Atheism and nihilism

[zippy2006]

Hey Frumius,

Sorry it took me so long to get back to you. I had a minor disaster. Three very large limbs fell from my Cottonwood tree in the front yard and practically blocked us in the house. I've been dealing with that.

Haha, not a problem. Did you at least get some firewood out of the deal? ..And you'll be delighted to hear that I'm Zippy, not Frumious.

Well, dictionaries tell us how words are commonly used and the vast majority of people hold a deontological view of morality which is wrong. The notion of a duty-based morality is a contradiction in terms. A duty is something that you must do regardless of your thinking and judgment on the matter. To divorce morality from choice is to commit the fallacy of the stolen concept. Are you familiar with this pernicious fallacy? My definition of morality is that it is a code of values to guide one in one's choices and actions, which actions determine the course of one's life. See, my definition includes the essential connection between moral values and life as well as the fact that man must think in order to live and he must act on his judgment and not blindly follow the dictates of authority. On my view morals or values are not handed down by an authority, nor are they dictated by society or your parents. Moral values are some aspect of reality in relation to man's life as identified by an objective process, i.e., one based on facts, and by an objective standard: man's life and its requirements.

Okay, thanks for giving me some background on your moral beliefs. I'm not going to get into a discussion on meta-ethics just at the moment. (FYI: I follow Thomas Aquinas who himself followed Aristotle, not unlike Rand.) I think our discussion focuses in on the relation between 1) Life, and 2) A morality that is based upon life. I will try to stick to that topic so the replies don't get too long.

My point was that man is a being of volitional consciousness. Life is an active process. Life is a process self generated, self sustaining action. Every living organism has a means of survival. For man that means is reason. Plants and the other animals act automatically to gain their values. Man does not. Man is the rational being. That doesn't mean all men are rational, it means that man is a being who survives by thinking and judging. So living for a man means thinking rationally. Reason does not happen automatically, it must be undertaken volitionally. So I think must is the right word to use in that context. I forget that you are probably not an Objectivst so I should have spelled it out explicitly. I've lived with these ideas for so long that they almost seem self-evident. I need to remember that they are not. Man must choose to live as man.

Alright, that all sounds good to me.

Whoa, where did I say this? I said that the choice to live or not is pre-moral which means its outside of the realm of morality. Morality begins with the commitment to live, which means to take such actions that your nature requires if you want to continue living. The choice to live is just that, a choice. It won't give you the values your life requires. That requires thinking, judging, making logical connections, planning, discovering causal connections, and all of the things that you must do to live.

Is my inference mistaken? If the choice to live or not is pre-moral then wouldn't committing suicide be as moral as living your life?

See, either we have some obligation to live or else we don't. It seems to me that you keep vacillating between seeing life as a categorical imperative and seeing it as a hypothetical imperative (even despite your opposition to deontology).

Suppose you are teaching your son morality. You are trying to help him understand the reasons behind your morality:

"Dad, I don't want to eat!" "Son, you have to eat." "Why?" "To nourish your body!" "Why do I need to nourish my body?" "Because if you don't you will lose weight." "What's wrong with losing weight?" "If you lose enough weight your body will shut down." "What's the problem with my body shutting down?" "If your body shuts down completely you will die!" "Is there something wrong with dying?" "Oh, no son, there isn't anything wrong with dying. Living and dying are pre-moral decisions." "Okay... so do I have to eat?"
​

That strikes me as a pretty anticlimactic resolution to your lesson to your son. I'm sure you can see the problem? It's like you're running a train with a long line of cars and no engine.

I never said that dying is as good as living. Life is a value. In fact it is the ultimate value. Life is the only value that is an end in itself. It is the source of values, so how could it not be a value? But nothing forces you to live and if you don't want to live, no action on your part is required and there's no standard by which to judge such choices. I call it pre-moral because to do otherwise would be to make use of stolen concepts. A rational morality does not permit one to drop context or to steal concepts. I'm simply remaining true to reason by doing it.

