Atheism and nihilism

Is atheism inherently nihilistic?

  • Yes

  • No


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FrumiousBandersnatch

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Yeah if we drill in we could probably blow up the subjective / objective distinction at some deep level.

But my point is that even using the conventional distinction between the two, enduring morality has an objective basis. I dont like destroying perfectly good concepts and distinctions unnecessarily.
OK.
 
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FrumiousBandersnatch

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I would call those moral virtues. The actions we take to gain and keep values are virtues. Both moral values and moral virtues require reason. Reason is a moral value. Rationality, the commitment to reason as ones only means of knowledge and one's only guide to action, is a moral virtue.
OK.
 
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rturner76

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Big thread, I didn't read much of it so I apologize if I'm repeating someone.

This question is a bit of a twister because:

I am religious, so my opinions are colored by that. As a religious person, who sees a "divine plan" of one sort or another, nihilism is the logical conclusion of a universe with no supreme being.

If I were an atheist, I would believe the exact opposite. I would think because the universe is essentially chaos in a sense or nihilist, it is our responsibility to improve our conditions as the cycle of evolution has revealed. Our human brains are seeking scientific ways of protecting our survival by manipulating "things" in our genes/DNA, we have discovered the physical roadmap of aging (to simplify).

It seems like we are just all trying to comprehend infinity, space, and time with our primate brains. :scratch:
 
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zippy2006

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I'm causing people to associate emotions with things. That's the manipulation. If I want to convince someone that stealing is bad, I'll cause them to associate negative feelings with the concept of stealing. Empathy is useful in that regard.

What if you appeal to emotions they have already associated? They have already associated insecurity with fear, and you are simply providing a way to assuage their fear by providing security. You're just an entrepreneur. ;)

Let's say an argument has five premises. If we evaluate those premises and find that two of them are false does that make the argument more reasonable than if four premises turn out to be false? I say the whole thing falls apart either way.

I think it could be more reasonable. Surely you believe that some premises are stronger and some are weaker, and that it's not simply a matter of binary truth and falsity? This is pretty important in the moral realm where you are required to balance competing interests, such as liberty, equality, productivity, safety, etc.

It also comes up when you are comparing two arguments that seem to be sound but have contradictory conclusions. Suppose you either can't or don't have time to ferret out falsity. How would you weigh the two conclusions against one another? Hopefully by the strength of the premises and inferences. You can even see this in systems. For example, in the way that General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics contradict each other, and yet each system seems sound.

No. There are lots of things that I want to do that you would say I "shouldn't" do.

Well you've never been very interested in following my moral authority. :p No, the question is whether you ought to do what you desire. Granted, "desire" is an ambiguous term in that it could be applied to the sense appetite or the intellectual appetite (we have spontaneous sexual desires as well as highly robust and thought-out intellectual desires). I think you have to deal with the more difficult intellectual desire if you want to sweep away all desire as normative. Certainly I don't think we should act on every small bodily or emotional inclination.

He'll be happier if he chooses the blue car. C'mon... Did you really think I was just going to say "should"? In common parlance I probably would say "should" because then I wouldn't care about being accurate.

Haha, I'm not trying to trick you. I want you to actually think about whether he should. What's the difference between saying you want and saying you should get? It seems to me that the only difference is ability. If we want something and we have the ability to get it then we will get it. The concept of "wanting" is already normative; the "should" is already built in.

Happiness is also intrinsically normative. You basically said, "He should get it," but with different normative language. If you convince someone that something will make them happier, then you've already convinced them that they should get it.

That's what makes conversations with me interesting! Too many discussions around here are crafted from the same boilerplate responses being batted back and forth. Philo doesn't like to argue, so I was giving him space to explain his thoughts, but he seems to be bored with that too. That's why I went back on the prowl. Rrawr!

No, I agree that questioning whether you should eat the hamburger you want to eat isn't "boilerplate." In fact it's downright nonconformist. :D ^_^

Believing what's true and doing what you desire often find themselves at odds, and I think that conflict illustrates the problem with what you've said here.

Well why should truth and desire be consistent with one another!? :p Say more, though.

Opposable thumbs point to the existence of things that we can grasp, sure. And moral values point to the existence of things that we can value. So what?

So perhaps the universally held value is universal because it is grounded in objective realities. That would explain a whole lot.

