I'll go along with this without diving into Boolean logical propositions.
Uhhh...well let's consider if this is falsifiable.
Where did the condition of falsifiability enter the discussion? I'd suggest you read up on Agrippa's(or Munchaussen's) trilemma
"God is an entity which is capable of creating universes."
I don't see why that's not a valid definition of "god"....or why any discussion of where such an entity comes from, what created it, or how it formed naturally is even a necessary element of the definition.
It's an ill-defined definition because as far as we can discover there is only one universe that has been observed. So whether or not such a class of beings exists is a pretty big question. It is a statement that is void of real meaning, at least so long as our only means of exploration is by referring to the universe.
What questions do you think still exist in the mind-body relationship?
There are numerous existent problems, causal exclusion being one of them. Generally the association problem is taken to be the most challenging, but there is very little by way of actual explanation of consciousness currently in science.
Do you think that problem still exists?
It is one that has numerous very robust theories that attempt to explain it away. I think it's a serious challenge for any physicalist conception of reality, to the point of falsifying physicalist metaphysics.
Maybe I'm missing something here but I didn't notice a contradiction.
Essentially, if the only causes that are natural causes are physical then mental causation(that is thoughts having causal efficacy on the body) leads to overdetermination. The problem was articulated as an argument against supervenience and non-reductiionest physicalism(that is to say strong emergence) and is generally accepted as a serious challenge to any mind-body theory though the 'hard problem" of association tends to get more attention
I'll look again.
I didn't think these people still existed lol.
Mind-body theorists lol.
When you consider what a "mind" is....
Are you defining it as the process of perceiving and thinking and the interplay between the two?
Or are you defining it as a thing (immaterial is my guess for how you would describe it) which performs the process described very generally above?
I understand I'm simplifying it a lot here but I don't see any way to discuss the entire process of consciousness without any simplification.
So I'm asking for the way you see it....
Mind= process
Or....
Mind= thing that does the process.
All of this is based on metaphysical presuppositions. There's no reason to believe that mind is just a manifestation of a special arrangement of matter unless we presume that at base the world is physical. And that is nothing more than an unjustified assumption
?
If there's some third option you think I'm missing, feel free to lay it out.
My ontology is best described as a neutral monism, where neither mind nor body reduce or depend on the other but both depend on a more fundamental third which integrates the two.
Right but if we intend to discuss it in any meaningful sense (follow me here) we'll need to agree upon that meaning.
And there in lies the problem. It's not truth, it's just a commonly agreed upon fiction.
I'm willing to go with "thing which are tangible" and I know that gets messy at the quantum level but should suffice for non-physical (thoughts) and physical (brains).
Concrete, tangible, et cetera don't seem to circumscribe the total picture of existence. Thoughts aren't really tangible and concrete, and we can't avoid discussing questions like the existence of abstract objects. Treating thoughts as nothing more than an extension of physical matter is what this analysis is aimed at dissuading, though I offer no theoretical explanation of my own. Simply pointing out that the metaphysical presumption of materialism/physicalism leads to a conflict in our observations.
It's only relevant if you're drawing some distinction between physical and natural.
It seems that there is a real distinction between the two, which is the point of this analysis. Based on the causal exclusion problem, it seems that physical is not a sufficient word to circumscribe natural phenomenon.
I don't think you understand what I have done here, because I'm not arguing anything I have simply performed semantic analysis. I've taken something that is accepted as a challenge for scientific theories of mind and has a robust amount of literature attempting to explain it and removed the conflict among the four propositons by examining the terms. It's semantic analysis and boils down to word-concept relationships. This isn't a problem I created or made up for this exercise. So it's not me making the distinction, it's the analytic process.
Did you think this was a good response to the claim that you are conflating categories?
Yes, because I am addressing a single category which is causation.
Yup....that is a presumption.
Well, glad we agree on that much.
Above, you described a presumption...not a problem.
I took a problem that is generally accepted as a real problem for scientific theories of mind and has a robust literature of responses and by re-arranging the terms resolved the conflict in the propositions. It's semantic analysiis and nothing more, I haven't proposed any sort of alternative(though I do of course have my own ideas) I have simply proferred the suggestion that the problem lies in our terms.
Would you mind describing the problem?
I have already, I'm not going to repeat myself. If you want the full description, you can read the argument as it was suggested by Jaegwan Kim and all of the subsequent responses that have been proferred among scientific theories of mind.
Obviously....you meant to describe a problem before you wrote the above....because you aren't conflating "presumptions" with "problems".
Not at all, I've done nothing more than a bit of semantic analysis on a generally accepted challenge to scientific theories of mind which has a robust amount of literature trying to explain away the problem. The only thing I've done is examine the terms of the problem to suggest that the problem lies not in the observations but in the terms that we are using. It's all about word-concept relationships and nothing more.
Go ahead and slip in the problem that your metaphysical presumption requires as a solution.
I've made no metaphysical presumption, I've simply performed a semantic analysis. I've suggested a solution to a problem that is widely regarded as a genuine challenge to any scientific theory of mind second only to the association problem.
No...my keyboard exists in objective reality. My mind didn't create it.
Certainly not, but the words that it has produced are surely a product of your mind, are they not? Or are you suggesting that you are nothing more than a wind-up toy of mindless physical action-reaction procedures? Did your intentions move your fingers along the keyboard, or are you simply aping conscious activity?
As for my posts, they exist in objective reality, again...my mind doesn't just will them into existence.
Uh huh...so there is no mental activity involved in them? They're just chemical and electrical noise with no real semantic significance?
As for the physical processes of my body....we would describe these typically as the domain of subjective reality. If you're struggling for a clear delineation of where one ends and the other begins....just ask if it would exist without any subject dependent existence.
"domain of subjective reality"? Now you're getting into some strange territory that requires torturing the terms. Why tye yourself into mental pretzels to insist upon a physical foundation for reality?
Before my posts were objectively created onto your screen into objective reality...they subjectively existed in my mind. They won't magically disappear even if my mind is destroyed tomorrow.
And down the road of madness you go.
Nope, it's nothing more than tying yourself into semantic knots that are wholly unnecessary.
I thought you were suggesting that reality itself is subjectively created....which again, sounds like magic....and makes any proposal at understanding reality useless if true.
Not at all, I'm merely suggesting that there is an empirical case against physicalist metaphysical presumptions. I'm making no suggestion of my own for what or how reality exists, though of course I do have my own ideas about it. I've performed philosophical analysis, and it confuses some people because what I have done is not to engage in metaphysics of my own but simply to engage in epistemics. If I have made an argument, which I don't believe I have, it is an epistemic one. I've done no metaphysical speculation of my own, though at points in the thread my metaphysics have been relevant to my replies.