I´d agree that succeeding in showing that there must be a necessary being (as opposed to merely attempting to) would be an extremely convincing argument for the existence of a necessary being.
I just wanted to point out that that's what the cosmological argument is trying to do. The nature of the entity whose existence it is trying to prove is pretty important.
Well, you would at least have to posit a reason or cause for it being necessary.
Absolutely!
Sorry, I wasn't that clear in my remark. It is my understanding that the cosmological argument initially asserts the need for a first cause, and then argues that such a cause must have necessary existence or it will not solve the problem of the infinite regress. I think this is a reasonable position.
It is up to the opponent of the cosmological argument to challenge the assertion that an infinite regress is incoherent, I think, rather than complaining that God doesn't solve the problem.
No atheist nor agnostic (hopefully) will deny that a necessary being is necessary. So let´s see the argument why something is necessary.
I suppose I'd go about it like this.
Premise 1: There exist things which might not have existed (which is to say, it is logically possible that they did not exist), i.e.
contingent things.
Premise 2: All contingent things rely for their existence on other things (in that they do not spontaneously appear or effect change in themselves).
Conclusion 1: If each contingent thing relies on (an)other contingent thing(s) for its existence, there is either an infinite regress of reliance, or there is/are (a) non-contingent (i.e.
necessary) thing(s) upon which all contingent things ultimately rely for their existence.
Premise 3: An infinite regress of reliance is incoherent.
Conclusion 2: Therefore (a) necessary thing(s) must exist which also have the properties needed to ultimately account for the existence of all contingent things.
I would then go on to elucidate what these additional properties would be. But I won't do that here because there's only so much devil's advocate I can play.
Personally, I would also like to see a good reason to call all that which is necessary "god", but, oh well, that´s just a matter of definition.
However, any property of god beyond "necessary" would require additional arguments, and as far as I can see most god concepts contain countless ideas beyond god merely being something necessary. In any case, it would have been a good idea for the OP to present this god-definition of his along with the question.
Then again, his god definitions have changed several times during this thread.
Well, this is a rather Thomistic argument, and in the
Summa Theologica, once Aquinas has proved the existence of this necessary being to his satisfaction, he can then pretty rapidly crank out the other properties of the being which make it seem increasingly God-like.
I'm not saying he's right, of course, but it is certainly not totally insane to think that one can get from the bare idea of this necessary, causal being to something with some more substantial properties.
