It would show that you can choose something else.
I can already choose different ways to achieve happiness, and yet you still deny that I have freedom. I have no idea why being able to choose something other than happiness would overcome your denial of freedom.
Well, we have to talk about different kinds of possibilities. Logically possible, physically possible, etc. It's logically possible for me to fly like Superman, but not physically possible with the constraints of the laws of physics. It is physically possible for me to bend my neck and back forward quickly, but doing so would cause me to crash my face through my glass desk, so it isn't possible for me to choose to do that because it would make me unhappy. To further complicate things, through subjectivity and the billions of humans, it's possible for chocolate ice cream to make one person super happy, and it's possible for chocolate ice cream to make another person feel violently ill. When it comes down to decision time, there is only one possible choice, sure.
I'm not sure how that was meant to interact with what I said. Are you just agreeing that there are no possibilities? You seem to want to imply that there were possibilities before "decision time"...?
We are determined to pursue happiness the best way we know how. We are determined to know how to pursue happiness by reasons that convince us.
Why would the pursuit of happiness or rationality entail determinism? I grant that we pursue happiness as best we know how, via rationality. Why does that commit me to determinism?
We don't choose to act a certain way; we must act that way because we believe it will make us happy.
We don't choose to believe acting a certain way will make us happy; we must believe that which convinces us.
I grant that if we believe some path will make us happy then we will pursue that path, but I also affirm that our rational decision-making process identifies which path will make us happy, and that this process involves freedom.
My actions are caused by my beliefs, my beliefs are caused by evidence. No where is there room for freedom in that.
So you are saying that causality precludes freedom? I think that's an honest statement, if not compelling.
You say: Evidence -> Beliefs -> Actions || Cue -> Cue Ball -> Cued Ball
The obvious alternative is that humans rationally weigh the evidence according to their knowledge and freedom in order to arrive at beliefs and actions. Again, just because I can't randomly choose to believe things doesn't mean that my beliefs are not affected by my freedom and my reasoning.
In general I would say that although there is a deterministic link between believing that something will make us happy and choosing that thing, the process of reasoning that leads to belief involves freedom, thus making the ultimate choice an object of freedom.
You don't have to go off on a tangent if you don't want, I didn't say that these tangents were related to freedom. You keep saying that free will is unfalsifiable, so I was giving you optional conversations that you could try to argue instead.
I would just quote Thomas, "Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain" (
link). People are of course
free to drop all of these obvious realities in favor of an unevidenced determinism.
We may as well quote your objection in Thomas'
Summa:
Objection 5. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as each one is, such does the end seem to him." But it is not in our power to be of one quality or another; for this comes to us from nature. Therefore it is natural to us to follow some particular end, and therefore we are not free in so doing.
Reply to Objection 5. Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and adventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual part, or in the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore, that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the intellectual part, he naturally desires his last end, which is happiness. Which desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not subject to free-will, as is clear from what we have said above (I:82:2). But on the part of the body and its powers man may be such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a temperament or disposition due to any impression whatever produced by corporeal causes, which cannot affect the intellectual part, since it is not the act of a corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal quality, such also does his end seem to him, because from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject something. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said (I:81:3. Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to free-will.
The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. And yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is in our power either to acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant to free-will.
Thomas' point is that although natural inclinations exist, according to which we act and desire, reason is capable of scrutinizing them and rejecting them. For example, men may be inclined to polygamy, but subject polygamy to reason and decide that it is inappropriate, and thus reject it.
Nope. Even though I doubt freedom is possible, I can't stop pursuing happiness. And proving you wrong makes me happy, so I
must give reasons.
You can't prove me wrong if you have no freedom. Proof, like argument, requires the possibility of truth and falsity and the ability to demonstrate that one or the other follows of logical necessity. Only free agents can prove things. A golden retriever or an orbiting planet could never prove that E=MC^2. This is because they are merely a collection of deterministic particles in motion. The dog's bark could never have the same significance and intentionality of Einstein's utterance. If someone can't see this they are surely to be pitied.
I explicitly said that happiness and pleasure are not the same thing. And I explicitly said that I was conflating and equivocating "pleasure" with "a good feeling" so by inference you should have seen that I said "a good feeling" and "happiness" are not the same thing since I also didn't say they were.
You think pleasure is that which all men desire. But that which all men desire is happiness. Therefore you think pleasure and happiness are the same thing.