An argument against (the usual concept of) God

[FrenchyBearpaw]

I'm not seeing how this is inconsistent with my other premises.

Then why can't I independently and objectively verify your claim.

 

[elopez]

Then why are you arguing against my assertion, here? Didn't I say from the start that I was arguing against an Anselmian definition of God?

You did, but what you're obviously not realizing is that Anselmian definition of God is not as 'set in stone' as laws of logic. Just yesterday I was reading an article that argued for omniscience as meaning no foreknowledge, while I said there omniscience does mean foreknowledge. There is no such disagreement on the meaning of the Second Law.

The second clause of the sentence to which the part you emboldened is attached: that clause is the reason I gave for good requiring self-revelation on God's part. Now granted, the sentence in full is open to dispute; but how did you miss the support I gave, within the sentence, for the sentence itself?

Well it's rather unclear what your support is. Even then I still don't see why God must reveal Himself in order that no one is left without an excuse, since I could definitely see the abundance of lame excuses flowing in if God had revealed Himself in a universal way.

This is not how logic works, sir. Conclusions follow from premises; premises don't follow from each other. In, "Socrates is a man, and all men are mortal," the mortality of all men does not follow from Socrates' manhood.

Just to be sure, you're claiming that in no argument of any kind do premises follow from other premises, right? That would be wholly incorrect. That is why in some arguments there is an indication of the previous one
stated in parenthesis, like how we would arrive at premise 3 from 1 and 2.

It seems, sir, that you aren't paying attention to the details of what I'm saying, and those who don't pay attention to details of other people's statements are disrespectful for doing so. You probably should apologize for disrespecting me at this point, in other words.

There is nothing I've missed or misrepresented, so I don't think it's a factor of my lack of attention.

 

[Ripheus27]

You did, but what you're obviously not realizing is that Anselmian definition of God is not as 'set in stone' as laws of logic. Just yesterday I was reading an article that argued for omniscience as meaning no foreknowledge, while I said there omniscience does mean foreknowledge. There is no such disagreement on the meaning of the Second Law.

The laws of logic aren't even too set in stone, and it is possible to wonder whether bivalence and the law of the excluded middle, for example, ultimately mean the same thing, or whether the law of non-contradiction implies the principle of explosion. For the purposes of my argument, Anselm's definition of God as the most perfect being is sufficiently clear that my claim ("The most perfect of all beings is one Whose existence would be self-evident") is reasonably possible in relation thereto.

Well it's rather unclear what your support is. Even then I still don't see why God must reveal Himself in order that no one is left without an excuse, since I could definitely see the abundance of lame excuses flowing in if God had revealed Himself in a universal way.

Those excuses would be self-deceptions, though. They would be of a different epistemic character than the excuses unbelievers have now, excuses which are rather more legitimate (like Bertrand Russell's, "The lack of evidence, sir, the lack of evidence," or w/e he said he'd say to God if asked, "Why didn't you believe in Me?").

Just to be sure, you're claiming that in no argument of any kind do premises follow from other premises, right? That would be wholly incorrect. That is why in some arguments there is an indication of the previous one
stated in parenthesis, like how we would arrive at premise 3 from 1 and 2.

It would be entirely fair to describe such a situation as a matter of a series of arguments, or an argument with sub-arguments, or something along those lines. I suppose you're indicating something such as:

1. If A then C.
2. If C then Z.
3. A.
4. If Z then Q.
5. C.
6. Z.
C. Therefore, Q.​

For here, 5 is a premise relative to 6 and 6 to C, yet 5 and 6 are also conclusions themselves.

None of this means that (i) and (ii) in my argument needed to be related as inferences, though.

 

[Ripheus27]

There is no such disagreement on the meaning of the Second Law.

What about some of the other examples I gave of axioms (at least, alleged ones)? And Aristotle, you know, was confused into thinking that possibility implies actuality at some time, i.e. if something never exists, its existence is impossible. Kant's formulations of the first principles of normativity, whatever their intuitive value, have not readily admitted of discursive evaluation.

In case you missed it part of the list from earlier was:

The law of physical causality ("Every physical event has a cause")
Ought implies can
Ought implies can be known
a + b = b + a
Whatever is necessary is actual
Whatever is actual is possible

To which could be added, "There is a difference between intension and extension," despite the difficulties there are in defining the contrasting terms; "There is a difference between the general and the particular," despite difficulties akin to those just referred to; and possibly others.