I pulled these two out of order because this is where I concede a little. I asked myself the "why is this good?" questions till I got to the bottom and happiness is one step up. Happiness is a state of pleasure being obtained, so I won't agree that happiness is the intrinsically desirable thing, but I will say that pleasure might be. That sensation we experience when dopamine is released in the brain, why is that desirable? Why does it feel good? It's that sensation that we associate with eating, and sex, and socializing, and robbing and pillaging, and knitting... We want to do these things because doing them gives us that sensation. Why do we like that sensation? I dunno.

First, I'm not so sure about robbing and pillaging in relation to dopamine, but I suppose adrenaline is similar. Second, happiness is a broader concept than mere sense pleasure. Pleasure can cause happiness, but so can other things. "For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last end to consist in four things, viz. 'in pleasure, repose, the gifts of nature, and virtue.'" Happiness isn't just pleasure and it isn't just a drug. As Aquinas says, happiness is acquiring your true goal or goals. For example, if you are working all day and are looking forward to reclining and taking a nap, the attainment of that repose will bring with it happiness even without your dopamine.

But I still don't see that filling in the gaps. Even granting the intrinsicality* of pleasure, there's still an opening between "I should desire this" and "I should fulfill that desire".

I think you meant to say that there is an opening between "I desire this" and "I should fulfill this desire." Sort of. First, are we agreed that there is no opening between "This is true," and "I should believe this"? And between "This will make me happy," and "I should seek this"? I don't think there is any opening between those, which gets at some of the previous comments.

Regarding desire, you're right that there is a gap between desiring and acting on that desire (to try to satisfy it). We can deliberate about whether the desire is worth pursuing, and also about how to pursue it, but desire itself is intrinsically ordered towards fulfillment. To put it succinctly: unfulfilled desire is bad. That doesn't mean we should fulfill every desire, for we have competing goals and desires. Buddhists even desire to be rid of all desire, paradoxically enough.

But post-deliberation desires--intellectual desires--are the sorts of things that we really should try to fulfill. Or better put, they are the things that we really do try to fulfill. I don't say that you should try to fulfill every desire, but I say that you do try to fulfill your very highest desires. I don't think there is any "gap" or "opening" with the normativity regarding our highest desires.

It's also worth noting that happiness and desire are very closely related. Happiness is, by definition, what all men desire. If something will make us happy then it is desirable and we should pursue it. It is also good. This begins to bring us full-circle to my first post (I think Philo's biggest mistake was identifying goodness with functionality).
 
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stevevw

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1. Because the moral precept is widely shared
First just because something is widely shared doesn't make it the truth where a person can force it on others. Second who says that because the moral value is widely shared that this makes it a subjective moral view. It may well be that because it is widely shared that this is an objective moral truth that people intuitively know and are mistakenly calling a subjective view.
2. Because it is widely internalized (i.e. part of the content of their consciences)
So how do people get this internalized moral truth that becomes etched into their conscience. As far as I know, subjective moral values are something that is personal so this can be the result of upbringing, personal experiences, socialization, enculturation.

It seems like a mighty big coincident that all these different individualized processes produced the exact same result which somehow becomes part of our conscience. How does this explain that even though people having subjective moral views as a result of these personalized processes still intuitively knowing moral truths that oppose their subjective views through their conscience?
3. Because it reflects some objective fact about human nature.
Naturalistic processes accounting for moral values has been disputed. You cannot equate things like human wellbeing, pain, or pleasure to moral values because they are also subjective determinations.
 
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stevevw

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Yes, and? I said they used words incorrectly for how they define them.
Yes, and the words they use are significant because this contradicts their subjective moral view. When they express their moral view or use it when engaging with others they are no longer just expressing an opinion but rather a fact about morality in saying something is right or wrong that people should not do. As you said, "people widely talk about morals like they're objective even if they say that they're subjective".

They use morality in these contexts as though they are claiming and projecting a "truth" out into the world, into the interaction or the situation that is being morally judged like everyone should have these moral values and apply them. That goes beyond subjectivism as you also said "a lot of subjectivists talk about morals incorrectly for how they apply them".

My point is that people intuitively know these moral truths and cannot help but appeal to them despite claiming there is only subjective morality. This is support for objective morality because it shows there is an independent truth that stands apart form peoples claimed subjectivism that holds them to that truth. It's in all of us even from the time we are born where it cannot be learnt from the influences claimed from subjective moral. Our subjective experiences and views are just blocks and blurs to those moral truths.
 