If life is a value and an end in itself, then how could it be pre-moral? I realize what you are saying here, but if someone truly doesn't want to make use of stolen concepts then I'm not sure they would be allowed to say that life is a value. I'm not perfectly sure how you define morality--apparently you see it as a closed logical system with life as an axiom--but if life is an end in itself then rejecting life is a blameworthy act which one ought not commit. By modus tollens, if one is "allowed" to commit that act then it is not blameworthy and life is neither valuable nor an end in itself.

I gave it above but I'll do it again here: morality is a code of values to guide one's thinking and actions, which actions determine the course of one's life.

Thanks. Let me try to express this succinctly...

1. Life ought to be lived.
2. All prescriptive claims fall within morality.
3. Morality only begins or applies once one has decided to live.​

It seems to me that you accept [3], deny [2], and deny(?) [1]. I'm honestly not quite sure how you view [1], but [2] is very important and (3 -> (~1 v ~2)). That is, if you accept [3] then you cannot accept both [1] and [2]. It could also be written (3 -> ~(1 ^ 2)). My biggest complaint is that you are rejecting [2]. You want to say that moral choices are important, choosing life is not a moral choice, but choosing life is important/valuable. Yet if choosing life is important & valuable then a prescriptive claim regarding life is derivable, and thus that prescriptive claim about life must itself fall within morality.

Notice how I gave examples of diverging actions that mean the difference between life and death and then you gave an example that is not a life and death choice. Of course it might be a life or death choice if you lived under sharia law or at the north pole.

Well, my point was that if choosing life is pre-moral then beard-shaving is as significant as walking off a cliff. It was an obscure argument; feel free to ignore it.

Then you would be very wrong. All that is proper to the life of a rational being is the good. All that destroys it is the bad. Death is bad if one wants to live.

But you've contradicted yourself. According to your second and third sentences death is bad, period. Yet your fourth sentence adds a qualification: death is only bad if one wants to live. Well which is it? Is death bad always? Or only for those who want to live? Is all that is proper to life good? Or is it only good for those who want to live?

See, there's that all important context that you keep dropping. Good and bad have no meaning apart from the context of a living being's goal to continue its life. The concept of good and bad presuppose the answer to two questions: good for whom and for what purpose. You would never say that something is good but it's good for nothing, just good, would you? Good does not exist in any object intrinsically, nor does it exist in the mind apart from any object. It exists in the relationship between some object or action and the life of a living organism. Just like truth is not in reality apart from the mind nor is it in the mind apart from reality. Truth exists in the relationship between the contents of a mind and the facts of reality. Hence its basis in the primacy of existence.

You are free to take the stance that all good is instrumental, but you can't do so while at the same time claiming that life is an end in itself. That's another contradiction. If all good must be good for some other purpose then nothing can be good in itself, or be an end in itself.

Because one wants to live. Hopefully, after the above, you know that it is not the case that I "don't think life is good". I love life, life is wonderful and rich. I want to live it fully and to the marrow. That is precisely why I need a rational code of values.

Ah, but I was asking whether eating food is good for humans, not whether it is specifically good for you. In your first sentence here you seem to reply that all desire to live, but the following sentences make clear that you are talking only about yourself, not humans generally. Presumably, then, eating is not good for all, but only for those who want to live?

 

[Moral Orel]

Well that's an interesting statement in itself. I know we've disagreed on how to interpret emotions, but why think that you are manipulating emotions at all? You're leveraging a widely held emotion that relates to security, but I don't see how you would necessarily be manipulating anyone. People legitimately desire security and you have a legitimate way to achieve it. That's not manipulation.

I'm causing people to associate emotions with things. That's the manipulation. If I want to convince someone that stealing is bad, I'll cause them to associate negative feelings with the concept of stealing. Empathy is useful in that regard.

..As an aside, I kind of do. I tend to view some propositions and arguments as more reasonable, plausible, or probabilistic than others. I actually think that the mere fact that there can be disagreement over what is true and reasonable means that there must be a spectrum, with some things being more deeply or obviously true than others. Perhaps metaphysically everything is simply true or false, reasonable or unreasonable, but the practicalities and probabilities of human life complicate things considerably..