 

[Ripheus27]

Oops, thought my browser had wiped the previous post.

 

[elopez]

The laws of logic aren't even too set in stone, and it is possible to wonder whether bivalence and the law of the excluded middle, for example, ultimately mean the same thing, or whether the law of non-contradiction implies the principle of explosion. For the purposes of my argument, Anselm's definition of God as the most perfect being is sufficiently clear that my claim ("The most perfect of all beings is one Whose existence would be self-evident") is reasonably possible in relation thereto.

Okay, you're kind of undermining your own argument here, which I would figure would happen at this point. First you were saying that the laws of logic are self - evident. That means they do not need to be proved. Now you're saying something a little different, namely that the laws are not 'set in stone' and then go on to question them - something that ought not to happen if they are indeed self - evident.

Those excuses would be self-deceptions, though. They would be of a different epistemic character than the excuses unbelievers have now, excuses which are rather more legitimate (like Bertrand Russell's, "The lack of evidence, sir, the lack of evidence," or w/e he said he'd say to God if asked, "Why didn't you believe in Me?").

Yet what makes those excuses you listed any more legitimate than an excuse if God had revealed Himself universally? The fact is the excuses now would be just as self deceptive as they would be given any proof of God, as they would not be any more true now (considering God does exist as we both believe it).

It would be entirely fair to describe such a situation as a matter of a series of arguments, or an argument with sub-arguments, or something along those lines. I suppose you're indicating something such as:

1. If A then C.
2. If C then Z.
3. A.
4. If Z then Q.
5. C.
6. Z.
C. Therefore, Q.​

For here, 5 is a premise relative to 6 and 6 to C, yet 5 and 6 are also conclusions themselves.

This is exactly what I'm talking about. I am just saying that your claim appears false given this, as you said "premises don't follow from each other." That claim is indeed very much wrong, so your analysis that "This is not how logic works" would also be wrong. I'm simply pointing out the obvious, but it apparently needs to be be pointed out.

None of this means that (i) and (ii) in my argument needed to be related as inferences, though.

None of what you're saying makes much sense. You've claimed that i and ii are modes tollens, which IS a rule of inference. If your premises are not related then the conclusion cannot be related. Period.

 

[elopez]

Why not stop playing devils advocate as it's really not working in your favor....

 

[Ripheus27]

Okay, you're kind of undermining your own argument here, which I would figure would happen at this point. First you were saying that the laws of logic are self - evident. That means they do not need to be proved. Now you're saying something a little different, namely that the laws are not 'set in stone' and then go on to question them - something that ought not to happen if they are indeed self - evident.

I have a more involved theory about epistemic regression than "axioms are self-evident truths," so on a different level than the one I've been working on in this thread, I think things like the law of non-contradiction admit of proof of a special kind. But for present purposes, self-evidence is the only evidence required to "prove" an axiom.

Yet what makes those excuses you listed any more legitimate than an excuse if God had revealed Himself universally? The fact is the excuses now would be just as self deceptive as they would be given any proof of God, as they would not be any more true now (considering God does exist as we both believe it).

Let me put it in terms of testimony. Until the Holy Spirit presented Itself to me in person (and I will, without much hesitation, claim that this took place on more than one occasion), I was an atheist. Even now, I'm more comfortable calling myself a transtheist than a theist (or even deist).

This is exactly what I'm talking about. I am just saying that your claim appears false given this, as you said "premises don't follow from each other." That claim is indeed very much wrong, so your analysis that "This is not how logic works" would also be wrong. I'm simply pointing out the obvious, but it apparently needs to be be pointed out.

You're just quibbling. So we normally say premises in an argument don't follow from each other. This is when we think of premises relative to the conclusions we draw from them. Of course, conclusions can go on to serve as premises in other arguments. But inasmuch as a proposition is functioning, in one or another argument, as a premise, it is not inferred from other premises. So "premises don't follow from premises" is relatively true (relative to the role premises tend to play in arguments).

None of what you're saying makes much sense. You've claimed that i and ii are modes tollens, which IS a rule of inference. If your premises are not related then the conclusion cannot be related. Period.

Isn't my argument

1. If the Anselmian God existed, His existence would be self-evident.
2. His existence is not self-evident.
C. Therefore, the Anselmian God does not exist.​

How does this argument violate modus tollens?

