Causal exclusion problem

[Hans Blaster]

The analysis isn't about providing a theoretical descriptiion, it's about identifying the problem term in the set of propositions. The conflict dissolves, which is a kind of solution. What the analysis indicates is that the principal issue in this specific mind-body problem is physicalist metaphysics. There's no need for me to provide any definitions, because the only interest is word-concept relationships. It's an empirical test of how we use words, your lack of understanding of the test isn't a weakness of the test it's a weakness of your comprehension.

As I have stated many times before in this thread, I see no practical difference between "natural" and "physical". You are correct that I don't understand the difference you are making, but that is largely because you won't answer as simple question. How about this one:

Can you name one thing/item/concept that falls within natural and not physical or vice versa?

I'm having this "problem" because nothing in my experience or training would indicate any difference between the two.

 

[Fervent]

Maybe .. maybe not. Either way, its more useful than moving on to Stream#11 on day 11 and finding nothing.

Depends on what we mean by "useful"...because if our target is truth, and we have to abandon searching for discernible truth to accept what science says, we haven't discovered gold. We've merely settled for an inferior substitute and convinced ourselves that it is gold.

 

[Fervent]

As I have stated many times before in this thread, I see no practical difference between "natural" and "physical". You are correct that I don't understand the difference you are making, but that is largely because you won't answer as simple question. How about this one:

Can you name one thing/item/concept that falls within natural and not physical or vice versa?

I'm having this "problem" because nothing in my experience or training would indicate any difference between the two.

That's a problem of your conception, not the analytic process, I would need a physicalist to provide a substantive definition to determine where to draw the line. You impose an ill-defined concept of "physical" upon what is natural and then proceed from there. It's unnecessary metaphysical baggage through prejudicial language, and it restricts the field of potential answers. It is you, who claims that all of nature is physical, who needs to supply a definiton of physical to demonstrate that there is any truth to the metaphysical claim.

 

[Hans Blaster]

That's a problem of your conception, not the analytic process, I would need a physicalist to provide a substantive definition to determine where to draw the line. You impose an ill-defined concept of "physical" upon what is natural and then proceed from there. It's unnecessary metaphysical baggage through prejudicial language, and it restricts the field of potential answers. It is you, who claims that all of nature is physical, who needs to supply a definiton of physical to demonstrate that there is any truth to the metaphysical claim.

As I have also said before, it is what *YOU* mean by the difference in physical and natural that matters, not what anyone else says. My "metaphysical baggage" is irrelevant. What is relevant is my lack of understanding of what *YOU* mean. I have heard distinctions, but they don't seem to be all the same. There is clearly some nuance here and I AM NOT A MIND READER.

Just answer my simple question. Certainly you know an example or you would not think the distinction to be meaningful.

 

[Fervent]

As I have also said before, it is what *YOU* mean by the difference in physical and natural that matters, not what anyone else says. My "metaphysical baggage" is irrelevant. What is relevant is my lack of understanding of what *YOU* mean. I have heard distinctions, but they don't seem to be all the same. There is clearly some nuance hear and I AM NOT A MIND READER.

No, what I understand makes no difference in the analytic process. You just fail to understand the procedures that I have employed which are independent of how I might define the word. This is an "objective" process. No need to be a mind reader, just need to follow the logical process. The fact that you think there is argumentation involved shows you don't understand the logical procedures that have been used.

Just answer my simple question. Certainly you know an example or you would not think the distinction to be meaningful.

Look, I can explain what I have done but I can't understand it for you. Your lack of understanding isn't a weakness of the procedures involved, it just shows a lack of comprehension on your part.

 

[SelfSim]

No, what I understand makes no difference in the analytic process. You just fail to understand the procedures that I have employed which are independent of how I might define the word. This is an "objective" process. No need to be a mind reader, just need to follow the logical process. The fact that you think there is argumentation involved shows you don't understand the logical procedures that have been used.

Look, I can explain what I have done but I can't understand it for you. Your lack of understanding isn't a weakness of the procedures involved, it just shows a lack of comprehension on your part.