Let's say an argument has five premises. If we evaluate those premises and find that two of them are false does that make the argument more reasonable than if four premises turn out to be false? I say the whole thing falls apart either way.

Because you want to? Isn't that just what wanting means?

No. There are lots of things that I want to do that you would say I "shouldn't" do.

Suppose Ben needs a new car and his favorite color car, by far, is blue. He loves blue cars and he wants one very badly. He goes to the store and finds the make and model he desires, and it is within his price range. There are two options for that model, a blue car and a non-blue car. Except for color they are exactly the same. Which should he choose?

He'll be happier if he chooses the blue car. C'mon... Did you really think I was just going to say "should"? In common parlance I probably would say "should" because then I wouldn't care about being accurate.

You know, I thought you had a good, reasonable discussion with Philo, but now you're getting goofy again.

That's what makes conversations with me interesting! Too many discussions around here are crafted from the same boilerplate responses being batted back and forth. Philo doesn't like to argue, so I was giving him space to explain his thoughts, but he seems to be bored with that too. That's why I went back on the prowl. Rrawr!

The thing is, oughtness or normativity is so much deeper than many realize. Truth itself has that essential character of oughtness, because it ought to be believed. We might as well add that to your two bizarre questions above: "Why should I believe what is true?" Sure, you can convince me beyond doubt that your syllogism is valid and sound, and that the conclusion is therefore true. So what? Why should I believe it? Sure, it's true, but why should I believe it?

The answer is that that's just what you do with truth: you believe it. That's just what you do with desire: you fulfill it. That's just what you do with happiness: you seek it.

Believing what's true and doing what you desire often find themselves at odds, and I think that conflict illustrates the problem with what you've said here.

Okay, sure. Yet the evolutionist would say that our (species') opposable thumbs indicate the existence of graspable objects. Does our species' moral values indicate the existence of realities graspable by emotion and desire?

Opposable thumbs point to the existence of things that we can grasp, sure. And moral values point to the existence of things that we can value. So what?

Because happiness is intrinsically desirable? Because happiness is precisely that thing you desire to have?

True, and yet acting for the sake of happiness is reasonable because happiness is intrinsically desirable. Happiness basically just is satisfied desire. If desire itself is incomplete and wanting, then the happiness that is completing and fulfilling is good.

I pulled these two out of order because this is where I concede a little. I asked myself the "why is this good?" questions till I got to the bottom and happiness is one step up. Happiness is a state of pleasure being obtained, so I won't agree that happiness is the intrinsically desirable thing, but I will say that pleasure might be. That sensation we experience when dopamine is released in the brain, why is that desirable? Why does it feel good? It's that sensation that we associate with eating, and sex, and socializing, and robbing and pillaging, and knitting... We want to do these things because doing them gives us that sensation. Why do we like that sensation? I dunno.

But I still don't see that filling in the gaps. Even granting the intrinsicality* of pleasure, there's still an opening between "I should desire this" and "I should fulfill that desire".

*I was curious if that was a word; spellcheck says "no".

 

[stevevw]

So you object to moral subjectivists because they are not doing subjective morality properly, the way you think they should be?

Subjective morality doesn't make moral truth statements beyond the person who makes them. How can a person with their personal view/opinion claim that what they are saying is a truth that should apply to everyone else?

 

[stevevw]

There is no correct way to act under subjective morality!

I thought you had said that people who claim subjective moral positions can act hypocritically by making objective moral claims. IE
Moral Orel said #1472
That's not what he's saying. He's saying that people widely talk about morals like they're objective even if they say that they're subjective. I think he does use that fact to promote the idea that we intuit objective morals, and I agree with you that isn't evidence for objective morality, but I agree with him that a lot of subjectivists talk about morals incorrectly for how they apply them.

 

[Speedwell]

Subjective morality doesn't make moral truth statements beyond the person who makes them. How can a person with their personal view/opinion claim that what they are saying is a truth that should apply to everyone else?

1. Because the moral precept is widely shared
2. Because it is widely internalized (i.e. part of the content of their consciences)
3. Because it reflects some objective fact about human nature.

