Boeing now says the 737 Max won’t fly again until at least mid-2020

[mala]

Boeing now says the 737 Max won’t fly again until at least mid-2020

Boeing on Tuesday announced that it’s now estimating its troubled 737 Max aircraft won’t fly again until at least mid-2020, a delay from the earlier January 2020 time frame. The newly announced delay means that the 737 Max will have been grounded for at least a year, regardless of when it returns to flight.

Well at least this will delay the planes grounding themselves for a bit longer...

 

[Nithavela]

My bet is on those things never flying again.

 

[ReesePiece23]

Airbus are better anyway lol.

 

[mala]

My bet is on those things never flying again.

They'll just re-brand them and nobody will know the difference.

 

[faroukfarouk]

Some much for the recently fired Boeing CEO saying the 737 MAX might be flying by the end of 2019...

The fact that the re-launch - if it even happens - has been put firmly back shows that for the moment the FAA runs the FAA rather than Boeing running the FAA, which it looked like for a while...

 

[faroukfarouk]

Airbus are better anyway lol.

Airbus traditionally has more computerized, complex systems for pilots. But it was the somewhat dodgy aerodynamics of the 737 MAX - caused by the desire of the money ppl at corporate HQ to cram as many passangers in a modified 737 as possible for long haul - that caused the need for a sensor based automatic pilot override system, which some pilots didn't even know about, and which can clog up in bad weather, causing faulty data to make the 'plane change altitude when it shouldn't.

The basic workhorse 737 design is excellent and safe; it's what the moneybags ppl forced it to do by making modifications that stretched its aerodynamics to the limit, that is behind the present troubles.

 

[Gene2memE]

Airbus traditionally has more computerized, complex systems for pilots.

Not really, at least in complexity terms. Maybe this was true 20-25 years ago in the 737 NG vs the A320 family, but not today. Airbus does have a few more envelop limitations in its flight rules though.

But it was the somewhat dodgy aerodynamics of the 737 MAX - caused by the desire of the money ppl at corporate HQ to cram as many passangers in a modified 737 as possible for long haul - that caused the need for a sensor based automatic pilot override system, which some pilots didn't even know about, and which can clog up in bad weather, causing faulty data to make the 'plane change altitude when it shouldn't.

It was a centre of gravity issue as well, rather than just aerodynamics (centre of pressure).

Boeing put a larger engine on the 737 to complete with Airbus' decision to put a larger engine on the A320. As the 737's wing was lower off the ground, the larger engine had to be moved up and forwards to accommodate the new engine.

Airbus customers transitioning to A320s with the new engines only needed computer-based type difference training for their pilots. Meaning they don't need to pull pilots out of rotation for a day or two to complete (expensive) simulator or practical training to maintain their type certification for the 'new' aircraft.

Boeing was under pressure to deliver the same for the 737 MAX. The problem was that the new engines (and new nacelles and new landing gear needed to accommodate them) created a nose pitching up movement in the aircraft at slow speeds as it heads towards a stall and/or as engine power is added. This is the opposite of what you want.

So they put in some new features (known as MCAS) into the flight control software to automatically pitch the nose down and make it fly like the older 737 - thus not needing more than computer-based type difference training for pilots and matching what Airbus could offer.

The problem came when the airspeed sensor was blocked/failed. This told the MCAS system the aircraft was stalling - even when it wasn't - and ordered the flight control software to pitch the nose down.

End result, two crashed 737 MAX aircraft.

The basic workhorse 737 design is excellent and safe; it's what the moneybags ppl forced it to do by making modifications that stretched its aerodynamics to the limit, that is behind the present troubles.

Ehhhh... The basic 737 structural design (talking about the 737 NG here) is fine, but its not really anything more than a interim quick/dirty response to introduction of the A320 family (which basically blew the 737 CL away in terms of technology and capabilities). Boeing has been looking at doing a clean paper narrowbody for at least 25 years, but one thing or another has stayed their hand. The 737 MAX is essentially an interim update to an interim update.

As for the 737's safety - yes its as safe as any Western manufactured large commercial airliner. However, this 737 MAX situation is not unique - the 737 CL suffered multiple fatal crashes (officially two, more realistically three and possibly as many as five) in the early 1990s due to rudder issues.