The explanation calls for an example.
Generalisations down to a specific instance.

 

[Fervent]

The explanation calls for an example.
Generalisations down to a specific instance.

The explanation is in the procedures. The terms need not be defined in any way, so long as there is not an illicit procedure done. My logical process did nothing more than remove the physicalist hypothesis from the closure principle without doing violence to the terms. It's a step-by-step process that is independent of specification. The only thing that matters is that my separating the closure principle be done in a non-arbitrary way in which the hypothetical metaphysics can be removed. The challenge seems to be that people are so committed to the metaphysical hypothesis that they aren't able to recognize them for what they are.

 

[Hans Blaster]

The explanation is in the procedures. The terms need not be defined in any way, so long as there is not an illicit procedure done. My logical process did nothing more than remove the physicalist hypothesis from the closure principle without doing violence to the terms. It's a step-by-step process that is independent of specification. The only thing that matters is that my separating the closure principle be done in a non-arbitrary way in which the hypothetical metaphysics can be removed. The challenge seems to be that people are so committed to the metaphysical hypothesis that they aren't able to recognize them for what they are.

Examples are needed.

For example are numbers and shapes (and similar mathematical concepts) part of "natural" but not "physical"?

If so, that would be an example. (Now numbers aren't causal to anything, so I doubt the placement of numbers in one set and not the other would have any impact on this "problem", but it is a start.)

Now what about something that would matter to the "causal exclusion problem" that is in one and not the other?

 

[Fervent]

Examples are needed.

If I were aiming at presenting a theoretical description, possibly. But my interest is analytical.

For example are numbers and shapes (and similar mathematical concepts) part of "natural" but not "physical"?

Ostensive definition isn't really appropriate for this sort of question, and it is the physicalist who is required to provide a definition not the skeptic. What makes a "mathematical concept" not "physical" but still "natural"? How are you distinguishing the two?

If so, that would be an example. (Now numbers aren't causal to anything, so I doubt the placement of numbers in one set and not the other would have any impact on this "problem", but it is a start.)

Again, the question is purely procedural. It's an appliction of skepticism towards physicalist metaphysics and nothing more. I don't need to define what is meant by "physical" only demonstrate that the removal of the presumption of physicality is removed in a non-arbitrary manner.

Now what about something that would matter to the "causal exclusion problem" that is in one and not the other?

I need not provide a theoretical explanation, and as I have repeatedly stated I didn't make this problem up. There is a great deal of very robust theoretical responses to the problem, but they all ignore a glaring epistemic solution. In order to criticize what I have presented it would be required that it be demonstrated that I have made some sort of illicit move in uncoupling the closure principle into two statements instead of one.

 

[Hans Blaster]

If I were aiming at presenting a theoretical description, possibly. But my interest is analytical.

If you can analyze things without knowing what they are then the analysis is meaningless.

Ostensive definition isn't really appropriate for this sort of question, and it is the physicalist who is required to provide a definition not the skeptic. What makes a "mathematical concept" not "physical" but still "natural"? How are you distinguishing the two?

I did not make a claim about mathematical concepts. I asked a question.

Again, the question is purely procedural. It's an appliction of skepticism towards physicalist metaphysics and nothing more. I don't need to define what is meant by "physical" only demonstrate that the removal of the presumption of physicality is removed in a non-arbitrary manner.

I need not provide a theoretical explanation, and as I have repeatedly stated I didn't make this problem up.

I didn't say you did, but you're the one making a deal about.

There is a great deal of very robust theoretical responses to the problem, but they all ignore a glaring epistemic solution. In order to criticize what I have presented it would be required that it be demonstrated that I have made some sort of illicit move in uncoupling the closure principle into two statements instead of one.

Your claim is thus that this "causal exclusion problem" is of importance to actual philosophers and you found a solution by substituting one concept for a nearly identical concept and you won't even tell us what has changed?

It is as if you called a repairman to fix a machine and when he arrived you said you'd already "fixed" it by pressing a different button, but when asked by the expert in the function of the machine, you wouldn't answere the question: which two buttons?

