Are cause - effect sequences always mechanical

[JJM]

Where else is it stored, specifically? If I vaporize a person's brain, where else is that person's imagination?

This is not the point. What is stored in the brain is not the image, but a chemical, perhaps electrochemical (it really doesn't matter) sequence or something of the like. This is not the image properly, but a catalyst for bringing it about. Again, as an analogy, there is not actual sound on a CD. The sound only occurs once it is working in conjunctions with speakers. That which is burned into a CD is only catalyst for the creation of sound. We are equivocating when we say there is sound stored on the CD. We are playing a word game, to allow us to think about the thing in a way we find conceptually useful as opposed to the way it actually is.

I have no idea what you're asking. Are you imagining an image it or are you seeing it?

I'm speaking of when you simply imagine a pineapple. When you imagine a pineapple, there is an image of a pineapple in your mind's eye. This pineapple does not exist external to your mind. Yet there is a representation of it in your mind. This image is an image properly, a chemical secquence is not the same thing as the image itself. Simply close your eyes and imagine a pineapple. The thing you are experiencing which resembles a pineapple is a true image. If you cannot do that consider some people who hallucinate and have images appear to them in their direct conscience experience which are not really there, or the images associated with a vivid dream you have had. There is an apparent representation of things which have no reality external to the mind. These may have the chemical workings of the brain as their source, but they are not the chemical workings of the brain. When I dream about a pineapple, I'm not seeing hormone levels changing in my visual cortex or whatever might be the correct way to describe the physical reality that is occurring within my skull, I'm seeing a pineapple, but it is not a real pineapple so it is an image. The question I'm asking is where is this image. You can only tell me where the chemical catalyst is. I'm terribly sorry if you cannot understand this distinction despite all of my efforts, but if not, then there is no longer any point in discussing the matter.

No, of course not. Again, not sure why this is surprising.

Yet there is an image in the consciousness which is like the image on the monitor and not like the magnetic sequence in the harddrive. It is the thing which corresponds to without being the image on the actual monitor in the article you referenced. If the image exists, as anyone who has a visual imagination can attest, but it does not exists in physical space as you admit, it must exist in or as some sort of nonphycial reality.

Nice rant. I particularly like the implied claim that philosophy is a higher level of thought than all of those other lowly approaches which only manage to produce actual answers.

Well it is. The answers philosophy seeks are of a higher level of answers than those which science seeks. This is true conceptually, they conceptually precede the scientific one and as a matter of difficulty typically. The reason science finds answers so readily is that its questions are not all that difficult. Francis Bacon, the father of the inductive method, makes this his principal reason for proposing use of the method. Essentially the argument in favor for the scientific method in the Novum Organon is: Let us spend our time answering easy questions we are more capable of by the scientific method than attempting to come to answers to these more difficult and profund questions, via another method because the scientific method cannot begin to approach them.

Someone who doesn't realize that the questions science answers are of a lower order and/or doesn't realize that it cannot answer questions of a higher order, has completely missed the point of the scientific project, which is essentially to create knowledge about physical bodies for the purpose of making technology which makes our lives more physically convenient. It simply cannot begin to approach questions of the nature of consciousness. Such questions are beyond its capacity.

I remember walking out of class once at Oxford, which was really more of a seminar, and having doctors of philsophy lamenting how frustrating it was that scientists, especially particle physicists, could not grasp the simplest philosophical concepts that virtually everyone agrees on and how even more frustrating that it was socially taboo to tell them so.

The image is encoded and stored there in a particular way. It isn't the way you might have naively guessed it would be stored, but all that says is that your assumptions about how things work are incorrect.

Can you not see how pompous this is? Are you so a priori convinced of my own stupidity that you cannot stop and consider what I am actually saying. I'm not suggesting that I ever guessed the image is actually in the harddrive like it might be in a filing cabinet. We agree on the physical reality that is occurring. The point I'm trying to get you to realize is that "store" like put something in a filing cabinet and "store" as in save something to a harddrive do not have the same meaning. Again we are equivocating. Again we are playing a word game to simplify the reality for our day to day purposes, but you are behaving as though the game is a reality. We are only virtually storing the image on the harddrive. "Virtual": being such in power, force, or effect, though not actually or expressly such

 

[JJM]

Where else is it stored, specifically? If I vaporize a person's brain, where else is that person's imagination?