 

[stevevw]

How is that fact that our wishes can differ from our consciences support for objective morals?

Simply because this points to some truth beyond us that opposes our subjective view. Like the monkey on our back whispering to us about the truth it is something beyond our own subjective views exposing the truth to us.

If one person believes their conscience tells them a certain action is moral and another person believes their conscience tells them it is not, how can the objective moral truth be established? How can they determine which of them is correct or incorrect?

That is where reason comes in as well. Unless a person is unsound or deluded everyone will come to a similar truth about morality. Rationality helps confirm this. For example, we see a person steal an old ladies handbag in the street. We will all say that this is morally wrong.

Anyone who says it is OK will be questioned as to whether they are thinking straight and are not unsound. Any reason or justification doesn't stand up. That is the moral truth. We all have this in us. Even infants can tell this so we don't need to be taught it.

It's easy to claim that there is an objective moral truth, but if there is no way to determine what it is, it seems that you either acknowledge moral uncertainty or assert moral certainty.

How do we tell truth statements? They are not physically tested like in science. Yet we all claim there are 'truth' statements that we can appeal to as being real. To say that just because we cannot measure them like in science that we can never know or make truth statements is unreal and against the way, we act and live.

So we can determine 'truth' in other ways such as the way we act and behave like something is 'truth'. If we claimed that there were no truths in epistemic and moral values then all human interaction would breakdown and we could not function.

No. All subjectivity means is that individuals have their own moral views. Some think views that differ are wrong, some think views that differ are right for the individual that holds them, and some think it depends on the circumstances.

Yet we brush all this aside and take truth positions like all that doesn't matter when we make truth claims and apply them to others. We act and live in real life applied situations beyond these subjective/relative positions. We make certain moral values real and truthful beyond ourselves.

Society and organizations impose the rules they do for a variety of reasons, to maintain order, safety, to provide a sense of justice and recourse, to increase prosperity & well-being; to protect themselves, to maintain a good image, for efficiency and profit, etc. There may be moral grounding for some of those rules, but in general, only fundamentalist societies make a claim to moral truth, and that, I suspect, more for political and propaganda purposes than sincerity (although some of the population may take it literally).

Yet each organization is pushing their idea and version of what they think is morally right onto others. Who said they are right, who said that their view of what will make them successful or a good corporate citizen is the truth. Who said that wellbeing, a sense of justice, order, safety should be the measures of morality. What are people have different views, do they get the opportunity to promote their views.

Look at those who have been dismissed for not meeting these rules. Often the motivation behind the ethical/moral standards to economic so they don't lose image and therefore profit. But that is just one view and we have seen how money skews people's views of what is morally right.

Consequentialism, where, 'the ends justify the means', has its own problems.

I agree and that's just one version of what is morally right. So how can people push that onto others when we know there are many other views that can be just as right under a subjective moral system?

On the contrary, Kantian deontology is based on reason and requires reason in its application - the 'perfect duty not to act by maxims that result in logical contradictions' requires that you reason whether your choice of action would be self-contradicting if universally mandated or followed.
See the Kantian 'Categorical Imperative' (above).

Not really. It is a rule and duty-based ethical theory. So even if following the rules means causing a moral bad that is still OK. So if the Nazis came to the door of a person hiding Jews and asked if they were hiding any Jews saying there were no Jews when there we some in the basement would be wrong as it's not adhering to the commandment not to lie. The only way around this would be to say nothing. But that can be impractical when there is no option and attract even more trouble.

Human well-being (or at least the predisposition not to do harm without good reason) is often accepted as a universal (captured in the 'golden rule') and hence the dehumanisation of victim groups, but I agree, who says what should be the basis? In practice, moral frameworks are generally built on the innate sense of fairness, enlightened self-interest (e.g. the golden rule), and the requirements for group success (cooperation, reciprocity, etc).

An innate sense of fairness seems to be more than just a sociobiologically developed ideal for survival. It points to inner knowledge and intuition that human life has value. Not because of survival in an evolutionary way but just because of its value in of itself.

