“Control” is not a rhetorical concept; it is a logistical one. Special operations forces and advisers cannot operate for more than days without a continuous supply of fuel, ammunition, maintenance, medical evacuation, intelligence, and rotation. That logistical tail requires secure ports, airfields, ground lines of communication, perimeter defense, and quick-reaction forces. Once you are securing bases, routes, and supply nodes, you are no longer talking about a light footprint, you are talking about brigade-level conventional forces and de facto occupation, whether the term is admitted or not.
The same logic applies to oil. Restoring Venezuelan production requires physical control of oil fields, refineries, pipelines, export terminals, and power infrastructure--all soft targets for even rudimentary guerrilla forces. Engineers, contractors, and shipping insurers will not operate without sustained security. That security cannot be episodic or outsourced; it must be continuous and territorial. In practice, protecting oil rehabilitation means military control of key regions for years, not weeks. Iraq demonstrated the cost of pretending otherwise.