The resignation of Hamas official Mohammed al-Farra is intended to pave the way for a technocratic committee in Gaza. But as long as weapons, security forces, and old networks remain in place, this move does not mark the end of Hamas rule.
That is precisely why we must look at this very carefully. On paper, this sounds like a major shift. Hamas speaks of a handover of administrative powers. Technical and specialized staff are to remain in place to prevent the collapse of public services. But it is precisely in this wording that the danger lies. Who will stay? To whom will these staff members be accountable? Which former Hamas structures will simply continue under a new name? And above all: Who will ultimately hold the weapons?
The Gaza Board of Peace therefore reacted with remarkable restraint. It stated that its assessment would be based on actions, not promises. The core principle remains: one authority, one law, one weapon. This sets forth the decisive condition. Gaza cannot simultaneously be administered by a technocratic committee and controlled by an armed Hamas. A genuine transfer of power does not begin with a press statement, but with verifiable disarmament, clear security controls, and an administration that is not directed behind the scenes by Hamas.
Nickolay Mladenov, Director-General of the Board of Peace, described the roadmap as a bridge between declarations and implementation. The sooner an agreement is reached on the outstanding mechanisms, the sooner the NCAG can assume responsibility, begin the disarmament process, proceed with the withdrawal of Israeli forces, and launch reconstruction on a larger scale. This sequence is important. Without resolving the security issue, there can be no sustainable reconstruction. Without disarmament, any administration in Gaza remains vulnerable to blackmail.
For months, Hamas has been trying to portray itself as ready to hand over civilian authority. As early as January, Reuters reported on the US-backed model of a Palestinian technocratic committee led by Ali Shaath, which is intended to administer Gaza during a transitional phase. At the same time, it remained unclear how Hamas was to be disarmed. It is precisely this point that is blocking the entire process. Reuters has now also reported that while Hamas wants to relinquish civilian responsibility, it intends to retain influence over security matters in parts of Gaza.
This is not a minor detail, but the core of the problem. Hamas never ruled Gaza solely through ministries, government offices, and permits. It ruled through weapons, intimidation, intelligence structures, the police, patronage, tunnels, rockets, and the ability to brand any opponent a traitor. An organization that suppresses its opponents, prevents protests, and executes alleged collaborators does not disappear from power simply because an official resigns.
Palestinian voices also expressed deep skepticism to the Jerusalem Post. A high-ranking official in Ramallah said that Hamas had not declared the end of its rule in the Gaza Strip, but only the dissolution of what it called an “emergency committee.” At the same time, another provisional structure was to take over. According to this assessment, Hamas wants to show that it is not blocking the process, while at the same time buying time and securing its military and administrative power.
For Israel, this is not a theoretical question. On Oct 7, Hamas demonstrated what its rule is all about. Over the years, it built up a terrorist infrastructure, hid in civilian areas, used its own population as a human shield, and turned Gaza into a launching pad for murderous attacks. If today only the civilian facade is replaced while the armed core remains, no new order will emerge. Instead, there will simply be a lull until the next escalation.
The planned transition to the NCAG can only be more than a facade if three things are ensured: Hamas must not be allowed to infiltrate its own security forces into the new structures under a new name. International aid must not flow once again into the terrorist organization’s networks. And the principle of “one authority, one law, one weapon” must be implemented not as a mere formula, but as a verifiable reality.
Cairo is now set to host further talks with Palestinian factions, including Hamas, within a short time. At stake here is not just administrative technique, but the question of power in the Gaza Strip. Who controls the police, border crossings, aid supplies, weapons depots, and reconstruction? Who decides whether Gaza will become a civilian area in the future or once again a military staging ground against Israel?
The international community should not be blinded by Hamas’s announcement. It may be a first step. But it may just as easily be an attempt to shirk responsibility, unlock funding, and at the same time preserve its own influence. Hamas is experienced at turning political pressure into tactical concessions. That is precisely why it is not enough to portray the resignation of a single official as a historic breakthrough.
Gaza does indeed need a new administration. The people there need supplies, reconstruction, security, and a future free from Hamas rule. Israel needs guarantees that the Gaza Strip will not once again become a source of rockets, tunnels, and command structures targeting its citizens. And the mediators must finally have the courage not to sidestep the crucial point: Hamas must be stripped of its power, not merely renamed.
As long as their weapons remain, their rule remains. As long as their people continue to operate within the police, the administration, and the security apparatus, the technocratic committee remains at risk. And as long as international actors value promises more highly than verifiable steps, Gaza will not be liberated, but merely repackaged.