Sure, codifying some moral views into group rules and laws clarifies the situation, but following a rule or law doesn't mean you share its moral values, it's contractual - follow the rules - whatever your opinion - and you will share in the benefits; a contract more honoured in the breach...

But what about my question? People have differing moral views; if they all claim that their various views represent objective moral truths, what difference would that make? e.g. how is it different from subjective morality?

They can claim that what they believe is the truth but that doesn't make sense as there can only be one truth. But I don't think that there is that much difference in peoples truths. What is often thought to be a difference in moral views is actually a difference in understanding the facts around what the moral is being applied to. People may be arguing about the same thing but from a different understanding and then thinking it is fundamentally different in morality as well.

And yet society is more polarised on what is and isn't right than it has been for many years...

I am not so sure about that. Like I said it can be differences in understanding of the facts. Take abortion. I think everyone involved agrees that life is precious and should be valued. Those who support abortion may not have a different moral view about the value of life but rather that the fetus involved is not living in the first place.

That is a difference in the factual understanding of what the moral is being applied to. If they realized that the fetus was life then they would have exactly the same morals about it being precious. So often there is no difference in the moral value itself.

The young have always questioned and criticised traditional values.

But I think it is different now. I mean in this time and place with the benefit of hindsight and the accumulation of the phases of thinking we have been though. It is a new paradigm of thinking where there is no truth. It is not just about constructively criticizing different views/positions. But more about the destruction and blocking out of anything different. It is not just about an immaturity but more an ideology.

 

[durangodawood]

....On my view morals or values are not handed down by an authority, nor are they dictated by society or your parents. Moral values are some aspect of reality in relation to man's life as identified by an objective process, i.e., one based on facts, and by an objective standard: man's life and its requirements.....

Thats pretty idealistic.

Many, perhaps most, people dont do the hard work of moral reasoning. So for all our sakes its good that we've institutionalized the transmission of moral rules through religion, parents, society.

 

[durangodawood]

I missed this somehow. It looks like you recognize that it's an absurd question, but that's my point. If we aren't correct to believe that personal security is good, then it isn't objectively true. It's an absurd question to ask because it isn't the sort of thing that is correct/incorrect like my other post about ice cream flavor.

I am correct to believe that the Earth is round. It cannot be said that I am correct/incorrect to believe that personal security is good. If personal security is not in fact good, then we aren't talking about objectivity.

We like personal security and we need it to survive individually and as societies. That much is objectively true. Thats the objective basis for our morality around that issue.

I dont know what this extra something "correct" is supposed to add to the explanation. It sounds like youre requiring moral facts to be backstopped by something ultimate, or imposed from some other realm, in which "correct" is an absolute rather than an instrumental.

 

[Moral Orel]

I thought you had said that people who claim subjective moral positions can act hypocritically by making objective moral claims.

Yes, and? I said they used words incorrectly for how they define them.

 

[Moral Orel]

We like personal security and we need it to survive individually and as societies. That much is objectively true. Thats the objective basis for our morality around that issue.

No we don't. We like the feeling of personal security, it doesn't actually aid in us not-dying though.

I dont know what this extra something "correct" is supposed to add to the explanation.

You don't know the difference between a fact and an opinion?

It sounds like youre requiring moral facts to be backstopped by something ultimate, or imposed from some other realm, in which "correct" is an absolute rather than an instrumental.

I never said anything about any of this.

 

[durangodawood]

No we don't. We like the feeling of personal security, it doesn't actually aid in us not-dying though.

You don't know the difference between a fact and an opinion?

I never said anything about any of this.

Clearly instrumental facts about what helps us fulfill natural values shouldnt be called "correct" according to you. So what do you mean by "correct" when you ask me about it?

For a statement to be "correct" without relation to real world facts, it must have some metaphysical derivation. Thats the only alternative. Thats what you seem to be demanding of me: show you a fact that is correct in relation to basically nothing.

I'm saying moral rules can only be called "correct" in relation to real world facts.

 

[durangodawood]

No we don't. We like the feeling of personal security, it doesn't actually aid in us not-dying though.....

Say what?

