@PhilosophicalBuster
I understood the law of excluded middle the first time it was written. Just because I offered an alternative doesn't mean I didn't get it.
As my complicated arggmentative stuff (down and up from here) tried to show: Your idea on having an alternative to the law of the excluded middle might be promising. And even the fact that one does think about an alternative for this law is a pretty smart step for a 15 year old guy. I can't remember I thought about that back then.
@WiccanChild
Perhaps, but so is numerical approximation and Newtonian mechanics.
And they both work. As does intuitionistic logic.
Non-contradiction states that something can't be what it's not: A can't be identical to ¬A by definition.
If some thing p is identical to A, then, since A can't be ¬A, neither can p.
If some thing p is not identical to A, then, by definition, p is identical to ¬A.
If p = A, then p ≠ ¬A.
If p ≠ A, then p = ¬A.
I.e., "A=A" and "A≠¬A" imply "A∨¬A".
First of all: Non-contradiction does not state something about being in the first place, but about propositions. It states that no proposition is both, true and false. Formally in statement logic ¬(A & ¬A) is a logical truth and A & ¬A a logical falsity. The main problem of your argument is, that is presupposes too much and thereby remains mysterious and unprecise; such things as identity for example - identity is a predicate that we have to define first and we already get to predicate logic then doing that. Since you introduced the identity sign without defining it, I do not see the point in your derivation without a definition of that sign. I believe of course that you presuppose a notion of identity that is intuitionistically invalid. Namely that x is either identical or nonidentical to y, which already presupposes the law of the excluded middle. Yet, intuitionistically speaking, it is not the case that if a thing is not non-identical with itself then it is also identical with itself. The identity of things with infinitley many properties is not established just from the fact that they are not different from anything else. They are neither identical nor non-identical with themselves. And by such terms, your argument does not hold.
What you should have done is, derive the law of the excluded middle from the axioms of intuitionistic statement logic. Otherwise inuitionistic logic just works. The point of course is, that such an endeavor is pointless, since you can derive ¬¬(A∨¬A) but not (A∨¬A) as your are missing the ¬¬A->A axiom.
I think you should begin to acknowledge the facts. There are modes of thought very different from what you estimate to be "making sense" that do work.
Which is an extension of, not a replacement for, identity. We may not know whether p is identical to A, but that doesn't bely the fact that it either is or is not.
The problem here is, that you have to cut out your own intuition of the difference between epistemplogy (knowledge) and onotlogy (being). Intuitionism does claim that for the domain of mathematical entities there is no difference between that which is known and that which is. This is simply a consequence of the assumtions made by the intuitionist mathematician. To deny the credibility of your opponent by dogmatically restating your own intuitions which rest on other modes of rationality is not a profitable strategy when it comes to mutual understanding.
The very first step is: Give up the distinction between fact and knowledge. There are no unknown facts in intuitionist mathematics.
You simply have to see: An intuitionist does not have any use for the classical reasoning with the identity predicate. It does not have to do anything with an extension or replacement. Since there are undecidable properties, identity may be undecidable, too.
Agreed. But that doesn't mean that any old mish-mash of geometries actually work. That's why I said you could posit the nonexistence of noses: classical logic isn't exalted, but rather intuitionism is nonsensical.
Just because you don't get it, doesn't mean it is nonsensical. That is a pretty arrogant stance to take up here. Actually, making sense isn't even the question. You can go on and take the Hilbert point of view that all mathematics is simply a formal game without the question of sense or truth even arising. And even from that point of view you can technically do intuitionist mathematics; it is not a question of taste here.
And I disagree that intuitionistic logic is one of them.
Then, my dear opponent, you are denying that there are noses. The fact that it works shows that it is possible to reason intuitionistically. Intuitionistic logic works and works well - that is even more certain than any fact about noses.