I came across this in my efforts to better understand how the brain works, specifically in regard to consciousness. While tempted to post this in the philosophy forum, philosopher Thomas Metzinger is using neuroscience to explore what makes us tick. A search of the forum shows that this subject has been touched on, but not in depth.
As I have never been a dualist or theist, I was surprised at my own reaction to the concept he is presenting; I found it a little unsettling, but it fits the data - what we experience correlates to brain activity.
I have since found a variety of ways to poke around at the edges of this 'self model' that demonstrate some of the things covered in the book and the video, and I will post those if this subject is of any interest here.
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Excerpted from Thomas Metzinger's book, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (Bradford):
Consciousness, the Phenomenal Self, and the First-Person Perspective
"This is a book about consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective. Its main thesis is that no such things as selves exist in the world: Nobody ever was or had a self. All that ever existed were conscious self-models that could not be recognized as models. The phenomenal self is not a thing, but a processand the subjective experience of being someone emerges if a conscious information-processing system operates under a transparent self-model. You are such a system right now, as you read these sentences. Because you cannot recognize your self-model as a model, it is transparent: you look right through it. You dont see it. But you see with it. In other, more metaphorical, words, the central claim of this book is that as you read these lines you constantly confuse yourself with the content of the self-model currently activated by your brain.
This is not your fault. Evolution has made you this way. On the contrary. Arguably, until now, the conscious self-model of human beings is the best invention Mother Nature has made. It is a wonderfully efficient two-way window that allows an organism to conceive of itself as a whole, and thereby to causally interact with its inner and outer environment in an entirely new, integrated, and intelligent manner. Consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective are fascinating representational phenomena that have a long evolutionary history, a history which eventually led to the formation of complex societies and a cultural embedding of conscious experience itself. For many researchers in the cognitive neurosciences it is now clear that the first-person perspective somehow must have been the decisive link in this transition from biological to cultural evolution. In philosophical quarters, on the other hand, it is popular to say things like The first-person perspective cannot be reduced to the third-person perspective! or to develop complex technical arguments showing that some kinds of irreducible first-person facts exist. But nobody ever asks what a first-person perspective is in the first place. This is what I will do. I will offer a representationalist and a functionalist analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective is."
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From Youtube: "Thomas Metzinger is the Director of the Philosophy Group at the Department of Philosophy at Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz. His research focuses on philosophy of mind, especially on consciousness and the nature of the self. In this lecture he develops a representationalist theory of phenomenal self-consciousness. "
"Being No One"
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ETA:
"The self-model theory of subjectivity (SMT)
The concept of a self-model plays the central role in a philosophical theory of consciousness, the phenomenal self and the first-person perspective. This specific theory is the so-called "self-model theory of subjectivity" (SMT; see Metzinger 2003a, 2005a). However, SMT is not only a conceptual framework in analytical philosophy of mind, but at the same time an interdisciplinary research program spanning many disciplines from neuroscience, cognitive science, neuropsychology and psychiatry to artificial intelligence and evolutionary robotics (e.g., Blanke & Metzinger 2009, Metzinger 2007, Lenggenhager et al. 2007, Windt & Metzinger 2007, Metzinger & Gallese 2003). The theory simultaneously operates on phenomenological, representational, functional and neuroscientific levels of description, using a method of interdisciplinary constraint satisfaction (see Weisberg 2007, section 2, for critical discussion). The central questions motivating the SMT are: How, in principle, could a consciously experienced self and a genuine first-person perspective emerge in a given information-processing system? At what point in the actual natural evolution of nervous systems on our planet did explicit self-models first appear? What exactly made the transition from unconscious to conscious self-models possible? Which types of self-models can be implemented or evolved in artificial systems? What are the ethical implications of machine models of subjectivity and self-consciousness? What is the minimally sufficient neural correlate of phenomenal self-consciousness in the human brain? Which layers of the human self-model possess necessary social correlates for their development, and which ones dont? The fundamental question on the conceptual level is: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the appearance of a phenomenal self?"
