, Christians who attempt to walk on water, Christians and Pagans who reject modern medicine for 'alternative' therapies, etc), and these beliefs really do cause a great deal of harm.

You say a false belief can cause benefits, but how?

What I was saying is quite simple. The claim is that God, if He exists, might be eternal in the sense that He is atemporal. If we determine that the universe is temporal, then it just isn’t eternal like God is claimed to be. In another possible world, maybe the universe is eternal in the same sense - who knows? But that is irrelevant. The important question is, is THIS universe eternal in that sense? And no it isn’t, since it is temporal and (if eternal) eternal in the sense that it is infinitely old, while God is claimed to be eternal in the atemporal sense.

Is the universe temporal, though? Things within it (i.e., us) experience time, but does that mean the universe itself is temporal? Our understanding of the universe's underlying fabric would suggest that it's not: time is just another, albeit peculiar, dimension in which things move. The universe itself may or may not be temporal.
Which, again, boils down to semantics: what is temporal? What is atemporal?

I agree with you that the program is not external to the hardware. The program is a particular arrangement of matter - so in a sense it is hardware too. Absolutely agree with you.

But the sword inside a simulated world is not made of bronze or iron atoms (or whatever a sword is made of), despite the fact that in that simulated world it might be called a “bronze” or “iron” sword. This sword is not a material sword made of atoms at all. And so the same question remains: how can something material influence this immaterial simulated world? Well, one simple answer is that it rearranges atoms in our physical world, which causes a change in that simulated world which supervenes upon the physical world. Such a movement of atoms allows one to do nearly anything, things that within the rules or confines of this simulated world might be deemed impossible or miraculous, and are done without any of the seemingly appropriate connection between cause and effect.

But that presupposes that the sword is anything but atoms in a computer - it's not. What we call 'the sword' isn't a sword at all. It's a human abstraction for a complex phenomenon, namely, the image of a sword on-screen. We can draw analogies with real swords, by referring to it's hilt, finish, etc, but that's all these things are: analogies.

So, more generally, something above and beyond this world would still need to interact with it in some way. Aren't you the one who demands a sufficient reason for everything? How can "It just can" be a sufficient reason?

And so the analogy is finished - there seems to me no logical problem in thinking that an immaterial world can influence a physical one. It may be that our physical world supervenes upon the mental world, particularly upon the mind of God. And while there are certain physical laws that prevent certain actions within our world, God is free to do as He pleases within this creation of His that He upholds at every moment - He can do the equivalent of what in our world amounts to modifying the hardware or program directly: He can perform virtually any miracle or feat that is not logically impossible.

But a change in hardware is just that: a change. A physical alteration. God is no more immaterial than the computer is; the software may be one level of abstraction above the hardware, but that's just a convenience. If God can manipulate the universe, he is, for all intents and purposes, material: we are the abstraction of the underlying 'material' in his world.

Why do you say this? Before you were saying that the fundamental theory of calculus gives you a finitude by adding an infinite amount. Now you’re saying that it gives you an infinitude by adding a finite amount? Or an infinite amount? I’m not even sure what your point is. Perhaps you could give a clear example of an *actual* infinity gained by adding one to another.

The set of all natural numbers is an actual infinity gained by adding one to another; 2 is 1+1, 3 is 1+2, 4 is 1+3, and so on. The same is true for the set of integers, reals, etc. Mathematics is riddled with infinity.

My point is that an infinite past is not impossible. The objection that we can't get to 'now' because we can't have crossed the 'past' to get here, is false: mathematically speaking, it's entirely possible to traverse infinity using finite steps. The trick is that we have an infinite number of finite steps.

I’m trying to think of just what example you may raise. Perhaps you’ll say that measuring the surface area of a sphere using calculus involves adding an infinite amount of infinitesimals, that add up to a finitude. I thought perhaps this is the point that your original statement was trying to make. But if that is your point, this represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the problem being raised. The idea is not to add up something and get a finite amount. Despite being a theoretical infinite amount of infinitesimal distance additions within the integral, the total area is finite. In the end you have a *finite* surface area of the sphere. What is asked for is to, by adding one thing to another, get an actual infinity. For an eternally old universe, the past is infinite - not finite like the surface of a sphere. Yet history advances one moment of time after the next...adding one moment of history to the next. How can such a process result in infinity?