Again this may help. If we assume memory exists purely in the brain, and perhaps even if not, the image is not stored anywhere, it is destroyed and the next time a pineapple is thought of a new perhaps otherwise qualitatively identical image is created.

 

[Eudaimonist]

Well it is. The answers philosophy seeks are of a higher level of answers than those which science seeks. This is true conceptually, they conceptually precede the scientific one and as a matter of difficulty typically. The reason science finds answers so readily is that its questions are not all that difficult. Francis Bacon, the father of the inductive method, makes this his principal reason for proposing use of the method. Essentially the argument in favor for the scientific method in the Novum Organon is: Let us spend our time answering easy questions we are more capable of by the scientific method than attempting to come to answers to these more difficult and profund questions, via another method because the scientific method cannot begin to approach them.

Someone who doesn't realize that the questions science answers are of a lower order and/or doesn't realize that it cannot answer questions of a higher order, has completely missed the point of the scientific project, which is essentially to create knowledge about physical bodies for the purpose of making technology which makes our lives more physically convenient. It simply cannot begin to approach questions of the nature of consciousness. Such questions are beyond its capacity.

I remember walking out of class once at Oxford, which was really more of a seminar, and having doctors of philsophy lamenting how frustrating it was that scientists, especially particle physicists, could not grasp the simplest philosophical concepts that virtually everyone agrees on and how even more frustrating that it was socially taboo to tell them so.

If nothing else, I agree with this.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Archaeopteryx]

I'm speaking of when you simply imagine a pineapple. When you imagine a pineapple, there is an image of a pineapple in your mind's eye. This pineapple does not exist external to your mind. Yet there is a representation of it in your mind. This image is an image properly, a chemical secquence is not the same thing as the image itself. Simply close your eyes and imagine a pineapple. The thing you are experiencing which resembles a pineapple is a true image. If you cannot do that consider some people who hallucinate and have images appear to them in their direct conscience experience which are not really there, or the images associated with a vivid dream you have had. There is an apparent representation of things which have no reality external to the mind. These may have the chemical workings of the brain as their source, but they are not the chemical workings of the brain. When I dream about a pineapple, I'm not seeing hormone levels changing in my visual cortex or whatever might be the correct way to describe the physical reality that is occurring within my skull,

Why should you expect to see hormone levels (I assume you mean neurotransmitter levels?) changing in your visual cortex?

I'm seeing a pineapple, but it is not a real pineapple so it is an image. The question I'm asking is where is this image. You can only tell me where the chemical catalyst is. I'm terribly sorry if you cannot understand this distinction despite all of my efforts, but if not, then there is no longer any point in discussing the matter.

We don't know how the brain "gives rise," for lack of better words, to the mind. There's a lot we don't know about the brain. Yet you seem to be committed to the notion that, whatever we learn, it will never be sufficient to satisfy that question.

Well it is. The answers philosophy seeks are of a higher level of answers than those which science seeks. This is true conceptually, they conceptually precede the scientific one and as a matter of difficulty typically. The reason science finds answers so readily is that its questions are not all that difficult.

Not all that difficult? You must be joking.

Francis Bacon, the father of the inductive method, makes this his principal reason for proposing use of the method. Essentially the argument in favor for the scientific method in the Novum Organon is: Let us spend our time answering easy questions we are more capable of by the scientific method than attempting to come to answers to these more difficult and profund questions, via another method because the scientific method cannot begin to approach them.

How do you identify which questions are "easy" and which are "hard"? You seem to think the distinction is straightforward. I don't think it is.

Someone who doesn't realize that the questions science answers are of a lower order and/or doesn't realize that it cannot answer questions of a higher order, has completely missed the point of the scientific project, which is essentially to create knowledge about physical bodies for the purpose of making technology which makes our lives more physically convenient. It simply cannot begin to approach questions of the nature of consciousness. Such questions are beyond its capacity.

Yet it is approaching that question, and not all philosophers are troubled by it (Pat Churchland comes to mind).