 

[elopez]

I have a more involved theory about epistemic regression than "axioms are self-evident truths," so on a different level than the one I've been working on in this thread, I think things like the law of non-contradiction admit of proof of a special kind. But for present purposes, self-evidence is the only evidence required to "prove" an axiom.

Either way you said the second law is obvious. Now you've questioned it. My point is since you're comparing God to the second law as to conclude it should be obvious, then it should not be surprising that God's existence is questioned and thus not self - evident.

Let me put it in terms of testimony. Until the Holy Spirit presented Itself to me in person (and I will, without much hesitation, claim that this took place on more than one occasion), I was an atheist. Even now, I'm more comfortable calling myself a transtheist than a theist (or even deist).

And your point is? The idea was that no matter the excuse, with or without objective evidence for God, it would be illegitimate. You were an atheist until your experience, so now that you know the Holy Spirit exists you're not, and must think that to some degree atheists are simply mistaken.

You're just quibbling. So we normally say premises in an argument don't follow from each other. This is when we think of premises relative to the conclusions we draw from them. Of course, conclusions can go on to serve as premises in other arguments. But inasmuch as a proposition is functioning, in one or another argument, as a premise, it is not inferred from other premises. So "premises don't follow from premises" is relatively true (relative to the role premises tend to play in arguments).

You wish I were. It's not true. I have no idea where you learned this from. We connect several premises, or sometimes not so many, in order to get to the conclusion. Without connecting the premises first, the conclusion will not follow. You are sorely mistaken here my friend.

Isn't my argument

1. If the Anselmian God existed, His existence would be self-evident.
2. His existence is not self-evident.
C. Therefore, the Anselmian God does not exist.​

How does this argument violate modus tollens?

What are you talking about? I never said anything violates modus tollens. I said you said premise i and ii are modus tollens. Did you not?

 

[Ripheus27]

Either way you said the second law is obvious. Now you've questioned it. My point is since you're comparing God to the second law as to conclude it should be obvious, then it should not be surprising that God's existence is questioned and thus not self - evident.

This might have to do with how I look at claims of things being obvious. Too many times I've seen someone claim something to be obvious, yet I at least felt like I could imagine the point of view of someone for whom such a claim was not obvious.

And your point is? The idea was that no matter the excuse, with or without objective evidence for God, it would be illegitimate. You were an atheist until your experience, so now that you know the Holy Spirit exists you're not, and must think that to some degree atheists are simply mistaken.

But by my lights, atheists aren't mistaken due to "excuses." They have a perfectly good reason to disbelieve in God, if belief in God is rational only upon interaction with the Holy Spirit at any rate (and, I might add, assuming a specific notion of this Spirit).

You wish I were. It's not true. I have no idea where you learned this from. We connect several premises, or sometimes not so many, in order to get to the conclusion. Without connecting the premises first, the conclusion will not follow. You are sorely mistaken here my friend.

Premises are connected by rules of inference, but the connection is shown in the conclusion, not the premises themselves. Now you say:

What are you talking about? I never said anything violates modus tollens. I said you said premise i and ii are modus tollens. Did you not?

I did not. I said that (c) could be inferred (followed from) (i) and (ii) by modus tollens.

 

[elopez]

This might have to do with how I look at claims of things being obvious. Too many times I've seen someone claim something to be obvious, yet I at least felt like I could imagine the point of view of someone for whom such a claim was not obvious.

So why then are you arguing God's existence to be self - evident?? It does not make sense...

But by my lights, atheists aren't mistaken due to "excuses." They have a perfectly good reason to disbelieve in God, if belief in God is rational only upon interaction with the Holy Spirit at any rate (and, I might add, assuming a specific notion of this pirit).

If God exists atheists are simply wrong. Any reason for thinking otherwise will be equally invalid as it were with or without proof. That is the point here. How belief is gained is irrelevant to that point.

Premises are connected by rules of inference, but the connection is shown in the conclusion, not the premises themselves. Now you say:

The connection is also shown among the premises, especially when such proof is given of an argument in symbolic form.

I did not. I said that (c) could be inferred (followed from) (i) and (ii) by modus tollens.

I think you're beating around the bush on this one. You're saying you did not claim premises i and ii are not modes tollens, but inferred by such inference. There is not much difference. Both premises are related and connected, or else we would not get the conclusion.

 

[Ripheus27]

So why then are you arguing God's existence to be self - evident?? It does not make sense...

I'm not arguing that His existence is self-evident. I'm arguing that if He is were an absolutely perfect being, His existence would be self-evident. He might exist without being absolutely perfect, after all.