Because you have an infinite number of steps. If the past is infinite, then we have already traversed an infinitely long stretch of time. The error is in treating the infinite as if it were merely very, very large.
How long would it take to traverse an infinite length of time, if we only had finite steps? It would take an infinite amount of time. But, luckily for us, we have an infinite amount of time: an eternal universe.

I've heard these objections before, and I don't think they amount to anything more than objections to the counter-intuitive.

Consider the future, and let’s assume that time will progress on and on and never cease. This means that the future is potentially infinite. Yet there will be no time in the future where we have a potentially infinite universe become an actually infinite one. We start our measurement from any arbitrary moment in the timeline, and ask ourselves “how long from here until we get an actual infinite?” Well, it doesn’t matter how much time passes, we cannot get an actual infinite future. It will always only be potential, never realised. The past infinitely old cannot have risen by adding one thing to another, yet that is supposedly what it is.

I agree that starting at any arbitrary moment precludes us 'reaching' infinity, but that's not what we're doing. We're not starting, since the past is infinitely long: there is no start. Moreover, we're not measuring from now into the future, we're measuring from the infinite past to now (e.g., from minus infinity to zero). There are an infinite number of steps we need to take, but we've had an eternity in which to take them. As I said before, infinities are attainable if you have other ones to play with.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

2 of 2 - Atheism and the Big Bang

Pure nonsense! I admitted to no such thing.

I beg to differ:

"I think discussions like this highlight the difference between science motivated by Christianity vs science motivated by atheism. Christians assume there is a reason, and that's what motivates us to explore the universe and understand. By exploring the universe, we are in a sense exploring the mind of God, and uncovering His handiwork. The atheist ... has no expectation that:
a) The universe makes sense
b) The universe will make sense to humans"

You explicitly state that atheists lack the same expectations that Christians have.

In any case, I disagree that either Christianity or atheism motivate scientists; rather, it is human curiosity, common to both camps.

Many atheists have a preconception that there *are* things that exist without reason, which commits them to the anti-scientific view that some things happen without any sufficient reason. The Christian does indeed hold the preconceived notion that the universe makes sense, and is accessible to human inquiry - and THAT view is precisely the one that will be most productive in science."
"But since the devil's bride, Reason, that pretty harlot, comes in and thinks she's wise, and what she says, what she thinks, is from the Holy Spirit, who can help us, then? Not judges, not doctors, no king or emperor, because [reason] is the Devil's greatest harlot." - Martin Luther, 1546

"...so it is with human reason, which strives not against faith, when enlightened, but rather furthers and advances it." - Martin Luther, 1569

Christians are somewhat historically resistent to scientific advancements. If we're going to make sweeping statements, let's get both sides.

If that’s a problem, it’s certainly not a problem for scientific endeavours. What are the consequences of such a preconceived notion? If it turns out that the atheist is right and some things just do happen for no sufficient reason, then what will the Christian have lost in trying to find a reason for these things? He won’t find an answer, but it’s certainly worth the effort to look. And since the atheist is likely to be mistaken (it seems to me) in most cases where he thinks we may have reached the end of the story, the Christian will be the one who makes a new breakthrough.

But as I said, the science doesn't think he's reached the end. The science always acknowledges that there is more to learn, more to unearth. Kelvin famously said that there was nothing new to discover in science - shortly before the quantum and relativistic revolutions. Neither atheism nor Christianity preclude someone from being a good scientist. I'm not entirely sure what your point is.

If you want to talk about preconceived notions, the typical atheist has already committed himself or herself to the view that there can be no explanations for things that are rooted in the spiritual, or by the hand of God.

I disagree. That is hard naturalism, something which most, if not all, atheists reject: we accept that there may be ghosts, gods, and goblins, but that, in light of the evidence (or absence thereof) there probable are not. Like I've said in other threads, I disagree that science is exclusively naturalistic, if only because I don't recognise any meaningful distinction between 'natural' and 'supernatural'.

That rules out a VAST class of possible explanations for things, a weakness which the theist does not share. Consider this example: I believe that most (if not all) supposed claims of miraculous healings today can be explained in terms of psychology, wishful thinking, and other natural explanations. But I am not committed to such a view. If the evidence should show a non-material explanation, I am quite able to accept that. The atheist, however, is already committed to a rejection of any non-natural explanation. He must seek any other answer than the non-material one, or forego his atheism.

Why? Atheism is the absence of belief in any god. The atheist is perfectly capable, if unlikely, of believing in 'supernatural' healings. Perhaps fairies did it with a twitch of their nose. Perhaps the ghosts of our ancestors did it. Perhaps the Loch Ness Monster splashed water on the broken bone. None of these are particularly likely, and I doubt even theists would believe them, but none of them preclude atheism, since none of them are necessarily theist.