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Moral Orel

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Yes, and the words they use are significant because this contradicts their subjective moral view. When they express their moral view or use it when engaging with others they are no longer just expressing an opinion but rather a fact about morality in saying something is right or wrong that people should not do. As you said, "people widely talk about morals like they're objective even if they say that they're subjective".

They use morality in these contexts as though they are claiming and projecting a "truth" out into the world, into the interaction or the situation that is being morally judged like everyone should have these moral values and apply them. That goes beyond subjectivism as you also said "a lot of subjectivists talk about morals incorrectly for how they apply them".

My point is that people intuitively know these moral truths and cannot help but appeal to them despite claiming there is only subjective morality. This is support for objective morality because it shows there is an independent truth that stands apart form peoples claimed subjectivism that holds them to that truth. It's in all of us even from the time we are born where it cannot be learnt from the influences claimed from subjective moral. Our subjective experiences and views are just blocks and blurs to those moral truths.
No, I'm not going to bother dismantling all this. All I said was that there is no correct way to act under subjective morality. You keep telling subjectivists how they should act if morality is subjective. Sorry, but there is no "should" if morality is subjective. You are not correct that we should accept people behaving in ways we don't like.
 
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Moral Orel

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Yes, we should do that.
If I like killing people and I'm sneaky enough to get away with it, then I should kill people.
But I dont think values are at all as arbitrary as you seem to be implying.
Eh... It depends on how you're using "arbitrary". If you mean "random" like some folk use the word, no, there is a solid explanation that is only semi-random that we as a species generally evolved certain desires. If you mean "unimportant", then yes. You've already agreed that there aren't values we should have, so no value is more important or better or what have you than any other value.
Also, keep in mind, I'm talking about the instrumental-effective sense of "should", and not the cosmic-absolute sense which I think we both agree doesnt exist.
It sounds to me like you're being descriptive and not prescriptive, which would mean you agree with me on subjectivity. If you're just describing values, and describing what we do with values, then sure. I don't like the word "should" for that, I think it's misleading just like calling behavior "right" and "wrong", but whatever. Are you merely describing and nothing more?
 
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Moral Orel

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What if you appeal to emotions they have already associated? They have already associated insecurity with fear, and you are simply providing a way to assuage their fear by providing security. You're just an entrepreneur. ;)
I need to make them associate a lack of fear, or a feeling of comfort, with my security.

I think it could be more reasonable. Surely you believe that some premises are stronger and some are weaker, and that it's not simply a matter of binary truth and falsity? This is pretty important in the moral realm where you are required to balance competing interests, such as liberty, equality, productivity, safety, etc.
Mmm... I'm thinking that some premises are only proven inductively so they are only trying to prove a likelihood. Is that what you mean?

It also comes up when you are comparing two arguments that seem to be sound but have contradictory conclusions. Suppose you either can't or don't have time to ferret out falsity. How would you weigh the two conclusions against one another? Hopefully by the strength of the premises and inferences. You can even see this in systems. For example, in the way that General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics contradict each other, and yet each system seems sound.
Eh. I don't know a ton about either of those. From my limited understanding of the concepts, I see QM as us discovering that GR is incomplete.

Well you've never been very interested in following my moral authority. :p No, the question is whether you ought to do what you desire. Granted, "desire" is an ambiguous term in that it could be applied to the sense appetite or the intellectual appetite (we have spontaneous sexual desires as well as highly robust and thought-out intellectual desires). I think you have to deal with the more difficult intellectual desire if you want to sweep away all desire as normative. Certainly I don't think we should act on every small bodily or emotional inclination.
Okay, so we shouldn't necessarily act on gut instinct desire because we haven't thought about things like consequences we might not want? Okay. But we should act on desires that we've put thought into and weighed the pros and cons?

Haha, I'm not trying to trick you. I want you to actually think about whether he should. What's the difference between saying you want and saying you should get? It seems to me that the only difference is ability. If we want something and we have the ability to get it then we will get it. The concept of "wanting" is already normative; the "should" is already built in.
For starters, should we get what we don't deserve? What if I don't value the well-being of others; should I take what I can get away with?

Happiness is also intrinsically normative. You basically said, "He should get it," but with different normative language. If you convince someone that something will make them happier, then you've already convinced them that they should get it.
It only seems like I said "he should get it" because we as a species feel that we ought to get what we want.

Well why should truth and desire be consistent with one another!? :p Say more, though.
I never said they should. You said we should believe the truth and we should do what we want. Sometimes the truth is unfortunately bleak and I'd feel happier if I believed it was false. Sometimes you can't do both.