Personal security is going about life not being killed. That definitely aids us in not-dying.

 

[Moral Orel]

Clearly instrumental facts about what helps us fulfill natural values shouldnt be called "correct" according to you.

Now you're just making stuff up. I asked if we are correct to like personal security, you won't answer the question, so it's clear that you know liking stuff isn't the sort of thing that is correct or incorrect.

The basis for morals revolving around personal security is that we like personal security. If we didn't, then we wouldn't bother having morals that promote that value. Remember that liking personal security was your step 1, but you don't want to acknowledge that's where it starts. If we aren't correct to think that personal security is good, then it isn't a fact, and your base is an opinion.

Say what?

Personal security is going about life not being killed. That definitely aids us in not-dying.

But I'll give you that one. I was just using that phrase with Zippy in a different context.

 

[durangodawood]

Now you're just making stuff up. I asked if we are correct to like personal security, you won't answer the question, so it's clear that you know liking stuff isn't the sort of thing that is correct or incorrect.

The basis for morals revolving around personal security is that we like personal security. If we didn't, then we wouldn't bother having morals that promote that value. Remember that liking personal security was your step 1, but you don't want to acknowledge that's where it starts. If we aren't correct to think that personal security is good, then it isn't a fact, and your base is an opinion.

Personal security is a value, not a moral.

We value various things naturally, as human organisms. Its not right or wrong. Its just what we are. (I've said this over and over. Maybe not to you tho.)

Moral rules otoh are right or wrong to the extent they help us fulfill our natural values. So its "correct" that not murdering our neighbors helps them and you have a better life according to what we naturally value.

 

[Moral Orel]

Personal security is a value, not a moral.

We value various things naturally, as human organisms. Its not right or wrong. Its just what we are.

The base of morality is the values. It's what we form morals for and about. If there is no "We should value X" then there is no "We should fulfill X". If you can't conclude that "We should fulfill X" is factually true, then morality isn't objective at all.

Moral rules otoh are right or wrong to the extent they help us fulfill our natural values. So its "correct" that not murdering our neighbors helps them and you have a better life according to what we naturally value.

I'd also add that there is nothing special about things valued by humans as a result of innate biology versus things valued as a result of living in the world. Morals can be more effective or less effective at promoting any value whether they be biologically innate or developed over time.

 

[durangodawood]

....If there is no "We should value X" then there is no "We should fulfill X".....

But if there is "we do value X", then there can be a "we should do Y to enable X". I'm arguing that this is the essence of our most basic morals.

Its like if you do want to arrive at your destination in one piece then you should drive at a reasonable speed.

 

[Moral Orel]

But if there is "we do value X", then there can be a "we should do Y to enable X". I'm arguing that this is the essence of our most basic morals.

Its like if you do want to arrive at your destination in one piece then you should drive at a reasonable speed.

Nope, sorry, you can't just insert a "should" out of the blue. There is "We value X" and there is "Y promotes X". The only way to make that jump is to believe the premise "We should do what promotes our values". But since we can value anything, I don't believe you believe that.

Now I agree that that "We should do Y to promote X" is the essence of what people do with morality, I am saying that conclusion is not true.

 

[durangodawood]

Nope, sorry, you can't just insert a "should" out of the blue. There is "We value X" and there is "Y promotes X". The only way to make that jump is to believe the premise "We should do what promotes our values". But since we can value anything, I don't believe you believe that.....

You certainly can insert "should" to indicate effectiveness. Thats a normal sense of the word. If you want X, you should do Y. This is normal and not some sort of semantic cheating.

 

[Moral Orel]

You certainly can insert "should" to indicate effectiveness. Thats a normal sense of the word. If you want X, you should do Y. This is normal and not some sort of semantic cheating.

Do you believe we should do whatever promotes our values whatever those values are?

 

[durangodawood]

Do you believe we should do whatever promotes our values whatever those values are?

Yes, we should do that.

But I dont think values are at all as arbitrary as you seem to be implying.

Also, keep in mind, I'm talking about the instrumental-effective sense of "should", and not the cosmic-absolute sense which I think we both agree doesnt exist.