Atheism is not synonymous with naturalism. Buddhists, for instance, are atheists who believe in all sorts of supernatural hooey.

It’s just silly for you to think that the atheist has no anti-scientific preconceived notions, and likewise silly that you thought I admitted any such thing.

If I misunderstood you, I apologise.

Christians are more open in terms of the kinds of scientific explanations they can accept, AND they hold a worldview that is conducive to scientific pursuit. Atheists, on the other had, rule out many explanations that they really ought not, and their worldview gives them at least one reason to suppose science is ultimately a doomed enterprise - that it can only take us a small distance, if any.

See above. I would further add that Christians are likewise likely to be restricted in what they believe: most non-scientific Christians I have spoken to, or read of, look at the facts through the Bible. Christians who are also scientists are much better, and hold the evidence as paramount - if the evidence says that there was no global flood, then so much for the literal interpretation of Genesis 4 (I think; possibly 5?).

In fact, humans already understand (so we think) FAR more than one would expect given the supposed evolutionary origin of our minds. The depths to which we understand quantum mechanics and relativity, and other fields of physics (even if we still think our understanding shallow) is far more than is required or explainable by our origins. The evidence is already there: either our minds understand far more than evolution can explain (designed by God), or we are mistaken about far more things than we currently suppose (N&E). We have in a real sense exceeded the expectations or needs of our evolved survival traits.

I disagree that evolution cannot explain our ability to comprehend what we can comprehend. With regard to quantum mechanics and general relativity, we have already surpassed what the mind can conceive: we use analogies and mathematics to teach kids, rather than clear explanations. Atoms are intuitive enough, but try explaining why electrons don't crash into the nucleus to someone in Year 6.

And even if we could comprehend quantum and relativistic phenomena in their entirety, that doesn't preclude an evolutionary explanation. In such a universe, we could simply point out that our brains are fantastically refined pattern-recognition machines whose level of abstraction is sufficient to comprehend these rare phenomena. After all, we never evolved to comprehend cars, but they pass by without much notice.

That’s hardly an answer. I made the claim that modern science shows a beginning of time logically after the singularity of the big bang begins expanding. Your quote doesn’t do anything to establish an answer against that claim, which you said was “a common misconception, and a popular belief, perhaps even among scientists, but that's not what the theory says.”

I don't see how. I gave quotations explaining what the Big Bang is (namely, an expansion of space over the past 13.5 billion years), which is sufficient to show that it's not what you said it was (namely, a scientific conclusion that time began). If you're not referring to the Big Bang, what are you referring to? The only thing in science that I'm aware of that comes close to the dawn of time is the Big Bang, and even that doesn't say time began.

Hawking has allegedly written (and I can’t verify this at the moment) that “Today almost everyone believes that the universe, and time itself, had a beginning at the big bang” (Stephen Hawking and Roger Penrose, The Nature of Space and Time,The Isaac Newton Institute Series of Lectures (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 20.)

Someone quoted this to me a long time ago, and I remember citing a later article in which Hawking clarified time and the Big Bang. Basically, he said that whatever happen before the Big Bang cannot affect what happened after it, so the Big Bang may as well be the start of time. Empirically, we can't say one way or the other, but theoretically, it's a handy label.

This doesn’t mean this conclusion is right. I’m open to the possibility that science discovers time did not begin with the big bang.

Science doesn't say one way or the other. As my quotations said, the Big Bang details the past 13.5 billion years of history; it says nothing about what, if anything, came before.

Just as a final thought, back on topic.

I still maintain that we should desire that there be a sufficient reason for everything, and that to hold otherwise is anti-scientific.

Why?

 

[EnemyOfReason]

To my deist friends, I'd like to ask the following question:


Are you guys serious? I don't know if you know, but the 18th century is over, and no one cares about the first cause argument anymore. And while no one has all the answers, it's pretty clear by now that science is better at coming up with better answers than any philosophy, and science does not require the supposition of any god. The god of deism is superfluous. Come into the fold; go get a red lightsabre, start eating kittens, and become atheists. (If you must, you can be agnostic, but we're just going to have to have this same talk again.)

Or have I missed something?

I am trying to read this and not laugh kiddo but your ignorance is cute

 

[Wiccan_Child]

I am trying to read this and not laugh kiddo but your ignorance is cute