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The basis of most religions in the world is the interaction of the physical and metaphysical. I am a Christian, and that interaction is an important part of faith.Yes, I do. I want to know. Are you going to answer?
It seems to me if we aren't committed to physicalism, the causal exclusion problem beomes a non-issue if we separate the ontological assumption that nature is physical from the causal closure principle. The causal exclusion problem states that we have good reason to believe four propositions:
Causal closure- For any event that has a cause at time t, there is a sufficient physical cause at t
Mental causation- Our mental faculties are causally effective
Mental/physical distinction- the mental is not the physical, and the physical is not the mental. Neither is illusory.
No overdetermination- If there is a sufficient cause, there can be no independent supplemental cause
Any 3 of these can be taken together, but when we add the 4th an inconsistency occurs. Now, there are various solutions but most attempt to preserve physicaliism because to give it up would be to give up closure which would be bad for science for what should be obvious reasons. But if we remove the metaphysical presupposition that nature is fundamentally physical from closure so that physicalism stands on its own, the problem seems to dissolve until we add physicalism back into the mix. What I mean by this is if instead of defining closure on the phyical, we define it on the natural and then leave the natural without specification there is no inconsistency. In other words:
Causal closure- For any event that has a cause at time t, there is a sufficient natural cause at t
Mental causation- Our mental faculties are causally effective
Mental/physical distinction- the mental is not the physical, and the physical is not the mental. Neither is illusory.
No overdetermination- If there is a sufficient cause, there can be no independent supplemental cause
All four of these can be true with no inconsistency. So do we have enough evidence for non-physical causes yet, or do we still want to insist that the natural iis physical?
It seems to me if we aren't committed to physicalism, the causal exclusion problem beomes a non-issue if we separate the ontological assumption that nature is physical from the causal closure principle. The causal exclusion problem states that we have good reason to believe four propositions:
Causal closure- For any event that has a cause at time t, there is a sufficient physical cause at t
Mental causation- Our mental faculties are causally effective
Mental/physical distinction- the mental is not the physical, and the physical is not the mental. Neither is illusory.
No overdetermination- If there is a sufficient cause, there can be no independent supplemental cause
Any 3 of these can be taken together, but when we add the 4th an inconsistency occurs. Now, there are various solutions but most attempt to preserve physicaliism because to give it up would be to give up closure which would be bad for science for what should be obvious reasons. But if we remove the metaphysical presupposition that nature is fundamentally physical from closure so that physicalism stands on its own, the problem seems to dissolve until we add physicalism back into the mix. What I mean by this is if instead of defining closure on the phyical, we define it on the natural and then leave the natural without specification there is no inconsistency. In other words:
Causal closure- For any event that has a cause at time t, there is a sufficient natural cause at t
Mental causation- Our mental faculties are causally effective
Mental/physical distinction- the mental is not the physical, and the physical is not the mental. Neither is illusory.
No overdetermination- If there is a sufficient cause, there can be no independent supplemental cause
All four of these can be true with no inconsistency. So do we have enough evidence for non-physical causes yet, or do we still want to insist that the natural iis physical?
Yeah. You believe that. But, the question is why.The basis of most religions in the world is the interaction of the physical and metaphysical. I am a Christian, and that interaction is an important part of faith.
Fair enough. I wasn't asking about your conversion, but why one believes something that cannot be proved.Personal experience, but my conversion to Christianity is not part of this thread.
After the experiencing the “way of salvation” as described in many places on this forum. I experienced a real change of heart. My desire to learn more about God, study the Bible, and live, as best I could, in a way that was more pleasing to God, increased significantly. I also experienced what I would consider a personal relationship to God, which included prayer, guilt when I got it wrong, and a greater love for my fellow human beings. It also increased my courage to do what is right without regard to what others thought about me. I am far from perfect and consider myself as under construction, but the change in direction was obvious to me.Fair enough. I wasn't asking about your conversion, but why one believes something that cannot be proved.
If your personal experience contributes to your belief, aren't you at least, in principle, saying that those unprovable things can have evidence? Would it not be the case that a cumulative collection of evidence would "prove" the unprovable?
It seems to me that you think you have enough evidence, in which case you don't believe the "unprovable".
It seems to me if we aren't committed to physicalism,
the causal exclusion problem beomes a non-issue if we separate the ontological assumption that nature is physical from the causal closure principle. The causal exclusion problem states that we have good reason to believe four propositions:
Causal closure- For any event that has a cause at time t, there is a sufficient physical cause at t
Mental causation- Our mental faculties are causally effective
Mental/physical distinction- the mental is not the physical, and the physical is not the mental. Neither is illusory.
No overdetermination- If there is a sufficient cause, there can be no independent supplemental cause
Any 3 of these can be taken together, but when we add the 4th an inconsistency occurs. Now, there are various solutions but most attempt to preserve physicaliism because to give it up would be to give up closure which would be bad for science for what should be obvious reasons. But if we remove the metaphysical presupposition that nature is fundamentally physical from closure so that physicalism stands on its own, the problem seems to dissolve until we add physicalism back into the mix. What I mean by this is if instead of defining closure on the phyical, we define it on the natural and then leave the natural without specification there is no inconsistency. In other words:
Causal closure- For any event that has a cause at time t, there is a sufficient natural cause at t
Mental causation- Our mental faculties are causally effective
Mental/physical distinction- the mental is not the physical, and the physical is not the mental. Neither is illusory.