I remember walking out of class once at Oxford, which was really more of a seminar, and having doctors of philsophy lamenting how frustrating it was that scientists, especially particle physicists, could not grasp the simplest philosophical concepts that virtually everyone agrees on and how even more frustrating that it was socially taboo to tell them so.

It is upsetting that some scientists think that philosophy is a useless endeavour. But not all scientists think this way. It is equally upsetting, to me at least, that some philosophers think that science can offer no insights into the questions they are most perplexed by.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

I believe in phenomenological causation. Something like a "naive realism" about the world we are born into experientially. When a child reached for an ice cream, he's not thinking "motor neurons, contracting muscle fibres, tick, tock", he's reaching for an ice cream. I think that a whole swathe of philosophy is based on the idea the "science" (i.e. the mechanical model) has somehow outstripped the illusion of reality and all we need to do is catch up and see the nihilistic clockwork we really are. Meh to science for the next 500 years.

 

[KCfromNC]

This is not the point.

Seems very much the point to me. We know there's lots of brain stuff involved with human perception. We don't have any reason to think there's anything else. If no one can point to what that view is missing, I'm not inclined to worry about it.

What is stored in the brain is not the image, but a chemical, perhaps electrochemical (it really doesn't matter) sequence or something of the like. This is not the image properly, but a catalyst for bringing it about. Again, as an analogy, there is not actual sound on a CD. The sound only occurs once it is working in conjunctions with speakers. That which is burned into a CD is only catalyst for the creation of sound. We are equivocating when we say there is sound stored on the CD. We are playing a word game, to allow us to think about the thing in a way we find conceptually useful as opposed to the way it actually is.

OK. No one believes there is literally a little person painting pictures inside people's brains. However we sometimes use the same word to describe different processes because that's how language works. English is not an exact science. What's your point, exactly?

I'm speaking of when you simply imagine a pineapple. When you imagine a pineapple, there is an image of a pineapple in your mind's eye. This pineapple does not exist external to your mind. Yet there is a representation of it in your mind. This image is an image properly, a chemical secquence is not the same thing as the image itself.

You're doing lots of asserting what things must and must not be here, but I see little reason to believe you.

This one of the weaknesses of philosophy - pretending that creating artificial categories (e.g. image "properly") has any sort of bearing on how reality actually works.

Simply close your eyes and imagine a pineapple. The thing you are experiencing which resembles a pineapple is a true image.

Yep, good example of normal physical brain processes creating the impression of a "properly" "true" image.

There is an apparent representation of things which have no reality external to the mind. These may have the chemical workings of the brain as their source, but they are not the chemical workings of the brain.

Why should I believe you? What else is going on? Please be specific.

When I dream about a pineapple, I'm not seeing hormone levels changing in my visual cortex or whatever might be the correct way to describe the physical reality that is occurring within my skull, I'm seeing a pineapple, but it is not a real pineapple so it is an image. The question I'm asking is where is this image.

I don't know. You tell me. What answer does your approach, whatever it might be, give us?

More realistically, though, as best as any location can be identified the process of visualization you're talking about happens in the brain. Disrupt the brain processes and the image goes away. Find me another process physically removed from that location which has the same effects and I'd be willing to change my mind.

Yet there is an image in the consciousness which is like the image on the monitor and not like the magnetic sequence in the harddrive.

Nope, it is like neither. The processes and end results involved are quite different in all three cases. Or maybe all three are similar enough that all are alike. It all depends on how you're measuring similarity - and right now, I don't see any real rhyme or reason to the process, just assertions.

Well it is. The answers philosophy seeks are of a higher level of answers than those which science seeks.

Some might think this, but it isn't a universally accepted answer. I happen to think that philosophy doesn't try to find answers. At best it is a useful set of training wheels for learning how to think using certain intellectual tools. Since it doesn't try to answer questions about reality there's really no penalty for getting it wrong. Solipsists still look both ways before crossing the street no matter how sure they say they are about their conclusions. But likewise, there's no real benefit either other than the practice gained in using the tools that other more useful fields employ to get things done.

Can you not see how pompous this is?

No, not really. You've created some weird questions based on artificial distinctions of your own making. Pointing this out seems to be a reasonable part of the discussion of your ideas.