 

[faroukfarouk]

Not really, at least in complexity terms. Maybe this was true 20-25 years ago in the 737 NG vs the A320 family, but not today. Airbus does have a few more envelop limitations in its flight rules though.



It was a centre of gravity issue as well, rather than just aerodynamics (centre of pressure).

Boeing put a larger engine on the 737 to complete with Airbus' decision to put a larger engine on the A320. As the 737's wing was lower off the ground, the larger engine had to be moved up and forwards to accommodate the new engine.

Airbus customers transitioning to A320s with the new engines only needed computer-based type difference training for their pilots. Meaning they don't need to pull pilots out of rotation for a day or two to complete (expensive) simulator or practical training to maintain their type certification for the 'new' aircraft.

Boeing was under pressure to deliver the same for the 737 MAX. The problem was that the new engines (and new nacelles and new landing gear needed to accommodate them) created a nose pitching up movement in the aircraft at slow speeds as it heads towards a stall and/or as engine power is added. This is the opposite of what you want.

So they put in some new features (known as MCAS) into the flight control software to automatically pitch the nose down and make it fly like the older 737 - thus not needing more than computer-based type difference training for pilots and matching what Airbus could offer.

The problem came when the airspeed sensor was blocked/failed. This told the MCAS system the aircraft was stalling - even when it wasn't - and ordered the flight control software to pitch the nose down.

End result, two crashed 737 MAX aircraft.



Ehhhh... The basic 737 structural design (talking about the 737 NG here) is fine, but its not really anything more than a interim quick/dirty response to introduction of the A320 family (which basically blew the 737 CL away in terms of technology and capabilities). Boeing has been looking at doing a clean paper narrowbody for at least 25 years, but one thing or another has stayed their hand. The 737 MAX is essentially an interim update to an interim update.

As for the 737's safety - yes its as safe as any Western manufactured large commercial airliner. However, this 737 MAX situation is not unique - the 737 CL suffered multiple fatal crashes (officially two, more realistically three and possibly as many as five) in the early 1990s due to rudder issues.

I also understood that Boeing pilots traditionally "fly the 'plane", whereas the Airbus pilots seem so far removed from the basic piloting procedures because of the extent of computerization; and this was a contributory reason for the Air France A340 Rio - Paris crash over 10 years ago, when a junior pilot - accustomed to letting the computer do most things - just didn't know that a 'plane at near 40, 000 feet doesn't behave like one at much lower altitudes. This, at any rate is the conventional wisdom, although you would probably be able to fill in more details not so readily known and which might mitigate the conventional wisdom.

 

[SimplyMe]

From what I've seen an heard, the big issue is that Boeing got "lazy" and was just looking to maximize profits. Rather than develop a new, modern airframe to compete directly with the A320, they decided it was too expensive to create a new plane. Instead, they again modified their 50 year old 737 airframe design -- which as pointed out let to various issues and instabilities.

 

[faroukfarouk]

From what I've seen an heard, the big issue is that Boeing got "lazy" and was just looking to maximize profits. Rather than develop a new, modern airframe to compete directly with the A320, they decided it was too expensive to create a new plane. Instead, they again modified their 50 year old 737 airframe design -- which as pointed out let to various issues and instabilities.

Something like that, it seems; the basic 737 design is very safe and aerodynamically stable; but the moneybags people at Boeing wanted to cram as many ppl onto a 737 as possible and use it as a longhaul airframe.

(Did I hear someone say 'corporate greed'?)

 

[Trogdor the Burninator]

As for the 737's safety - yes its as safe as any Western manufactured large commercial airliner. However, this 737 MAX situation is not unique - the 737 CL suffered multiple fatal crashes (officially two, more realistically three and possibly as many as five) in the early 1990s due to rudder issues.

Actually, I'd argue that it IS different.

The rudder reversal issues with the 737 Classic, or even the causes of the DC-10 crashes earlier, were all due to either design flaws in a particular part, part faults or maintenance issues.

The 737 MAX problem is unique (at least in modern commercial airliners) in that it is a fundamental issue with the aerodynamics of the airplane. Even the de Havilland Comet didn't have that problem.