It's widespread too. Take a look at the news and how different it is depending on the political slant of the media organization promoting it. We don't need to talk about which side is right or wrong. The stories are reported in a manner that are mutually exclusive to each other and there are folks on both sides who sincerely believe what's being reported. It's possible that everyone is spreading falsehoods that people believe because they don't want the truth, but at a minimum one side is.

So perhaps the universally held value is universal because it is grounded in objective realities. That would explain a whole lot.
There are no universally held moral values. What we value is so malleable that there is no universal consistency. Some people learn to associate extreme pain with pleasure. Some people learn to associate extreme pleasure with suffering.

First, I'm not so sure about robbing and pillaging in relation to dopamine, but I suppose adrenaline is similar. Second, happiness is a broader concept than mere sense pleasure. Pleasure can cause happiness, but so can other things. "For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last end to consist in four things, viz. 'in pleasure, repose, the gifts of nature, and virtue.'" Happiness isn't just pleasure and it isn't just a drug. As Aquinas says, happiness is acquiring your true goal or goals. For example, if you are working all day and are looking forward to reclining and taking a nap, the attainment of that repose will bring with it happiness even without your dopamine.
Dopamine isn't the only chemical we enjoy the sensation of experiencing, it's just the one most commonly associated with pleasure. Dopamine is released even as we eat. Some people lack the ability to experience pleasure altogether and it's difficult to get them to even eat food. Are you so sure that relaxing doesn't release chemicals that are pleasurable?

I don't know a ton about neuroscience, but I have an education in clinical psychology, and the extent of things that we can alter about what people associate with pleasure and suffering is absolutely bizarre.

I think you meant to say that there is an opening between "I desire this" and "I should fulfill this desire." Sort of.
Not really, I was granting that some thing should be desired and still seeing a gap.

First, are we agreed that there is no opening between "This is true," and "I should believe this"? And between "This will make me happy," and "I should seek this"? I don't think there is any opening between those, which gets at some of the previous comments.
There is. Put it in a syllogism. You need "I should believe things that are true" and "I should seek things that make me happy", respectively, to make a valid argument. I think those are assumed and are separate from what it means to desire things and believe things. We do in fact seek what we desire, but we only feel we should because we feel that we're entitled to being happy.

Regarding desire, you're right that there is a gap between desiring and acting on that desire (to try to satisfy it). We can deliberate about whether the desire is worth pursuing, and also about how to pursue it, but desire itself is intrinsically ordered towards fulfillment. To put it succinctly: unfulfilled desire is bad. That doesn't mean we should fulfill every desire, for we have competing goals and desires. Buddhists even desire to be rid of all desire, paradoxically enough.

But post-deliberation desires--intellectual desires--are the sorts of things that we really should try to fulfill. Or better put, they are the things that we really do try to fulfill. I don't say that you should try to fulfill every desire, but I say that you do try to fulfill your very highest desires. I don't think there is any "gap" or "opening" with the normativity regarding our highest desires.
If we can satisfy a desire, and after deliberation we find that we won't experience consequences that we don't desire, should we pursue that desire? Without exception?

It's also worth noting that happiness and desire are very closely related. Happiness is, by definition, what all men desire. If something will make us happy then it is desirable and we should pursue it. It is also good. This begins to bring us full-circle to my first post
I think we attain happiness by experiencing pleasure and avoiding suffering. Heck, avoiding suffering is pleasurable in itself as it will reinforce behavior just like receiving rewards. But I don't really see this distinction as being all that important.

(I think Philo's biggest mistake was identifying goodness with functionality).
I told Philo I wouldn't argue with him, so even in this conversation between you and I, I won't comment on any errors I may or may not have identified. :p
 
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stevevw

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No, I'm not going to bother dismantling all this. All I said was that there is no correct way to act under subjective morality. You keep telling subjectivists how they should act if morality is subjective. Sorry, but there is no "should" if morality is subjective. You are not correct that we should accept people behaving in ways we don't like.
But don't you think that if a subjective moralist who claims that there are no moral truths beyond an individual's views, preferences, 'likes and dislikes' says that everyone should adhere to their idea of morality that they are acting beyond the position of what subjective morality is.

They are moving their personal moral view that only applied to them to now applying to everyone outside them. That makes morality a truth that applies to all and therefore objective. Otherwise, your more or less saying that a subjectivist can take an objectivists position and still call it subjective morality. .
 