 

[Fervent]

If you can analyze things without knowing what they are then the analysis is meaningless.

Not at all, its only meaningless if there is a procedural error.

I did not make a claim about mathematical concepts. I asked a question.

You provided an ostensive definition, but no indication of what makes one physical and one non-physical.

I didn't say you did, but you're the one making a deal about.

I performed logical analysis by separating a proposition that is generally given as a single propositon into two statements and then removing one of the statements. It's an objective, procedural analysis. It is only in error if there is a error in the processes applied.

Your claim is thus that this "causal exclusion problem" is of importance to actual philosophers and you found a solution by substituting one concept for a nearly identical concept and you won't even tell us what has changed?

You keep ignoring that I didn't invent this problem, it's a widely discussed challenge second only to the "hard problem" of association. What changed is I removed a metaphysical presumption. I separated closure from physicalism and removed physicalism from the equation. That's the whole of it, and how physicalism is defined doesn't matter unless someone wants to argue that how I stated the physicalist hypothesis so that I could separate it from closure is in error in some way.

It is as if you called a repairman to fix a machine and when he arrived you said you'd already "fixed" it by pressing a different button, but when asked by the expert in the function of the machine, you wouldn't answere the question: which two buttons?

The procedures speak for themselves. All you're seeming to try to do is make an illegitimate appeal to authority.

 

[Hans Blaster]

You keep ignoring that I didn't invent this problem, it's a widely discussed challenge second only to the "hard problem" of association. What changed is I removed a metaphysical presumption. I separated closure from physicalism and removed physicalism from the equation. That's the whole of it, and how physicalism is defined doesn't matter unless someone wants to argue that how I stated the physicalist hypothesis so that I could separate it from closure is in error in some way.

I DIDN'T CLAIM YOU INVENTED IT. I just want to know how you are using the terms. Otherwise I cannot see any meaning full change in your modification.

What do those who did think the difference between physical and natural is? (Examples preferred)

 

[Fervent]

I DIDN'T CLAIM YOU INVENTED IT. I just want to know how you are using the terms. Otherwise I cannot see any meaning full change in your modification.

How I am using the terms doesn't really matter because the question is the legitimacy of the procedures. My analysis is neutral to various definitions, it's unnecessary to provide a definition because the question is the relationship between the words themselves. The analysis is nothing more than restating the closure principle as two distinct propositions instead of conflating closure with physicalism.

What do those who did think the difference between physical and natural is? (Examples preferred)

It doesn't matter what I think or how I define the two words, the only thing that matters is that I can separate them into two distinct concepts and remove one of the concepts from the set of propositions. It's up to the person who believes that nature is physical to supply a meaningful definition if they wish to defend closure as necessarily physical. The only relevant fact is the procedures I used, because my procedures are independent of specified definitions. You seem to beliieve that they mean the same thing, I am skeptical of that proposition.. It's up to you to supply a definition that doesn't beg the question and is demonstration that they are in fact the same thing.

 

[Hans Blaster]

How I am using the terms doesn't really matter because the question is the legitimacy of the procedures. My analysis is neutral to various definitions, it's unnecessary to provide a definition because the question is the relationship between the words themselves. The analysis is nothing more than restating the closure principle as two distinct propositions instead of conflating closure with physicalism.

It doesn't matter what I think or how I define the two words, the only thing that matters is that I can separate them into two distinct concepts and remove one of the concepts from the set of propositions. It's up to the person who believes that nature is physical to supply a meaningful definition if they wish to defend closure as necessarily physical. The only relevant fact is the procedures I used, because my procedures are independent of specified definitions. You seem to beliieve that they mean the same thing, I am skeptical of that proposition.. It's up to you to supply a definition that doesn't beg the question and is demonstration that they are in fact the same thing.

