The Israeli Security Cabinet has approved the first practical step toward establishing a new order in the Gaza Strip. The “Board of Peace,” led by U.S. President Donald Trump, has been authorized to launch a pilot project in Rafah aimed at providing basic services, humanitarian aid, and temporary housing in areas outside Hamas’s control.
The decision goes well beyond a mere political declaration of intent. Israel is also granting the multinational International Stabilization Force (ISF) and the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) access to at least part of the Gaza Strip. This could lead to the creation, for the first time since the war, of an area that is neither administered by Hamas nor supplied solely by Israeli military structures.
The pilot program is set to begin in Rafah in the coming weeks. The plan calls for temporary housing for residents of the Gaza Strip and the restoration of basic services. According to the *Jerusalem Post*, anyone wishing to live there will be subject to strict vetting. Individuals with ties to Hamas are to be excluded. If the model proves successful, it will be expanded to other areas at a later date.
This marks the start of an effort to no longer make reconstruction contingent on a prior comprehensive solution for all of Gaza. Instead of waiting years for the complete disarmament of Hamas, the plan is to first establish an alternative to its rule in a limited and controllable area.
This could be a necessary way out of the current deadlock. However, it could also turn into a serious security blunder if the controls fail and Hamas infiltrates the new facilities through front organizations.
According to the Jerusalem Post, the international force is expected to include soldiers from Morocco, Albania, and Kazakhstan, among others. Several countries had already declared their willingness, in principle, to provide troops for the ISF. The force is intended not only to support relief efforts but also to secure the new order and prevent armed groups from regaining control.
What will therefore be decisive is not the number of troops, but their mandate. An international force that merely manns checkpoints and reports violations, while Hamas fighters in the surrounding area retain their weapons, would be worthless. It would not relieve Israel of its burden but would instead erect a new international facade over a regime of terror that continues to exist.
The ISF must have the authority and political backing to secure weapons depots, repel armed intruders, and protect the new administration from intimidation. Likewise, Israel must retain its military freedom of action in the event that the international force fails to eliminate an acute threat.
The resolution does not yet mean that Hamas has been disarmed. On the contrary: the terrorist organization continues to refuse to surrender all of its weapons. This is precisely where the greatest contradiction in the new plan lies.
The “Board of Peace” had proposed a phased approach. First, the most dangerous weapons, including rockets, heavy explosives, and military-grade rifles, were to be surrendered. Tunnels would have to be rendered inoperable. Disarmament was to be carried out gradually in tandem with a withdrawal of Israeli forces. Hamas has not yet accepted this approach.
Rafah is now intended to circumvent this problem geographically. The pilot zone is to be established in areas where Hamas no longer exercises control. Residents will receive aid and shelter if they pass security checks. The hope behind this is understandable: Palestinians are to experience that a life with supplies, reconstruction, and civilian administration is possible without Hamas.
If this succeeds, the terrorist organization will lose one of its most important means of power. Hamas did not rule solely through the use of weapons. It controlled employment, aid supplies, housing, permits, and social services. Anyone in need of food, money, or protection was often dependent on its structures. A functioning alternative could break this dependency.
If the project fails, however, Hamas will be given a new opportunity. It could infiltrate members as inconspicuous civilians, threaten construction companies, demand protection money, or divert materials. Previous attempts to prepare for construction work in Israeli-controlled areas are said to have been obstructed by armed Hamas members.
The security screening must therefore not be reduced to a superficial questioning. Israel must be able to contribute its intelligence on Hamas fighters, officials, financiers, and supporters. Members of the new administration must also be vetted. A person is not automatically considered safe simply because they do not wear a uniform and call themselves a technocrat.
Egypt bears a special responsibility. Israeli and Egyptian officers held strategic talks in early July regarding the next phase in Gaza. Cairo is seen as taking a much tougher stance toward Hamas than Qatar or Turkey and is reportedly willing to take back weapons that have been surrendered. For Egypt, Hamas also poses a domestic and security threat due to its ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.
The cabinet decision opens up a real possibility. It shifts part of the civil responsibility to international and Palestinian structures without explicitly allowing Hamas to return to the administration. At the same time, it shows that Israel is willing to support an alternative if it meets its security requirements.
Now the harder part begins. On paper, a technocratically administered Rafah protected by an international force is easy to describe. In Gaza, however, this model must hold its own against a terrorist organization that views any independent authority as a threat.
Rafah will therefore not merely serve as a testing ground for reconstruction.
It will serve as a test of whether the international community is truly willing to protect Gaza from Hamas, rather than simply imposing further obligations on Israel.