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Speedwell

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First just because something is widely shared doesn't make it the truth where a person can force it on others. Second who says that because the moral value is widely shared that this makes it a subjective moral view. It may well be that because it is widely shared that this is an objective moral truth that people intuitively know and are mistakenly calling a subjective view.
That could be, but that's not the question you asked. You wanted to know how people justify condemning the moral views of others even though they do not support moral objectivity.
So how do people get this internalized moral truth that becomes etched into their conscience. As far as I know, subjective moral values are something that is personal so this can be the result of upbringing, personal experiences, socialization, enculturation.
That will do for a working hypothesis, although I suspect there is more to it than that, as more of our mind beyond the conscious part is involved.

It seems like a mighty big coincident that all these different individualized processes produced the exact same result which somehow becomes part of our conscience. How does this explain that even though people having subjective moral views as a result of these personalized processes still intuitively knowing moral truths that oppose their subjective views through their conscience?
It's not really a coincidence at all. They have the same moral values embedded in their superegos because they were all socialized in the same society, by adults similarly socialized, etc..
Naturalistic processes accounting for moral values has been disputed. You cannot equate things like human wellbeing, pain, or pleasure to moral values because they are also subjective determinations.
Yes, subjective moral values are not objective moral values.

You know, this line of argument is not doing you much good. Condemning moral subjectivists because they are not doing subjective morality according to your rules just makes you look jealous.
 
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Speedwell

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But don't you think that if a subjective moralist who claims that there are no moral truths beyond an individual's views, preferences, 'likes and dislikes' says that everyone should adhere to their idea of morality that they are acting beyond the position of what subjective morality is.

They are moving their personal moral view that only applied to them to now applying to everyone outside them. That makes morality a truth that applies to all and therefore objective. Otherwise, your more or less saying that a subjectivist can take an objectivists position and still call it subjective morality. .
Why is that a problem?
 
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durangodawood

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If I like killing people and I'm sneaky enough to get away with it, then I should kill people.

Eh... It depends on how you're using "arbitrary". If you mean "random" like some folk use the word, no, there is a solid explanation that is only semi-random that we as a species generally evolved certain desires. If you mean "unimportant", then yes. You've already agreed that there aren't values we should have, so no value is more important or better or what have you than any other value.

It sounds to me like you're being descriptive and not prescriptive, which would mean you agree with me on subjectivity. If you're just describing values, and describing what we do with values, then sure. I don't like the word "should" for that, I think it's misleading just like calling behavior "right" and "wrong", but whatever. Are you merely describing and nothing more?
Ok. let me make sure I understand where your coming from here:

Do you express your moral sense in should/shouldnt statements? (or some equivalent word). Like "we should not kill our neighbor"?

If so, what exactly do you mean by "should"?

If not, how do you express your moral sense.?
 
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Moral Orel

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Ok. let me make sure I understand where your coming from here:

Do you express your moral sense in should/shouldnt statements? (or some equivalent word). Like "we should not kill our neighbor"?

If so, what exactly do you mean by "should"?
In casual conversation, yes, I'll use the word "should". I make a specific point to avoid it in conversations that are specifically about the nature of morality though because it is misleading. Just like saying "right" and "wrong" but not meaning "correct" and "incorrect".

When I say "We should not kill our neighbor" I mean, "We would dislike the sort of society in which people kill their neighbor". If I am speaking on the level of an individual such as "You shouldn't kill your neighbor" I mean, "You would not like the very probable consequences of killing your neighbor".
 
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Moral Orel

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But don't you think that if a subjective moralist who claims that there are no moral truths beyond an individual's views, preferences, 'likes and dislikes' says that everyone should adhere to their idea of morality that they are acting beyond the position of what subjective morality is.

They are moving their personal moral view that only applied to them to now applying to everyone outside them. That makes morality a truth that applies to all and therefore objective. Otherwise, your more or less saying that a subjectivist can take an objectivists position and still call it subjective morality. .
If I can convince other people to like and dislike the same things I do, why shouldn't I? Explain that to me without using any version of a "should" or "ought" statement. What tactics and manipulative techniques should I not use and why? Again, explain this without using any version of a "should" or "ought" statement.

I know this is impossible, that's the point. There is no "should"! You can only prescribe behavior in your system of morality, it can't be done with mine. But I can persuade people to feel differently about things, and they'll act in accordance with their feelings.
 
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Econ4every1

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To reiterate my point: because nearly all atheists are hostile towards religion..

Have you ever asked yourself why this might be?