Are you so a priori convinced of my own stupidity that you cannot stop and consider what I am actually saying.

What evidence do you have that this is what I'm doing?

I'm not suggesting that I ever guessed the image is actually in the harddrive like it might be in a filing cabinet. We agree on the physical reality that is occurring. The point I'm trying to get you to realize is that "store" like put something in a filing cabinet and "store" as in save something to a harddrive do not have the same meaning.

So? In neither case are the images stored anywhere other than the filing cabinet or hard drive. Or maybe they are stored nowhere depending on what meaning of stored we're using at the time. Same with images in the brain. Sounds like a lot of word games to demonstrate - well, I'm not sure what exactly.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

A problem is we have a model of the brain which is miniscule. Lets say a cell has 5 billion DNA bases for starters, and a brain is the decentralised complex interaction of billions of such cells. This is literally impossible to imagine. Even the most advanced supercomputers, used in medical reasearch, IIRC only model as a basic cellular level.

Then theres the issue of strong emergence. If concious causation is truly novel, and I believe it is, then reducing it brain chemistry is by deduction inappropriate.

That would be like, (possibly, I am not a know it all) ...be like a looking to apply the theory Quantum Mechanics to everyday sized macroscopic objects. Theres a rift between thte ontological domains (micro and macro) and one science (QM) and its categories doesnt fit the other (Newtonian Mechanics and Relativity).

Likewise with brain science and phenomenology - theres an explanatory gap.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_emergence#Strong_and_weak_emergence

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Explanatory_gap

 

[GrowingSmaller]

I htink that if there is mechanical causation, then other types may exist, but they have to be consistent with mechanical processes. If there are laws of mechanics, they cant (it seems) be violated from the top down or othersise. But that does not mean all processes are therefore mechanical. Does it?

I am thinking of self knowledge we are conscious, this it seems is due to the causal power of consciousness. So we have a new type of cause, conscious causation. The words "aware" etc are examples of novel effects. But uttering "aware" doesnt violate mechanical laws, even if it was not caused by what would typically be regarded as standard blind causal mechanisms.

 

[juvenissun]

I'd say no.

Based on Cornell logician Max Black saying that the concept of cause is "a peculiar, unsystematic, and erratic notion"

I don't think we understand causal sequences - please note I am not venturing into Humean territory.

To me looking for or positing causal (in a mechanical sense) relationship between things people say or do is ridiculous.

I honestly wonder sometimes if this isn't the one of the biggest areas of misunderstanding in the modern world.

Would it apply to animals? I say it will apply very well.
So, how did human evolve from animal?

 

[Davian]

If a man can live with only a minimal brain (5% of normal) and still have a 126 IQ, then I suggest that conscious volition is beyond the brain.

Is your confidence in that such that you would submit to having 95% of your brain removed?

 

[DogmaHunter]

Would it apply to animals? I say it will apply very well.
So, how did human evolve from animal?

The same way humans evolved from mammals.

 

[ananda]

Is your confidence in that such that you would submit to having 95% of your brain removed?

No. I am only suggesting that conscious volition lies beyond the physical brain. The brain contains other things.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

No. I am only suggesting that conscious volition lies beyond the physical brain. The brain contains other things.

On what do you base this suggestion?

 

[ananda]

On what do you base this suggestion?

The facts as I've seen it and interpret it, and my religious beliefs.

 

[Eudaimonist]

The brain contains other things.

Okay, such as?


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[ananda]

Okay, such as?


eudaimonia,

Mark

IMO the brain provides mainly instinctual thought and emotions, and some degree of autonomic control over the body's functions.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

The heart does the rest....?

 

[Davian]

IMO the brain provides mainly instinctual thought and emotions, and some degree of autonomic control over the body's functions.

To paraphrase Asimov, all the hundreds of millions of people who, in their time, were of the opinion that the Earth was flat, never succeeded in unrounding it by an inch.

 

[ananda]

To paraphrase Asimov, all the hundreds of millions of people who, in their time, were of the opinion that the Earth was flat, never succeeded in unrounding it by an inch.

Asimov died like any other man or woman, didn't he?

 

[Davian]

Asimov died like any other man or woman, didn't he?

Your point?