No overdetermination- If there is a sufficient cause, there can be no independent supplemental cause
All four of these can be true with no inconsistency. So do we have enough evidence for non-physical causes yet, or do we still want to insist that the natural iis physical?
It depends on whatever you mean by physical.Only if we presume that reality is fundamentally physical. What this argument is meant to accomplish is to ask the question whether or not we need that presumption to do science.
If we can restate closure in a metaphysically neutral way and remove metaphysical assumptions, and doing so improves our explanations, why preserve the metaphysical assumption?
We don't need to assume that nature is physical for science to work. So why do we have to show mental causation separate from physical causation to not presume that the mental is derivative of the physical? Why can't we understand it as both the physical and the mental being derivative of something more fundamental?
Are you sure about that? How do we know that the physical doesn't exist wiithin a mental medium?
Metaphysical garbage. If by changing the closure principle in a way that I remove metaphysical presuppositions resolves the issue, then the metaphysical presuppositions have to go. We don't need to presume physical closure to do science, we just need a closure principle. Occam dictates to multiply entities no more than necessary, so why not let physicalist metaphysics stand on their own feet and not dogmatically enshrine them into science?
Or both are dependent on a third.
I don't see it as separate either, but I don't take the physical as fundamental.
No, simply that the notion that the world is fundamentally physical is suspect
and that physicalism is the issue in the mind-body problem.
If there is any argument at all, its that we have had evidence for mental causation all along but physicalist metaphysics
It doesn't matter what it sounds like. Empirical means drawn from experience, it's the definition of the word. But this isn't a question about the data, it's about hidden premises snuck into the closure principle.
Atheist's aren't skeptics, though.
They settle for the world and then refuse to dig any deeper.
You've made an unjustified assumption. Why'd you stop there?
Actually, people need to start realizing that "Philosophy" is the application of 4 or 5 distinct, but still interdependent fields. One of those fields is claimed by atheist nearly everywhere to be of absolute value. Being that this is the case, I so often wonder why atheists eschew "philosophy" when, at every waking moment, at least one field of philosophy is what they're always engaged in: i.e. LOGIC.
Yes, LOGIC is part and parcel of the overall discipline of Philosophy, and being that Philosophy is a multifaceted, interdisciplinary discipline, resulting ultimately not in speculation but in the application of analysis, I'd think people would wake up to this fact.
I start with something that can't possibly be false.
Yeah, and my question is why do you need the word physical if you're identifying the same thing?
The value is in the resolution of a discrepancy in observations.
The disappearance of the inconsistency which allows the four propositions to stand together without conflict.
If they were the same thing nothing would change by shifting terms around. But something changes when we do. So they don't mean the same thing. As atheists love to trot out:do not multiply entities needlessly.
If we only mean by physical that it is natural, then there is no need for a different term.
You can't just say nature is nature.
Well it helps to see that thus far, its not possible to conceive what the term reality means without a human mind doing that.
True mind independent reality is either: (i) completey nonsensical when one considers my above evidence based statement or (ii) just another belief.
A 'physically real world' is a model. Its either testable or untestable. Science's 'physically real world', (I prefer 'objectivelly real world'), is distinguished from any other kind, by way of beliefs (untestable) and the scientific method (the latter of which, involves objective testing).
'Natural causes' and 'physical causes', I think, is some folks' attempt to dissociate the scientific testing method from straight outright beliefs. The human mind's fingerprints are all over both beliefs and scientific testing, so in distinguishing between beliefs and the physical, its better to to just admit that and point to the objective testing method as the special distinction science brings to the table, from outright unevidenced, untestable beliefs.
Both require an active healthy human mind somewhere, to conceive .. and not some mind independent 'thing'.
My way also draws on semantic meanings expressed by human minds (along with the usage of the scientific mehthod).
Rather than the word 'physical' I'd recommend the term 'objective', which then provides a solid and consistent justification/basis for the scientific method to proceed.
I agree with the underlined part above.
The basis of most religions in the world is the interaction of the physical and metaphysical. I am a Christian, and that interaction is an important part of faith.
Accurately with respect to what? The belief in the assumption of an external independent reality?.. Specifically, attempting to describe the #2 belief accurately.
The scientific method was developed to be useful. That's it .. that's all.I think the assumption of an external independent reality must be made....otherwise it's unclear what the scientific method is for.
Accurately with respect to what? The belief in the assumption of an external independent reality?
Pfft! So much for the meaning of that kind of 'accuracy'! (IMO).
The scientific method was developed to be useful. That's it .. that's all.
Many would disagree.Plants metabolize, but do not have the nephesh chayah, the living soul, the breath of life, as do both human beings and animals.
I see logic as nothing more than the describable limitations of language.
"It"???In respect to whatever ways it can be truthfully described.
For goodness sake! You have no idea what useful contributions science has made?Useful for what?
And you came by this view about "Logic" via which sources and influences?
Wittgenstein, perhaps?
I'm perusing the textbooks I have on formal and informal Logic and I'm not quite seeing how they are merely presenting nothing more than the describable limitations of language. There's a bit more there than that .........................
I sure hope you're not referring to the other, prior Logical Positivists. Because they contradicted themselves.
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