Christians, like people who believe in a flat earth, believe in ideas that lack evidence. So why do Atheists seem to take such exception to Christians?

Because Christians have more influence in my personal life than Flat-Earthers based on their unfounded ideas and beliefs.

particularly Christianity, a faith that provides a good moral foundation...

I don't believe that it's Christianity that provides a good moral foundation, I believe that most people share similar inherent values. Christianity isn't the source of those values, rather it is the result. Ironically, Christianity has enabled some of the most immoral behavior I know of.

and enables believers to avoid eternity in hell and inherit salvation,

Believing the earth is flat does not make it flat.

it therefore makes sense to think that atheism and nihilism go hand in hand.

There is so much there that logically incoherent, it's hard to know where to start. For that matter, your apparent lack of basic logic makes it hard to know where to begin.
 
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Econ4every1

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They sure aren't indifferent on these forums.

Almost anyone that might click on this topic is people who aren't indifferent. It's like standing at a football game in the crowd and judging how people feel about football from that point of view. Forums tend to be like "being at the game".
 
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Econ4every1

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If I can convince other people to like and dislike the same things I do, why shouldn't I? Explain that to me without using any version of a "should" or "ought" statement. What tactics and manipulative techniques should I not use and why? Again, explain this without using any version of a "should" or "ought" statement.

I'm just jumping into the middle of your convo because I want to address is/ ought... You brought it up in thread I started and I never took the time to address it. If you don't mind, I'd like to do that now.

When it comes to morality there must be some decision made of what to value which, I think we can agree, can never be derived from mere knowledge of facts about the world. But while it is true that moral directives cannot be derived from the bare facts of the external world, they are still based on those facts, and therein lies the key. From that, consider the following:

Any ethical directive based on a demonstrably false statement is wrong.

In other words, descriptive statements cannot confirm prescriptive statements but can disprove them. Ethical directives based on claims of fact that are not known to be false, but that lack sufficient evidentiary support, should be held in abeyance until that claim is either decisively confirmed or decisively refuted.

For example, any moral system that proposes unequal treatment of people based on immutable characteristics such as race and gender is wrong and should be discarded, based on scientific findings that all human beings are fundamentally the same at the genetic and cognitive levels.

Thoughts?
 
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durangodawood

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...When I say "We should not kill our neighbor" I mean, "We would dislike the sort of society in which people kill their neighbor". If I am speaking on the level of an individual such as "You shouldn't kill your neighbor" I mean, "You would not like the very probable consequences of killing your neighbor".
It sounds like we're in basic agreement about how our society arrive at its moral rules.

Possibly we disagree about exactly why we'd dislike a free-murder society. I claim its for reasons natural to the human animal. You claim its because of just individual opinion. Am I right?

The part that freaks me out a bit is that neither of us seem to be able to ground the moral rule in the condition of the neighbor himself. Rather its all about the potential murderer's feelings.
 
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Moral Orel

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It sounds like we're in basic agreement about how our society arrive at its moral rules.
Probably. That's why I don't like the word "should", it's generally used prescriptively and that's what is impossible to do.

Possibly we disagree about exactly why we'd dislike a free-murder society. I claim its for reasons natural to the human animal. You claim its because of just individual opinion. Am I right?
I think our individual opinions are the result of reasons natural to the human animal.

Think about the average person versus a psychopath. The average person feels bad when they see someone else feel bad and feels good when they see someone else feel good, ya? The psychopath doesn't. For both of these people the reason they have the feelings they do and lack the feelings they do is because of genetics determining brain chemistry, ya? That's natural processes at work, ya?

I think socialization is a natural process that results in the development of values too, but that's debatable. Think about a rat in a cage with an electrified lever and a lever that dispenses food. The electricity produces pain that we are naturally adverse to, and the food produces pleasure that we naturally value. As we socialize we associate behavior with pleasure and suffering, and as we associate behavior with pleasure and suffering we value and devalue those behaviors, respectively. All natural processes in my opinion.

The part that freaks me out a bit is that neither of us seem to be able to ground the moral rule in the condition of the neighbor himself. Rather its all about the potential murderer's feelings.
Oh yeah, don't get me started on altruism. It doesn't exist either. Good feelings motivate us to act, and bad feelings motivate us to not act. People aren't going to do anything that they believe will result in a net negative feeling. For instance, if I donate $1000 to charity, that's a lot of money on my budget. But the good feeling I get from it is worth more than $1000 to me or I wouldn't do it. Hypothetically. We're all hypothetically good people, lol.
 
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