If God exists atheists are simply wrong. Any reason for thinking otherwise will be equally invalid as it were with or without proof. That is the point here. How belief is gained is irrelevant to that point.

I wasn't keeping track of the agnostic/atheist distinction. I should say that agnostics, and maybe weak theists, are at least entirely within the limits of reason to doubt God's existence.

I think you're beating around the bush on this one. You're saying you did not claim premises i and ii are not modes tollens, but inferred by such inference. There is not much difference. Both premises are related and connected, or else we would not get the conclusion.

Premises can't "be" modus tollens. The inference from them can be. Since my first premise is of the form, "If A, then B," and the second is of the form, "Not-B," then the conclusion, "Not-A," follows by modus tollens. That's all there is to it: that's how the logic of modus tollens works.

Where did you take your introductory logic course? Do you study things like modal and paraconsistent logic a lot? It seems like you got a peculiar idea about logic from someone, an idea that isn't reflected in the practices of academic philosophy.

 

[elopez]

I'm not arguing that His existence is self-evident. I'm arguing that if He is were an absolutely perfect being, His existence would be self-evident. He might exist without being absolutely perfect, after all.

I don't think you have a clear argument, and nor do I think you can ever get it straight forward. You said in the OP that " If God existed, His existence would be self-evident." You also said that you're arguing against a specific idea of God, that of the Anselmian conception, which does in fact state that God is perfect. So, you are arguing that God's existence should be self - evident.

I wasn't keeping track of the agnostic/atheist distinction. I should say that agnostics, and maybe weak theists, are at least entirely within the limits of reason to doubt God's existence.

This is not about any distinction. It is about the illegitimate reasons for disbelieving in God having God actually exist. Obviously those reasons for disbelief would be incorrect if God existed.

Premises can't "be" modus tollens. The inference from them can be. Since my first premise is of the form, "If A, then B," and the second is of the form, "Not-B," then the conclusion, "Not-A," follows by modus tollens. That's all there is to it: that's how the logic of modus tollens works.

Where did you take your introductory logic course? Do you study things like modal and paraconsistent logic a lot? It seems like you got a peculiar idea about logic from someone, an idea that isn't reflected in the practices of academic philosophy.

Now you're just nit picking. The first premise in MT is called a hypothetical proposition. The second premise is denying the consequent of that hypothetical proposition. I understand that the premises themselves are not MT, but that's not really what I'm saying here. I am saying that both premises are connected to each other, for without the first we could not have the second premise.

Nothing about that idea of logic is peculiar, and it is used in academic practices. Now, the fact that you think premises are not connected is more peculiar than anything I have ever said, so if anyone's understanding of logic is to be questioned, it is yours.

 

[Ripheus27]

I don't think you have a clear argument, and nor do I think you can ever get it straight forward. You said in the OP that " If God existed, His existence would be self-evident." You also said that you're arguing against a specific idea of God, that of the Anselmian conception, which does in fact state that God is perfect. So, you are arguing that God's existence should be self - evident.

Dear Lord, in the OP I emphatically said I wasn't arguing against all conceptions of God. I wasn't claiming that all conceptions of God imply self-evidence. I was claiming that the perfect-being conception did. It's totally clear what I'm saying.

This is not about any distinction. It is about the illegitimate reasons for disbelieving in God having God actually exist. Obviously those reasons for disbelief would be incorrect if God existed.

"I don't have evidence that God exists," is not an incorrect reason to disbelieve in God's existence, even if God does exist.

Now you're just nit picking. The first premise in MT is called a hypothetical proposition. The second premise is denying the consequent of that hypothetical proposition. I understand that the premises themselves are not MT, but that's not really what I'm saying here. I am saying that both premises are connected to each other, for without the first we could not have the second premise.

Nothing about that idea of logic is peculiar, and it is used in academic practices. Now, the fact that you think premises are not connected is more peculiar than anything I have ever said, so if anyone's understanding of logic is to be questioned, it is yours.

You were saying that (ii) needs to follow from (i) in order for my argument to be valid. But "follow from," in logic, is the inference relation. The second premise of my argument doesn't need to be inferred from the first in order for the argument to be valid. That the premises are connected in some sense besides the "follow from" one, though, I don't deny. Now to quote what you said initially:

Since 1 is false 2 could not follow from it. ... Since 2 doesn't even follow from 1 as 1 is false the conclusion simply cannot be.