Self models - Scholarpedia
As I have never been a dualist or theist, I was surprised at my own reaction to the concept he is presenting; I found it a little unsettling, but it fits the data - what we experience correlates to brain activity.
I have since found a variety of ways to poke around at the edges of this 'self model' that demonstrate some of the things covered in the book and the video, and I will post those if this subject is of any interest here.
----------------------
Excerpted from Thomas Metzinger's book, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (Bradford):
Consciousness, the Phenomenal Self, and the First-Person Perspective
"This is a book about consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective. Its main thesis is that no such things as selves exist in the world: Nobody ever was or had a self. All that ever existed were conscious self-models that could not be recognized as models. The phenomenal self is not a thing, but a processand the subjective experience of being someone emerges if a conscious information-processing system operates under a transparent self-model. You are such a system right now, as you read these sentences. Because you cannot recognize your self-model as a model, it is transparent: you look right through it. You dont see it. But you see with it. In other, more metaphorical, words, the central claim of this book is that as you read these lines you constantly confuse yourself with the content of the self-model currently activated by your brain.
This is not your fault. Evolution has made you this way. On the contrary. Arguably, until now, the conscious self-model of human beings is the best invention Mother Nature has made. It is a wonderfully efficient two-way window that allows an organism to conceive of itself as a whole, and thereby to causally interact with its inner and outer environment in an entirely new, integrated, and intelligent manner. Consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective are fascinating representational phenomena that have a long evolutionary history, a history which eventually led to the formation of complex societies and a cultural embedding of conscious experience itself. For many researchers in the cognitive neurosciences it is now clear that the first-person perspective somehow must have been the decisive link in this transition from biological to cultural evolution. In philosophical quarters, on the other hand, it is popular to say things like The first-person perspective cannot be reduced to the third-person perspective! or to develop complex technical arguments showing that some kinds of irreducible first-person facts exist. But nobody ever asks what a first-person perspective is in the first place. This is what I will do. I will offer a representationalist and a functionalist analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective is."
-------------------------
From Youtube: "Thomas Metzinger is the Director of the Philosophy Group at the Department of Philosophy at Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz. His research focuses on philosophy of mind, especially on consciousness and the nature of the self. In this lecture he develops a representationalist theory of phenomenal self-consciousness. "
"Being No One"
----------------------
ETA:
"The self-model theory of subjectivity (SMT)
The concept of a self-model plays the central role in a philosophical theory of consciousness, the phenomenal self and the first-person perspective. This specific theory is the so-called "self-model theory of subjectivity" (SMT; see Metzinger 2003a, 2005a). However, SMT is not only a conceptual framework in analytical philosophy of mind, but at the same time an interdisciplinary research program spanning many disciplines from neuroscience, cognitive science, neuropsychology and psychiatry to artificial intelligence and evolutionary robotics (e.g., Blanke & Metzinger 2009, Metzinger 2007, Lenggenhager et al. 2007, Windt & Metzinger 2007, Metzinger & Gallese 2003). The theory simultaneously operates on phenomenological, representational, functional and neuroscientific levels of description, using a method of interdisciplinary constraint satisfaction (see Weisberg 2007, section 2, for critical discussion). The central questions motivating the SMT are: How, in principle, could a consciously experienced self and a genuine first-person perspective emerge in a given information-processing system? At what point in the actual natural evolution of nervous systems on our planet did explicit self-models first appear? What exactly made the transition from unconscious to conscious self-models possible? Which types of self-models can be implemented or evolved in artificial systems? What are the ethical implications of machine models of subjectivity and self-consciousness? What is the minimally sufficient neural correlate of phenomenal self-consciousness in the human brain? Which layers of the human self-model possess necessary social correlates for their development, and which ones dont? The fundamental question on the conceptual level is: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the appearance of a phenomenal self?"
Self models - Scholarpedia
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