In the OP you stated that these propositions together were not consistent:

Causal closure- For any event that has a cause at time t, there is a sufficient physical cause at t
Mental causation- Our mental faculties are causally effective
Mental/physical distinction- the mental is not the physical, and the physical is not the mental. Neither is illusory.
No overdetermination- If there is a sufficient cause, there can be no independent supplemental cause

but changing one word in the first proposition (physical to natural) then this set is consistent:

Causal closure- For any event that has a cause at time t, there is a sufficient natural cause at t
Mental causation- Our mental faculties are causally effective
Mental/physical distinction- the mental is not the physical, and the physical is not the mental. Neither is illusory.
No overdetermination- If there is a sufficient cause, there can be no independent supplemental cause

If that change is as you say, then why does changing "physical" to "natural" in the first proposition change the group to be consistent? If it's not about the content of the categories "physical" and "natural" then what is it?

 

[Fervent]

In the OP you stated that these propositions together were not consistent:

Causal closure- For any event that has a cause at time t, there is a sufficient physical cause at t
Mental causation- Our mental faculties are causally effective
Mental/physical distinction- the mental is not the physical, and the physical is not the mental. Neither is illusory.
No overdetermination- If there is a sufficient cause, there can be no independent supplemental cause

but changing one word in the first proposition (physical to natural) then this set is consistent:

Causal closure- For any event that has a cause at time t, there is a sufficient natural cause at t
Mental causation- Our mental faculties are causally effective
Mental/physical distinction- the mental is not the physical, and the physical is not the mental. Neither is illusory.
No overdetermination- If there is a sufficient cause, there can be no independent supplemental cause

If that change is as you say, then why does changing "physical" to "natural" in the first proposition change the group to be consistent? If it's not about the content of the categories "physical" and "natural" then what is it?

That is the question, isn't it? What you don't seem to be understanding is my change from physical to natural iis not an arbitrary move as if I simply swapped one word for another. I separated closure into two propositions. 1)Causal closure and 2)the physicalist hypothesis(however the physicalist wants to define "physical") and then I removed the physicalist metaphysical hypothesis from the equation while maintaining closure. That making that non-arbitrary move resolved a conflict in empirically derived propositions indicates that the physicalist hypothesis about the nature of causation is likely false. The onus is on the physicalist to prove that natural causes are exclusively physical which would need to include a clear definition of physical that isn't simply a meaningless catch-all, not on me to define what a non-physical cause would look like. If you think my process is in error for some reason, it's on you to say what violence I have done to closure by removing a metaphysical concept from it.

 

[Hans Blaster]

That is the question, isn't it? What you don't seem to be understanding is my change from physical to natural iis not an arbitrary move as if I simply swapped one word for another.

I didn't say it was arbitrary, I only doubt that it is meaningful. OK, let's see then...

I separated closure into two propositions. 1)Causal closure and 2)the physicalist hypothesis(however the physicalist wants to define "physical") and then I removed the physicalist metaphysical hypothesis from the equation while maintaining closure.

Well, you did *modify* causal closure by making events dependent on natural rather than physical causes. (Again whatever the difference is...)

Now the only "physicalist" bit left is the mental /= physical proposition, which seems rather superfluous along with the other mental proposition.

That making that non-arbitrary move resolved a conflict in empirically derived propositions indicates that the physicalist hypothesis about the nature of causation is likely false.

What? That physical things don't have causation? THat seems rather odd.

You've replaced "physical causation" with "natural causation" (again, whatever the difference is, I don't see the point.)

The onus is on the physicalist to prove that natural causes are exclusively physical which would need to include a clear definition of physical that isn't simply a meaningless catch-all, not on me to define what a non-physical cause would look like.

All I see is meaningless difference.

If you think my process is in error for some reason, it's on you to say what violence I have done to closure by removing a metaphysical concept from it.

We could all do with less metaphysics.

 

[Fervent]

I didn't say it was arbitrary, I only doubt that it is meaningful. OK, let's see then...

If it isn't meaningful, why does the conflict go away? You assume natural and physical are one and the same, it's onto you to show what violence I have done to the closure principle or how they are the same.