Maybe my trolling detectors aren't operational. Actually, I know they're not, since I pretty much can never tell when I'm being trolled.

 

[elopez]

Dear Lord, in the OP I emphatically said I wasn't arguing against all conceptions of God. I wasn't claiming that all conceptions of God imply self-evidence. I was claiming that the perfect-being conception did. It's totally clear what I'm saying.

I have the feeling you're not even reading my posts thoroughly. I know in the OP you said you were not arguing against all conceptions of God, which is why I said you were arguing against the Anselmian. Or did you miss that? You did say that conception of God should be self - evident. However, in post 32 you said God may not be perfect after all, though, according to the definition of the God you are arguing against, He is absolutely perfect. That obscures your original statements just a tad.

"I don't have evidence that God exists," is not an incorrect reason to disbelieve in God's existence, even if God does exist.

It would be if they ignored the evidence or dismissed it. If God does exist, then there is some type evidence available.

You were saying that (ii) needs to follow from (i) in order for my argument to be valid. But "follow from," in logic, is the inference relation. The second premise of my argument doesn't need to be inferred from the first in order for the argument to be valid. That the premises are connected in some sense besides the "follow from" one, though, I don't deny. Now to quote what you said initially:

Without the first premise there would e no second premise. So yes, the second premise is completely dependent on the first. Again, the second premise is denying the consequent of the first premise.

Maybe my trolling detectors aren't operational. Actually, I know they're not, since I pretty much can never tell when I'm being trolled.

Well premise 1 is false. If one premise is false, then we cannot get to the conclusion. I know you'd like to easily dismiss this criticism as 'trolling' but it's not that easy, for if it was you would have stopped replying to me a long while ago

 

[Ripheus27]

I know you'd like to easily dismiss this criticism as 'trolling' but it's not that easy, for if it was you would have stopped replying to me a long while ago

No, I'm just really dense and it takes me a while to recognize when someone is playing games with me. There was one time on another forum when I think I kept a thread going for months because I just couldn't accept that the poster I was arguing with was willingly disregarding everything I said, to the point of asking me questions over and over again that I had already answered (it wasn't that my answers were necessarily right, but this guy couldn't even agree to disagree). I'm not going to make that mistake again.

 

[elopez]

No, I'm just really dense and it takes me a while to recognize when someone is playing games with me. There was one time on another forum when I think I kept a thread going for months because I just couldn't accept that the poster I was arguing with was willingly disregarding everything I said, to the point of asking me questions over and over again that I had already answered (it wasn't that my answers were necessarily right, but this guy couldn't even agree to disagree). I'm not going to make that mistake again.

Well I'm letting you know now that you're not fooling anyone here. There is no game being played unless it is from your end. I've pointed out why I think your argument is wrong, and I've pointed out the instances of which you were wrong on certain things concerning logic (premises do follow from each other, and are indeed connected). If you want to discontinue this discussion I have no issue with that, but don't act like it's on account of some superiority on your behalf, because it is clearly not.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Well I'm letting you know now that you're not fooling anyone here. There is no game being played unless it is from your end. I've pointed out why I think your argument is wrong, and I've pointed out the instances of which you were wrong on certain things concerning logic (premises do follow from each other, and are indeed connected). If you want to discontinue this discussion I have no issue with that, but don't act like it's on account of some superiority on your behalf, because it is clearly not.

I have to side with Ripheus27 on the inference point; it seems obvious to me that he's saying "I have premise (i) and premise (ii), and together they conclude (iii)". (i) and (ii) aren't necessarily related.

i) If God is a man, then he is mortal
ii) God is not a man
iii) Therefore, God is not mortal

This is modus tollens, the style of argument used in the OP. The two premises aren't related by inference - (i) doesn't logically follow from (ii), nor is it claimed to be. They are both uttered as premises, not as a single premise that leads ipso facto to an intermediary step.

Modus tollens takes two premises and concludes a conclusion. (i) and (ii) are the premises, (iii) is the conclusion. (iii) is what is inferred, not (i), and not (ii).

 

[elopez]

Modus Tollens consists of two premises. The first is a hypothetical proposition. The second premise is denying the consequent of the hypothetical proposition. To say these two premises are not related is to completely undermine the whole meaning of MT....

 

[elopez]

It's simple. Without premise i there would be no premise ii. So, premise ii is contingent on i, hence they are related.