Well, you did *modify* causal closure by making events dependent on natural rather than physical causes. (Again whatever the difference is...)

I did, I uncoupled 1)an empirically supported proposition and 2) a metaphysical hypothesis. Which is why this analysis is significant, because removing that metaphysical hypothesis dissolves an apparent conflict.

Now the only "physicalist" bit left is the mental /= physical proposition, which seems rather superfluous along with the other mental proposition.

You're focusing on irrelevant details. The only question is if I did violence to the causal principle by removing a metaphysical presumption.

What? That physical things don't have causation? THat seems rather odd.

It's onto the person who claims that there is no distinction to show that physical and natural are one and the same.

You've replaced "physical causation" with "natural causation" (again, whatever the difference is, I don't see the point.)

And an apparent conflict dissolved, so what does that say about the hypothesis that the nature of nature is physical? If you wish to maintain that proposition it's on to you to either demonstrate how my uncoupling did violence to the causal principle or provide a definition of physical that isn't presumptive.

All I see is meaningless difference.

Because you are blind to your metaphysics.

We could all do with less metaphysics.

Metaphysics is unavoidable, you just seem to refuse to critically inquire into yours by denying that you have any.

 

[SelfSim]

For what is worth .. (groan) ..

In philosophy:
Physicalism:

In philosophy, physicalism is the view that "everything is physical", that there is "nothing over and above" the physical,[1] or that everything supervenes on the physical.[2] It is opposed to idealism, according to which the world arises from mind. Physicalism is a form of ontological monism—a "one substance" view of the nature of reality, unlike "two-substance" (mind–body dualism) or "many-substance" (pluralism) views. Both the definition of "physical" and the meaning of physicalism have been debated.

Naturalism:

In philosophy, naturalism is the idea that only natural laws and forces (as opposed to supernatural ones) operate in the universe.[1] In its primary sense,[2] it is also known as ontological naturalism, metaphysical naturalism, pure naturalism, philosophical naturalism and antisupernaturalism. "Ontological" refers to ontology, the philosophical study of what exists. Philosophers often treat naturalism as equivalent to materialism, but there are important distinctions between the philosophies.

That's enough for me .. I ain't a goin'down this rabbit hole!
None of this is a scientific viewpoint .. there are no absolutes in science .. Science makes use of inferences drawn from test results and does not commence from fixed, absolute untestable assumptions (like philosophers do).

 

[Fervent]

For what is worth .. (groan) ..

In philosophy:
Physicalism:

Naturalism:


That's enough for me .. I ain't a goin'down this rabbit hole!
None of this is a scientific viewpoint .. there are no absolutes in science .. Science makes use of inferences drawn from test results and does not commence from fixed, absolute untestable assumptions (like philosophers do).

The analysis I performed is language-independent, it removes the linguistic component of the concepts at play and focuses purely on their conceptual referent. Ask 100 physicalists/naturalists what they mean and you'll get 100 different answers. But it's clear that there is a conceptual difference between physical causes and natural causes that requires a re-definition of physical to a degree that it is unrecognizable from the common sense definition of the word. I didn't engage in any philosophical speculation, I engaged in analytic philosophy which necessarily has an empirical referrent. This is purely about word-concept relationships, but it does create a lot of epistemic questions.

 

[SelfSim]

You're focusing on irrelevant details. The only question is if I did violence to the causal principle by removing a metaphysical presumption.

Dunno .. but you have done irreparable damage/violence by introducing heavy dollops of philosophy in a physical sciences forum, (IMO).

It's onto the person who claims that there is no distinction to show that physical and natural are one and the same.

Its sort of like starting a fight between two people in pub .. and then running away, no(?)

And an apparent conflict dissolved, so what does that say about the hypothesis that the nature of nature is physical? If you wish to maintain that proposition it's on to you to either demonstrate how my uncoupling did violence to the causal principle or provide a definition of physical that isn't presumptive.

Because you are blind to your metaphysics.

Metaphysics is unavoidable, you just seem to refuse to critically inquire into yours by denying that you have any.

Groan!